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 Juridifi cation by Constitution. National 
Sovereignty in Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Century Europe 
 Ulrike  Müßig 
 Abstract  In its fi rst research period (2014–2015), the Research project ReConFort 
focused on national sovereignty/constituent sovereignty as a key category of its 
overall research on communication dependencies of historic constitutions. The 
topos was not only used as a search item, but also as  tertium comparationis. On a 
comparative overview, national sovereignty is used to explain a legal starting point 
of the constituting process (the so-called ‘big bang-argument’). All references to 
national sovereignty mark the process of juridifi cation of sovereignty by means of 
the constitution, i.e. political legitimation is turned into legal legitimation. This is 
coincident with the normativity as goal of the modern constitutional concept arising 
out of the revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century. 
 The essay of the Principal Investigator examines the juridifi cation of sovereignty 
in the French discourse around the works of Sieyès and the parliamentary pre- 
revolution. In the debates around the Great Sejm the old aristocratic understanding 
of the Polish Nation as one of the noblemen is found to be powerful. The procedural 
openness of the May Constitution 1791 is explained as a refl ex onto juridifi cation of 
national sovereignty. National sovereignty in the Spanish Cádiz Constitution 1812 
is connected to the anti-Napoleonic context of the constitutional process. The gen-
eral and extraordinary Cortes’ claim to the constituent power by virtue of the 
recourse to national sovereignty cannot be understood as representing a Rousseauian 
national  volonté générale . The natural origin of national sovereignty in the Cádiz’ 
liberal understanding is infl uenced by late scholastical concepts and combines the 
supralegal limitations for the royal government with the historical legitimisation of 
the Cádiz constitution by the old fundamental laws of the Monarchy ( las antiguas 
leyes fundamentales de la Monarquía ). The constituent sovereignty in the Norwegian 
 Grunnloven May 1814 is in various aspects comparable with the Spanish case: the 
constitutional process was received as guarantee of national independence. The 
Moss Process into the Swedish Union under the Fundamental Law of the Norwegian 
Empire of November 4, 1814 demonstrates the Extraordinary Storting as Constituent 
Assembly and the monarchy as constituted power. The statement of the Christiana 
 U.  Müßig (*) 
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Faculty of Law 1880 on the King’s veto with regard to constitutional amendments 
relies on the differentiation between constituent and constituted sovereignty by 
explaining why constitutional amendments cannot be left to either of the constituted 
powers – neither to an ordinary parliamentary assembly nor to the King alone. 
 The French  Charte Constitutionelle 1814, mixing constitutional binding and 
divine reign, avoids the term sovereignty. The reference to authority ( l’autorité tout 
entière ) in the preamble permits the prerevolutionary subsumption as divine right. 
The monarch by the Grace of God Louis XVIII appears as constituent sovereign, 
the label as charter ( charte ) tries to create the impression of a royal privilege. Due 
to his absolute power, the monarch is the sole bearer of executive power (Art. 13), 
of the exclusive right of legislative initiative (Art. 45, 46) and of jurisdiction (Art. 
57). The  Charte Constitutionnelle 1814 was imitated numerously until 1830, includ-
ing its intrinsic systematic incompatibilities (between the monarchical principle and 
parliament’s legislative and budgetary rights). Its revolutionary overcoming in the 
French July Revolution 1830 led to a European-wide constitutional movement, 
whose connection with national struggles for freedom, invigorated the people and 
its representation as constitutional factors. Like in France, a parliament took over 
the task of drafting a constitution in Belgium after the Revolution of 1830: The 
constituent assembly, dominated by the liberal-catholic legal minds, is  pouvoir con-
stituant , the newly-to-be-appointed King is just taking on the role as  pouvoir consti-
tué . Contrary to the French model, the Belgian Constitution is not negotiated with 
the monarch, but freely proclaimed by a national congress in its own right. 
 In the octroi of the Piedmontese  Statuto Albertino 1848, the constituent act of 
granting the fundamental law ( statuto fondamentale ) was communicated to main-
tain the  plenitudo potestatis of the absolute monarchy, to rationalize the old royal 
sacredness. Therefore, according to the preamble of the  Statuto Albertino , the par-
ticipation of the Council ( Consiglio di conferenza ) was simply advisory. The 
Piedmontese state was to remain based on the ‘monarchical constitutional founda-
tion’ (art. 2) and ‘the person of the King is holy and inviolable’ (art. 4). The oath of 
the Senators and Representatives contained fi rst the loyalty towards the King and 
then towards the constitution and the laws (art. 49). The Italian coincidence of the 
monarchical sovereignty in its absoluteness with the granting of the Albertine Statute 
was meant to avoid any scope for the differentiation between  pouvoir constituant 
and  pouvoir constitué . The improvised parliamentarism in the Frankfurt National 
Assembly corresponded with the openness of the ‘Sovereignty of the Nation’ 
whereby Heinrich von Gagern inaugurated the St. Pauls church-assembly. This 
avowal to the singular and unlimited  pouvoir constituant of a not existant German 
nation did not make sense as a programmatic claim to self-government, but refl ected 
the indecisiveness of the post- kantian liberalism between monarchical and popular 
sovereignty. It avoided the open commitment to popular sovereignty and thus the 
confl ict with the monarchy, enabling a consensual framework between imperial 
government and parliamentary majority. 
 Keywords  National sovereignty •  Constituent sovereignty •  Constitution •  juridifi -
cation •  Normativity 
U. Müßig
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1  On ReConFort’s Research Programme in General 
 The traditional approach in legal history focuses on constitutional documents, 
believing in a nominalistic autonomy of constitutional  semantics . Looking onto the 
European Constitutionalism of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century, even a 
written constitution cannot statically fi x the administrative-legal relations of power, 
as they depend on the legal  interpretation and the  confl ict mentality of the political 
decision-makers. In the context of ReConFort, 1 constitution is understood as an 
evolutionary achievement of the interplay of the constitutional text with its contem-
porary societal context, with the political practice and with the respective constitu-
tional interpretation. Such a functional approach keeps historic constitutions from 
being simply log books for political experts. It makes apparent how sovereignty 2 as 
constituted  power translates ways of thinking and opinions in the  Burckhardt ean 
sense 3 : sovereignty can only be exercised with the consent of the ruled. Even the 
constitutional cycle anticipated by  Polybius has presupposed that the  politeiai of 
monarchy, aristocracy and democracy degenerate, where sovereignty is not accepted 
or gambled away. 4 
 The interest in the interdependencies between constitution and public  discourse 
reaches the key goal legitimation: Thomas  Paine ’ s response to ‘Mr. Burke’s attacks 
on the French Revolution’ rests on the argument that  legitimacy is not transmitted 
through tradition or established institutions, but rather solely through the consent 
and agreement of the citizens. 5 Not the text-body of the constitution, but rather the 
agreement of those to be ruled by the  pouvoirs constitutés creates sovereignty. For 
David  Hume , the discourse-dependency of the state power is axiomatic: ‘it is […] on 
opinion only that government is founded’ (1758). 6 Sovereignty is considered to 
depend on the belief of the subjects and the political élites in its utility and  legitima-
cy . 7 The ‘belief in  sovereignty ’ which went along with the founding act of forming a 
constitution becomes palpable in the ‘religious affi nities’ of the constitutional  pre-
1  ReConFort, Reconsidering Constitutional Formation. Constitutional Communication by Drafting, 
Practice and Interpretation in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe, 7th Famework Programme, 
“Ideas”, ERC-AG-SH6 – ERC Advanced Grant – The study of the human past, Advanced Grant 
No. 339529. 
2  Müßig ,  Ulrike, Giornale di Storia Costituzionale 27 (2014), 107 n. 2 and the discourses in  idem ., 
Recht und Justizhoheit, (Law and Judicial Sovereignty) 2nd ed., Berlin 2009, p. 90 et seq.; p. 141 
et seq.; p. 205 et seq.; p. 208 et seq; p. 210 et seq.; p. 279 et seq. 
3  Burckhardt ,  Jacob, Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien (The culture of the Renaissance in Italy), 
Leipzig 1869, p. 364. 
4  Cited by  von Fritz, Kurt, The Theory of Mixed Constitution in Antiquity: A Critical Analysis of 
Polybius’ Political Idea, New York 1954, p. 10 et seq. 
5  Paine ,  Thomas, Rights of Men: Being an Answer to Mr. Burke’s Attack on the French Revolution, 
London 1792, p. 15, p. 134. 
6  Hume, David, Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects (1758), in: Political Essays, Cambridge 
1994, p. 127. 
7  See also  Luhmann ,  Niklas , Macht (Power), 3rd Edition, Stuttgart 2003, p. 4 et seq, who describes 
state authority as a “symbolically generalized communication medium”. 
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ambles in the eighteenth century: Such an affi nity does not mean the recourse of the 
constituents to divine authority for the written text, but rather the presentation of 
central constitutional  guarantees as philosophical truths with a claim to eternal valid-
ity. 8 This is contextually why the constitutional  debates in the northamerican colo-
nies are read as ‘creeds of the new time’ (“ Glaubensbekenntnis der neuen Zeit ”). 9 
 The litmus test of the communication  dependency of constitutions is their inde-
cisiveness in crucial points . This is not only elaborated for the  pouvoirs  constitué s , 10 
but is also true for the  pouvoir  constituant , the constituent  sovereignty . Under the 
impression of the Jacobinian reign of virtue and terror and the struggle for resistance 
of the allied monarchies against the  revolutionary army of the  Republique Française , 
the republic got discredited into antagonism with monarchy and there was a remark-
able ‘renaissance’ of the monarchy in the early constitutionalism. 11 The constitu-
tional  formation in the strict legal sense, i.e. the act of constituting, 12 could ‘defend 
the monarchy from the threat of the people’, as explained for the Albertine Statute 
1848, 13 could be a ‘legal decision of a national constituent  assembly ’ as in the 
Belgian Case 1831, 14 could borrow from the old notion of a fundamental law as in 
the Polish Case 1788–1792 15 or try to remain in between as the reference to the 
‘Nation as sovereign’ in the French September Constitution  1791 does, which has 
8  The most prominent example is the French Declaration of the Rights of Men: The “natural, 
inalienable and sacred rights of man” (Preface to the French Declaration of the Rights of Men), are 
laid down catechistically as the basis of “all political society” (Art. 2, also Art. 16). Cf.  Sieyès , 
Préliminaire de la constitution, Reconnaissance et exposition raisonnée des droits de l’homme et 
du citoyen, Observations, cit. in: Orateurs de la Révolution française, édition Pléiade, vol. I, Paris 
1989, p. 1004: “ Quand cela serait; une déclaration des droits du citoyen n’est pas une suite de lois, 
mais une suite de principes .” For the American Constitution cf.  Stolleis, Michael, Souveränität um 
1814, in: Müßig (ed.), Konstitutionalismus und Verfassungskonfl ikt, Tübingen 2006, p. 101–115, 
103. Muß, Florian, Der Präsident und Ersatzmonarch, Die Erfi ndung des Präsidenten als 
Ersatzmonarch in der amerikanischen Verfassungsdebatte und Verfassungspraxis, Munich 2013 
(Diss. iur. Passau supervised by Ulrike Müßig). 
9  Dreier ,  Horst, Gilt das Grundgesetz ewig? Fünf Kapitel zum modernen Verfassungsstaat, Munich 
2008, p. 14. 
10  Müßig ,  Ulrike, L’ouverture du mouvement constitutionnel après 1830 : à la recherche d’un 
équilibre entre la souveraineté monarchique et la souveraineté populaire, Tijdschrift voor 
Rechtsgeschiedenis 79 (2011), 489 et seq. 
11  Therefore, trust in a strong representation of the people, as the French Constitution of 1791 
breathes, is hardly found among European Constitutions around 1800. Apart from the Norwegian 
Grunnloven of Eidsvoll (May 1814), echoes of the French September Constitution are just found 
in the short-lived Spanish Constitution of Cádiz 1812. 
12  Deciding on the legal text in contrast to the broader sense of constitutional formation, on which 
ReConFort is based, comprising also constitutional praxis and interpretation. 
13  The  Omnipotence of Parliament in the legitimisation process of ‘representative government’ dur-
ing the Albertine Statute (1848–1861, in: Müßig (ed.), ReConFort I: National Sovereignty, here, 
p. 159. 
14  National sovereignty in the Belgian Constitution of 1831. On the meanings of article 25, in: 
Müßig (ed.), ReConFort I: National Sovereignty, here, p. 93 et seq. 
15  Sovereignty issues in the Public Discussion around the Polish May Constitution (1788–1792), in: 
Müßig (ed.), ReConFort I: National Sovereignty, here, p. 215. 
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infl uenced the Cádiz  Constitution 1812. Therefore, constituent sovereignty is the 
perfect starting point for the research project on communication  dependency of con-
stitutions, as it is the legitimizing explanation of the constitutional  process . 
2  Method of Comparative Constitutional History 
2.1  Targeted Sources of ReConFort 
 ReConFort’s approach to the interplay of constitutional processes and public par-
ticipation relies on a systematic analysis of constitutional documents in combina-
tion with refl ective documents of acting political stakeholders. 16 The targeted 
sources comprise constitutions and constitutional materials, 17 relevant cross-border 
private correspondences of protagonists and their publicist activities including exile 
literature, regional/national and cross-border constitutional journalism in public 
media. The last category of sources opens up the research approach onto the report-
ing on constitutional affairs in a selected number of leading media 18 or specialised/
exile media. 19 Both categories, the fi rst being determined by the cut off-principle 
(largest readership) and the second by specialisation on certain opinions, have a 
special regard to the causative interdependencies between media dissemination and 
the  politicisation of the population. Such an analysis of public  media in the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth century combine the quantitative reconstruction (surveying) 
with the subsequent qualitative elaboration of typological key passages (cognitive, 
classifi catory or narrative). The following key passages ( topoi ) form the  debates as 
semantic paradigms:
•  Constituent Sovereignty/ National  Sovereignty =ReConFort, Vol. I 
•  Precedence of Constitution = ReConFort, Vol. II 
•  Judiciary as Constituted  Power 
•  Justiciability of Politics. 
16  Cf.  www.reconfort.eu . The whole team comprises also the British post doc Dr. Shavana Musa 
(Dec. 2015 till August 2016), two doctoral students Franziska Meyer and Joachim Kummer, the 
project manager Stefan Schmuck and is supported by an international advisory board. Translations 
by the Advanced Grantee are marked here with UM. 
17  Constitutional drafts or offi cial stenographic records of constitutional debates . 
18  For instance: Gazeta Narodowa i Obca, Journal Hebdomadaire de la Diète, Pamiętnik 
Historyczno-Politczny-Ekonomiczny (PL); El Constitucional: ó sea, Crónica científi ca, literaria y 
política, La Constitución y las leyes, Mercurio histórico y político, El Universal. Observador espa-
ñol (ES); Journal des Flandres, L’Union Belge; Politique (BE); Allgemeine Zeitung, Deutsche 
Zeitung, Kölnische Zeitung (DE); Il censore, giornale quotidiano politico polpulare, Il nazionale, 
Gazetta del populo, La Concordia (IT). 
19  Exile Lit.: El Español (London 1810–1814), El Español Constitucional (London 1824–1827), 
L’Avenir (Paris 1830–1831). For representing tendencious opinions: El Censor. Periódico político 
y literario, El Defensor del Rey, El Zurriago; Kreuzzeitung, Neue Deutsche Zeitung; L’Imparziale. 
Foglio Politico. 
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2.2  Methodological Challenges: Finding the Tertia 
Comparationis 
 Any comparative legal historical approach is burdened with a double  hermeneutical 
circle . First , there is ‘an unalterable difference between interpreter and author that 
originates from the historical distance’. 20 Secondly, the past linguistic usage is 
enshrined in the constitutional development of different legal systems. The legal 
terms ‘nation’ and ‘sovereignty’ are not interchangeable in Belgian, English, 
French, German, Italian, Polish and Spanish sources and thus not comparable by 
themselves. Language has to be accepted as the frontier of its user’s world. 21 
Therefore, different historical formulations of the national sovereignty cannot serve 
as  tertia comparationis in a historical comparison. This is obvious for everybody 
consulting the following linguistic expressions: In the introduction and in Art. 2 of 
the Polish May  Constitution 1791 the nation is equivalent to the  nobility , in the 
French September  Constitution 1791 (Tit. III, Art. 1) the nation is a political point 
of reference next to the  monarch , and the address of the General and Extraordinary 
 Cortes of Cádiz to the sovereignty of the  nation in Tit. 1, Art. 2 means to annul the 
declaration of abdication given in  Bayonne in favour of Napoleon. 
 If one searches for benchmarks abstracted from the constitutional wording, the 
 contexts of the claims for national sovereignty are useful  tertia comparationis . So my 
paper does not deal with national sovereignty as an abstract perception of the political 
history of ideas, but as the  political polemics in concrete situations of confl ict . Common 
to all contexts is the use of national sovereignty as a legal starting point (‘big bang-
argument’). This is coincident with the normativity as goal of the modern constitu-
tional  concept arising out of the revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century. 22 
 All references to national sovereignty mark a process of juridifi cation of  sover-
eignty , i.e. political legitimation is turned into legal legitimation. A constitution is a 
legal codifi cation to fi x the political order as a legal order. This solves the paradox 
of the  Bodin ian sovereignty, which could not explain the legal bindingness at the 
moment of concluding the social  contract . According to  Bodin binding obligation 
was only thought of in relation to already existent law. 23 It is only with the differen-
tiation between the sacrosanct and the dispositive law that the legal term of the 
20  Gadamer ,  Hans - Georg, Wahrheit und Methode, Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, 
3rd extended ed., Tübingen 1972, p. 280. Paraphrasing transl. by UM. 
21  Wittgenstein ,  Ludwig, Tractatus logico-philosophicus, in: Werkausgabe, Vol. 1, Stuttgart 1984, 
Vol. 1, p. 67, 5.6: “Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt” (“The limits 
of my language equate the limits of my world”). Paraphrasing transl. by UM. 
22  Müßig ,  Ulrike, Konfl ikt und Verfassung, in: idem (ed.),  Konstitutionalismus und 
Verfassungskonfl ikt , Tübingen 2006, p. 2. 
23  Of course, the  lois fondamentales were binding after conclusion between the parties as “ conuen-
tions iustes & raisonables ” in contrast to the statutory “ lois de ses prédécceurs” . And the binding 
authority of natural or divine law is not questioned.  Holmes, Stephan , Jean Bodin: The Paradox of 
Sovereignty and the Privatization of Religion, in: Pennock, James Roland/Chapman John W. (ed.), 
Religion, Morality and the Law, New York 1988, p. 17 et seq. 
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constitution of the eighteenth century manages to justify the self-commitment of 
political power without the concept of the state contract ( Staatsvertrag ). National 
sovereignty is the synonym for the juridifi cation of  sovereignty by means of the 
constitution. 
2.3  Constitutionalisation by Public Sphere 
2.3.1  Press  Media as Roadster of Politicisation 
 In his leading titles ‘The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere’ 24 and 
‘Communication and the Evolution of Society’ 25 the German philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas argues that the emergence of the public sphere is twinned with the 
‘growth of democracy, individual liberty and popular  sovereignty and the emer-
gence of a self-conscious bourgeoisie and a reasoning public’. 26 As the countries of 
my comparative overview all share constitutional  formation  (i) in the stress fi eld of 
external hegemonic powers (French Revolutionary Wars, Polish Partitions, French 
occupation of Spain during the Napoleonic wars, Belgian secession from the United 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, German Restoration under the big four of the Vienna 
 Congress , Franco-Austrian rivalry over Italian territories) or  (ii) in the light of inter-
nal rivalries between ethnic-cultural or language factions (competing models for 
citizenship in post-1815 German territories and the Habsburg Empire, confl icts 
between Flanders and Walloons), the constitutional  formation has a key role for 
‘national’ self-determination under external encroachments. Therefore publicistic 
 debates on constitutional matters do not represent technical items for specialized 
elites, but are the mouthpiece of a general ‘politicised’ public. Due to the general 
atmosphere of upheaval, the reports of constitutional affairs are at the core of a fun-
damental  politicisation of the broader population. The constitutional  debates in the 
Belgian National Congress 1830–1831 are accompanied by the reports of the lead-
24  Habermas ,  Jürgen, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a cate-
gory of Bourgeois Society, Cambridge 1962 transl 1989. On the self-conscious bourgeoisie and the 
public sphere, see p. 81: “The constitutional state as a bourgeois state established the public sphere 
in the political realm as an organ of the state so as to ensure institutionally the connection between 
law and public opinion”. On the “reasoning public”, ibid., p. 83; p. 107: the principle of popular 
sovereignty could be realized only under the precondition of a public use of reason. On popular 
sovereignty, liberty, and their connection to the public sphere, p. 101: The representative system 
does this, (1) by discussion, which compels existing powers to seek after truth in common; (2) by 
publicity, which places these powers when occupied in this search, under the eyes of the citizens; 
and (3) by the liberty of the press, which stimulates the citizens themselves to seek after truth, and 
to tell it to power.” 
25  Habermas ,  Jürgen, Communication and the Evolution of Society, Boston 1979, p. 114. 
26  Eisenträger, Stian A.E., The European Press and the Question of Norwegian Independence in 
1814, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Masterthesis 2013 ( http://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/
bitstream/ handle/11250/187931/Eisentrager_master.pdf?sequence = 1), p. 29. The following argu-
mentation relies on Eisenträger’s argumentation at p. 29 et seq. 
Juridifi cation by Constitution. National Sovereignty in Eighteenth and Nineteenth…
8
ing journal  Politique (Liège), which was the fl agship of the  independence move-
ment. 27 And the national unifi cation movement  il  Risorgimento (resurgence) is 
named after a newspaper founded in 1847 in Turin by the Sardinian politician and 
architect of the Italian unifi cation  Cavour . The outburst of political periodicals from 
1848 onwards ( Il nazionale, Gazetta del populo, La concordia ) prove the Italian 
national liberation movement to be a product of the reciprocal communicative 
dimensions of constitutional  processes . In the pre-revolutionary feudal society, peo-
ple were born into certain estates of the realms, without the chance for change. 
Newspapers and journals as mass means of dissemination and communication moti-
vated a broad  politicisation and served as transmittors of the new ideas of the mod-
ern constitutional  concept . 28 The  Allgemeine Zeitung, Deutsche Zeitung, Kölnische 
Zeitung, and the Neue Berliner Zeitung were mouthpieces of the German liberalism 
and, together with other political writings, 29 accompanied the debates regarding the 
concept of national sovereignty in 1848/49. 
 Furthermore, the political impact of the press-based public  sphere is mirrored by 
the rigorous censorships which governments of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century invented to ‘regulate the fl ow of ideas’. 30 Press  freedom  in the liberal under-
standing could fi rst be found in England through the expiration of the Long 
Parliament’s Licensing Act  1695 . 31 The emancipation of the bourgeoisie was traced 
by the turn-up of the constitutional  guarantees of Press  freedom . 32 
27  Its spiritus rector Paul Devaux was secretary to the constitutional commission. 
28  Kovarik ,  Bill, Revolutions in Communications: Media History from Gutenberg to the Digital 
Age, New York 2011, p. 26. Eisenträger, ibid. (n.26), p. 30. 
29  Such as  Fick ,  Alexander Heinrich, Denkschrift an die souveräne constituierende deutsche 
Nationalversammung, Marburg 1848 and  von Hermann ,  Friedrich, Die Reichsverfassung und die 
Grundrechte, Zur Orientierung bei der Eröffnung des bayrischen Landtags im September 1849, 
Munich 1849. 
30  Eisenträger, ibid. (n. 26), p. 30;  Taylor ,  P. M., Munitions of the mind. A history of propaganda 
from the ancient world to the present day, Manchester/New York 2003, p. 129. 
31 Also called “An Ordinance for the Regulating of Printing”. Regarding the expiration compare 
 Deazley, Ronan, On the Origin of the Right to Copy, Charting the Movement of Copyright Law in 
Eighteenth-Century Britain (1695–1775), Oxford 2004, p. 1 et seq. Yet the effect of the expiration 
of the Licensing Act on press freedom should not be overestimated:  the same , p. 5: “In May 1695, 
[…] the Lord Justices declared that the offences of criminal and seditious libel were, when 
detected, still punishable at common law. In one sense then, nothing had really changed”. 
32  Compare Willoweit, Dietmar/Seif, Ulrike (=Müßig) ed., Europäische Verfassungsgeschichte 
(European Constitutional History), Munich 2003: First Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States from November 3, 1791: Art. I  “Congress shall make no law (…) abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press (…).” (p. 277); Constitution Française from September 3, 1791: 
Titre premier  “La liberté à tout homme de parler, d’écrire, d’imprimer et publier ses pensées, sans 
que les écrits puissant être soumis à aucune censure ni inspection avant leur publication (…)” 
(p. 295); Constitution du 5 fructidor an III from August 22, 1795:  “353. Nul ne peut être empêché 
de dire, écrire, imprimer et publier sa pensée. – Les écrits ne peuvent être soumis à aucune censure 
avant leur publication. – Nul ne peut être responsible de ce qu’il a écrit ou publié, que dans les cas 
prévus par la loi.” (p. 387); Constitutión política de la Monarquía Española from March 19, 1812: 
Capítulo VII. “Art. 131.  Las facultades de las Córtes son: (…) 24° Proteger la libertad política de 
la imprenta. ” (p. 448). The Cádiz Constitution lacks a general press freedom, but rather, only a 
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2.3.2  Importance of Cross-Border News: The  American Revolution 
in the Polish Public Discourse 
 With the French  revolution and the Napoleonic wars the demand for news increased, 
and especially for news from abroad. In his monograph on French, German, English 
and American journalism Jürgen Wilke illustrates the dominant position of foreign 
affairs in news coverage 33 and explains 34 the substitute-function of foreign matters 
over domestic matters: It was safer against censorship to report on external political 
variables. In my contribution to the Polish Legal History Conference in Krakow 
2014 35 I reported in length about the American  Revolution in Polish journalism. The 
main lines of argumentation are recapitulated here, as the rhetorical use of the 
American  struggle for freedom against Westminster both by the ‘patriotic’ reform 
minds as well as by the ‘old-Republican’ sustainers is a masterpiece of 
mere political press freedom is laid down. Compare also Art. 371, which only talks about the free-
dom to publish “political ideas”. ( http://www.congreso.es/constitucion/fi cheros/historicas/
cons_1812.pdf , 13.01.2016). Charte Constitutionelle from June 4 – 10, 1814: Art. 8 “ Les Français 
ont le droit de publier et de faire imprimer leurs opinions, en se conformant aux lois qui doivent 
réprimer les abus de cette liberté. ” (p. 485 f); Constitution for the Kingdom of Bavaria from May 
26, 1818: § 11. “ Die Freiheit der Presse und des Buchhandels ist nach den Bestimmungen des 
hierüber erlassenen besondern Edicts gesichert. ” (p. 498) ; Constitution de la Belgique from 
February 7, 1831: Art. 18. “ La presse est libre; la censure ne pourra jamais être établie; il ne peut 
être exigé de cautionnement des écrivains, éditeurs ou imprimeurs. Lorsque l’auteur est connu et 
domicilié en Belgique, l’éditeur, l’imprimeur ou le distributeur ne peut être poursuivi. ” (p. 512) ; 
Fundamental law for the Kingdom of Hannover from September 26, 1833: § 40. “ Die Freiheit der 
Presse soll unter Beobachtung der gegen deren Mißbrauch zu erlassenden Gesetze und der 
Bestimmungen des teutschen Bundes stattfi nden. Bis zur Erlassung dieser Gesetze bleiben die 
bisherigen Vorschriften in Kraft. ” (p. 538) ; German Federal Act from June 8, 1815: Art. XVIII. d) 
“ Die Bundesversammlung wird sich bei ihrer ersten Zusammenkunft mit Abfassung gleichförmiger 
Verfügungen über die Preßfreiheit und die Sicherstellung der Rechte der Schriftsteller und Verleger 
gegen den Nachdruck beschäftigen. ” (p. 558) Yet, in 1819 the Carlsbad Decrees were issued. The 
Frankfurter Constitution from March 28, 1849 [Paulskirchenverfassung] guarantees in Art. IV, § 
143: “(…)  Die Preßfreiheit darf unter keinen Umständen und in keiner Weise durch vorbeugende 
Maaßregeln, namentlich Censur, Concessionen, Sicherheitsbestellungen, Staatsaufl agen, 
Beschränkungen der Druckereien oder des Buchhandels, Postverbote oder andere Hemmungen 
des freien Verkehrs beschränkt, suspendiert oder aufgehoben werden. Ueber Preßvergehen, welche 
von Amts wegen verfolgt werden, wird durch Schwurgerichte geurtheilt. Ein Preßgesetz wird vom 
Reiche erlassen werden. ” (p. 582). 
33  1796, only the Parisian  Gazette nationale ou le Moniteur Universel was an exception. 
34  Wilke, Jürgen, Foreign news coverage and international news fl ow over three centuries, Gazette 
39 (1987), 147–180, p. 174: “A need for information could be satisfi ed this way, and at the same 
time, attention could be diverted from more pressing internal matters. A ‘clamp-down’ of news on 
the home front could be reconciled with an openness to news from the outside world”. 
35  Reconsidering Constitutional Formation – The Polish May Constitution 1791 as a masterpiece of 
constitutional communication, CPH 67 (2015), 75–93. I owe the retrieval strategy into the publi-
cism around the Great Sejm to  Libiszowska, Zofi a , The Impact of the American Constitution on 
Polish Political Opinion in the Late Eighteenth Century, in: Samuel Fiszman (ed.),  Constitution 
and Reform in 18th-Century Poland, The Constitution of 3 May 1791 , Indiana Press 1997, p. 233 
et seq. 
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 communication  dependency on constitutional  debates . Yet the presentation of the 
constitutional draft 36 to the representative chamber on May 3, 1791 was connected 
to the Anglo- American republican  discourse . 37  Kołłątaj ’s 38 dedication for the 
 representation of the cities in the Sejm referred to the democratic ideas of  Franklin 
and  Washington 39 . The role model of the American society lacking estate differ-
ences inspired the editor of the  Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny  Piotr  Świtkowski 
to discuss the rights of the townspeople in his article about the United States. In 
America, it was ‘the personal accomplishment and not noble  birth (paraphrased)’ 40 
that counted, George Washington being a favorite example. Reading the pro-patri-
otic  Gazeta Narodowa i Obca , one is convinced by Julian Ursyn  Niemcewicz : 
‘Nobody of us knows who the father of Washington or the grandfather of Franklin 
was. … But everybody knows and will remember in the future that Washington and 
Franklin freed America (paraphrased).’ 41 Washington and Franklin leave even more 
marks in the  Gazeta Narodowa i Obca as media vehicles for the Polish Constitutionalism; 
the introductory speech of President Washington in the fi rst Congress is printed in two 
36  Together with Sejmmarshall Stanisław Małachowski (1736–1809) there are the following pro-
tagonists considered as the editors of the May constitution: Scipione Piattoli, royal secretary, 
Ignacy Potocki, spokesman of the patriots in the Sejm, Hugo Kołłątaj, since 1791 royal vice chan-
cellor and the monarch himself (compare  von Unruh ,  Georg-Christoph , Die polnische Konstitution 
vom 3. Mai 1791 im Rahmen der Verfassungsentwicklung der Europäischen Staaten, in: Der Staat 
13 [1974], 185 et seq.). 
37  “In this century, there were two pivotal Republican constitutions, the English and the American, 
ours [the Polish] outperforming the two of them; it guaranteed liberty, security and all freedoms.” 
Paraphrasing translation of the speech, cited in: Gazeta Narodowa i Obca, no. 37, 7 May 1 1791. It 
may be due to political calculus that Małachowski does not mention the French Revolution. These 
associations of Małachowski with the Anglo-Saxon constitutions mirrors the importance of the 
English constitutional model and the American constitutional movement in the journalism during 
the Great or Four-Year Reichstag ( Sejm Wielki or  Czteroletni ) from October 6, 1788 until May 29, 
1792. Materiały do dziejów Sejmu Czteroletniego [Sources concerning the deeds of the Four-Year 
Sejm], published by Michalski, Jerzy, Emanuel Rostworowski, Woliński, Janusz, vol. 1–5, together 
with Eisenbach, Artur, vol. 6, Warszawa 1955–1969. 
38  Hugo Kołłątaj (1750–1812), Former dean of the University of Krakau and later royal vice chan-
cellor in 1791, had great infl uence on the Sejmmarshall Stanisław Małachowski. Concerning 
Kołłątaj’s person and oeuvre compare  Pasztor, Maria , Hugo Kołłątaj na Sejmie Wielkim w latach 
1791–1792, Warsaw 1991. H. Kołłątaj, the spiritual cornerstone of the “forge” (Kuźnica), became 
the reform motor due to its Listy Anonima (1788/90) and a constitutional draft (prawo polityczne 
narodu polskiego, 1790). The Polish writings of Kołłątajs were newly edited during the 50s by 
 Leśnodorski, B., who also wrote an article on Hugo Kołłątaj in: Z dziejów polskiej myśli fi lozofi c-
znej i spolecznej, Volume 2, Warsaw 1956. 
39  Kołłątaj, Hugo, Uwagi nad pismem… Seweryna Rzewuskiego… o sukcesyi tronu w Polszcze 
rzecz krótka [Remarks about Seweryn Rzewuski’s short essay on the throne succession in Poland], 
Warsaw 1790, p. 71–77. 
40  “Stan prawdziwy wolnej Ameryki Północnej” [The true state in the free North America], 
Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny, April 1789. 
41  Gazeta Narodowa i Obca , no. 27 of March 9, 1791. A selection from Niemcewicz’s speech was 
cited in The Newport Mercury of July 30, 1790. Compare  Haimann ,  Miecislaus, The Fall of 
Poland in Contemporary American Opinion, Chicago 1935, p. 35. 
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consecutive editions in January 1791 42 when the Polish constitutional draft was 
more and more opposed by the old-Republican opposition of conservative  noble-
men led by  Seweryn  Rzewuski (1743–1811). Franklin’s praise of the American  con-
stitution 43 was published in order to advertise for the Polish reform project. 44 
Occasionally, the  press reports about America were formulated as letters from 
America – with a clear tenor against the intrigues of the aristocratic opposition. 45 In 
the  Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny , one fi nds Piotr Świtkowski’s history of 
America, ‘which had only shortly come into its political existence under the fl ag of 
liberty (paraphrased)’ 46 and whose success was meant to promote the acceptance of 
the Polish constitutional efforts. 
 Not only the patriotic reform powers, but also the old-Republican constitutional 
opponents make use of the American role model. In his chronological information 
about the loss of liberty under a hereditary monarch ( Wiadomość chronologiczna, w 
którym czasie, które państwo wolność utraciło pod rządem monarchów sukce-
syjnych 1790), the Field-Hetman and old-Republican spokesman Seweryn Rzewuski 
devalued the English hereditary monarch by viewing the American struggle for lib-
erty as being incompatible with liberty: The Americans did not have ‘any other 
option but to fi ght the English crown (paraphrased)’. 47 Franklin and Washington had 
‘unmasked the true spirit of the English liberty (paraphrased)’. 48 The equation of the 
hereditary monarch and despotism is explained through the English suppression of 
the American colonies. 49 According to Rzewuski’s essay on the succession to the 
throne in Poland ( O sukcesyi tronu w Polszcze rzecz krótka 1789), the traditional 
42  Gazeta Narodowa i Obca , no. 4, of January 14, 1791. 
43  Gazeta Narodowa i Obca, no. 46, of June 8, 1791. 
44  [ Potocki, Ignacy ], Na pismo, któremu napis “O Konstytucji 3 Maja 1791.”… odpowiedź [Answer 
to the publications with the title “About the May constitution 1791”], Gazeta Narodowa i Obca, no. 
46, of June 8, 1791. Compare  Smoleński ,  Władyslaw, Ostatni rok Sejmu Wielkiego [The last year 
of the Great Diet], Kraków 1897, p. 77. 
45  For instance, a letter supposedly originating from Boston opposes the cabinet intrigues, the wars 
and disagreements in Europe to the wealth, calm and openness in the self-administered and inde-
pendent United States of America in the  Gazeta Narodowa i Obca of May 1791. Gazeta Narodowa 
i Obca, no. 63, of July 6, 1791. 
46  “Stan prawdziwy wolnej Ameryki Północnej” [The true state of the free North America], 
Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny, April 1789, p. 1128–1142. 
47  [ Seweryn Rzewuski ], Wiadomość chronologiczna, w którym czasie, które państwo wolność 
utraciło pod rządem monarchów sukcesyjnych [Chronological information on when and what state 
lost its liberty due to a hereditary monarch], Warszawa, without a year [1790]. Zofi a Zielińska 
convincingly shows that Rzewuski was himself the author of most of he pamphlets (Republikanizm 
spod znaku buławy. Publicystyka Seweryna Rzewuskiego z lat 1788–1790 [Republicanism under 
the Field-Hetmans Streitkolben. Political articles of Seweryn Rzewuski 1788–1790], Warsaw 
1991, p. 23 et seq. 
48  [ Seweryn Rzewuski ], Uwagi dla utrzymania wolnej elekcyi króla polskiego do Polaków, w 
Warszawie roku 1789 [Remarks for the Polish on the assurance of free elections of the Polish 
king]. 
49  List z Warszawy do przyjaciela na wieś o projektach Nowey formy Rządu [A letter from Warsaw 
to a friend on the countryside about the proposals of a new governmental form], 9 August 1790. 
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old- republicanism with elective monarchy and  liberum veto corresponds to 
American federalism if transferred to Polish circumstances. 50 A few anonymous 
authors supported Rzewuski’s position of the elective kingdom as a guarantee for 
liberty by reference to the newly founded Republic of America. 51 
 Stanisław (Wawrzyniec)  Staszic (1755–1826) 52 though, answers Rzewuski ’s 
polemics with the warning that the (noble) Republic cannot exist between despotic 
monarchies. 53 For the liberal reform wing the American role model strengthens the 
conviction that the executive power is best vested in a hereditary monarch, 54 as it 
had been idealised by  Montesquieu ’s description of the French monarchy (II, 4 De 
l’Esprit des Lois). 55 In his series of essay in  Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny , 
Świtkowski  compares the Polish and American constitutional circumstances 56 and 
draws the reader’s attention to the fact that the exterior political threat of Poland 
demands a strengthening of the executive as well as the introduction of a hereditary 
50  Rzewuski ,  Seweryn, O sukcesyi tronu w Polszcze rzecz krótka [A short essay on the throne suc-
cession in Poland] 1789). Compare  Zielińska ,  Zofi a, Republikanizm spod znaku buławy. 
Publicystyka Seweryna Rzewuskiego z lat 1788–1790 [Republicanism under Feldhetmans 
Streitkolben. Political articles of Seweryn Rzewuski 1788–1790], Warszawa 1991, p. 57 et seq.; 
“O sukcesyi tronu w Polszcze 1787–1790” [About the succession to the throne in Poland 1787–
1790], Warsaw 1991. 
51  [ Seweryn Rzewuski ], Myśli nad różnemi pismy popierającymi sukcesyą tronu [Thoughts on the 
different essays on the support of the succession to the throne], 1790. 
52  Stanisław Staszic infl uenced the reform discussion immensely with his articles on Uwagi nad 
życiem Jana Zamoyskiego (1787) and Przestrogi dla Polski (1790) ( Suchodolski, Bogdan , Art. zu 
Stanisław Staszic, in: Z dziejów polskiej myśli fi lozofi cznej … Volume 2, Warsaw 1956;  Goetel , 
 W., Stanisław Staszic, Kraków 1969). Staszic later became President of the infl uential society of 
the friends of science (1808). 
53  Staszic ,  Stanislaw, Przestrogi dla Polski [Warnings to Poland], in Pisma fi lozofi czne i społeczne, 
published by Suchodolski, Bogdan, vol. 1, Warsaw 1954, p. 192. 
54  In the same direction goes the pamphlet “Krótka rada względem napisania dobrej konstytucji” 
(Short advice on how to elaborate a good constitution) which was published in 1790 in its para-
phrased translation: “Even if a nation has no king , the legislative and executive power have to be 
separated. Then, the executive power is vested in the administration; the legislative power is vested 
in the national representatives. This is the situation in the thirteen American provinces … where 
each province has its own administration, its own courts, its own tax and military and all together 
have their House of Representatives with their President which only differs from the English King 
by his name [sic!] and enjoys the executive power and the might to make laws for the whole terri-
tory.” ([ Kajetan ]  Kwiatkowski , Krótka rada względem napisania dobrej konstytucyi [Short piece of 
advice on how to elaborate a good constitution], without a place of publication 1790, p. 28). 
55  Compare concerning the convincing power of the idealised monarchy as it is portrayed in 
 Montesquieu in II, 4 De l’Esprit des Lois (Pléiade-Edition, Oeuvres complètes, published by Roger 
Caillois, tome II, Paris 1994, p. 247 et seq.)  Konic ,  Charles-Etienne-Léon , Comparaison des 
Constitutions de la Pologne et de la France de 1791 (thèse doct. Univ. de Neuchatel), Lausanne 
1918, p. 45 et seq. More generally on II, 4 De l’Esprit des Lois see  Seif (=Müßig), Ulrike, Der 
mißverstandene Montesquieu: Gewaltenbalance, nicht Gewaltentrennung, ZNR 22 (2000), 149–
166 (157 et seq.). 
56  The United States, a confederation of colonies having gotten rid of George III. were said to be 
eager to fi nd a surrogate for the king when modelling the presidential offi ce. 
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monarchy. 57 Support comes from Ignacy  Potocki who regrets that Poland cannot be 
a general republic or confederation according to the given circumstances, but only 
a constitutional monarchy. 58 
3  References to the National  Sovereignty in the Historic 
Discourses of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century 
Europe 
3.1  In General: The Nation’s Start as Singular State 
Organisational Legal Point of Reference 
 ‘Long live the nation!’, the exclamation of thousands of soldiers from the French 
Revolutionary Army during the cannonade of Valmy on September 20, 1792 aston-
ished the  Prussians . The infantry banners of the Revolutionary Army showed the 
maxim ‘The King, the Nation, Freedom, the Law’. The war correspondent and com-
panion of the Duke Karl August von Sachsen-Weimar Johann Wolfgang von  Goethe 
noted in his late (1820/1821) autobiographical report  Kampagne in Frankreich 
( Campaign in France ): ‘Here and on this day begins a new era of world history’. 59 
Leaving aside the doubt of the literary studies, 60 the French perception as a victory 
of the nation is more important than the popularity of Goethe’s words concerning 
Valmy. It was no longer a victory of the French King: on September 21, 1792, one 
day after the cannonade, the King was declared to have abdicated and the Republic 
was proclaimed. The Victory at Valmy was historic since the Revolutionary Army 
consisting of unexperienced volunteers was unlikely to win against the higher 
ranked Prussian army. And the news of the victory at Valmy was decisive for the 
consolidation of the rule of the convent in Paris. 61 It is not by chance that the 
Republic Constitution of (24 June) 1793 contains elaborate provisions on who is a 
57  Świtkowski ,  Piotr, “Dalsze myśli i uwagi względem Konstytucji 3 Maja” [Further thoughts and 
remarks on the constitution of May 3], Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny, August 1791, 
p. 737–745. 
58  Ignacy Potocki an Eliasz Aloe, 7 August 1790. Mss. Potocki Papers, no. 277 vol. 303, AGAD, 
Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw. Ignacy Potocki was the spokesman of the patri-
ots in the Sejm. 
59  Von Goethe ,  Johann Wolfgang , Die Kampagne in Frankreich [Campaign in France], in: Goethes 
sämtliche Werke, Stuttgart 1902, p. 60: “Von hier und heute geht eine neue Epoche der 
Weltgeschichte aus, und ihr könnt sagen, ihr seid dabei gewesen” [From here and today, a new 
epoch begins in the history of the world, and you could say to be witnesses]. 
60  Borst, Arno, Valmy 1792 – Ein historisches Ereignis?, in: Der Deutschunterricht, Vol. 26/6, 1974, 
88–104 (101): “This is the purest example of a history of effects of pieces of art that can be 
imagined”. 
61  Keyword “Valmy” in Jeschonnek, Bernd: Revolution in Frankreich 1789–1799. Ein Lexikon 
(Revolutions in France 1789–1799. An encyclopedia) Berlin 1989, p. 232–233. 
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member of the nation and who is not. 62 The  Acte constitutionnel de la  République 
attributes in Art. 7 the sovereignty to the people, defi ned as the entity of the French 
citizens. 63 Art. 4 defi nes the citizenship precisely for any French men born and bred 
of 21 years, for any foreigner of 21 years living in France for one year, who sustains 
himself by his work or has acquired ownership, married a French woman, adopted 
a French child or supported a French old man, and for any foreigner who was 
declared by the legislative corps to have merits for humanity. 64 
 Napoleon declared the day of Valmy the beginning of the French triumphal pro-
cession in Europe, which was ‘crowned’ with his emperorship and had the canons 
brought into position before  Les Invalides where even nowadays they can still be 
marvelled. And the ‘King of the Citizens’ Louis-Philippe I (reg. 1830–1848) who 
served as an offi cer in the Revolutionary Army 65 let immortalize the canonade of 
Valmy by means of painting (1835) by Jean Baptiste Mauzaisse (1784–1844) in the 
gallery of heroes in the  Chateau de Versailles . What Goethe’s genius had seen was 
that the term ‘nation’ had entered the stage of world history as an abstract point of 
reference. To make this turning point clear we have to go back to the pre- revolutionary 
French Enlightenment. 
 The Marquis d’  Argenson (1696–1764), 66 a close friend of Voltaire, noted in his 
 Memories 67 that ‘the words nation and fatherland were not common under Louis XIV 
62  The actual text of the constitution is preceded by a declaration of human and civil rights . Its 
article 23 in the French original reads: “ La garantie sociale consiste dans l’action de tous pour 
assurer à chacun la jouissance et la conservation de ses droits: cette garantie repose sur la sou-
veraineté nationale .” The latter is translated as «sovereignty of the people » by Gosewinkel/Masing 
(p. 195). Yet article 25 reads: “ La souveraineté réside dans le peuple ; elle est une et indivisible, 
imprescriptible et inaliénable and article 26: “ Aucune portion du peuple ne peut exercer la puis-
sance du peuple entier ; mais chaque section du souverain, assemblée, doit jouir du droit 
d’exprimer sa volonté avec une entière liberté .” In fact, article 28 seems to attribute the constituent 
sovereignty to the people: Article 28. Un peuple a toujours le droit de revoir, de réformer et de 
changer sa constitution. Une génération ne peut assujettir à ses lois les générations futures. 
63  Pölitz ,  Karl Heinrich Ludwig, Die europäischen Verfassungen seit dem Jahre 1789 bis auf die 
neueste Zeit, Mit geschichtlichen Erläuterungen und Einleitungen (The European Constitutions 
from the Year of 1789 to the Modern Age, Including Historical Explanations and Introductions), 
Second Volume, Second, Restructured, Corrected and Revised Edition, Leipzig 1833, p. 24, Art. 7, 
Von der Souverainetät des Volkes. 
64  Pölitz , ibid. (Fn. 63), Vol. 2, p. 23, Art. 4, Von dem Bestand der Bürger. 
65 As the Duke of Orléans Louis Philippe III (1773–1850) he got access to monarchical power in 
1830 under the name of Louis-Philippe I er . 
66  From his literary remains was published:  Considérations sur le gouvernement ancien et présent 
de la France (Amsterdam 1764), a luminous document for the understanding of the internal condi-
tions in France at the time. 
67  De Voyer de Paulmy, Marquis d’Argenson, René-Louis, Mémoires et journal inédit du marquis 
d’Argenson, éd. Rathéry, Edme Jacques Benoît, vol. 4, Paris 1858, p. 189 et seq., Note of 24. 
Juillet 1754: “ On remarque qu’on n’a jamais autant parlé de nation et d’État qu’aujourd’hui. Ces 
deuz noms ne se prononҫoient jamais sous Louis XIV, on n’en avoit seulement pas l’idée. On n’a 
jamais été si instruit qu’aujourd’hui sur les droits de la nation et de la liberté. Moi-même, qui ai 
toujours médité et puisé des matériaux dans l’étude sur ces matières, j’avois ma conviction et ma 
conscience tout autrement tournées qu’aujourd’hui: cela vient du parlement et des Anglois ”. 
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and that there was  not even yet an idea of them.’ Since the adjective ‘national’ was 
not existent as a keyword in the  Encyclopédie , it was consequently also not con-
tained in Voltaire’s  Dictionnaire philosophique 1764. For the lemma ‘nation’ 68 the 
 encyclopédists (1765) follow the lexical tradition of a geographic connotation since 
the  Dictionnaire Furetière 1690. 69 Up to the revolution, the relations which 
described the (state) organisational subordination were defi ned personally from 
human to human: the civil servants were servants of the  King ; the commanders in 
chief of the army, the ambassadors, the members of the judiciary were all the King’s. 
There was no unity or national coherence beyond the social ranks and above all, the 
élite of the Enlightenment was predominantly cosmopolitan. 
 Rousseau’s and amongst all others  Sieyès’ ideas were the masterpieces to explain 
the new legal state organization since the victory at Valmy was evidently no longer 
a victory of the French King. 
 For the fi rst time, the modern term ‘nation’ appears in the article  Essai sur la 
constitution de la Corse where Jean Jacques  Rousseau wrote: ‘All people are to 
have a national character and if it were to be missing, it would have started by giv-
ing it one’. 70 And he explains it as identifi cation with the nation by both his body and 
spirit, his will, his feeling to belong to it with all his might 71 and even more pathetic 
by dying for the nation and – what is more relevant for us legal historians – by obey-
ing all its laws and its commands. 72 
 This text is pivotal for the coinage of the modern term of nation; for Rousseau, 
the nation is the point of reference of participation, the laws and the political 
decision- makers. The nation is no longer the collective term for all those who live 
within the borders of the territorial state or under the centralised monarchical 
68  In addition to the geographic understanding ( “mot collectif dont on fait usage pour exprimer une 
quantité considérable de peuple, qui habite une certaine étendue de pays, renfermée dans cer-
taines limites, et qui obéit au même gouvernement.” ) the Encyclopédie (vol. XI) describes the 
medieval universitarian use (“La faculté de Paris est composée de quatre nations; savoir, celle de 
France, celle de Picardie, celle de Normandie, celle d’Allemagne… “La nation d’Allemagne com-
prend toutes les nations étrangères, l’Angloise, l’Italienne”). 
69  “ Se dit d’un grand peuple habitant une même étendue de terre, refermée en certaines limites ou 
sous une même domination .” Cit. according to  Pasquino, Pasquale (Sieyès et l’invention de la 
constitution en France, Paris 1998, p. 56) who also refers to the equivalent defi nition in the diction-
naire de Trévoux 1752. The Dictionnaire de l’Académie (4.éd. Paris 1762) defi nes the ‘nation’ as 
‘ Terme collectif. Tous les habitants d’un même État, d’un même Pays, qui vivent sous les mêmes 
lois, parlent le même langage .’ (cit. ibid.). Cf. also  Clere, Jean-Jacques , Etat-Nation-Citoyen Au 
Temps de la Revolution, in: Conrad, Marie-Françoise/Ferrari, Jean/Wunenburger, Jean-Jacques 
(ed.), L’ Idée de Nation, Dijon 1987, p. 97. 
70  “ tout peuple doit avoir un caractère national et s’il manquait, il faudrait déjà commencer par le 
lui donner ”  Rousseau, Jean-Jaques, Oeuvres complètes, Edition Pléiade vol. III (du contrat soci-
ale, écrits politiques), Paris 1964, Projet de constitution pour la corse, p. 913. 
71  Suratteau, Jean-René, La nation de 1789 a 1799. Sens, idéologie, évolution de l’emploi du mot, 
in: Gilli, Marita (ed.), Région, Nation, Europe: Unité et Diversité des processus sociaux et culturels 
de la Révolution franҫaise, Paris 1988, p. 687. 
72  “ je jure de vivre et de mourir pour elle, d’ observer toutes ses lois et d’ obéir à ses chefs en tout 
ce qui sera conforme à ces lois ”  Rousseau, Jean-Jaques, Oeuvres complètes, Edition Pléiade vol. 
III (du contrat sociale, écrits politiques), Paris 1964, Projet de constitution pour la corse, p. 943. 
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administration, but for the fi rst time appears as a singular self-sustaining political 
subject, as a state organisational legal point of reference. Nevertheless, the 
Rousseauian sovereign formed by the common will ( volonté générale ) is not on the 
mainroad of the French  discourse , even if it served as justifi cation that the Third 
 Estate made itself the constitutional assembly by abolishing the estatal representa-
tion and the despotic majority of the fi rst two estates. The metaphor of the  volonté 
générale as combination of natural law contractual theory and popular  sovereignty 
in the  Contrat Social (1762) is constantly realised in the state, 73 namely in the form 
of statutes –  actes de la  volonté générale . 74 
 Rousseau declares the content of sovereignty to be found exclusively in legisla-
tion, which is reserved for the people as a whole. The executive is a non-sovereign 
organ for carrying out laws. The Rousseauian sovereign as political body ( corps 
politique ) of the legal rules about the rights and duties of the citizens is absolute. 
With the passing of the social  contract , every citizen alienates his rights of the state 
of nature to the sovereign ( aliénation totale ). 75 The absolute freedom, which the 
individual transfers to the sovereign, enables him to do everything in absolute 
freedom. 
 Deriving sovereignty from the general  will leads to the following pivotal ques-
tion: the identity of individual and common interest. As an expression of 
societalisation, 76 the common will ( volonté générale ) is ‘not an agreement between 
the superior and the inferior.’ 77 Neither is it the sum of the particular wills ( volontés 
particulières ). Rather, to work out the general will, it has to be fi ltered from the 
particular wills in a dialectical process of decision. The general  will  aiming at this 
can be found in the judicial-political decision making procedure of the legislature, 
where the particular wills, by mutual contradiction, cancel out each other. Rousseau 
holds the so-formed general will to be the guarantee of the objective good, the 
73  “ La souveraineté n’étant que l’exercice de la volonté générale ne peut jamais s’aliéner et … le 
souverain, qui n’est qu’un être collectif, ne peut être représentée par la même raison qu’elle ne 
peut être représentée par lui-même ” ( Rousseau ,  Jean-Jaques, Du contrat social II, 1, p. 368. 
Compare ibid. III, 15, p. 429: “ La Souveraineté ne peut être représentée, par la même qu’elle ne 
peut être aliénée; elle consiste essentiellement dans la volonté générale, et la volonté ne se 
représente point. ” [Edition Pléiade, vol. III (du contrat sociale, écrits politiques), Paris 1964 ; the 
Roman numeral refers to the book, the Arabic one to the chapter]. 
74  Rousseau , Du contrat social II, 6, p. 379: “ Alors la matière sur laquelle on statue est générale 
comme la volonté qui statue. C’est acte que j’appelle une loi .” 
75  Rousseau , Du contrat social I, 1, p. 360: “ Ces clauses bien entendues [les clauses Du contrat 
social – Annotation of the author]  se réduisent toutes à une seule, savoir l’aliénation totale de 
chaque associé avec tous ses droits à toute la communauté […].” Thus, the subjective rights are 
negated both by Rousseau’s contract construction as well as Hobbes since they are being con-
sumed by sovereignty. 
76  Rousseau , Du contrat social II, 4, p. 375: The ‘volonté générale’ is a  “convention légitime, parce 
qu’elle a pour base le contract social […]” (legitimate convention because it is based on the social 
contract). 
77  Rousseau, Du contrat social II, 4, p. 375: “ Qu’est–ce donc proprement qu’un acte de souver-
ainité? Ce n’est pas une convention du supérieur avec l’inférieur, mais une convention du corps 
avec chacun de ses membres […].” 
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‘ bonum commune ’ of classical philosophy; the danger of a dictatorship of truth of 
the majority arose only under  Robespierre and the Jacobins. The  volonté générale is 
the phrase for the central statement of the Rousseauian constitutional draft for 
Poland 78 and Article 6 of the  Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789: 
freedom arises from participation in legislation. 79 
 The absoluteness of the sovereign and the fact that it is rooted in the will of the 
citizens has two consequences: sovereignty is based on the political and legal equal-
ity of all people, which is acquired through the social  contract , and is inalienable 
and indivisible. 80 The intellectual precondition is the equality of all people under 
natural law laid out in the  Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality among 
Men (1755). 81 Representation and separation of powers are excluded. 82 The indivis-
ibility of governmental power is the consequence of the indivisibility of the sover-
eignty of the  people . 83 The irrepresentability of sovereignty (‘ l’irréprésentabilité ’) 
leads Rousseau to the denial of any representative assembly or estates’ assembly in 
which the right to vote of the representatives of the people called by the monarch is 
not based on the person but rather their social class. 84 
78  Rousseau , Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne, et sur sa réformation projetée en avril 
1772, cap I (État de la Question), p. 954: “ Je vois tous les Etats de l’Europe courir à leur ruine. 
Monarchies, Républiques, toutes ces nations si magnifi quement instituées, tous ces beaux gouver-
nements si sagement pondérés, tombés en décrépitude, menacent d’une mort prochaine […].” And 
he continued, cap VIII. (Moyens de Maintenir la Constitution), p. 978 et seq.: “ Un des plus grands 
inconvénients des grands Etats, celui de tous qui y rend la liberté le plus diffi cile à conserver, est 
que la puissance législative ne peut s’y montrer elle-même, et ne peut agir que par deputation. 
Cela a son mal et son bien, mais le mal l’emporte. Le Legislateur en corps est impossible à cor-
rompre, mais facile à tromper. Ses répresentans sont diffi cilement trompés, mais aisément corrom-
pus, et il arrive rarement qu’ils ne le soient pas .” 
79  This idea is totally unknown in the American constitutional discourse , which never associates 
 legislation with the word  will . 
80  Rousseau , Du contrat social II, 2, p. 369. See ibid. II, 13, p. 427: “ l’autorité souveraine est simple 
et une, et l’on ne peut la diviser sans la détruire .” 
81  Rousseau’s  Discours sur l ’Origine et les Fondements de l’Inégalité parmi les Hommes 1755 
inspired Kant’s autonomy of pure practical reason. Kant changed both Rousseau’s state of nature 
as well as the term social contract “from an experience into an idea, he believed not to be devaluat-
ing but rather to found and secure this value in a narrower sense” ( Cassirer, Ernst, Rousseau, Kant, 
Goethe, ed. and introduced by Rainer A. Bast, Hamburg 1991, p. 24 et seq., p. 37). 
82  Rousseau, Du contrat social II, 1, p. 368; ibid., III 15, p. 429. 
83  Rousseau, Du contrat social II, 2, p. 369: “ Par la même raison que la souveraineté est inalié-
nable, elle est indivisible. Car la volonté est générale, ou elle ne l’est pas; elle est celle du corps 
du peuple, ou seulement d’une partie. Dans le premier cas cette volonté déclarée est un acte de 
souveraineté […]. Mais nos politiques ne pouvant diviser la souveraineté dans sons principe, la 
divisent dans son objet […]; ils font du Souverain un être fantastique et formé de pieces 
rapportées. ” 
84  Rousseau, Du contrat social II, 2, p. 369. Cf. also his Considérations sur le gouvernement de 
Pologne, et sur sa réformation projetée en avril 1772, chap. VIII, p. 978 et seq. 
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 Rousseau’s logical connection between lawmaking and equality was refi ned by 
the polemic paper ‘What is the  Third  Estate ?’ (1789) into the representation of the 
 volonté nationale , i.e. of the will of the majority of the National Assembly. 85 
3.2  The Various Interpretations of  National  Sovereignty 
in the Works of  Sieyès  
 The actual architect of national sovereignty is Emmanuel Sieyès, the author of the 
pamphlet ‘What is the third estate?’ and the protagonist in the political discussion 
after the convocation of the general  estates up to the debate on the royal  veto . The 
declaration of the Third  Estate as the National  Assembly on June 17, 1789 86 which 
resembled a coup d’état, was not enough to transfer the sovereignty of the King onto 
the nation. 87 For that, the development of a new collective identity and a new politi-
cal subject was necessary: the nation. The creation of the modalities of the exercise 
of the sovereignty 88 was also necessary: the constitution. Sieyès himself defi ned the 
85  Sieyès , Qu’est-ce que le Tiers État?, Edition critique avec une introduction et des notes par 
Roberto Zapperi, Genève 1970, p. 178 et seq., chap. 5: “ Les associés sont trop nombreux et répan-
dus sur une surface trop étendue, pour exercer facilement eux-mêmes leur volonté commune. Que 
font-ils ? Ils en détachent tout ce qui est nécessaire, pour veiller et pourvoir aux soins publics; et 
cette portion de volonté nationale et par conséquent de pouvoir aux soins publics ils en confi ent 
l’exercice à quelques-uns d’entre eux. Nous voici à la troisième époque, c’est-a-dire, à celle d’un 
gouvernement exercé par procuration. […] ce n’est plus la volonté commune réelle qui agit, c’est 
une volonté et par conséquent représentative .” Together with the brochures  Essai sur les privilèges 
(Paris 1788) and  Vues sur les moyens d’exécution dont les Représentans de la France pourront 
disposer en 1789 (Paris 1788) the script  Qu’est-ce que le Tiers-État? (Paris 1789) form the most 
infl uential brochures on the eve of the French Revolution. 
86 After the unsolvable dispute of the voting issue ‘by estates’ not ‘by head’, the representatives of 
the 3rd Estate began to meet on their own as the  Communes (Commons), from June 17 onwards 
they called themselves National Assembly . The majority of the clergy and some of the nobles 
joined them on June 19. The royal counter with the closing of the assembly room led to the famous 
moving to the tennis court with the Tennis Court Room Oath on the 20th June “ de ne jamais se 
séparer, et de se rassembler partout où les circonstances l’exigeront, jusqu’à ce que la Constitution 
du royaume soit établie et affermie sur des fondements solides .” The King recognised the National 
Assembly on June 27. 
87  By  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 54 referring to Mirkine-Guetzévitch, Boris, La Souveraineté de la 
nation, Revue politique et parlementaire CLXVIII 43 (1936), p. 130. 
88  In the terminology of Sieyès, representation is another word for the perception of duties – also in 
politics and in all public functions – by agency or division of labour. Cf.  Loewenstein, Karl, Volk 
und Parlament nach der Staatstheorie der französischen Nationalversammlung von 1789: Studien 
zur Dogmengeschichte der unmittelbaren Volksgesetzgebung (People and parliament according to 
the theory of the state of the French National Assembly in 1789: Studies on the history of the doc-
trine of direct popular legislation), Munich 1922, repr. Aalen 1964;  Schmitt, Eberhard, 
Repräsentation und Revolution: Eine Untersuchung zur Genesis der kontinentalen Theorie und 
Praxis parlamentarischer Repräsentation aus der Herrschaftspraxis des Ancien régime in Frankreich 
(Representation and Revolution: An appraisal of the genesis of continental theory and practice of 
parliamentary representation in the government practice of the Ancien Régime in France) (1760–
U. Müßig
19
constitution in his hardly known Discours of the Second Thermidor III (July 20, 
1795) as ‘almost complete in the organisation of the central public creation’ and he 
defi ned the central public room as ‘the political machine that you create to create the 
law, for … the execution of the law under all aspects of the Republic’. 89 For Sieyès, 
national sovereignty and represented government are logical twins. 
 Following the French historiographical state-of-the art, 90 the studies of Elisabeth 
Fehrenbach 91 and their profound elaboration by  Pasquale  Pasquino 92 three 
 interpretations of nation were present in the political vocabulary of 1789, predomi-
nantly infl uenced by Sieyès. 
3.2.1  Anti-estate Societal Meaning of National Sovereignty 
 The nation is a homogeneous and self-suffi cient entity as opposed to the estate soci-
ety, which the convocation of the general  estates by Louis XVI on May 5, 1789 tried 
to reactivate. The nation, which was constituted by the declaration of the Third 
Estate as the National Assembly developed as a new political subject and embodied 
the (revolutionary) claim to representing everything of a part (of the Third Estate) 
 for the entirety. This exclusionary consequence for the privileged estates was criti-
cised by the speaker of the moderate monarchists in the  constituante Pierre-Victor 
Malouet 93 : ‘But they [the clergy and the  nobility ] are part of the Nation […] and 
1789) Munich 1969;  Hafen, Thomas, Staat, Gesellschaft und Bürger im Denken von Emmanuel 
Joseph Sieyès (State, society and citizens in the thinking of Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès), Bern 1994; 
 Pasquino ,  Pasquale, Sieyès et l’ínvention de la constitution en France, Paris 1998. 
89  “ presque entière dans l’organisation de l’établissement public central” (“almost complete in the 
organisation of the central public creation”) “la machine politique que vous constituez pour don-
ner la loi, pour… l’exécution de la loi sous tous les points de la république ” (“the political machine 
that you create to create the law, for … the execution of the law under all aspects of the Republic”) 
Published in  Bastid, Paul , Les Discours de Sieyès dans les débats constitutionnels de l‘ an III, Paris 
1939, p. 13 et seq. and in:  Bastid, Paul , Sieyès et sa pensée, Genf 1978, p. 373. 
90  Bacot, Guillaume , Carré of Malberg and the distinction between sovereignty of the people and 
national sovereignty, Paris Édition du C.N.R.S. 1985;  Clere , (n. 69);  idem , L’ emploi des mots 
nation et peuple dans le langage politique de la Révolution française (1789–1799), in: Nation et 
République, les éléments d’un débat, actes du colloque de l’AFHIP des 6–7 avril 1994 à Dijon, 
Presse Universitaires d’ Aix-Marseille 1995, p. 51–65;  Slimani, Ahmed , La modernité du concept 
de nation au XVIIIe siècle (1715–1789): Apports des Thèses Parlementaires et des Idées Politiques 
du Temps, Presse Universitaires d’ Aix-Marseille 2004. 
91 Art. Nation, in: Reichardt, R./Schmitt, E. (ed.), Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in 
Frankreich 1680–1820, booklet 7, Munich 1986, p. 75–107. 
92  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 55 et seq. 
93 As spokesman of the moderate monarchists in the constituante he explaines his use of sover-
eignty in his manuscript “Sur la révolte de la minorité contre la majorité” (1791): “ Le Corps légis-
latif est seul indépendant, dans le royaume, de toute personne et de toute autorité. Le Corps 
législatif, et le roi à la tête, voilá la représentation exacte de la souveraineté nationale; mais le 
monarque représente à lui seul la souveraineté de la loi .” (Orateurs de la Révolution française, 
édition Pléiade, vol. I, Paris 1989, p. 499). He pleads for the royal veto (ibid., p. 507) and seems to 
quote from Montesquieu’s ideal monarchy (ibid., p. 507). 
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you, the representatives of the commoners, why do you call yourself the only repre-
sentatives of the Nation?’. 94 The starting point for this term of the nation, which 
excludes the aristocracy [and thereby expressing the state citizen equality] is the 
fi rst chapter of Sieyès Tiers État: ‘Such a class [the  nobility ] is absolutely unknown 
to the nation by its idleness’ 95 since it does not work, does not create value or bears 
public functions. Even more precise is the abridge version of the Tiers État which is 
kept in the French National Archives and which Pasquino has managed to edit. 
There you can read the equalization of 3rd estate and nation in Sieyès original 
soundtrack: “ Le tiers n’est point le tiers, c‘ est la nation, et si l‘ on veut distinguer 
des non-privilégiés les deux classes privilégiées, il faut alors dire: le clergé, la 
noblesse, et la nation .” 96 The pathetic ending of this pamphlet concludes with the 
address to the French people as Spartanian Helotes. 97 
 Similar, but more pointedly anti-monarchical is the second meaning of nation in 
1789. 
3.2.2  Anti-monarchical Meaning of National Sovereignty 
 The nation and the theory of national sovereignty are addressed against the twelve 
hundred years of French monarchy. The monarchy by divine right ( le droit divine ) 
is still the characteristic wording of the edits against the  Parlement  de Paris under 
the redaction of the chancellor  Maupeou 98 : “ Nous ne tenons notre couronne que de 
Dieu: le droit de faire des lois par lesquelles nos sujets doivent être conduits et 
gouvernés nous appartient à nous seuls, sans dépendance et sans partage ;” 99 It is 
exactly this absolutistic  claim to ‘hold our crown … for the grace of God’ and the 
claim for exclusive monarchical legislation ‘the right to make laws by which our 
subjects will be governed is to us alone without any kind of dependence and without 
any kind of sharing’– which the second meaning of nation in 1789 aims at putting 
in the museum of history. There are many voices to question any monarchical legiti-
mation. Pasquino quotes the ‘ Mémoires ou Tableau historique et politique de 
l ’ Assemblée constituante ’ (1797) of Antoine de Rivarol on the fi rst months of the 
94  “ Mais ils [le clergé et la noblesse] font partie de la Nation […] et vous, les deputés des com-
munes, pourquoi vous appelleriez-vous les seuls représentants de la Nation? ” Second discours sur 
la constitution des communes en Assemblée nationale, cit. in: Orateurs de la Révolution française, 
édition Pléiade, vol. I, Paris 1989, p. 451. 
95  “ Une telle classe [la noblesse] est absolument étrangère à la nation par sa fainéantise ” Ed. by 
Zapperi, Robert, Genf 1970, p. 125. 
96 Archives Nationales Paris, 284 AP 4 doss. 8, ed. by  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 169. 
97  “ Je m’adresse à tous les bons citoyens, à tous ceux qui tremblent pour l’evénement et croient déjà 
voir deux cent mille aristocrates replonger dans les fers vingt-cinq millions d‘ ilotes .” (Archives 
Nationales Paris, 284 AP 4 doss. 8, ed. by Pasquino, (n. 69), p. 170). 
98  Cf. for the context of the prerevolutionary parliamentary opposition:  Müßig ,  Ulrike , Justizhoheit 
(Judicial Sovereignty), ibid. (n. 2), p. 105. 
99  Edit de décembre 1770, in:  Jourdan/Décrusy/Isambert, Tome XXII, p. 501, p. 506 et seq. 
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French  revolution : “La couronne n’ est plus qu’ une ombre vaine” (‘The crown is 
nothing more but a vaine shadow’). 100 
 Despite the monarchical position as head of the executive and integral part of the 
legislative, the September  Constitution 1791 does no longer cause illusions due to 
the only suspensive royal  veto (Tit. III, Chap. III, Sec. 3, Art. 1, 2). 101 Sieyès wants 
to eliminate the crown’s integration into legislation. In his manuscript ‘ Représentation 
et Élections ’ 1791, Sieyès argues against any monarchical participation in the legis-
lation, denying even a suspensive  veto of the king, otherwise the legislative decision- 
making process would be divided into two branches, in a national  will and a 
hereditary monarchical will: “ Suivant le comité le corps législatif se divise en deux 
branches, l’Assemblée et le roi. Dans ce cas le pouvoir législatif est formé de deux 
volontés, la  volonté nationale exercée par le système temporaire des élus et la volo-
nté royale héréditaire .” And he closes this rarely known manuscript with the 
polemic, that ‘the  king is not a minister in the national interest next to the national 
assembly, therefore he is not a legislative representative.’ 102 Such a theoretical posi-
tion is congruent with those of the President of the Constituent National Assembly 
Jacques Guillaume  Thouret 103 or the Jacobine Antoine  Barnave . 104 And the highlight 
of this democratic-republican use of nation is the explanation of the national sover-
eignty in the 1793 constitution as popular  sovereignty . 
3.2.3  The National Sovereignty as Idea or Principle 
of an “ordre nouveau” 
 Sièyes’ idea 105 of the nation is a principle that is incompatible with aristocratic privi-
leges and legitimizes the civil war against the  Ancien Régime as new “ droit com-
mun ”, as “ ordre nouveau ”. This (modern) term of the nation which has been coined 
100  Rivarol, Antoine de , Mémoires ou Tableau historique et politique de l’Assemblée constituante, 
Paris Maret, Desenne, Cérieux 1797, p. 226. Antoine de Rivarol (1753–1801) was a French and 
Europe-wide known editor, from an originally Italian Bourgeois family. 
101  Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 326;  Müßig , Die europäische Verfassungsdiskussion 
des 18. Jahrhunderts (The European Constitutional discourse of the 18th c.), Tübingen 2008, p. 49. 
102  Le roi n’agit que comme ministre de l’intérêt national auprès de l’Assemblée, il n’est pas 
représentant législatif 284 AP 4 doss. 12, cit. also in  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 173. 
103  1746–1794. 
104  Together with Adrien Duport and Alexandre Lameth, Antoine Barnave was called the “Troika” 
in the constituante. He supported Sieyès, though in favour of the suspensive monarchic veto , and 
was, apart from Mirabeau, the rhetoric protagonist at the National Assembly. His passionate dis-
pute with Mirabeau and Jacques Antione Marie de Vazalès on the question of whether the King had 
the right to decide on war or peace (May 16–23, 1791) is deemed one of the most notable scenes 
in the history of the National Assembly. 
105  Lafayette is to talk of the principle of the nation later on in his pre-draft on the declaration of 
human and citizen rights of July 11, 1789, cf. here No. 3 and AP, Vol. VIII, BN, Microfi lm 
M-11174(4): AP, Vol. VIII, P. 222 [11 juillet 1789]. Malouet critisises in his Opinion sur l’acte 
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in the Fifth Chapter of the Tiers État is the expression of the state citizen equality 
and carries through with the Tennis Court Oath: ‘The nation exists before all, it is 
the origin of everything. Its will is always legal and it is the law itself.’ 106 
 Now the  Third  Estate can declare itself the National  Assembly , the exclusive 
representative of the nation construed as the sovereign: “ Une société politique, un 
peuple, une nation sont des termes synonymes .”, formulates Sieyès’ manuscript 
‘ Contre la Ré-Totale ’ (1792). 107 If one opposes the absolutistic  sovereignty attitude 
of the Leviathan according to which it is impossible to think the sovereign without 
the people, 108 the new legal conception (of the nation) becomes evident: the nation 
consists before all and is the origin of all. Thus, the nation can exist independent of 
the process of the representation and can be carrier of the  pouvoir  constituant . 109 
 Thereby, for the fi rst time, the (normal) legislative power can be distinguished 
from the constituent  assembly . Sieyès is the person who fi rst formulates the distinc-
tion between  pouvoirs  constitués and  pouvoir  constituant in his preliminaries of the 
French Constitution: ‘A healthy and useful idea was established in 1788, that is the 
idea of the division between the pouvoir constituant and the pouvoirs constitués. It 
belongs to the discoveries that have found their way, it is due to the French’ (his 
discours of 2 thermidor III). 110 Often, the  pouvoirs constitués are called  pouvoirs 
commettants by Sieyès, especially when they have been voted for. 111 
 Constitution-creating sovereignty of the  nation resolves the self-referring para-
dox of the sovereignty as an unfi xed power of self-bindingness, which had been left 
in the open by social  contract theories. 112 With the fi ction that the will of the nation 
constitutionnel: “ Tel est donc le premier vice de votre Constitution, d’avoir placé la souveraineté 
en abstraction ,” (cit. in: Orateurs de la Révolution française, vol. I, édition Pléiade, Paris 1989, 
p. 503. 
106  La nation existe avant tout, elle est l’origine de tout. Sa volonté est toujours légale, elle est la 
loi elle-même . ( Sieyès , Qu‘ est-ce que le tiers état?, edition by Zappieri, R., p. 180). 
107  284 AP 5 doss. 1 (1), cit. also in  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 175. 
108  Hobbes, Thomas , Leviathan, Part II (of commonwealth), cap. XVII (Of the Causes, Generation, 
and Defi nition of a Commonwealth): ‘And in him consisteth the essence of the Commonwealth; 
which, to defi ne it, is: one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with 
another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means 
of them all as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defence. And he that carryeth 
this person is called sovereign, and said to have sovereign power; and every one besides, his sub-
ject.’ (in: The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Molesworth, William (ed), vol. III, London 1839, 
Reprint Aalen 1962, p. 172). 
109  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 63. 
110  «Une idée saine et utile fut établie en 1788, c’est la division du pouvoir constituant et des pou-
voirs constitués. Elle comptera parmi les découvertes qui ont fait faire un pas à la science, elle est 
due aux Français» Discours sur le projet de constitution et sur la jurie constitutionnaire.—
Moniteur du 7 thermidor an III (25 juillet 1795) = Les discourses de Sièyes dans les débates con-
stitutionnels de l’an III (2 et 18 thermidor), ed. and with introduction by Paul Bastid, Paris 1939, 
p. 20. 
111  Sieyès , Préliminaire de la constitution francaise, p. 35 et seq.;  idem , Quelques idées de constitu-
tion applicables à la ville de Paris, p. 30 et seq. Realized by  Pasquino , (n. 69), note 58 on page 65. 
112  Müßig , Konfl ikt und Verfassung, p. 5 and also  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 63. 
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itself is always lawful and that it is the law in itself – designed by Sieyès in the cited 
fi fth chapter – the entire decisive process of the juridifi cation of the  sovereignty is 
initiated. 113 This is so, since the constitution is understood as decision ( acte impéra-
tif de la nation ) according to Émile Boutmy: ‘a decision which creates the positive 
law and leads back to a conception of the constitution’. 114 Essential for the under-
standing of Sieyès sovereignty concept, articulated in his third estate-pamphlet, is 
the differentiation between  pouvoirs  constitués  and  pouvoirs constituant . 115 This is 
elaborated further in his not well-known abridged version of the pamphlet ‘What is 
the third estate ?’: From the non-interchangeability of the  pouvoirs constitués and 
the  pouvoir constituant  Sièyes concludes that the ordinary legislative body cannot 
touch the constitution. 116 
 Even less well-known is Sieyès’ manuscript ‘ Limites de la Souveraineté ’ (limits 
of the sovereignty), 117 where he specifi es the exclusion of any absolutistic political 
 power by the sovereignty of nation and its immanent differentiation between consti-
tuant assemblies and ordinary legislative bodies. Thereby he seems to anticipate the 
liberal state theory of the  Kantian Metaphysics of Morals 118 and points out that any 
kind of absolutistic omnipotence of the constituted  powers  ( pouvoirs constitués ) is 
excluded. The political power ( le pouvoir politique ) is limited by the political object 
of society ( l’objet politique de la société ). 119 The latter has the same meaning as 
 Locke ’s extra- statutory natural law as an immanent limit of every exercise of power 
with the freedom guarantee of the common law before the prerogative. 120 Sieyès’ 
pamphlet declares the protection of liberties and rights as a political object of any 
113  “ Das Verfassungsdenken wird von einem wachsenden Rechtspositivismus durchzogen .” 
( Schmale, Wolfgang, Constitution, Constitutionnel, in: Reichardt, Rolf/Lüsebrink, Hans-Jürgen 
(ed.), Handbuch politsch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680–1820, Munich 1992, p. 37). 
114  Boutmy, Émile, Études de droit constitutionnel: France, Angleterre, États-Unis, Paris 1885 (3rd 
éd. 1909), p. 241: “ une décision qui crée le droit positif, et renvoie à une conception de la 
constitution ”. 
115  «Dans chaque partie, la constitution n’est pas l’ ouvrage du pouvoir constitué, mais du pouvoir 
constituant.» Sieyès , Qu’est-ce que le Tiers État? Edition critique avec une introduction et des 
notes par Roberto Zapperi, Genève 1970, p. 180–181. 
116  “ J’y vois que le pouvoir constitué et le pouvoir constituant ne peuvent point se confondre. Et 
qu’ainsi le corps des représentants ordinaires du peuple, c’est-à-dire ceux qui sont chargés de la 
législation ordinaire, ne peuvent sans contradiction et sans absurdité toucher à la constitution. Il 
est évident que tous les droits appartiennent toujours à la nation et que dans tous les différends qui 
regardent la constitution, c’ est à la nation elle-même d’y mettre ordre, en confi ant, à cet effet, un 
pouvoir spécial à des représentants ordinaires dont les forces ainsi que celles de la nation elle-
même sont libres, et indépendantes, des formes constitutionnelles sur lesquelles ils ont à juger .” 
(284 AP 4 doss. 8, cit. also by  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 168). 
117  284 AP 5 doss. 1 (4), cit. also by  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 177 et seq. 
118  Cf.  Müßig , Justizhoheit (Judicial Sovereignty), ibid. (n. 2), p. 279 et seq. 
119  Il y a une grande différence entre un pouvoir absolu/total, complet, et le pouvoir politique. 
Celui-ci pris même dans son intégrité est déjà borné par l’objet politique de la société ; 284 AP 5 
doss. 1 (4), cit. also by  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 177. 
120  Cf.  Müßig , Justizhoheit (Judicial Sovereignty), ibid. (n. 2), p. 210 et seq. 
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societal association. The majority’s decision becomes law. 121 If the constitution 
doesn’t exist before the majority’s decision it falls within the nucleus of the associ-
ation- contract conducted under the unanimous will of the people. Therefore the 
constituent  sovereignty is under control by means of the personal veto of every dis-
senting individual. Even if the constitutional decisions have to be taken for practical 
reasons by the majority, the guarantee of the minority resides within the act of the 
association and therefore within the legal text of the constitution decided upon in 
the constituent national assembly. This immanent guarantee is the equivalent of the 
 bonum  commune by the political philosophers since ancient times and bars the sov-
ereignty executed by the majority from unifying all of the political powers, from 
disorganising them and from reframing their constitutional organisation. 122 And for 
Sieyès this imminent guarantee is the safeguard for personal liberty by means of 
constitutions. Thereby despotism is excluded before the legal second in which the 
ordinary legislative body (deciding on statutory law by the majority) is established 
121  […] On s’associe pour être protégé et aidé dans l’exercice de sa liberté/ses droits par la puis-
sance de toute l’association. Ainsi donc la  toute-puissance  n’appartient point au souverain, il est 
souverain de l’association et non maître des associés. Quant aux limites de ce  pouvoir politique 
 pris dans sa totalité, voyons : Un acte qui exige l’unanimité, c’est l’acte d’association. Puisque 
chaque individu y entre, il y reste librement, c’est sa volonté. Toute autre volonté commune concer-
nant les intérêts de la société peut n’être pas unanime. Il faut néanmoins qu’elle fasse loi. L’acte 
d’association est donc une convention tacite ou formelle de reconnaître pour loi la volonté de la 
 majorité  des associés. […] (284 AP 5 doss. 1 (4), cit. also by Pasquino, (n. 69), p. 178) Bolding by 
UM . 
122  […] C’est le passage de la première époque à la seconde, qui décide de la liberté d’un peuple. 
Si la constitution n’existe pas avant l’action de la majorité (la majorité ne peut décider pour la 
minorité qu’en la représentant, la représentation est libre de la part du représenté; il faut donc 
qu’il existe de la part de chacun un engagement préalable de reconnaître la majorité même contre 
son vœu individuel; cet engagement fait partie de l’acte social) ou si la majorité peut manquer aux 
lois constitutionnelles, l’aristocratie se montre à la place de la liberté.  On se trompe donc 
lorsqu’on parle de la souveraineté du peuple comme n’ayant point de bornes. 1. Ce ne peut 
jamais être la toute-puissance sur les associés, nous l’avons prouvé plus haut,  la souveraineté 
est enfermée dans les limites d’un pouvoir politique . 2. Le peuple votant  à l’unanimité  ne peut 
pas exercer une souveraineté dangereuse, puisque chaque individu a dans cette supposition  son 
veto personnel . Dès que le peuple votant ainsi a arrêté  son acte d’association et ses lois consti-
tutionnelles  qui en sont la  garantie  (puisqu’il ne peut plus, à moins d’être en demeure, continuer 
à vouloir à l’unanimité, car dans cette supposition, il n’y aurait jamais de lois, chacun aurait son 
veto et la société manquerait son but, elle s’anéantirait)  il est évident que  la souveraineté  lorsqu’il 
vote à la majorité  n’embrasse pas le droit de réunir tous les pouvoirs politiques ni de les désor-
ganiser, ni d’en exercer aucun en particulier autrement que suivant les lois de son organisation 
constitutionnelle. La liberté d’un peuple tient essentiellement à cette condition.  Sans elle, la 
majorité dévorerait la minorité, et s’il faut exécute [?] elle-même, elle continuerait à se dévorer 
jusqu’à l’anéantissement de la liberté.  La garantie de l’acte d’association, et de la minorité 
réside donc dans sa constitution.  Les philosophes et surtout ceux de l’Antiquité diront que cette 
garantie est  dans les mœurs et dans la bonne volonté du peuple .  Mais comme la bonne volonté est 
ambulatoire et ne peut trop aux ordres des passions, comme les mœurs se dépravent ou changent 
par le seul avancement des arts et la progression des richesses,  je dis que c’est à la constitution à 
nous garantir notre liberté . […] Bolding and underlining by UM. (284 AP 5 doss. 1 (4), cit. also 
by Pasquino, (n. 69), p. 178 et seq) . 
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as  pouvoir constitué . 123  Sieyès’ conclusions from his differentiation between the 
decision on constitution and the passing of ordinary legislative acts in his ‘ Limites 
de la souveraineté ’ are expressly against  Rousseau : ‘Respresentation can never be a 
direct act, and under the constitution it is always divided, never accumulated and 
always dependent on the constitutional laws.’ 124 
 With the introduction of the nation a second point of reference besides the mon-
archy comes into existence. The  monarch is indeed disempowered, but not abol-
ished. In my perception, this means a quite decisive process of juridifi cation of 
 sovereignty . 125 
 This can be traced via the elaboration of Sieyès’ concepts in  Lafayette’s draft of 
the Declaration of Human and Civil  Rights July, 11 1789. The Declaration of 
Human and Civil  Rights in the National Assembly on August 26 to November 3, 
1789 relies indirectly on  Lafayette’s draft: “ Le principe de toute souveraineté réside 
dans la nation . 126  Nul corps, nul individu ne peut avoir une autorité qui n’en émane 
expressément ” (‘The principle of the entire sovereignty is vested in the nation. 
Nobody, no individual can have an authority which is not derived therefrom’). 127 
123  “ Le despotisme doit être rendu impossible avant qu’on se permette de faire une loi à la majorité .” 
284 AP 5 doss. 1 (4), cit. also by  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 179). 
124  “ Donc, la représentation et non l’action directe; dons la représentation divisée, sous la constitu-
tion, et non accumulée et rendue indépendante de ses lois constitutives .” 284 AP 5 doss. 1 (4), cit. 
also by  Pasquino , (n. 69), p. 179 et seq.). 
125  “ The constitutional thinking is permeated by a growing legal positivism. ” ( Schmale ,  Wolfgang, 
“Constitution, Constitutionnel”, in: Reichardt, Rolf/Lüsebrink, Hans-Jürgen (ed.), Handbuch poli-
tisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich (Handbook of social-political basics in France) 1680 – 
1820, Munich 1992, 37). 
126 AP, Vol. VIII, BN, Microfi lm M-11174(4): AP, Vol. VIII, p. 222 [11 juillet 1789]: M le marquis 
de Lafayette fait lecture du projet qui suit: 
 “La nature a fait les hommes libres et égaux; les distictions nécessaires à l’ordre social ne sont 
fondées que sur l’utilité générale. 
 Tout homme nait avec des droits inaliènables et imprescriptibles; telles sont la liberté de toutes 
ses opinions, le soin de son honneur et de sa vie; le droit de proprieté, la disposition entière de sa 
personne, de son industrie, des toutes ses facultés; la communication des ses pensées par tous les 
moyens possibles, la recherche du bien-être et la résistance à l’oppression. 
 L’exercice des droits naturels n’a de bornes que celles qui en assurent la jouissance aux autres 
membres de la société. 
 Nul homme ne peut être soumis qu’à des lois consenties par lui ou ses représentants, antéri-
eurement promulguées et légalement appliquées.” Then the quotation in the main text follows. 
127  The wording of Lafayette continues : “Tout gouvernement a pour unique but le bien commun. 
Cet intérêt exige que les pouvoirs législatif, exécutif et judiciaire, soient distincts et défi nis, et que 
leur organisation assure la représentation libre des citoyens, la responsabilité des agents et 
l’impartialité des juges. 
 Les lois doivent être claires, précises, uniformes pour tous les citoyens. 
 Les subsides doivent être librement consentis, et proportionellement répartis. 
 Et comme l’introduction des abus et le droit des générations qui sed succèdent nécessitent la 
révision de tout établissement humain, il doit être possible à la nation d’avoir, dans certains cas, 
une convocation extraordinaire de députés, dont le seul objet soit d’examineer et corriger, s’ il est 
nécessaire, les vices de la constitution.” Archives Parlementaires de 1787 a 1860, Recueil complet 
débats législatifs & politiques des chambres françaises, sous la diréction de M.J. Mavidal/MM. E. 
Laurent et E. Clavel, première série (1789 à 1799), Tome VIII du 5 Mai 1789 au 15 septembre 
1789, Paris 1875. 
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‘The origin of all sovereignty is intrinsic to the nation’, it is formulated in the dec-
laration of the human and civil rights of 1789. In the September  constitution of 
1791 , Title III, Article 1 repeats: ‘The sovereignty is unique, indivisible and non- 
susceptible to time-barring. It only belongs to the nation. No part of the people and 
no singular person can appropriate its exercise.’ 128 Such an understanding corre-
sponds with Sieyès’ periphrasis of legal equality: ‘I think of the law as being in the 
centre of an enormous sphere: all citizens without exception fi nd themselves in the 
same distance on the surface, all depend equally from the law, all give their freedom 
and belongings under its protection. … All these individuals …, enter into obliga-
tions and trade, always under the same guarantee of the laws … By protecting the 
common rights of every citizen, the law protects every citizen in everything until 
the moment when that what he wants begins to be opposed to the common interest.’ 
(translat. U.M.). 129 
 The wording of the  sovereignty of the  nation in the  French September Constitution 
 1791 does not only manage to integrate two sovereigns, but also joins the constitu-
tional idea with national integration. 130 Symbolizing the revolutionary pathos for 
equality, the idea of a French nation was expanded from that of a few privileged to 
all of the citizens, with a corresponding census. Thus, the French Constitution of 
 1791 created a right of citizenship (Tit. II, Art. 2–6), 131 and announced civil equality 
(Tit. I), 132 even though three sevenths of French men (due to poverty) and French 
women altogether were excluded from the right to vote (Tit. III, Chap. I, Sec. II, Art. 
2), 133 and the right to stand for election (Tit. III, Chap. I, Sec. III, Art. 3). 134 The 
demand for civil equality expresses itself also in the modern understanding of laws 
as abstract/general norms, 135 and in the postulate of a unitary, legally equal nation as 
128  Cit. by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 299. 
129  Sieyès ,  Emmanuel Joseph , Qu’est-ce que le Tiers État? Edition critique avec une introduction et 
des notes par Roberto Zapperi, Genève 1970, p. 209, chap. VI (Chapitre VI) : «  Je me fi gure la loi 
au centre d’un globe immense ; tous les citoyens sans exception sont à la même distance sur la 
circonférence et n’y occupent que des places égales ; tous dépendent également de la loi, tous lui 
offrent leur liberté et leur propriété à protéger ; et c’est ce que j’appelle les droits communs de 
citoyens, par où ils se ressemblent tous. Tous ces individus correspondent entr’eux, ils négocient, 
ils s’engagent les uns envers les autres, toujours sous la garantie commune de la loi. […]  La loi, 
en protégeant les droits communs de tout citoyen, protège chaque citoyen dans tout ce qu’il peut 
être, jusqu’à l’instant où ses tentatives blesseroient les droits d’autrui. ” 
130  Cf. for more details,  Müßig , Giornale di Storia Costituzionale 27 (2014), 107 et seq., 109. 
131  Cited by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 297 et seq. 
132  Cited by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 294 et seq. 
133  Cited by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 302. 
134  Cited by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 305. 
135  Sieyès, tiers état, chap. 6: “ Je me fi gure la loi au centre d’un globe immense; tous les citoyens 
sans exception sont à la même distance sur la circonférence et n’y occupent que des places égales; 
tous dépendent également de la loi, tous lui offrent leur liberté et leur propriété à protéger; et c’est 
ce que j’appelle les droits communs de citoyens, par où ils se ressemblent tous. Tous ces individus 
correspondent entr’eux, ils négocient, ils s’engagent les uns vers les autres toujours sous la garan-
tie commune de la loi. […]  La loi, en protégeant les droits communs de tout citoyen, protège 
chaque citoyen dans tout ce qu’il peut être, jusqu’à ses tentatives blesseraient les droits d’autrui. ” 
(I imagine the law in the center of an enormous globe: all citizens without exception are equally 
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a rationally based unit, in which individuals may realise their pursuit of happiness. 
The antonym 136 of the happy constitution ( heureuse constitution ) and the pre- 
constitutional state ( agrégat inconstitué ) corresponds with the  bonum  commune of 
the antique political philosophy in the enlightened adaption. 137 
 In relation to Sieyès’ quoted explanation of legal equality, the King himself or 
members of the former privileged estates are also included. Therefore, the monar-
chical  principle was held compatible with the sovereignty of the nation  (Tit. III, 
Chap. II Sec. I, Art. 2). 138 It is the abstractness of national  sovereignty that allows a 
monarchical reading of the September Constitution 1791. It is again  Malouet , who 
opens our eyes for the monarchical impact within the process of juridifi cation by 
constitution: “ Le Corps législatif est seul indépendant, dans le royaume, de toute 
personne et de toute autorité. Le Corps législatif, et le roi à la tête, voilá la représen-
tation exacte de la souveraineté nationale; mais le monarque représente à lui seul 
la souveraineté de la loi. Ainsi, tout ce qui peut porter atteinte à sa dignité, à sa 
prérogative d’indépendance, à son autorité légitime, est aussi criminel en fait 
qu’absurde en principe, si l’on veut conserver la monarchie .” 139 Neither the imple-
mentation of Sieyès’ ideas into the declaration of 1789 nor into the text of the 
September constitution 1791  were antimonarchical. 
3.3  Openness of the Political Vocabulary of 1789 
for the Rankly Oriented Use of Nation by the French 
parlements 
 Besides Sieyès’  connotations of the nation, there is one other infl uence on the politi-
cal vocabulary of 1789, which derives from the usage of the French  parlements as 
origin of the estate resistance since 1760. From the registration right ( droit de 
spaced on the surface, all equally alike depend on the law, all their freedom and their property 
themselves under its protection. … All these individuals are facing each other in relationships with 
each other, enter into commitments, and do business, always under the joint guarantee of the law. 
…While the law protects the common rights of every citizen, it protects every citizen in all that he 
may be up to the moment when what he wants to be, begins to harm the common interest.) ed. 
Zapperi, p. 209. 
136  In the  Cahiers an  agrégat inconstitué describes the opposite of the happy constitution ( heureuse 
constitution ). Cf. Goubert, Pierre/Denis, Michel (ed.), Les Français ont la parole (The French have 
the word), p. 65 quotes the Cahiers de doléances des États généraux, Paris 1775: “ régnez comme 
Charlemagne; mais ajoutez à votre gloire ce qui a manqué à la sienne: forces vos successeurs à 
maintenir l’heureuse constitution que vous allez nous rendre ” . 
137  Cf. defi nition by the  L ’ Encyclopédie methodique, Economie politique of 1784, that when a 
nation wishes to form a political society, it must give itself the most suitable constitution, which 
will be exactly the one, which aims at its “ salut …,  perfection …,  bonheur ” (Démeunier, Jean 
Nicolas (ed.) Encyclopédie méthodique, Economie politique, vol. 1. Paris 1784, p. 642). 
138  Cited by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig) ibid. (n. 32), p. 310. 
139  Sur la révolte de la minorité contre la majorité (Fev. 1791), cit. in: Orateurs de la Révolution 
française, édition Pléiade, vol. I, Paris 1989, p. 499. 
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remontrance avant l’enregistrement ) the  parlements derived their right to be the 
(estate) guardians of the right of the nation, 140 which had been eternalized by 
 Montesquieu in his idealisation of the French monarchy (II, 4). 141 At the heart this is 
about the rest of the estate restrictions of the absolute monarchy. In my habilitation 
‘ Recht und Justizhoheit ’ (‘Law and Judicial Sovereignty’), I elaborately took a 
stance concerning the pre-revolution of the  parlements, 142 as defendant of the old 
constitution of the Kingdom and of the estate rights which are described as natural 
law; the  parlements describe themselves as  cours souveraines 143 in their remon-
strances and notably the  Parlement  de Paris since 1788 as “ représentants de la 
nation ”. 144 The King was well aware of the danger as his speech in the Parlement de 
Paris  in 1766 on the occasion of a  lit de justice , known under the name  Séance de la 
fl agellation made evident: “ Les droits et les intérêts de la nation, dont on ose faire 
un corps séparé du monarque, sont nécessairement unis avec les miens, et ne repo-
sent qu’un mes mains ” (‘The rights and the interests of the nation of which one 
dares to make a body separate from the Monarch are necessarily united with mine 
and extend only to my hands’). 145 A very similar read is the dissertation by the court 
historian and apologist of the  Ancien Régime Jacob Nicolas  Moreau of 1789 by the 
title ‘ Défense de notre constitution monarchique francaise ’: ‘I have said it without 
reference to the nation’. 146 These ideas of the prerevolutionary parliamentary oppo-
sition against the French crown have been well known in the National  Assembly 
since 1789. For contemporaries, they open up the  interpretation of the nation as 
canon of old republican freedoms, that understanding which can easily be traced in 
the Polish May  Constitution 1791. 
140  Esp.  Müßig , Justizhoheit (Judicial Sovereignty), ibid. (n. 2), p. 121. 
141  Müßig, Justizhoheit, ibid. (n. 2), p. 122 et seq. 
142  Müßig, Justizhoheit, ibid. (n. 2), p. 130 et seq. 
143  Müßig, Ulrike, Höchstgerichte im frühneuzeitlichen Frankreich und England – 
Höchstgerichtsbarkeit als Motor des frühneuzeitlichen Staatsbildungsprozesses, Akten des 36. 
Deutschen Rechtshistorikertages in Halle an der Saale 2006, Lieberwirth, Rolf/Lück, Heiner (ed.), 
Baden-Baden 2008, p. 544–577, 544 with the quotation according to the French-Latin Dictionary, 
ed. in Paris 1569. 
144  Müßig , Justizhoheit (Judicial Sovereignty), ibid. (n. 2);  Bickart ,  Roger, Les Parlements et la 
nation de souverainetés nationale au XVIIIe siècle, Paris 1932. 
145  Flammermont/Tourneux , Remonstrances, II, Paris 1895, p. 558. 
146  “ Je l’ai dit, sans le roi point de nation […]” Exposition et défense de notre constitution monar-
chique française, précédé de l’Histoire de toutes nos Assemblées Nationales, dans deux mémoires 
où l’on établit qu’il n’est aucun changement utile dans notre administration, dont cette constitution 
même dont cette constitution même ne nous présente les moyens, vol. II, Paris 1789, p. 105. 
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3.4  The Nation in the Polish May-Constitution 1788 
3.4.1  Old  Republicanism as an Integral Part of the Juridifi cation 
by Constitution 
 In the tradition of the pre-revolutionary estate-based ideas, the Polish constitution of 
May  1791 , just after its  preamble , includes a constitutional contract between the 
estates‘ assembly representing the nation on the one side and ‘ Stanisław August by 
the Grace of God through the will of the nation King of Poland ’ (Introduction to the 
Polish May  Constitution 1791) 147 on the other. The constituent nation in the sense of 
the  preamble is not meant to be understood as the sovereign people of free and equal 
citizens, but – and this is in accordance with the old-estate understanding of the 
nobility as ‘the furthermost pillar of liberty and the contemporary constitution’ 148 – 
as the nation of the  nobility . 149 The affi rmation of the old-Republican  pacta con-
venta in Art. 7 perfectly fi ts into the picture. 150 Even in the non-state period after the 
 Polish partitions , the ancient Republican principles served as legitimations for the 
historic Polish Nation. Yet the  Grande  Émigration 1830 after the Warsaw upheaval 
relies on the ‘legitimacies’ 151 of the Polish Nation as Joachim Lelewel’s manuscript 
147  This passage is a precision of  Müßig , Reconsidering Constitutional Formation – The Polish May 
Constitution 1791 as a masterpiece of constitutional communication, CPH 67 (2015), 75- 93. It 
elaborates the fi rst delineation in  Müßig , Reconsidering Constitutional Formation – Research chal-
lenges of Comparative Constitutional History, Journal of Constitutional History/Giornale di Storia 
Costituzionale, 27 (2014), 107–131. The introduction is cited by Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 
32), p. 281. 
148 Art. 2 at the end, cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 283. 
149  In the introduction and Art. 2 of the May constitution, the meaning of nation is equivalent to 
nobility . 
150 Art. 7, cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 287. 
151  « La nation polonaise avait aussi ses légitimités; on les a discutées, on les a sacrifi ées avec les 
légitimités de tant d’autres peuples, pour statisfaire à l’avidité d’honorables brigands, dépréda-
teurs couronnés. La dipolmatie envahissante en 1807 et en 1808, et spoliatrice en 1815, sanction-
nant les partages anciens avec de nouveaus morcellemens, et évitant de donner une sincère 
satisfaction à la légitimité de la nation polonaise, renouvelait, par ce fait même, les violences 
qu’elle lui avait déjà fait subir, et donnait ainsi une preuve de l’existence de sa légitimité. Disons 
dons quelques mots sur la position et la nature de cette légitimité .” (Polish Library Paris,  Lelewel, 
Joachim , Légitimité de la Nation Polonaise, Rouen 1836. B.r. Imp. D. Brière. 8°, p. 12). In the 
paraphrasing English translation it reads: ‘The Polish Nation also had its legitimacies; …, we have 
hailed them with the legitimacies of so many other peoples to satisfy the avarice of the honourable 
bandits, the crowned predators. The overgrown diplomacy in 1807 and in 1808, and the raiding in 
1815 sanctioning the old habits with new fragmentations and avoiding to give a true satisfaction to 
the  legitimacy of the Polish Nation renewed by the very same fact the violence that it had already 
caused it to suffer and thereby proved the existence of its legitimacy. Let us say a few words on the 
position of the nature of this legitimacy.’ As long as no Polish state existed after the  Polish parti-
tions , the Polish Nation remained the point of reference of the legitimacy. The mastermind of this 
and an important French voice in the Grande Emigration after the Warsaw upheaval 1830 was 
Joachim Lelewel (1786–1861). He has not only published a manuscript “ Légitimité de la Nation 
Polonaise ”, but also a comparative history of Spain and Poland and a comparative analysis of all 
Polish constitutions. He uses ‘nation’ as ‘state’ (p. 12). 
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‘ Légitimité de la Nation Polonaise (1836)’ 152 indicates. For this mastermind accom-
panying Adam Jerzy  Czartoryski , 153 Frédéric Chopin and Adam Mickiewicz, the 
language 154 and the political element are points of national  legitimacy . The latter is 
explained explicitly: The social  state ( l’état social ) is the main legitimation: ‘In one 
word, if we want to depict in the history of Poland a true social element this is no 
different from the political element. The civil life only, purely political creates 
exclusively the principal themes of the Polish history.’ 155 The political element is 
specifi ed as ‘political habit of the ancient Poland’. 156 National legitimation is syn-
onymous with Republican legitimation:  For  Lelewel ’s ex post-perspective after the 
Warsaw upheavel, Poland was a Republic and as the great ancient Republics, 157 it 
has elected its head on its own for his lifetime. And every candidate had the same 
honour without differences as to the rank or his wealth since the ‘brotherhood’ 
( braterstwo ), and the ‘equality’ ( równość ) was decisive for the Polish Republic. 
Thus, the sovereignty of the  people manifested itself in all rulers: in the judiciary 
that is independent and representative, in the administration which executes the will 
of all. 158 Lelewel’s explanations about the old Polish  Republicanism refer to the 
slavistic linguistic speciality. In the Polish language, the word for slave did not exist, 
only for subject ( podany ). This foundation of the Polish  Republicanism is an impor-
tant condition for freedom from the point of view of the  Grande Émigration  1830. 159 
 Interestingly enough, around  the  Great Sejm 1788–1792 there were some inac-
curacies, which mark the Polish term of the nation to be in between the sense of 
the old aristocratic Republic and the opening towards an understanding of a gen-
152  Lelewel , ibid. (n. 151). 
153  On the advice of Eugène Delacroix he bought the hotel Lambert on the Île Saint-Louis, where 
the Polish Library is still situated. 
154  Polish Library Paris,  Lelewel , ibid. (n. 151), p. 2. 
155  Polish Library Paris,  Lelewel , ibid. (n. 151), p. 4, paraphrased and translated by UM. 
156  “ La vie civique seulmenet, vie purement politique, fournit exclusivement les sujets principaux 
d’histoire polonaise” (“The civil life only, purely political creates exclusively the principal themes 
of the Polish history”); “ coutumes publiques de l’ancienne Pologne ” (“political habit of the ancient 
Poland”) Polish Library Paris,  Lelewel , ibid. (n. 151), p. 5. 
157  Là est la légitimité de la Pologne; et si les Polonais combattent légitimement pour son existence 
et leur propre indépendance, c’est encore un devoir légitime pour eux que de rechercher ces 
mêmes principes républicains que leurs ancêtres leur ont laissés en heritage.” (‘There is the  legiti-
macy of Poland; and if the Polish legitimately fi ght for their existence and their own independence , 
then that is still a legitimate goal for them as it is to look for their own Republican principles that 
they inherited from their ancestors’). (ibid. p. 8). Cf. also page 12, where Lelewel closes his plea 
on by reference to the legitimation by means of the old Republican principles. 
158  Polish Library Paris,  Lelewel , ibid. (n. 151), p. 8. Also at p. 9. 
159  Polish Library Paris,  Lelewel , ibid. (n. 151), p. 10. His comparative analysis of the constitutions 




eral political body. The law on ‘Our free Royal Cities in the States of the 
 Rzeczpospolita ’ of April 18, 1791’ 160 was adopted unanimously and received the 
constitutional rank as a law in article III of the  May  Constitution , a law that gives 
the free Polish Aristocracy a new, true and powerful force for the safety of its 
freedoms and the inalienability of the common fatherland. 161 There seem to be 
two ideas behind this prudent and rather confusing formulation. The fi rst one is 
that the law on the free royal cities in the states of the Republic of April 18, 1791 
does not want to restrict the aristocrats’ privileges in any way. The second one is 
that the foundation of the ‘Republic’ are both the Polish aristocracy and the citi-
zenship. Lelewel  made it very clear that the law of the free royal cities should not 
be seductive for the assumption of a unitarian urban area. He pointed out in his 
manuscript ‘ Légitimité de la Nation Polonaise ’ 162 that Poland had never had a uni-
fi ed ‘national law’ since the cities functioned as small Republics, especially with 
their German town law. 163 
 The inaccuracies with the usage of the term of the nation fi t into this picture. In 
Article II of the May Constitution, the nation is the point of reference in the sense 
of an old aristocratic nation 164 while in Article IV 165 even the farmers seem to be 
included. And the union that was renewed on October 20, 1791 was named 
 Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów , the  Republic of two nations . The sovereignty of 
the  nation  is claimed to be the origin of all state authority (Art. 5), even though since 
the second and third division of Poland a nation in the sense of a politically mobil-
160  The First English translation is accessible here in the  Appendix . The German translation was 
done by  Inge Bily with the help of  Danuta Janicka (Torún) and  Zygfryd Rymaszwski (Łódź). The 
Polish text can be found in the edition of Kawecki, J., “Miasta nasze królewskie wolne w 
Rzeczypospolitej”, in: “Konstytucja 3 maja 1791” PWN, Warsaw 2014, p. 125–136. 
161  Therefore this volume includes in the  Appendix the fi rst English translation of the law of the free 
royal cities of the republic (edited by Kawecki, J., “Miasta nasze królewskie wolne w 
Rzeczypospolitej”, in: “Konstytucja 3 maja 1791” PWN, Warsaw 2014, p. 125–136). The English 
translation was made by Max Bärnreuther and Ulrike Müßig. The free royal cities are not equiva-
lent to the “free towns” under German law or to the royal cities, but are cities within a  res publica . 
The new granted rights freed them from the feudal corset. The meaning of the new “freedom” is 
explained in Art. I Nr. 2 of the law (‘We acknowledge the inhabitants of these cities as free men. 
Furthermore, we acknowledge their land property in the cities in which they live, their houses, vil-
lages and territoria which currently legally belong to these cities. All this is acknowledged by us as 
hereditary property of the inhabitants of these cities.’). 
162  Ibid. (n. 151). 
163  Polish Library Paris,  Lelewel, Joachim , Légitimité de la Nation Polonaise, Rouen. B.r. Imp. 
D. Brière. 8°, p. 6, esp. at n. 2. 
164  Handelsman ,  Marceli, Konstytucja Trzeciego Maja roku 1791 [Die Konstitution vom 3. Mai 
1791; The Constitution of May 3, 1791], Warsaw 1907, p. 58 et seq. 
165  Wording of Article IV according to Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 283, in para-
phrased translation: ‘The land people under the hands of which fl ows the most fertile source of the 
belongings of the Empire that makes up the greatest part of the nation and consequently is the most 
powerful protection for the country – that we protect by the law both from the point of justice and 
Christianity as well as our own, well understood interest’. 
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ised people is lacking. 166 Hence, contrary to the French September document, the 
Polish May constitution does  not establish a new basis of legitimation for modern 
statehood after a revolutionary break with inherited power structures. 167 Though it 
does not systematically fi x the conditions of  legitimacy as ‘the basis and foundation 
of government’ (in the wording of the Virginia Bill of  Rights 1776 168 ) or as “ le but 
de toute institution politique ” (in the wording of the declaration of human civil right 
as it is found in the September  constitution  1791 169 ), the Polish May Constitution 
fi xes a core part of normativity and a positive uniform constitutional  text due to the 
notion of constitutional supremacy. It is the only constitutional document of the 
revolutionary era which expressly states the precedence of the constitution: that ‘all 
consecutive resolutions of the current sejm are to be consistent with the constitution 
in all respects’ (ending of the Introduction, May Const. 1791). 170 It is the argumenta-
tion of the American revolutionaries, opposing the ‘unconstitutional’ taxation of the 
colonies by the Westminster  Parliament  against the constitutionally legitimate resis-
tance of the colonies, which suited, from the Polish point of view, the  legitimation 
of the Polish resistance against the Russian Tsarina, the Prussian  King and the 
Habsburg Kaiser of the Holy Roman Empire. 
 With the modern concept of the constituent  sovereignty , the 1791-text of the 
Great Sejm  seems to combine the old idea of an aristocratic nation. The openness of 
the sovereignty of nation in the Polish May Constitution to continuities with the 
pre-revolutionary class-based state can be seen in different aspects, which I laid 
down in length at the Polish Legal History Conference in Cracow. 171 In regard to 
national  sovereignty as juridifi cation, we can concentrate on the May Constitution’s 
procedural openness. 
166  Only the Polish nobility was inhibited by liberal reform ideas. Accordingly, the Polish 
Constitution of 1791 regulated no Polish civil rights. 
167  Therefore there was no declaration of rights, only religious and cultural freedom was mentioned 
in the context of the fi xing of  Catholicism  as the state religion in Art. 1. 
168  Compare “ le but de toute institution politique ” in the diction of the preamble of the  Declaration 
of human and civil rights 1789 (cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 250). 
169  Cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 251. 
170  Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 281. 
171  Müßig ,  Ulrike, Reconsidering Constitutional Formation – The Polish May Constitution 1791 as 
a masterpiece of constitutional communication, CPH 67 (2015), 75–93. 
U. Müßig
33
3.4.2  The Procedural Openness of May Constitution as Refl ex 
onto the Juridifi cation of National Sovereignty 
 The procedural openness of the May Constitution refl ecting the juridifi cation of 
national sovereignty fi nds its fi rst expression in the partnership of legal and parlia-
mentary ministerial responsibility. As ‘father and head of the nation’, the Monarch 
is not responsible. The ministers appointed by the King assume legal responsibility 
for the decrees issued by the king by means of countersignature. Moreover, in Art. 
7, the May constitution fi xes a parliamentary vote of no confi dence, which resem-
bles the American impeachment requiring a two thirds majority: ‘In the case, by 
contrast, that both chambers united in the  Reichstag demand the resignation of a 
minister from the state council or another position by means of a two thirds majority 
of secret votes, the King shall be held to most immediately appoint another to this 
position’. 172 The partnership of legal and parliamentary ministerial responsibility 
motivates my often articulated intervention 173 against the popular contrast between 
constitutionalism and parliamentarism. 174 
 Another aspect is the elaboration of the executive in Art. 7 with the separation of 
the hereditary monarch 175 and the state council which was referred to as  straż praw 
(guardian of the rights) in accordance to  Montesquieu’s  dépôt des lois . The consti-
tutional terminology of ‘the King in his state council’ is proven by individual inter-
172 Art. 7, cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 289. About the appreciation as parlia-
mentary vote of no confi dence compare  Malec, Jerzy, Rec. on Nationale und Internationale 
Aspekte der polnischen Verfassung vom 3. Mai 1791, in: Jaworski, Rudolf (ed.), Ius Commune 22 
(1995), 431, 433;  Tenzer, Eva/Pleitner, Berit, Polen, in: Brandt, Peter/Kirsch, Martin/Schlegelmilch, 
Arthur (ed.): Handbuch der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert, Band 1: 
Around 1800, Bonn 2006, p. 546–600 (567). The contradictory opinion can be found in  von 
Beymes ,  Klaus, Die parlamentarischen Regierungssysteme in Europa, 2nd ed., Munich 1973, p. 49 
et seq. 
173  Müßig ,  Ulrike, Konfl ikt und Verfassung in: Müßig (ed.),  Konstitutionalismus und 
Verfassungskonfl ikt , Tübingen 2006, p. 11 et seq.;  idem , Die europäische Verfassungsdiskussion 
des 18. Jahrhunderts, Tübingen 2008, p. 127 et seq.;  Seif, Ulrike  (= Müßig ) , Introduction, in: 
Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. XXXII. 
174  Hintze, Otto, Das monarchische Prinzip und die konstitutionelle Verfassung (1911), in:  idem , 
Staat und Verfassung. Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur allgemeinen Verfassungsgeschichte, pub-
lished by Gerhard Oestreich, 2. Edition, Göttingen 1962, p. 359 et seq.;  Huber, Ernst Rudolf , 
Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789, Vol. 3, 2nd ed., Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln 1978, p. 3 et seq . ; 
 the same , Das Kaiserreich als Epoche verfassungsstaatlicher Entwicklung, in: Handbuch des 
Staatsrechts, published by Josef Isensee/Paul Kirchhof, Vol. 1, 3rd ed., Heidelberg 2003, § 4 Rdnr. 
52 et seq.;  Böckenförde ,  Ernst-Wolfgang, Der deutsche Typ der konstitutionellen Monarchie im 19. 
Jahrhundert, in: Beiträge zur deutschen und belgischen Verfassungsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert, 
published by Conze, Werner, Stuttgart 1967, p. 70 et seq.; also  Kühne ,  Jörg-Detlef, Die 
Reichsverfassung der Paulskirche, Vorbild und Verwirklichung im späteren deutschen Rechtsleben, 
2nd ed., Neuwied and others 1998. Concerning the state of the art  Fehrenbach ,  Elisabeth, 
Verfassungsstaat und Nationenbildung 1815–1871, Munich 1992, p. 71–75 and 75–85. 
175  Successor to Stanisław August II. Poniatowski is supposed to be a hereditary monarch from the 
Wettiner. After their extinction, the right to vote a new monarch falls back to the nation. 
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preters with the association of the English wording of ‘ the king in council ’. 176 The 
state council, which is subordinate to the laws and supervises the authorities, con-
sists of the archbishop of Gnesen as primas of Poland, fi ve ministers 177 as well as 
two secretaries. It had no right to vote. The monarch as head of the state council was 
not responsible before it. 
 The elaboration of the two chamber legislative body, which was separated from 
the executive 178 and made up of the Messengers’ Chamber and the Senators’ 
Chamber also shows potential for evolutionary development. While the Messengers’ 
Chamber was supposed to be ‘the sanctuary of the legislature as the representative 
body and embodiment of national sovereignty’ , 179 the Senators’ Chamber which 
was governed by magnates and headed by the King had a suspensive  veto against 
the resolutions of the Messengers’ Chamber. By contrast to the American  constitu-
tion , the House of Representatives was dominating. If after the veto of the Senate, 
the same law was passed again by the House of Representatives, it was valid irre-
spective of the Senate’s veto. The King possessed a single vote in the Senate; he did 
not have the right to veto by means of his chair. As was the case in the French 
September  constitution , the King had a right of legislative initiative, the same apply-
ing to the messengers. Besides the 204 representatives of the nobility, 24 citizens 
were part of the Messengers’ Chamber as commissioners of the royal cities. As 
representatives of the nation as a whole (Art. 6), the representatives from the (pro-
vincial) state parliaments were no longer dependent whereby the metamorphosis 
from an estate organ towards a modern representative institution can be observed. 
The estate-based perception of an imperative  mandate turns into the conviction of 
the individual freedom of decision of the state citizen who is obliged to the general 
good. The majority principle was applied in both legislative bodies.  Liberum veto 
and the confederate right were abolished. 180 
176  Libiszowska ,  Zofi a, ibid. (n. 35), p. 233 et seq. 
177  Police/Interior affairs; exterior affairs; defense; justice; fi nances. 
178 Art. 5 of the May constitution separates the executive power of the hereditary monarch and the 
one of the state council from the legislative power of the Reichstag as two chamber legislative body 
made up of the Messengers‘ Chamber and the Senators‘ Chamber and from the jurisdiction of the 
existing courts (cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 284). Compare Art. 7 and the 
explicit separation of the executive and legislative power: ‘The executive power shall not pass any 
laws, no taxes whatsoever, no state derivatives, not change the state income, not declare any war, 
no freedom, no contract and no diplomatic acts’ (cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), 
p. 286). 
179 Art. 6, cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 284. 
180 Art. 6 at the end cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 286. 
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3.5  National Sovereignty in the Cádiz  Constitution 1812 
3.5.1  Sovereignty of the Spanish Nation ( nación española ) 
 Analyzing national sovereignty in the Spanish Cádiz  Constitution 1812, one real-
izes at fi rst sight, that the constitutional  process in Spain is connected with the anti- 
Napoleonic resistance ( Guerra de Independencia ). 181 The reference to the 
sovereignty of the  nation ( soberanía nacional ) in Tit. 1, Art. 3 182 is directed against 
the usurpation claims of the French imperial family Bonaparte, 183 in an intermediate 
situation of revolutionary potential. 184 Only thanks to its sovereignty, the nation was 
able to annul the declaration of abdication in favour of  Napoleon in  Bayonne as well 
as the statute of Bayonne and to ‘fi x the laws and conditions according to which 
their kings ascend the throne.’ 185 Thus, only one day after the festive inauguration of 
181  In detail  Timmermann ,  Andreas, Die “gemäßigte Monarchie” in der Verfassung von Cádiz und 
das frühe liberale Verfassungsdenken in Spanien (The “moderate monarchy” in the Constitution of 
Cádiz and the early liberal constitutional thinking in Spain), Münster 2007, p. 25 et seq.;  Masferrer , 
 Aniceto, La soberanía nacional en las Cortes gaditanas: su debate y aprobación, in: Escudero 
López, José Antonio (ed.),  Cortes y Constitución de Cádiz. 200 años , vol. 2, Madrid 2011, p. 660. 
182  Cited in Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 430. 
183  The French claimed that the highest form of sovereignty was vested in the Spanish Crown, and 
due to the abdication of Karl IV and his son Ferdinand VII, was transferred to them in  Bayonne in 
1808. Compare  de Argüelles ,  Agustín, Discurso preliminar a la Constitutión de 1812 (1811), First 
Part, Madrid 1989, p. 78; also related to this topic:  Sánchez Agesta ,  L., Introducción, in: de 
Argüelles, A., Discurso preliminar, p. 44;  Badia ,  J. Ferrando , Vicisitudes e infl uencias de la 
Constitutión de 1812, in: Revista de Estudios Políticos 126 (1962), p. 187;  ibid ., Die spanische 
Verfassung von 1812 und Europa (The Spanish Constitution of 1812 and Europe), in: Der Staat 
2 (1963), 153; in the same sense  Gmelin, Hans, Studien zur spanischen Verfassungsgeschichte 
(Studies on the Spanish Constitutinal History), Berlin 1905, p. 20. 
184  Masferrer, ibid. (n. 181), p. 660. In regard to the Weberian differentiation between power and 
rule and the infl uences of the school of Salamanca onto the constitutional discourse my argumenta-
tion borrows from the statements and the sources of the seminarthesis of  Müller, Marius, Der 
Souveränitätsbegriff im Konstitutionalisierungsprozess von Cádiz 1810–1812, supervised at my 
chair in Passau. It will be published under the title ‘The notion of sovereignty in the constitutional 
process of Cádiz (1810–1812)’. 
185  Meeting of the Cortes of December 29, 1810, in: de Argüelles, Agustín. Discurso preliminar 
ibid. (n. 182), p. 82; further  Estrada ,  Alvaro Florez , Representación hecha a S.M.C. el señor Don 
Fernando VII (1820), Madrid 1996, p. 15, 17 et seq. 
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the  Cortes on the Isla of Léon 186 near Cádiz on September 24, 1810, 187 the order fol-
lowed that the proper title of Charles IV and  Ferdinand  VII was ‘Majesty’ . 188 
 It had been Napoleon’s declared goal to renew the Spanish monarchy under 
French preponderance and dominance and to legitimate the Napoleonic usurpation 
of the Spanish throne. On May 23, 1808, after  Bayonne , he convened an assembly 
of notables of the Spanish nation with only 91 representatives appearing when asked 
to do so. On June 20, 1808, they were presented a constitutional draft elaborated by 
 Napoleon and Maret, which led to the  constitutional octroi of July 6, 1808. In this 
draft, the hereditary monarchy and  Catholicism as a state religion were fi xed. The 
Cortes were intended as estate representation and divided up into a bench of the 
clergy, one belonging to the aristocracy and a bench of the people. 189  Napoleon ’s 
handwriting contained the following provisions: ‘Spain and India shall be governed 
by virtue of a single civil code’ (art. 96); ‘The courts are independent’ (art. 97); the 
judiciary is to be administered in the name of the King by the courts appointed by 
him (art. 98, 99); three-fold appellate stage (article 101); abolition of all landlord 
courts and the special judiciary (art. 98); guarantor of the freedom of press (article 
45); the legislature is vested in the king and will be ‘considered and drafted’ by the 
state council (art. 57) and is presented to the Cortes for further deliberation and 
permission (art. 86). The legislature was not regulated in an independant chapter. 
Napoleon appointed his brother Joseph as king of the Spanish/Spain-America. This 
constitutional  octroi of July 6, 1808 based on monarchical prerogatives of the 
intruder king ( rey intruso ) was widely rejected by the people as a sign of French 
foreign rule. 
186  During the French occupation in the Spanish War of Independence  (1808–1814), Cádiz was the 
only unoccupied territory in Spain and hosted the Junta Central on the Isla de León, in the midst of 
today’s natural park Bahía de Cádiz. From February 6, 1810 to August 25, 1815, the French sieged 
and bombarded the city, though they did not succeed in their conquest of Cádiz, which was pro-
tected on its seaside by the British Royal Navy. (cf. also Archer, Christon (ed.), The Wars of 
Independence in Spanish America, Wilmington 2000, p. 23). 
187  Cortes generales y extraordinarias (ed.), Colección de los Decretos y Órdenes que han expedido 
las Cortes generales y extraordinarios desde su instalacion en 24 de setiembre de 1810 hasta igual 
fecha de 1811, Vol. 1, Madrid 1813, p. 1 et seq.;  Gallardo y de Font , Apertura de las Cortes de 
Cádiz en 24 de Septiembre de 1810, Vol. 1, Segovia 1910, p. 30 et seq: “ (…) y declaran nula, de 
ningun valor ni efecto la cesión de la corona que se dice hecha en favor de Napoleon, no solo por 
la violencia que intervino en aquellos actos, injustos é ilegales, sino principalmente por falterle el 
consentimiento de la Nación ”, almost literally reinforced in the decree of January 1, 1811: 
“ Declárense nullos todos los actos y convenios del Rey durante su opresión fuera ó dentro de 
España ”, in: Cortes generales y extraordinarias, ibid., p. 41. 
188  Decree of September 25, 1810: “ Tratamiento que deben tener los tres poderes ”, in: Cortes gene-
rales y extraordinarias, Colección de los Decretos y Órdenes, ibid. (n. 184), p. 3 et seq. After the 
dissolution of the Central Junta on 29 January 1810 it was the fi ve-person Regency Council of 
Spain and the Indies which took over the responsibility for convening the Cortes. 
189 Article 61 of Joseph Napoleon’s Constitution of July 6, 1808, in: Pölitz, Karl Heinrich Ludwig , 
Die europäischen Verfassungen seit dem Jahre 1789 bis auf die neueste Zeit, Mit geschichtlichen 
Erläuterungen und Einleitungen (The European Constitutions from the Year of 1789 to the Modern 
Age, Including Historical Explanations and Introductions), Third Volume, Second, Restructured, 
Corrected and Revised Edition, Leipzig 1833, p. 15. 
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 On May 22, 1809, the “ Junta Suprema Central y Gubernativa ” 190 as the provi-
sional government in the name of Ferdinand VII  agreed on the reinvigoration of the 
Cortes as the legally legitimate representation of the monarchy. 191 While fl eeing 
from the French army, it moved to Cádiz, dissolved on January 29, 1810 and con-
ferred government powers to a governing council, which decreed the convocation of 
the Cortes on June 18, 1810. Since 1809 the preparing commission ( Comisión de 
Cortes ) had begun to ask the estates and the cities about their reform 
expectations. 192 
 By virtue of the recourse to  national  sovereignty , the general and extraordinary 
convention of Cádiz ( Cortes generales y extraordinarias ) claimed the constituent 
power ( el poder constituyente ) for itself since all authoritarian power supposedly 
had fallen back to the nation represented by the Cortes after the dismissal of the 
legitimate Spanish King. 193 The reference to national sovereignty in Tit. 1, Art. 3 194 
is no rejection of monarchy, but the exclusive claim of the constituent power: “ La 
soberanía reside esencialmente en la Nación, y por lo mismo pertenece a esta exclu-
sivamente el derecho de establecer sus  leyes fundamentales ” (‘Sovereignty is essen-
tially vested in the nation, and therefore the nation has the exclusive right to decide 
on the fundamental laws). 195 In the ‘political revolution’ ( revolución política), 196 
190  The central administration ( Junta Suprema Central y Gubernativa ) in Aranjuez, Extremadura, 
Seville and later in Isla de León near Cádiz had the command over the Provincial administrations 
( juntas provincials ) set up to organize the guerrilla war and to coordinate the British aid ( Brey 
Blanco, José Luis , Liberalismo, nacíon y soberanía en la Constitución española de 1812, in: 
Álvarez Vélez, Isabel (ed.), Las Cortes de Cádiz y la Constitución de 1812: ¿la primera revolución 
liberal española?, Madrid 2011, p. 72;  Suárez, Federico , Las Cortes de Cádiz, Madrid 1982, p. 16). 
191  Konetzke, Richard (with completion by  Kleinmann, Hans Otto), Die iberischen Staaten von der 
Französischen Revolution bis 1874, in: Schieder, Theodor (ed.), Handbuch der Europäischen 
Geschichte, Band 5, Stuttgart 1981, p. 886–929, 897.  Ramos Santana, Alberto , 1808–1810. La 
nación reasume la soberanía, in: Czeguhn, Ignacio/Puértolas, Francesco (ed.), Die spanische 
Verfassung von 1812. Der Beginn des europäischen Konstitutionalismus, Regenstauf 2014, p. 206. 
192  The Archivo de la Real Chancilleria de Granada keeps a bundle of documents with the prepara-
tory questionaires. 
193  The Cortes did not see themselves as old estate representation in the sense of the ancien régime 
but as a popular representation and constitutive assembly. As Diaries of the Cortes debates the 
Diario de las discusiones y Actas de la Córtes, Cádiz en la Imprenta Real 1811 are digitalised in 
the Bavarian State library (cited here with the abbreviation D.D.A.C.). The  Prospecto del Periodico 
Intitulado is said to be published under the “souverain authority and controll of the constituant 
National congress”/“ Diario de las Discusiones y actas de las Cortes, que se ha de publicar baxo 
de la soberana autoridad é inspeccion del Congreso Nacional ” And the Prospecto itself concedes 
that there is no mandate by electoral consensus: “ al pueblo deben du autoridad ” and “ vuestro 
cuerpo soberano os prepara la constitucion ”. 
194  La soberanía reside esencialmente en la Nacion, y por lo mismo pertenece á esta exclusivamente 
el derecho de establecer sus leyes fundamentales. The sovereignty resides essentially within the 
nation. 
195  Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 430. 
196  For this contemporary denomination of the revolutionary movement, that was directed against 
the Spanish absolutism and the French occupation cf.  Martínez Marina, Francisco , Teoría de las 
cortes ó grandes juntas nacionales de los reinos de Leon y Castilla: Monumentos de su constitucion 
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pillared by clerics and  lawyers , the nation served as a topos to communicate on the 
Spanish  independence without referring to the abdicated King and the suppressed 
people. Whilst sovereignty before and during the constitutional  debates was often 
described in contemporary literature as a little elites’ burlesque 197 or as an oligarchic 
‘stage spectacle’, 198 it obtained the strength of a legal construct for supreme power 
not derived from anything before. 
 Miguel Artola Gallego 199 and Brey Blanco 200 seem to borrow from the Weberian 
differentiation between power ( Macht ) and ruling according to legal competences 
( Herrschaft ), 201 when explaining the semantics of national sovereignty within the 
process of  constitutionalisation of Cádiz. The juridifi cation  of constituent  sover-
eignty ( soberanía constituyente ) by constitution generates the constituted powers 
 (poderes constituidos ). The sovereignty in terms of a constituted  power was divided 
between  King and Cortes (as normal legislative body, art. 15) 202 because the power 
of the nation was institutionalised (=juridifi cated) by constitution. The original sov-
ereignty attributed to the nation (art. 1 and 3) is differentiated from the constituted 
sovereignty, divided between Cortes and Monarch (art. 15 and 16). 203 According to 
the  Diario de las Discusiones y Actas de las Cortes, the constituted sovereignty or 
rather sovereignty  in actu was divided between King and nation, and both made the 
laws in agreement with each other. 204 
 The  Monarch becomes the constituted power ( el poder constitucionalizado ): 
‘Don Ferdinand the Seventh, by the grace of God, and by the Constitution of the 
política y de la soberanía del pueblo, Madrid Imprenta de Fermin Villalpando 1813, vol. 1, p. XL; 
 Artola Gallego, Miguel , Los origenes de la España contemporánea, vol. 2, 2nd ed., Madrid 1975, 
p. 466. 
197  “ Como á todos los demas españoles, se les tapó la boca, se les hechó un candado á sus labios, 
por decir lo así, […] ” (quoted from:  Carnicero, José Clemente , El liberalismo convencido por sus 
mismos escritos, ó examen crítico de la constitucion politica de la monarquia española publicada 
en Cádiz y de la obra de Don Francisco Marina “Teoría de las Cortes” y de otras que sostienen las 
mismas ideas acerca de la soberania de la nacion, Madrid Imprenta de D. Eusebio Aguado 1830, 
p. 23). 
198  “ epectáculo de gran escenografía ”; quoted from:  Agesta, Luis Sanchez , Historia del 
Constitucionalismo Español, 2nd ed., Madrid 1964, p. 19. 
199  Artola Gallego, Miguel , Los origenes de la España contemporánea, vol. 2, 2nd ed., Madrid 
1975, p. 467 (“ La denominación del poder es la soberanía ”) . 
200  Blanco , Liberalismo, ibid. (n. 190), p. 89. 
201  Weber, Max ; Economy and society; Roth, Guenther/Wittich, Klaus (ed.); Berkeley et al., 1978, 
p. 53. 
202 Article 15 “La potestad de hacer las leyes reside en las Córtes con el Rey.”, (quoted from: 
Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 432); the English translation “The legislative power 
belongs to the Cortes, together with the king.” is cited according to Constitution of the Spanish 
Monarchy, printed by G. Palmer, Philadelphia 1814, p. 6. 
203  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, Joaquín , La teoría del estado en los origines del constitucionalismo 
hispanico (Las Cortes de Cádiz), Madrid 1983, p. 65. 
204  “ Después de la invasión de los sarracenos se levanta la Monarquía de Asturias, y la soberanía 
está dividida entre rey y la nación, y ambos de conformidad hacen las leyes .”. D.D.A.C., ibid. (n. 
193), vol. 8, p. 57. 
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Spanish Monarchy, King of Spain’ the  preamble of the Cádiz-Constitution of March 
19, 1812 is worded. 205 In their address to the King on December 24, 1811 in the 
context of the ‘ Discorso preliminar ’, the Cortes themselves speak of a new ‘liberal 
Constitution’ on the ‘fi rm basis’ of which is now based the throne. 206 The deduction 
of monarchical power from the national sovereignty  represented by the Cortes 207 is 
experienced as revolutionary by contemporaries. 208 However, popular  sovereignty 
in the sense of  Rousseau’s  volonté générale or in the sense of the French national 
convent 1792–1795 did not come to the Cortes’ mind: They did not act as proxy of 
their voters but as sovereign representatives of the nation. 209 The members of the 
Cortes represented the nation. 210 ‘The representatives that compose this Congress 
205  Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 429. 
206  Hartmann, Carl Friedrich , Die spanische Constitution der Cortes und die provisorische 
Constitution der Vereinigten Provinzen von Südamerika; aus den Urkunden übersetzt mit histo-
risch-statistischen Einleitungen, Leipzig 1820, p. 106. Concerning the denomination as “Magna 
Charta” of Spanish liberalism compare  Dippel ,  Horst, La Signifi cación de la Constitución Española 
de 1812 para los Nacientes Liberalismo y Constitucionalismo Alemanes, in: Iñurritegui Rodrígez, 
José María/Portillo Valdés, José María (ed.) Constitución en España: Orígenes y Destinos, Madrid 
1998, p. 287–307;  Konetzke, Richard (with completion by  Kleinmann, Hans Otto), Die iberischen 
Staaten von der Französischen Revolution bis 1874, in: Schieder, Theodor (ed.), Handbuch der 
Europäischen Geschichte, Band 5, Stuttgart 1981, p. 886–929, p. 898. 
207  Compare already the formulations in: Article 5 Polnish May Constitution (Willoweit/Seif, 
(=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 284) and in Article Title III, Article 1 French September Constitution 
1791 (Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 299). The Spanish nation is defi ned as ‘assembly 
(réunion) of all the Spanish of both hemisphere’ in Title 1 Article 1 of the Cortes-constitution 1812 
(Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 430). Compare  Arbós ,  Xavier, La idea de nación en el 
primer constitucionalisme espanyol, Barcelona 1986, p. 110 et seq. 
208  The seminarthesis of  Müller, Marius (ibid. Fn. 184, [2] n. 12) cites Don Franciso Marina and 
Karl Ludwig Haller. Cf. also among others:  Soldevilla , Fernando, Las Cortes de Cádiz. Orígines 
de la Revolución española, Madrid 1910;  del Valle Iberlucea, E., Las Cortes de Cádiz. La 
Revolución de España y la Democracia de América, Buenos Aires 1912;  Novales ,  A. Gil , La revo-
lución burguesa en España, Madrid 1985, esp.  ders. , Las contradicciones de la revolución burguesa 
española, ebda., Madrid 1985, p. 50 et seq.;  Artola Gallego, Miguel, Antiguo Régimen y revolu-
ción liberal, Barcelona 1991, a.o. p. 161, 163;  Morán Orti, Miguel, Revolución y reforma religiosa 
en las Cortes de Cádiz, Madrid 1994;  Portillo Valdés ,  J. M., Revolución de nación. Orígines de la 
cultura constitutional en España, 1780–1812, Madrid 2000. Compare  Müßig ,  Ulrike, Die 
europäische Verfassungsdiskussion des 18. Jahrhunderts, Tübingen 2008, p. 81. 
209  Compare the voting order of the central junta of January 1, 1810 (Instrucción que deberá obser-
varse para la elección de Diputados de Cortes vom 1.1.1810, cited by  Bernecker, Walther 
L. / Brinkmann ,  Sören, Spanien um 1800, in: Brandt, Peter/Kirsch, Martin/Schlegelmilch, Arthur 
(ed.), Handbuch der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert. Institutionen und 
Rechtspraxis im gesellschaftlichen Wandel, Volume 1: Around 1800, Bonn 2006, p. 601–639, 
p. 617. The order was divided up into four calls for election (convocatorias) to different addressees 
and may be understood as the fi rst electoral law of Spain,  Ull Pont, E., Derecho electoral de las 
Cortes de Cádiz, Madrid 1972, p. 11;  Estrada Sánchez, M. , El enfrentamiento entre doceañistas y 
moderados, in: Revista de Estudios Políticos 100 (1998), p. 244 et seq. Compare Title 3 1. Section 
Cádiz-constitution 1812,  Willoweit/Seif , (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 435. 
210  “ al pueblo deben du autoridad ” or rather “ vuestro cuerpo soberano os prepara la constitucion ” 
(Prospecto of D.D.A.C., ibid. n. 193, p. III, IV). Rather concerning the representative character 
Torres del Moral, Antonio, Constitucionalismo histórico español, 7th ed., Madrid 2012, p. 60. 
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and who represent the Spanish Nation, declare themselves legitimately constituted 
in general and extraordinary Cortes and that in them resides the national 
sovereignty.’ 211 
 The formulation of the  preamble , according to which the King was to ‘proclaim’ 
the constitution of the Spanish monarchy that the Cortes had ‘agreed upon’ and 
‘enacted’, 212 does not leave room for any doubts about the new ratio of powers 
between popular or national representation on the one side and the crown on the 
other. The people and the monarch belong to the nation. With that, monarchical 
 sovereignty is not excluded, as the double legitimation of the new Spanish constitu-
tional monarchy (‘by the grace of God and by virtue of the constitution’) illustrates 
in its  preamble . It becomes obvious that such a constitutional legitimation opens up 
old estate dualistic understanding 213 and for the liberal understanding of the nation 
as a new point of reference. This openness takes into account the scholastic infl u-
ences 214 onto liberal representatives, like Diego Muñoz  Torrero , president of the 
University of Salamanca, and Antonio Oliveros, 215 whose understanding of the 
nation as  cuerpo moral in the  Suárezean tradition 216 incorporates the  king as head of 
it ( illudque consequenter indiget uno capite ). 217 These traditional concepts 218 in the 
Cádiz  constitutionalisation process document the distinctiveness of national sover-
eignty represented by the Cortes  from the Rousseauian  volonté générale . 
211  “ Los diputados que componen este Congreso, y que representan la Nación española, se declaran 
legítimamente constituidos en Cortes generales y extraordninarias, y que reside en ellas la sober-
anía nacional. ” (Colección de Decretos y Ordenes que han expedido las Cortes extraordinarias y 
Generales, Madrid 1820, vol. 1, p. 1). 
212  Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 429. 
213  Id est dualism between crown and estate representation. 
214  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna ,  Joaquín, Política y Constitución en España (1808–1978), Madrid 
2007, p. 61; same, La teoría del estado, ibid. (n. 203), p. 39;  Timmermann , ibid. (n. 181), p. 133. 
215  Both were clerics and alumni of the University of Salamanca. 
216  “ Primo solum ut est aggregatum quoddam sine ullo ordine vel unione physica vel morali; […] 
Alio modo ergo consideranda est  hominum multitudo , quatenus speciali voluntate seu communi 
consensu in unum  corpus politicum  congregantur uno societatis vinculo et ut mutuo se iuvent 
ordine ad unum fi nem politicum, quomodo effi ciunt unum  corpus mysticum ,  quod moraliter dici 
potest per se unum  […] ”, ( Suárez, Francisco , De legibus, vol. IV, Madrid 1973, p. 153) underlining 
by UM; concerning the notion  cuerpo moral :  Maravall, José Antonio ; Estudios de Historia del 
Pensamiento Español, Madrid 1973, p. 190 ff. 
217  Suárez , De legibus, ibid. (n. 216), p. 153;  Varela , La teoría del estado, ibid. (n. 203), p. 39. 
218  Gallego , ibid. (n. 199), p. 468. 
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3.5.2  Late Scholastic Concepts of the Transfer of Sovereignty 
( translatio imperii ) or the Nation as Moral Entity 
( cuerpo moral ) in the Cádiz  Debates 
 The legal defi nition of the Spanish nation ( nación española ) as reunion of all the 
 Spaniards of both hemispheres (“ reunión de todos los españoles de ambos 
hemisferios ”) 219 by art. 1 cannot be read as to equate nation with people. 220 Art. 2 
articulates not only the freedom and the  independence of this nation, but also 
negates any claim for possession. 221 Art. 3 attributes sovereignty essentially ( esen-
cialmente ) to the Nation . 222 Francisco Javier Borrull y Vilanova differentiates 
explicitly between the constitutional wording ‘ esencialmente’ and the social con-
tract of the citizen of Geneva 223 . If the sovereignty resides ‘essentially’ in the nation, 
it has not to be conveyed on it by a social  contract . 
 This is parallel to the  natural law of Francisco  Suárez and Fernando Vázquez de 
 Menchaca , who attributed sovereignty to the political human nature, ‘that before a 
determined form of government is elected this ability resides in the community or 
congregation of men’. 224 In allusions to  Aristotle and his Christian adaption by 
 Thomas Aquinas , 225 the natural origin of the nation’s sovereignty depends on the 
219  Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, ibid. (n. 202), p. 4. For the debates cf. Diario de sesiones 
de las Cortes Generales y Extraordinarias: dieron principio el 24 de setiembre de 1810 y terminaron 
el 20 de setiembre de 1813 , vol. 3, Sesion del dia 25 de agosto de 1811, Madrid 1870, p. 1684. 
220 Article 1 “ La Nación Española es la reunión de todos los españoles de ambos hemisferios .” 
(Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 430). 
221  “ La Nación española es libre é independiente, y no es, ni puede ser, patrimonio de ninguna 
familia ni persona. ”; cit. from: Diario de sesiones ibid. (n. 219) , vol. 3, Sesion del dia 28 de agosto 
de 1811, p. 1706; [“The Spanish nation is free and independent, and neither is nor can be the pat-
rimony of any family or person whatever.”, cited from: Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, ibid. 
(n. 201), p. 4]. 
222  “ La soberanía reside esencialmente en la nación, y por lo mismo le pertenece exclusivamente el 
derecho de establecer sus leyes fundamentales, y de adoptar la forma de gobierno que más la 
convenga. ” cit. from: Diario de sesiones ibid. (n. 219) , vol. 3, Sesion del dia 28 de agosto de 1811, 
p. 1707; [“ The sovereignty resides essentially in the nation; in consequence whereof it alone pos-
sesses the right of making its fundamental law ; cited from: Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, 
ibid. (n. 202), p. 4]. 
223  “ Se propone igualmente en ste artíclulo que la soberanía reside esencialmente en la nación. Yo 
reconozco la soberanía de ésta, y sólo me opongo a la palabra “esencialmente”; est es, a que 
resida esencialmente en la misma: lo cual parece convenir con el sistema de varios autores que 
creyendo poder descubir los sucesos más antiguos con el auxilio de conjeturas y presunciones tal 
vez demasiado vagas, atribuyen el origen de las sociedades a los diferentes pactos y convenios de 
los que se juntaban para formarlas. Pero yo, siguiendo un camino más seguro, encuentro el prin-
cipo de las mismas en las familias de los antiguos patriarcas que usaban de una potestad suprema 
sobre sus hijos y descendientes, y no la habían adquirido en virtud de dichos pactos. ” cit. in 
D.D.A.C., ibid. n. 193), vol. 8, p. 57. 
224  que antes de elegirse determinada forma de gobierno reside dicha facultad en la comunidad o 
congregación de hombres […], quoted from: D.D.A.C., ibid. Fn. 193, vol. 8, p. 59. 
225  Aristotle , Politik, translated by Franz Schwarz, Stuttgart 1989, p. 78);  Thomas Aquinas, Über 
die Herrschaft der Fürsten, Schreyvogel, Friedrich (ed.), Stuttgart 1975, p. 7. 
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existence of the human community itself. 226 In the  School of Salamanca , which 
‘passed’ natural law from theologians to  jurists , monarchical  sovereignty is not of 
divine but of human origin. The justifi cation for this secularization 227 relies on the 
legal argument of the transition of sovereignty ( translatio imperii ); monarchical 
 sovereignty comes from God by means of the community of the human beings, 
whose social nature includes their natural legislative power. 228 With reference to 
Domingo de  Soto and his statement that ‘the sovereign power derives from God to 
the  king s by means of the people, where it is said to reside primarily and 
essentially’, 229 a protest against the aforementioned Art. 3 was formulated in the 
Cortes. 
 It was the old dualism between  monarch and estates that survived as a secular-
ized model of the biblical covenant between God and his people. Irrespective of any 
French infl uences onto Cádiz-constitutionalism, 230 the prevailing discourse patterns 
with regard to national sovereignty rely on the mutual power of people and King. 231 
The Spanish Nation as the people and the Monarch is refl ected by Antonio  Llaneras , 
who is not against the draft of national sovereignty in Art. 3, because ‘the Spanish 
nation […] has a head, that is Ferdinand VII, whom [the cortes] had sworn solemnly 
as sovereign on the fi rst day of their installation.’ 232 Similar is the statement of José 
Ramón Becerra y  Llamas : ‘The Spanish people, who has deputed us to represent it 
in this general and extraordinary Cortes, and our beloved sovereign Ferdinand VII, 
who is its head, form a moral body, which I call the nation or the Spanish 
226  The Bishop of Clahorra even expressly referred to Thomas von Aquin: “ dicen […] Santo Tomás 
[…] que en una comunidad perfecta era necesario un poder á quien perteneciese el Gobierno de 
ellla misma, porque el pueblo, segun la sentencia del Sábio […] quedaria destruido faltando quien 
gobernase. ” (quoted from: D.D.A.C., ibid. Fn. 193, vol. 8, p. 59). 
227  In relation to the change of religious covenant-concept see  Oestreich, Gerhard , Die Idee des 
religiösen Bundes und die Lehre vom Staatsvertrag, in: Hoffmann 1967, p. 128;  Timmermann , 
ibid. (n. 181), p. 140; the preamble implies this specifi c covenant in the meaning of an ability of 
Cortes to transfer government in accordance to divine will on the king : ‘by the grace of God and 
the constitution of the Spanish monarchy’ (quoted from: Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, 
ibid. (n. 202), p. 4). 
228  Cf.  Reibstein, Ernst , Johannes Althusius als Fortsetzer der Schule von Salamanca: 
Untersuchungen zur Ideengeschichte des Rechtsstaates und zur altprotestantischen 
Naturrechtslehre, Karlsruhe 1955, p. 94;  Castellote, Salvador , Der Beitrag zur Spanischen 
Spätscholastik zur Geschichte Europas, in: Kremer, Markus/Reuter, Hans-Richard (ed.), Macht 
und Moral – politisches Denken im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, p. 26 f. (Francisco de Vitoria). 
229  “ la potestad soberana es derivada de Dios a los reyes mediante el pueblo, en quien se dice 
residir primaria y esencialmente; ” (Quoted from: D.D.A.C., ibid. Fn. 193, vol. 8, p. 58). 
230  So  Agesta , ibid. (n. 198), p. 59;  Timmermann , Die Nationale Souveränität in der Verfassung von 
Cádiz (1812), Der Staat 39 (2000), p. 570–587, 572;  Masferrer , ibid. (n. 184), p. 646.  Torres del 
Moral , La soberanía nacional en la constitución de Cádiz, Revista de Derecho Político, 82 (2011), 
p. 55–117, 66. 
231  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna , La teoría del estado, ibid. (n. 203); p. 179. 
232  “ la Nación española […] tiene cabeza que es Fernando VII, a quién V.M. en el primer día de su 
instalación juró solemnemente por soberano […] ” (Quoted from: D.D.A.C., ibid. Fn. 193, p. 21). 
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monarchy’. 233 The  cuerpo moral of Llamas is distinct from the Rousseauian  corps 
moral that receives its  moi commun through the social  contract . 234  Llamas’  cuerpo 
moral is  derived from the late scholastical notion of the  cuerpum mysticum (cuerpo 
místico), 235 which can be traced back to the works of Francisco  Suárez . 236 The 
Monarch is the head of the  cuerpo moral , which consists of himself and the people, 237 
and in Art. 3 it is the King as head of the nation who participates in the national 
sovereignty together with the Cortes. 238 Any idea of one homogeneous will embod-
ied in the nation is to fail because it is not the egalitarian abstract idea of the human 
society born out of natural state, politically unifi ed as nation, but the real conditions 
of the former global power 239 that are predominant in the cortes‘  debates . The meta-
phorical equivalence between the human organism and the political community in 
late scholasticism 240 leads to the understanding of the nation as an organic unity. 241 
People ( pueblo) describe the population in different territories or kingdoms of both 
hemispheres rather than an homogenous political entity. According to the scholastic 
doctrine of the seventeenth century, the Spanish nation consisted of the Castilian 
and Indian communities ( comunidades), people  (pueblos), republics  (repúblicas ) 
and the Monarch. 242 This matches the particular preconditions of nineteenth century 
hispanic-american constitutionalism. 243 It could not be ignored that the Spanish 
nation was a conglomerate of different people ( pueblos que forman una sola nación) 
233  “ El pueblo español, que nos ha diputado para presentarlo en estas cortes generales y extraor-
dinarias, y nuestro amado soberano el señor don Fernando VII, que es su cabeza, forman un 
cuerpo moral, al que yo llamo la nación o monarquía española, […] ” (Quoted from: D.D.A.C., 
ibid. Fn. 193, p. 15). 
234  “ A l’instant, au lieu de la personne particuliere de chaque contractant, cet acte d’association 
produit un corps moral et collectif […], lequel reçoit de ce même acte son unité, son moi commun, 
sa vie et sa volonté. ” ( Rousseau, Jean-Jacques , Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique , 
liv. I, chap. VI (Du pacte social), ed. Derathe, Robert (Pleïade), Paris 1964, p. 361). 
235  Details about the  Cuerpo Místico :  Maravall , ibid. (n. 216), p. 190 ff. 
236  “ Primo solum ut est aggregatum quoddam sine ullo ordine vel unione physica vel morali; […] 
Alio modo ergo consideranda est hominum multitudo, quatenus speciali voluntate seu communi 
consensu in unum corpus politicum congregantur uno societatis vinculo et ut mutuo se iuvent in 
ordine ad unum fi nem politicum, quomodo effi ciunt unum corpus mysticum, quod moraliter dici 
potest per se unum […] ” (quoted from:  Suárez, Francisco , Tractatus de legibus ac deo legislatore 
(1612), Vol. IV, Madrid (Inst. de Estudios Politícos) 1973, p. 153). 
237  With Suárez the  hominum multidudo needs a head to be a moral cuerpo mysticum: “ illudque 
consequenter indiget uno capite. ” (quoted from:  Suárez , ibid. (n. 236), p. 153). 
238  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna , La teoría del estado, ibid. (n. 203), p. 212. 
239  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna , La teoría del estado, ibid. (n. 203), p. 182. 
240  Maravall identifi es the infl uence of humanism as condition for the perception of a political com-
munity ( Maravall , ibid. (n. 216), p. 58). 
241  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna , La teoría del estado, ibid. (n. 203), p. 211. 
242  Maravall, José Antonio , Teoría española del Estado en el siglo XVII, Madrid, 1944. 
243  Cf. inter alia Álvarez Cuartero, Izaskun/Sánchez Gómez, Julio (ed.), Visiones y revisiones de la 
independencia americana, Salamanca, 2007;  Annino, Antonio/Ternavasio, Marcela , El laboratorio 
constitucional iberoamericano, Madrid et al., 2012;  Chust, Manuel/Serrano, José Manuel , Debates 
sobre las independencias iberoamericanas, Madrid et al., 2007. 
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and that the representation of national sovereignty in the  Cortes does not hinder the 
particular representation of the provinces . 244 
3.5.3  The Natural Origin of National Sovereignty as a Limitation 
for the Monarchical Sovereignty 
 The natural origin of national sovereignty according to the late scholastics in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century 245 is used by the representatives Diego Muñoz 
 Torrero and Antonio Oliveros 246 to explain the supralegal limitations of the monar-
chical position, 247 and to promote their concept of a moderate monarchy. 248 As 
monarchical  sovereignty is derived from God by means of the community of human 
beings, whose natural legislative power is represented by the  pouvoir  constituan t 
( poder constituyente ) of the general and extraordinary convention of Cádiz ( Cortes 
generales y extraordinarias ), natural law is above divine law. The King’s recogni-
tion of the sovereignty of the Cortes amounts to a supralegal limitation of royal 
government. This line of arguments guides Muñoz  Torrero’s counterplea against the 
conservative bishop of Calahorra. 249 Muñoz  Torrero’s rhetorical question, ‘if sover-
eignty belongs exclusively to the king of Spain, what right do have the Cortes to put 
limits and restrictions on the exercise of royal authority?’ is replied by himself, that 
it is the King’s reward for the nation’s sovereignty (“ reconocer la soberanía de la 
Nacion ”) 250 that limits monarchical  sovereignty by means of the natural law. 251 The 
supralegal natural limitation of monarchical  sovereignty 252 is what Muñoz  Torrero 
and Oliveros conclude from the  debates of the  preamble draft ‘ In the name of 
244  Cites the Chilean representative Leyva during the debate on the 26th of September 1811 about 
article 91 of the Constituion of Cádiz: D.D.A.C., ibid. Fn. 193, vol. 8, p. 459; “[…]  I do not agree, 
that the representatives of the congress do not represent the pueblos, that elected them. That the 
congregation of representatives of the pueblos that form one single nation represent the national 
sovereignty does not destroy the character of particularly representation of their respective prov-
ince. ”. Cf. also “ Si las Cortes representan a la Nación, los cabildos representan un pueblo deter-
minado. ”; cit. from: Diario de sesiones ibid. (Fn. 220) , 10 de enero de 1812, p. 2590; [ engl.: “If the 
Cortes represent the nation, the councils represent a determined people.” ] . 
245  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, Política y Constitución en España, ibid. (n. 214), p. 61. 
246  Both these representatives were clerics and pupils of the University of Salamanca, fi rst one 
furthermore its president; Muñoz Torrero quoted extensively from Pufendorf and Grotius.  Varela 
Suanzes-Carpegna , La teoría del estado, ibid. (n. 203), p. 39, 49. 
247  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna , La teoría del estado, ibid. (n. 203), p. 123. 
248  Diego Muñoz Torrero: “ […] reconocido y proclamado rey de España por toda la nacion. ” 
quoted from: D.D.A.C., p. 84). [“recognizing and proclaimed king of Spain for all the nation”]. 
249  “ Dije tambien que el discurso del señor Obispo de Calahorra contine algunas  contradicciones 
[…]” [“I also expressed that the bishop of Calahorra’s discourse containes some contradictions 
[…]”] ; (quoted from: D.D.A.C., ibid. (n. 193), 29. August 1811, p. 85). 
250  Quoted from: D.D.A.C., ibid. (n. 193), 29. August 1811, p. 86 . 
251  Muñoz Torrero quoted extensively from Pufendorf and Grotius. (see  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, 
Política y Constitución en España, ibid. (n. 214), p. 49). 
252  Muñoz Torrero and Oliveros in D.D.A.C., ibid. (n. 193), p. 9,11. 
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Almighty God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the author and supreme legislator of 
the universe. ’  253 
 Both the royalist conservatives  ( realistas ) and the liberals refer to the  leges fun-
damentales ( leyes  fundamentales ). The historical continuity, highlighted by the 
 Discurso Prelimiar of  Agustín de  Argüelles , 254 is cloud point of all the different 
views on the question of sovereignty in Cádiz. 255 The pro-monarchic  realistas 
explain with the help of the  fundamental laws that sovereignty of the Cortes is lim-
ited 256 and even that they cannot have the  pouvoir  constituant in the absence of the 
king. For the royalist conservatives  ( realistas ) , the  leyes  fundamentales imply the 
pre-constitutional organizational framework of the Spanish monarchy, 257 confi rm-
ing the monarch as head of the executive (Art. 16) and as part of the legislative (Art. 
15). In consideration of the nation’s long historical continuity, 258 it is therefore only 
a derived constituent power ( poder constituyente constituido ), which Juan de Lera y 
 Cano attributes to the Cortes of Cádiz; According to him, both the general and 
extraordinary convention of Cádiz ( Cortes generales y extraordinarias ) were rein-
vigorated ‘by entering to the execution of it [the sovereignty] to conserve it for its 
legitimate king and descendants’. 259 From the royalist point of view ‘Conserving the 
sovereignty for the legitimate King and descendants’ means, that the Cortes do not 
have the nation’s  poder constituyente during the Monarch’s absence . 
 For liberal representatives, the  leyes  fundamentales express the transmission of 
sovereignty from the nation onto the  King , and represent the conviction, borrowed 
from the School of Salamanca, that monarchical  sovereignty is not of divine but of 
natural origin. As supra-legal limitations of the nation’s constituent  sovereignty , 260 
253  “ Dios Todopoderoso, Padre, Hijo y Espíritu Santo, autor y Supremo Legislador de la Sociedad. ”. 
Quoted from: D.D.A.C., ibid. (n. 193), p. 7. 
254  See  Argüelles , Discurso preliminar ibid. (n. 183), p. 1 ff.; “ Nada ofrece la Comisión en su 
proyecto que no se halle consignado del modo más auténtico y solemne en los diferentes cuerpos 
de la legislación española […] ”; [‘Nothing offers the Commission in its project that would not be 
consternated in the most authentic and solemn mode in the different bodies of Spanish 
legislative.’]. 
255  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna , La teoría del estado, ibid. (n. 203), p. 121. 
256  In this way the Bishop of Calahorra: “ apropiándose a sí mismo de la soberanía que tenía cedida 
solemnemente con el contrato y pacto más relevante expresado en las leyes fundamentales ”; 
(quoted from D.D.A.C., ibid. (n. 193), vol. 8, p. 61); [‘appropriating to herself the sovereignty that 
she had assigned solemnly with the contract and pact more relevantly expressed within the funda-
mental laws.’]. 
257  Juan de Lera y Cano: “ una monarquía baxo las condiciones que forman las leyes fundamen-
tales ” (quoted from D.D.A.C., ibid. (n. 193), p. 76). 
258  Cf. Llaneras: “ no para dar á la nacion española una nueva constitucion fundamental; sino para 
mejorar la que hay […] ”; (cited from D.D.A.C., ibid. Fn. 193, vol. 8, p. 21); [‘not to give the 
Spanish nation a new fundamental constitution; but to improve the existing one.’]. 
259  “ á entrar en el ejercicio de ella [soberanía], para conservarla á su legítimo Rey y descendien-
tes ”; (quoted from D.D.A.C., ibid. (n. 193), vol. 8, p. 77). The Spanish language uses the feminine 
personal pronoun. 
260  Cf. the Spanish wording of  Article 3 “ […] y por los mismo pertenece exclusivamente el derecho 
de establecer sus leyes fundamentales. ” (quoted from: Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), 
p. 430). 
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the  leyes  fundamentales are used by liberals to argue for moderate, limited monar-
chy, as they are carried forward by positive-legal limitations. 261 In this context, the 
 leyes fundamentales are the argumentative nucleus of the limitations on constituted 
sovereignty. 262 The  leyes  fundamentales serve as an argumentative link between 
constituent  sovereignty and constituted sovereignty, due to the historical continuity 
established prominently in the  Discurso Prelimiar of Agustín de Argüelles . The 
historical continuity is therefore not only a semantic keynote in the Cádiz  debates , 
but it stands for the particuliarity of the Spanish  discourse , which understands 
national sovereignty  not as an abstract notion as in the French discourse, but as a 
historic one. 263 
3.5.4  Primacy of the Cortes in the Constitution of Cádiz 
 The legislative power of the  Cortes is the centrepiece of the constitution of Cádiz, 264 
as the 140 articles in its third title shows. Thus, the balance of powers is shifted far 
beyond the constitutional participation rights of its French role model of 1791 265 in 
favour of the  Cortes, 266 and not only out of admiration of the constituent for English 
parliamentary sovereignty, 267 but rather above all because of the situational  weakness 
261  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, Política y Constitución en España, ibid. (n. 214), p. 121. 
262  Varela Suanzes-Carpegna , La teoría del estado, ibid. (n. 203), p. 121. 
263  Müller , ibid. (n. 184), p. 25 with reference to  Jellinek, Georg , Allgemeine Staatslehre, 3. ed., 6th 
Reprint, Bad Homburg 1959, p. 487. 
264  De Argüelles ,  Agustín , Discurso preliminar a la Constitutión de 1812, ibid. (n. 183) p. 77. 
Accordingly, the third title  ( “ De las Cortes ”) – alone comprising 140 articles – is also the most 
comprehensive of the whole text. Among other things, it comprises a complete electoral law. Cf. 
inter alia  González Trevijano, Pedro José , El concepto de Nación el la Constitución de Cádiz, in: 
Escudero López, José Antonio, Cortes y Constitución de Cádiz. 200 años, vol. 2, Madrid 2011, 
p. 607. 
265  The executive power was vested in the King and his ministers (Titre III, Article 4). The legisla-
tive power was vested in the National Assembly  as a single chamber legislature, which emphasised 
the unity of the nation and avoided a conservative upper house (Titre III, Article 3, Titre III, Chapter 
I). The right of legislative initiative was only accorded to the single chamber legislature (Titre III, 
Chapitre III, Section 1, Article 1, No. 1). The meeting of the legislative body was regulated in the 
constitution (Titre III, Section V, Article 1 & 5), and not dependent on being called by the monarch. 
The King could not dissolve the National Assembly (Titre III, Chapitre I, Article 5). The ministers 
were appointed and dismissed by the King (Titre III, Section IV, Article 1), and assumed by coun-
tersignature (Titre III, Section IV, Article 4) the legal responsibility for the legality of the acts of 
government of the King (Titre III, Section IV, Article 5). Only in two particularities was the strict 
division between the executive power of the king and his ministers from the single chamber legis-
lature of the National Assembly modifi ed: the king had a suspensive veto in the legislative proce-
dure (Titre III, Chapitre III, Section 3, Article 1 & 2), and the legislature had a right of participating 
in foreign policy (Titre III, Chapitre III, Section 1, Art. 2). 
266  Cortes , Spanish: House of Representatives, Parliament of the Estates. 
267  The evaluation of the comprehensive correspondence of the  Cortes generales y extraordinarias 
with London is one of the research tasks of the Advanced Grant ReConFort. 
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of the transitional government ( regencia ) during the War of  Independence . 268 The 
primacy of the parliament has various manifestations in the constitution of Cádiz. 
The Cortes are, together with the monarch, entitled to legislation (Art. 15, 142). 
Every representative and every member of the government has the right of legisla-
tive initiative. 269 The monarch only has a suspensive right to  veto , limited to two 
years (Art. 147). If he denies his approval to a statute, the bill can be put forward a 
second time in the following session (Art. 147). A second refusal has suspensive 
effect, until the Cortes can override the monarchical veto with a two-thirds majority 
in the third year (Art. 148, 149). 270 The exclusion of the executive from participation 
in parliamentary sessions also strengthens the superiority of the Cortes. Although 
the sessions were public, neither the King nor the minister were allowed to attend 
them (Art. 124 et seq.). 271 Furthermore, Art. 131, N° 26 stipulates a provisional 
presumption of the Cortes’ competence in constitutional issues. 272 The primacy of 
the Cortes can also be seen in its relationship with the executive. The Monarch exer-
cises the executive power (Art. 16, 170). But his competencies are enumeratively 
regulated in Article 171 and they are bound to detailed participation rights of the 
Cortes (Art. 172). Thus, the catalogue of Art. 172 encloses the prohibition to sus-
pend the Cortes. The Monarch appoints the state ministers (Art. 171 N° 16). These 
were politically responsible to the Cortes (Art. 226). The recognition authority for 
the Prince of Asturias as successor to the throne (Art. 210), their right of proposal of 
appointment of the members of the privy-council ( Consejo de Estado ) according to 
Art. 235, 273 and the coronation oath before the plenum (Art. 173) document the 
derived monarchical power. 274 
3.5.5  The Legitimisation of the Cádiz  Constitution by the Old 
Fundamental Laws of the Kingdom ( las antiguas leyes 
fundamentales de la Monarquía ) 
 In the Cortes’  debates , one realizes the argumentative link between the constitu-
tional drafts and the tradition and history of the old Spanish law in order to avoid the 
general suspicion that they were headed to revolutionary goals. This defensive strat-
egy marked the formulation in the  preamble of the Cortes-Constitution according to 
which the general assembly of the Cortes ‘after the most careful investigation and 
268  Sánchez Agesta, L. , Introducción, in: De Argüelles, ibid. (n. 183), part one, p. 55. 
269  In practice, the usage of the legislative initiative by the monarch remained the exception. For 
instance, 92% of the adopted drafts during the so-called Trienio Liberal (1820–1823) were based 
on the  Cortes ’ initiative,  Marcuello Benedicto, Juan Ignacio , División de poderes y proceso legis-
lativo en el sistema constitucional de 1812, in: Revista de Estudios Políticos 93 (1996), p. 225 
et seq. 
270  Cited in accordance with Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 451. 
271  Cited in accordance with Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 445 et seq. 
272  Cited in accordance with Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 448. 
273  Cited in accordance with Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), ibid, p. 463. 
274  Cited in accordance with Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 461. 
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the most thorough contemplation’ were convinced that the ‘already established fun-
damental laws of the kingdom ( las antiguas leyes  fundamentales  de la Monarquía ) 
as well as the fi xed and permanent securing of the execution of the adequate orders 
and the measure provisions advanced the great goal of furthering the well-being and 
prosperity of the whole nation …’. 275 Even if this declaration in the  preamble marks 
the transition from the traditional constitutional  semantics of the  Ancien Régime 
towards a constitutional understanding of a sovereign nation, 276 in their ‘addresses 
to the king’ 277 of August 11, 1811, November 6, 1811 and November 24, 1811 con-
tained in the three ‘‘ discorso preliminar ’’, the Cortes put their constitutional works 
in the historical context that was not vulnerable ‘to the argument of revolutionary 
upheaval and dangerous novelty originating from the  monarch ’. 278 ‘In its draft, the 
commission establishes nothing that is not yet to be found in the most authentic and 
celebratory manner in the different Spanish laws …’. 279 In the address of August 11, 
1811, the constitutional commission rejects ‘the draft of novelty’ 280 and the suspi-
275  Willoweit/Seif (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 430; Concerning the “leyes fundamentales” as “fun-
damental laws” compare  Pölitz ,  Karl Heinrich Ludwig, Die Constitutionen der europäischen 
Staaten seit den letzten 25 Jahren, Dritter Theil, Leipzig 1820, p. 36. Concerning the literal model 
of the edition elaborated by Hartmann, Karl Friedrich (anonymously published:  Hartmann ,  Karl 
Friedrich, Die spanische Constitution der Cortes und die provisorische Constitution der Vereinigten 
Provinzen von Südamerika; aus den Urkunden übersetzt mit historisch-statistischen Einleitungen, 
Leipzig 1820) see  Mohnhaupt ,  Heinz, Das Verhältnis der drei Gewalten in der Constitution der 
Cortes, in: Müßig (ed.),  Konstitutionalismus und Verfassungskonfl ikt , Tübingen 2006, p. 79–99, 
82, that also mentions the distorting translation mistake in the preamble (Compare the preamble of 
 Pölitz , Constitutionen, Dritter Theil, p. 36, instead of: “daß die alten Grundgesetze … den großen 
Zweck …  nicht erfüllen können” (“that the old fundamental laws … may  not accomplish the great 
goal …”), it has to be positively: “… erfüllen können” (‘can accomplish’). Cf. also von Grunenthal, 
Friedrich/Dengel, Karl Gustav (ed.), Spaniens Staats-Verfassung durch die Cortes, Berlin 1819, 
p. 3. Concerning the function and meaning of the “fundamental laws” compare also  Mohnhaupt , 
 Heinz, Von den “leges fundamentales” zur modernen Verfassung in Europa. Zum begriffs- und 
dogmengeschichtlichen Befund (16.-18. Jahrhundert), in: Ius Commune 25 (1998), p. 121–158. 
276  Compare  Mohnhaupt , ibid. (n. 275), p. 121 et seq.;  idem , Verfassung I, in: Mohnhaupt, Heinz/
Grimm, Dieter, Verfassung. Zur Geschichte des Begriffs von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, 2nd 
edition., Berlin 2002, p. 62–66, 78–83;  Coronas González, Santos Manuel , Las Leyes 
Fundamentales del Antiguo Régimen (Notas sobre la Constitución histórica española), Anuario de 
Historia del Derecho Española, LXV (1995), p. 127–218;  Magin Ferrer, R. P. Fr ., Las Leyes 
Fundamentales de la Monarchía Espaňola, segun Fueron antiguamente, y segun conviene que sean 
en la época actual, I-II, Barcelona 1845. 
277 All in all, the adresses allow for comprehensive conclusions about the intention of the constitu-
tional commissions of the Cortes, printed by Hartmann in “ Discorso preliminar ” ( Hartmann , 
Spanische Constitution (n. 275), p. 3–106). My analysis and assessment follows  Mohnhaupt , 
Cortes (n. 275), in: Müßig (ed.),  Konstitutionalismus und Verfassungskonfl ikt , Tübingen 2006, 
p. 79. 
278  Mohnhaupt , Cortes (n. 275), in: Müßig (ed.),  Konstitutionalismus und Verfassungskonfl ikt , 
Tübingen 2006, p. 79–99, 89 et seq. 
279 Adresse of August 11, 1811, in:  Hartmann, Spanische Constitution ibid. (n. 275), p. 4. 
280 Von Grunenthal/Dengel, ibid (n. 275), Berlin 1819, p. III). 
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cion of having neither ‘borrowed something from foreign nations, nor of having 
been penetrated by reformative enthusiasm’ since they did nothing but to adopt what 
‘had become unfashionable since several centuries’ and ‘what had been known and 
usual in Spain’ in their ‘present draft’. 281 
 The sovereignty of the  nation is derived from old traditions: ‘In order to prove 
this thesis, the commission must do nothing but refer to the decrees of the  Fouero 
Zuzgo [the  Gothic code ] about the laws of the nation, the king and the citizen, about 
the mutual obligations to uphold the laws, about the manner of delivering the same 
and to execute them. In the fundamental laws of this code, the sovereignty of the 
 people is pronounced in the most authentic and celebratory manner that is 
conceivable.’ 282 Even the old ‘fundamental laws of Aragon, Navarra and Castile’ as 
well as the older codes from “ Fuero Zuzgo ” to “ Nueva Recopilación ” are being 
used. 283 This should hush every critic: ‘Who upon seeing such celebratory, such 
clear, such decisive decrees was still able to refuse to accept as an undeniable prin-
ciple that the sovereignty originated from the nation and is inherent to it?’ 284 In this 
sense, also  Rotteck called the constitutional draft of the Cortes a creation ‘born in 
the spirit of the new ages of reestablishment of the rights of the nation asserted by 
law against the monarch that it had been deprived of’. 285 The context of the old 
traditions is obvious, even more so since the catholic national religion confi rms the 
Cortes’ traditionalism. 286 With this lack of a separation of law and religion, the 
Cortes contradicted all cosmopolitan and religious principles of the Enlightenment, 287 
even if the constitutional commission in its address of December 24, 1811 
281  In:  Hartmann , Spanische Constitution ibid. (n. 275), p. 5. 
282  In:  Hartmann, Spanische Constitution ibid. (n. 275), p. 8. 
283 Adresse to the King of August 11, 1811, in:  Hartmann , Spanische Constitution ibid. (n. 275), 
p. 4, 17, 34; compare also von Grunenthal/Dengel, Spaniens Staats-Verfassung ibid. (n. 280), p. X 
et seq. 
284  In:  Hartmann, Spanische Constitution (n. 275), p. 8. Compare Mohnhaupt, Cortes (n. 275), in: 
Müßig (ed.), Konstitutionalismus und Verfassungskonfl ikt, Tübingen 2006, p. 91 et seq. 
285  Von Rotteck ,  Carl, Cortes und Cortes-Verfassung in Spanien, in: Von Rotteck, Carl/Welcker, 
Karl Theodor (ed.), Carl, Staats-Lexikon oder Encyklopädie der Staatswissenschaften, Dritter 
Band, Altona 1836, p. 57. 
286  “The religion of the Spanish people is and remains for ever the one, true, roman-catholic and 
apostolic religion. The people protect it by means of wise and just laws and forbids the exercice of 
any other,” article 12 Cortes-Constitution 1812. (Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 432). 
287  Concerning this confl ict between political and religious freedom compare  Portillo, José María , 
La Libertad entre Evangelio y Constitución. Notas para el Concepto de Libertad Política en la 
Cultura Española de 1812, in: Iñurritegui Rodrígez, José María/Portillo Valdés, José María (ed.), 
Constitución en España: Orígenes y Destinos, Madrid 1998, p. 139–177. 
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 proclaimed political freedom of speech and the press (Art. 371) 288 as ‘the true 
medium of the Enlightenment’. 289 
 The normativity of the modern constitution, as a text of law, which fi xes the 
political order as a legal order, fl ashes up in the refl ection of the enlightened claim 
for codifi cation. 290 For instance, the constitutional draft according to the constitu-
tional commission is ‘in its character national and ancient’, in its ‘order and method’, 
however, ‘new’ 291 : ‘[New is the ...] method of how the matter is divided up, …, by 
depicting and classifying it like this, that they form a system of fundamental and 
constitutional laws wherein one fi nds the fundamental laws of Aragon, Navarra and 
Castile scattered amongst everything what unifi ed the decrees that concern the lib-
erty and  independence of the nation, the rights and duties of the citizens, the dignity 
and authority of the king and the tribunals with one another.’ 292 The generalising 
order of the legal matter and the fi xation of the political order as a legal order serves 
the creation of the nation state by means of territorial unifi cation and integration of 
all social groups. The unifi cation in the fi rst constitutional title (Concerning the 
Spanish nation and the Spanish) and of the second constitutional title (Concerning 
the territory of Spain, concerning its religion and government and concerning the 
Spanish people) 293 serves the creation of common economic conditions, as well as 
to ‘further the national prosperity by means of everything possible without the 
reglementations and rules of the government having to interfere …’. 294 
 ‘Revolutionary’ state theories are consciously avoided, the name of  Montesquieu 
not being named once in the ‘addresses to the king’ of the year of 1811. 295 The 
Cortes justifi ed the ‘separation of the sovereign authority of a nation’ into three 
288 Article 371: “Todos los españoles tienen libertad de escribir, imprimir y publicar sus ideas políti-
cas …”; text version in García, Antonio Fernández (ed.), La Constitución de Cádiz (1812) y 
Discurso Preliminar a la Constitución, Madrid 2002, p. 169; compare  Sarasola, Ignacio Fernànde, 
Opinión pública y “libertades de expresión” en el constitucionalismo español (1726–1845), in: 
Giornale di Storia costituzionale 6/2 (2003), Macerata 2003, p. 195–215, 200–205. 
289 Adresse of the Cortes to the King of December 24, 2811, in:  Hartmann, Spanische Constitution, 
ibid. (n. 275), p. 101. 
290  The declared goal of the constitutional commission was that “the constitution of the Spanish 
monarchy should be a complete and well-arranged system whose parts were fully connected and 
in harmony with each other. It must be made by the same hand”. Adresse to the King of August 11, 
1811, in:  Hartmann , Spanische Constitution (n. 275), p. 18. Compare  Caroni, Pio, Gesetz und 
Gesetzbuch. Beiträge zu einer Kodifi kationsgeschichte, Basel/Genf/Munich 2003, p. 5–21. 
291 Adresse to the King of August 11, 1811, in:  Hartmann , Spanische Constitution ibid. (n. 
275),  p. 18, paraphrased translation by UM. 
292 Adresse to the King of August 11, 1811, in:  Hartmann , Spanische Constitution ibid. (n. 275), 
p. 4, paraphrased translation by UM. 
293  Willoweit/Seif , (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 430 et seq. Art. 1–9 (“De la Nación española y de los 
Españoles”) and in Art. 10 and 11 (“Del territorio de las Españas, su Religion y Gobierno, y de los 
Ciudadanos Españoles”). 
294 Adresse der Cortes an den König vom 24. Dezember 1811, in:  Hartmann, Spanische Constitution, 
ibid. (n. 275), p. 84 et seq. 
295  De Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu ,  Charles-Louis, De l’Esprit des Lois (1748), 
Livre I, Chapitre III (“Des lois positives”). 
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branches with the human nature in which possibilities for  confl ict are immanent: 
‘The separation of the same is indispensable; but the dividing lines that one has to 
observe in particular between the legislative and executive branch in order to create 
a correct and stable balance are of such a degree of uncertainty that their delimita-
tion has been the bone of contention amongst the important authors of governmental 
science and that the systems and dissertations concerning this matter have indefi -
nitely multiplied.’ 296 For instance, the Cortes-Commission is able to contemplate in 
its address to the king of November 6, 1811 whether ‘it may be benefi cial under 
very urgent circumstances to unite the legislative and executive power for a certain 
amount of time…’. 297 The dangers going hand in hand with the concentration of the 
three branches of power or the three Aristotelian state functions 298 for the ‘political 
and civil liberty’ as well as ‘personal security’ were nevertheless very well known 
to the Cortes. These dangers were seen as possible potential for  confl ict in the sys-
tem of the constitution that was only perceived as avoidable by means of the separa-
tion of powers. In this sense, the separation of justice and administration allows the 
creation of ‘the necessary balance between the government’s authority … and 
inalienable liberties’. 299 
3.5.6  Struggle of the  realistas for the Monarchical Principle 
 Therefore reactionary longings for the restoration of the absolutistic Bourbon mon-
archy had room. After the fl ight of the French King Joseph  Napoleon and the return 
of the Spanish King  Ferdinand  VII in March 1814, the  realistas – as the royalists 
were called – took the view in their renowned Persian manifest of April 12, 1814 
that the Cortes Constitution of Cádiz which while not being directed against the 
monarchy was created without the monarch 300 and therefore could not possibly bind 
the king. 301 The latter called for absolute power as he had held before the displace-
ment by Napoleon. Ferdinand VII consequently annulled the Cortes Constitution of 
1812 and in the meantime proclaimed laws by the decree of May 4, 1814. 302 
296 Adresse of the Cortes to the King of August 11, 1811, in:  Hartmann , Spanische Constitution (n. 
275), p. 21 et seq. ; “ Su separación es indispensable …”, in:  de Argüelles , ibid. (n. 183), p. 78. 
297  In:  Hartmann , Spanische Constitution, ibid. (n. 275), p. 56. 
298  Aristoteles , Politica, 1297 b 35–1298 a 7. 
299 Adresse of the Cortes to the King of December 24, 1811, in:  Hartmann , Spanische Constitution, 
ibid. (n. 275), p. 88. Compare  Sánchez Agesta , Introducción, in: ibid. (n. 183), p. 52–59. 
300  Badía ,  Juan Ferrando, Die spanische Verfassung von 1812 und Europa, Der Staat 2 (1963), 
153–180, p. 153;  Santana ,  Alberto Ramos, La Constitución de 1812 en su Contexto Histórico, in: 
Ramos Santana, Alberto/Marchena Fernández, Juan (ed.), Constitución política, Vol. I, Estudios, 
Sevilla 2000, p. 9–67. 
301  Compare:  Konetzke, Richard (with completion by  Kleinmann, Hans Otto), Die iberischen 
Staaten von der Französischen Revolution bis 1874, in: Schieder, Theodor (ed.), Handbuch der 
Europäischen Geschichte, Band 5, Stuttgart 1981, p. 886–929, p. 899 et seq. 
302  Compare CD-ROM-1, Dok.-Nr. 8.2.8 (Königliches Dekret von Valencia über die Abschaffung 
der Verfassung v. 4.5.1814) concerning  Bernecker, Walther L. / Brinkmann ,  Sören, Spanien um 
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 By doing so, the situation before the  octroi of the French constitution of 1808 
was supposed to be restored.  Rotteck called the following phase of restoration a 
‘reactionary tyranny’ by means of which the inquisition, ‘the heaviest intellectual 
pressure’ and ‘all calamitous fl aws of the old administration’ had come back. 303 A 
cruel domestic struggle (1814–1820) was to follow. Not only liberal forces and 
farmers took part in the upheaval against the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy, 
but the reactionary agitation also seized the badly equipped and irregularly paid 
army. The offi cer corps had since long been a domain of the middle class strongly 
infl uenced by liberal ideas. 304 Attempts to instrumentalize the restored Bourbon 
Kingdom concerning the offi cer corps failed. Rather, since 1814, military revolts 
took place ( Pronunciamientos ) that aimed at the return to the Constitution of Cádiz. 
After a putsch of the military and a proclamation of the restoration of the Cortes 
Constitution of 1812, Ferdinand VII  found himself having to fi nally accept the con-
stitution of 1812 on March 7, 1820. The laws passed before 1814 were now rein-
vigorated. In the towns, the squares received again their original name “ Plaza de la 
Constitución ”. 305 The often used battle cry ‘Constitution or Death’ 306 marks well the 
political radicalisation of the country after 1814 and makes clear that it was not a 
struggle within an agreed upon constitutional frame, but that it focused on the con-
stitution itself, the power to make the fi nal decision in the non-constitutional state 
and thus on sovereignty. 307 
3.5.7  Contemporary Ambigous Evaluation of the Cádiz  Constitution 
 The ambiguous argumentation of the Cortes, their recourse to old liberties and the 
rejection of enlightened sanctuary of religious liberty is mirrored in the disputed 
assessment of the Cortes-constitution in the historiographical state of the art. It is 
partially described as the Magna Carta of Spanish  liberalism , 308 and partially  only 
named a revolution on paper. 309 The same is true for the contemporaries’ evaluation. 
1800, in: Peter Brandt/Martin Kirsch/Arthur Schlegelmilch (ed.), Handbuch der europäischen 
Verfassungsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert. Institutionen und Rechtspraxis im gesellschaftlichen 
Wandel, Volume 1: Around 1800, Bonn 2006, p. 601–639. 
303  Von Rotteck , Cortes ibid. (n. 285), p. 54. 
304  Bernecker/Brinkmann , ibid. (n. 209), p. 616. 
305  Konetzke , Die iberischen Staaten, (n. 301), p. 901. 
306  Konetzke , Die iberischen Staaten, (n. 301), p. 901. 
307  Hofmann, Hasso , “Souverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet” (Carl Schmitt), 
in: Müßig (ed.),  Verfassungskonfl ikt (n. 278), p. 269–284, 272 et seq. 
308  Compare  Dippel ,  Horst, La Signifi cación de la Constitutión Española de 1812 para los Nacientes 
Liberalismo y Constitutionalismo Alemanes, in: Iñurritegui Rodrígez, José María/Portillo Valdés, 
José María (ed.) Constitutión en España: Orígenes y Destinos, Madrid 1998, p. 287–307;  Konetzke , 
ibid. (n. 191), p. 898. 
309  Indeed, until nowadays scholars dispute whether the work of the Cortes of Cádiz may be under-
stood as a “civil” revolution. With regard to the noble property and some clergy prerogatives, Josep 
Fontana emphasized the political modesty of the bourgoisie, its readiness to social compromise 
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 Metternich reviled the Cortes-Constitution of 1820 as ‘the work of arbitrariness or 
senseless blindness’. 310 The ‘Holy Alliance’ 311 and the representatives of the strict 
monarchical  principle – as for instance Albrecht von  Haller – demanded: ‘Avoid the 
word constitution; it is poison in monarchies since it requires a democratic basis, 
organizes the inner warfare and creates two elements of life and death fi ghting each 
other. Who called for this constitution? It was the Jacobins themselves …. The 
people do not demand from you a constitution but protection and justice.’  312 The 
supportive voices were certainly not Jacobins. Its infl uence on the Constitution of 
the United Provinces of South America (December 3, 1817) 313 as well as its model 
character for Portugal, Piedmont and Naples-Sicily, 314 however, support Dominique 
Georges Frédéric de  Pradt’s assessment, which was given under the title ‘ De la 
révolution actuelle de l’ Espagne et de ses suites ’ (1820): ‘The absolutistic Europe 
will not be able to escape the infl uence that these revolutions with their constitution 
of 1812 will exercise on it in the future to come.’ 315 In Carl von Rotteck’s words,  the 
positive evaluation goes as follows: ‘What friend of liberty and a popular constitu-
tion will not consider such a provision as desirable?’ 316 In this sense,  Pölitz declares 
with the traditional forces and the social-revolutionary character of the Cortes was disputed. 
Manuel Pérez Ledesma by contrast differs between the phase of the Cortes of Cádiz qualitatively 
from the actual beginning of the constitutional period (since 1834) and only acknowledges the 
judgement of Fontana for the latter, compare  Fontana ,  Josep, La crisis de Antiguo régimen 1808–
1833, Barcelona 1992, p. 17 et seq. and p. 48 et seq. ;  Ledesma ,  M. Pérez, Las Cortes de Cádiz y 
la sociedad española, p. 167 et seq., in: Artola, M. (ed.), Las Cortes de Cádiz, Madrid 1991. 
310  Brandt, Hartwig (ed.), Restauration und Frühliberalismus 1814–1840 (Quellen zum politischen 
Denken der Deutschen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Volume III), Darmstadt 1979, p. 229; compare 
also  Dippel ,  Horst, Die Bedeutung der spanischen Verfassung von 1812 für den deutschen 
Frühliberalismus und Frühkonstitutionalismus, in: Kirsch, Martin/Schiera, Pierangelo (ed.), 
Denken und Umsetzung des Konstitutionalismus in Deutschland und anderen europäischen 
Ländern in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts, Berlin 1999, p. 219–237, p. 222. 
311  Compare  Ferrando Badía ,  Juan, Die spanische Verfassung von 1812 und Europa, in: Der Staat 
2 (1963), p. 153–180 (174–180);  Von Görres ,  Joseph, Die heilige Allianz und die Völker auf dem 
Congresse von Verona, Stuttgart 1822. 
312  Von Haller ,  Carl Ludwig, Ueber die Constitution der Spanischen Cortes, s.l. 1820, p. 72. 
313  Hartmann has illustrated the “Constitution der Vereinigten Provinzen von Südamerika vom 3. 
Dezember 1817” directly after the Cortes-constitution and thereby clarifi ed the closer connection 
of the two constitutions.  Hartmann, Spanische Constitution (n. 195), p. 177–222 (177): “Vorläufi ges 
Verfassungsgesetz, gegeben (den 3. Dec. 1817) von dem souveränen Congreß der vereinigten 
Provinzen von Südamerika, für die Regierung und Verwaltung des Staats (L.S.) bis zur Zeit der 
öffentlichen Bekanntmachung der Constitution. Buenos Ayres, in der Druckerei der Unabhängigkeit. 
1817.” Concerning the infl uence of the Cortes-constitution of 1812 on the Southern American 
continent, compare:  Sánchez Agesta ,  Luis, La Democracia en Hispanoamérica, Madrid 1987, p. 35 
et seq.;  Bravo Lira ,  Bernardino, El Estado Constitucional en Hispanoamérica 1811–1991, Mexico 
1992, p. 10 et seq. 
314  More precisely  Badía , Spanische Verfassung (n. 183), p. 153–180. 
315  De Pradt ,  Dominique Georges Frédéric, De la révolution actuelle de l’Espagne et de ses suites, 
Paris 1820, p. 143, here cited according to  Badía , Spanische Verfassung (n. 183), p. 154 with 
Footnote 9. 
316  Rotteck, Cortes (n. 285), p. 64. 
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as well – even if doing so a little bit more tacitly: ‘Thus, when considering it as a 
whole, one cannot refuse approval to this constitution.’ 317 
3.6  The Constituent Sovereignty in the Norwegian  Grunnloven 
 The Norwegian Fundamental Law ( Grunnloven ), 318 adopted on May 17, 1814, is 
particular not only for its ‘survival’ of the restoration after the Vienna  Congress , 319 
but for the unique combination of a strong parliament and a strong crown. Compared 
to its previously outlined European contemporaries, like the French September 
 Constitution of 1791 320 and the Spanish  Cortes Constitution of 1812, the Norwegian 
 Grunnloven does not only rely on the strength of  Parliament , but also allows for a 
strong monarchical position, 321 – much stronger than in the Swedish form of gov-
ernment of 1809. 322 The ‘ Eidsvoll -alliance’ of a strong parliament and a strong 
crown allowed for an evolutionary transition from the constitutional to the parlia-
mentary system, which was accompanied by a legal dispute over the King’s veto 
317  Pölitz , Constitutionen III (n. 275), p. 28. 
318  Of May 17, 1814. Cited in:  Pölitz ,  Karl Heinrich Ludwig, Die europäischen Verfassungen seit 
dem Jahre 1789 bis auf die neueste Zeit, Mit geschichtlichen Erläuterungen und Einleitungen (The 
European Constitutions from the Year of 1789 to the Modern Age, Including Historical Explanations 
and Introductions), Third Volume, Second, Restructured, Corrected and Revised Edition, Leipzig 
1833, p. 92 et seq. 
319  Therefore it is the oldest functioning constitution of Europe and only topped globally by the 
Constitution of the United States of 1787. 
320  Norway was for a long time the only European country with a constitutional monarchy infl u-
enced by the French role-model of 1791 with a royal suspensive veto and lacking monarchical 
right of dissolution. Up until the separation of Sweden and Norway in 1905, the King frequently 
made use of his veto when it came to simple laws. Besides the suspensive veto , the French 
Revolutionary Constitution was also the role model when it came to the rules for the indirect elec-
tion of the Parliament and when it came to the allocation of the respective candidate to a residence 
in the constituency. 
321  The text of the constitution puts the regulations of the monarchical executive at the beginning. 
The provisions relating to the State Council, (Here: the government as in “the cabinet”.) the com-
petence of the monarch for foreign affairs, for the armed forces, the declaration of war and the 
conclusion of peace treaties illustrate this intention to establish a strong monarchical power. 
322  The Swedish form of government served as a role model for the regulation of the relationship 
between the King and the government, namely the ministerial responsibility and the ministerial 
counter signature of royal decrees. The role of the monarch in Norway, however, remained stronger 
in respect of the latter point. A synopsis of the sources on the Norwegian Fundamental Law can be 
found at  Höjer, Nils Jakob , Norska Grundlagen och dess Källor, Stockholm 1882, p. 171–198; 
 Tønnesen, Kåre , Menneskerettserklæringene i det attende århundre og den norske Grunnlov, in: 
E. Smith (ed.), Menneskerettihetene i den nasjonale rett i Frankrike og Norge, Oslo 1990, p. 20–38; 
Heivall, Geir, En introduksjon til Kants begrep om statforfatning, in: Michalsen, D. (ed.), 
Forfatningsteori møter 1814, Oslo 2008, p. 95–144. A potential infl uence of the Cádiz Constitution 
of 1812 on the Norwegian Constitution of 1814 is discussed by  Tamm, Ditlev , Cádiz 1812 y 
Eidsvoll 1814, in: Historia Constitucional (revista electrónica), n. 7, 2006, p. 313–320,  http://www.
historiaconstitucional.com/index.php/historiaconstitucional /iisue/view/8/showToc [30.04.2016]. 
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against constitutional alterations. As the evolutionary understanding of constitution 
in the context of ReConFort comprises the respective constitutional interpretation, 323 
the Norwegian Constitutional Formation is to be included into my paper, even 
though Norway is not a ReConFort-targeted country. The statement of the Christiana 
Faculty of Law does not only refer to the constitutional nature of the King’s veto, 
but also covers constituent  sovereignty and the precedence of constitution by 
explaining why constitutional  amendments cannot be left to an ordinary parliamen-
tary assembly. Therefore, it is a document that is crucial for the understanding of the 
Norwegian implementation of the modern constitutional model. 
3.6.1  Eidsvoll Debates and the Norwegian  Grunnloven  of May 17, 1814 
 Christian  Frederik 324 summoned the leading men on February 16, 1814 in order to 
have himself declared the hereditary  king by virtue of his hereditary right and vested 
in him as the Danish Prince. He saw himself confronted with the argument that – 
with the abdication of the Danish King Friedrich IV as the Norwegian King after the 
Peace of Kiel of January 14, 1814 – the state power was not handed down to the 
Prince, but to the Norwegian people. Despite the fact that the men surrounding 
Georg  Sverdrup 325 and calling for a constitutional monarchy were only a small elite, 
Christian Frederik still had to satisfy their claims in order to make sure that he was 
able to continue his policy of  independence of a Norwegian Kingdom. Due to the 
fact that the Norwegian actions appeared to be of a rebellious and revolutionary 
nature from the Swedish perspective, Christian Frederik was exposed to a dilemma: 
on the one hand, he wished to fi ght for the Norwegian  independence and on the 
other hand, he wanted to assure the continuance of the Union with Denmark. The 
aversion against the  Ancien Régime was not generally directed against crowned 
heads, as the crown was perceived as bulwark against revolutionary  terreur and in 
the special Norwegian Case was received as a guarantee of  independence . 326 
323  See here ‘I. On ReConFort’s research programm in general’. Of course one has to bear in mind 
that according to the Norwegian state of arts the faculty’s statement was a kind of circumvention 
of stortinget as all lawyers were the King’s lawyers formulating his position he could not get 
through Parliament as legal opinion of the capital’s law faculty (Writing democracy. The Norwegian 
Constitution 1814–2014 edited by Gammelgaard, Karen/Holmøyvik, Eirik, New York/Oxford a.o. 
2014). 
324  Cousin of the Danish King; After King  Frederik VI of Denmark died in 1839, Christian Frederik 
ascended to the throne as King  Christian VIII of Denmark . 
325  Georg Sverdrup ( 1770 – 1850 ) represented Christiania (Oslo) at the Imperial Assembly of 
 Eidsvoll on May 17,  1814 . He was the leading person of the Party of Independence. Sverdrup was 
a member of the Constitutional Committee and was furthermore President of the Imperial 
Assembly. He was a member of the  Storting from 1818 to 1824 and from 1824 to 1826. 
326  ‘A striking feature of the Constitutional Assembly at Eidsvoll in 1814 was that the assembly 
resolved of its own accord that it would not adopt positions on or consider issues relating to foreign 
policy. Such issues were to be reserved for the regent, Christian Frederik. When the resolution was 
put to the vote on 19 April 1814, there were 55 votes in favour and 55 against. The president of the 
assembly used his casting vote to support the Independence Party’s view that the assembly should 
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 In the proclamation of February 19, 1814, Prince Christian Frederik – in his posi-
tion as the ‘regent’ – proclaimed the convocation of a Constitutional Imperial 
Assembly ( Riksforsamlingenat ) 327 that was to elaborate an Imperial Constitution 
and fi x the electoral procedure comprising an obligatorily preceding oath for the 
civil servants, the voters and the candidates ‘to defend Norway’s  independence and 
to risk life and blood for the beloved fatherland’. 328 The actual constitutional work 
was vested in the hands of the constitutional committee, which had the plenary 
assembly’s agree to twelve fundamental principles ( grunnsetninger ) before deliber-
ating on specifi c constitutional provisions. Among them were No. 2 ‘The people are 
to exercise the legislative power through representatives. ( Folket skal utøve den lov-
givende makt gjennom sine representanter )’ and No. 3 ‘Only the people are to have 
the right to impose taxes through their representatives. ( Folket skal alene ha rett til 
å beskatte seg gjennom sine representanter ).’ 329 The constitutional elaborations 
were conducted at an extreme speed of six weeks (convocation on April 10, 1814, 
fi nalisation of the elaborations on May 16, 1814) relying mostly on the draft of the 
Norwegian jurist Christian Magnus  Falsen (1782–1830) 330 and of the Danish Crown 
Secretary Johan Gunder  Adler (1784 –1852), both familiar with the French and the 
American  constitutional discourse. 
not consider matters relating to foreign policy.’ Dag Michalsen and Ola Mestad refer to the trans-
formation of international law and Norwegian Sovereignty in 1814 in their conference announce-
ment “The International Infl uence of the Norwegian 1814 Constitution 1814–1920”, Oslo 18–20 
November 2015. 
327  Constituted on April 10, 1814. 
328  Cited according to  Brandt ,  Peter , Norwegen, in: Daum, W. (ed.), together with Brandt, Peter/
Kirsch, Martin/Schlegelmilch, Arthur (ed.), Handbuch der europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte im 
19. Jahrhundert. Institutionen und Rechtspraxis im gesellschaftlichen Wandel, Volume 2: Around 
1815–1847, Bonn 2006, p. 1174. 
329  (1) Norway was to become a moderate hereditary monarchy. It was to be a free, independent and 
inseparable Kingdom and the regent was to have the title “King”. […] (4) The right to declare war 
and to make peace was to be the King’s. (5) The King was to receive the right to pardon. (6) The 
judiciary was to be independent from the legislative and executive power. (7) There is to be the 
freedom of publication and printing; (8) The Evangelic-Lutheran religion is to be the religion of 
the state and the King. Religious cults are able to exercise their religion freely; but Jews are to be 
hindered from the entering of the Imperial territory altogether. (9) New restrictions of the trade are 
not to be allowed. (10) Privileges relating to persons or being of mixed character are not to be 
granted any more (11). The citizens of the state are to be obliged to contribute to the defense 
of the fatherland evenly, irrespective of their standing, birth or wealth (Norwegian version to 
be found at:  https://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-demokratiet/Grunnloven/Eidsvoll-
og-grunnloven-1814/ ). 
330  Falsen led the Independent Party ( Selvstendighetspartiet ) that wanted complete independence 
and was prepared to resist Sweden militarily. 
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3.6.2  Moss Process into the Swedish Union: The Extraordinary 
 Storting as Constituent Assembly and the Fundamental Law 
of the Norwegian Empire of November 4, 1814 
 The Swedish insisting on the compliance with the Peace of Kiel led to a new war 
ending with the Norwegian defeat in the Treaty of  Moss of August 14, 1814. After 
the abdication of King Christian Frederik  who – according to the wording of the 
ceasefi re agreement ‘gave his power into the hands of the nation’, the moss- wording 
was argued upon with the commissioners of the Swedish Crown and guaranteed: 
“ Sa Majesté Le Roi de Suède promet d‘ accepter la constitution religée par des 
deputés de la diète  d’Eidsvoll . Sa Majesté ne proposera d’autre (sic)n changements, 
que ceux necessaires à l’union des deux royaumes, et s’engage de n’en faire d’autres 
que de concert avec la diète ”. 331 
 The ‘Extraordinary Storting’ steadfastly refused to deliver the election of Carl 
XIII 332 of Sweden to become King of Norway (where he was Carl II) before the 
altered Fundamental Law had been adopted. Following the constitutional promise 
emanating from the Treaty of  Moss , the ‘Fundamental Law of the Norwegian 
Empire’ ( Kongeriget Norges Grundlov ) of November 4, 1814 was negotiated 
between the commissions of the Swedish government and the newly elected 
Extraordinary Storting as a de facto second constitutional assembly. 333 On the same 
day, 48 of the 79 representatives “elected” Carl to the throne, 23 ‘elected and 
acknowledged’ him and 8 ‘acknowledged’ him. These formulations are based on 
the emphasis of a (fi ctitious) free Norwegian decision that is in accordance with the 
previously enacted constitution. The special vote of Brandt on the Faculty opinion 
of August 30, 1880 confi rms the Crown as the  pouvoir constitué . 334 Thereby, the 
personal union under a King with two independent states 335 with a respectively own 
331  Cited according to the legal opinion, p. 88. 
332 And the French revolutionary Bernadotte through the Swedish Prince  Karl Johan (formerly 
Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte). 
333  Hence, the principle of national sovereignty and the separation of powers amongst the  Storting 
(legislation and budget), the government (executive power) with the King and the judiciary were 
retained in Norway. On October 20, 1814, under the impression of 15.000 occupying soldiers and 
600 Norwegian soldiers in Swedish imprisonment decided with only fi ve opposing voices “that 
Norway shall be an independent Empire united with Sweden under a King but under the adherence 
to the constitution with the alterations that have been necessary for the well-being of the Empire 
due to the unifi cation with Sweden”. ( Berg, Roald , Storting og Unionen med Sverige 1814–1905. 
Dokumenter fra Stortingets arkiver, Oslo 2005, p. 12). 
334  ‘I obviously deem the Fundamental Law not to be a contract between the King and the people, 
but as an order established by the people themselves by virtue of their own sovereignty wherein all 
state power fi nds it  legitimacy . I do not attach any importance to King Karl Johan’s so-called 
“adoption” of November 10, 1814 as far as the validity of the Fundamental Law is concerned […]’ 
but I deem this “as an adoption or – at the most – a ratifi cation of the deliberations with the Swedish 
commissioners”. Legal Opinion, p. 84. 
335  There was no automatism between the Crowns: the Swedish King had to be specifi cally crowned 
at Trondheim in order to become the King of Norway. The King also had to reside on Norwegian 
territory for a certain number of days. 
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government 336 for internal affairs was fi xed. 337 In 1815, a treaty was signed between 
the Storting and the Swedish estates in the form of an ‘Imperial Act determining the 
constitutional relations resulting from the Union between Norway and Sweden’. 338 
This international treaty between the Norwegian  Parliament ( Stortinget ) and the 
Swedish Estates ( Stænder ) concerned the royal power and the provisions in the case 
of the vacant throne. It had constitutional rank in Norway and amounted to a simple 
law in Sweden. 339 
3.6.3  Relationship Between Monarch and Parliament in the Norwegian 
 Grunnloven 
 According to § 3  Grunnloven , the executive power was solely vested in the King 
who appointed and dismissed his ministry, which was referred to as ‘State Council’ 
at his liking. 340 The responsibility for the government action was located therein. 
The ministerial duty of countersignature for ‘all orders issued by the King himself’ 
(§ 31) corresponded to the ‘holiness’ of the person of the ruler in the understanding 
336  The Swedish King did not directly govern the neighbouring country but rather appointed a gov-
ernor who looked after the Swedish interests in Norway. 
337  Norway’s independence results from the formulations of the November Constitution: the provi-
sions “Norway is a free, independent, inseparable and unattached Empire” was complemented by 
the phrase “united with Sweden under a King”. 
338  The Act of Union ( Riksacten ) regulating the constitutional personal union between Sweden and 
Norway, was passed by the Norwegian Storting on July 31 and by the Swedish Riksdag on August 
6, 1815] ( http://www.verfassungen.eu/n/norwegen14-1.htm ); see also Allgemeine Zeitung 
München [General newspaper of Munich] of January 18, 1816, Beilage [insert], p. 25 et seq. 
339  Berg ,  Roald, Storting og Unionen med Sverige 1814–1905. Dokumenter fra Stortingets arkiver . 
[Oslo] 2005, p. 15. 
340 A proposal of 18 representatives of the Imperial Assembly of early 1814 from Western Norway 
and the territory of Trondheim had as a content not only the restriction of the suspensive veto but 
also the comprehensive revision of the constitution towards a parliamentarisation of the govern-
ment (election of the State Councils by the ( Storting ).  Seip, Jens Arup , Utsikt over Norges historie, 
2 Vol., Oslo 1974–1981, Vol. 1, p. 39–41, plausibly distinguishes between two main types of gov-
ernmental drafts: fi rst, those of a Western European constitutional theoretical kind that is based on 
the separation of powers and a strong position of the Parliament elected by means of a restricted 
suffrage, completely being formulated by civil servants and the bourgeoisie and second a strong 
monarchy with a rather counselling position of the Parliament and drafts emanating from farmers 
and partially citizen bourgeoisie. In both groups, radical democratic and Republican tendencies 
may be depicted. On the tradition of the existent drafts CD-ROM-2, Doc.-Nr. 14.2.2 (Eidsvold 
Constitution of May 17, 1814). Both versions of the Fundamental Law of 1814 – the draft (Adler/
Falsen) forming the basis for the parliamentary deliberations as well as further drafts and respec-
tive documents in the Kongeriget Norges Grundlov og øvrige Forfatningsdokumenter which has 
been published by the Storting in Kristiania in 1903; and Riksforsamlingens forhandlinger, utgit 
efter offentlig foranstaltning, 5 Vol. Christiania 1914–1918; now also in: Th. Riis a. o. (ed.), 
Forfatningsdokumenter fra Danmark, Norge og Sverige 1809–1849/Constitutional Documents of 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden 1809–1849 (= Dippel, Horst (ed.), Constitutions of the World from 
the late 18th Century to the Middle of the 19th Century. Sources on the Rise of Modern 
Constitutionalism, Europe, Vol. 6), Munich 2008. 
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of the time (§ 5); at the same time, the State Councils were obliged to dissuade in a 
written form if they considered the royal decisions to be unconstitutional or unlaw-
ful or harmful for the wellbeing of the state. They were forbidden from resigning 
out of protest. It is only in the case of them not dissuading that they could be indicted 
before the Imperial Court (§ 30). The King had the supreme command over the 
armed forces, declared war and made peace, appointed and dismissed civil servants 
within the legal provisions (which protected civil servants from arbitrary dismiss-
als) ‘after having heard his State Council’ (§ 21). According to § 4 of the Fundamental 
Law, his person was holy and hence could not be held accountable or sued. The 
responsibility was vested in his council, the government. Decisions of the King 
required the countersignature of the respective minister. The latter was under the 
obligation to oppose illegal decisions in a written form and – if that did not help – 
only had the possibility of resigning from offi ce in order to deny responsibility for 
the decision. In the case of unconstitutional decrees, the ministers were obliged to 
lodge counter presentations or to resign. Otherwise, they could be impeached before 
the Imperial Court (impeachment). The Norwegian government had to affi rm the 
legislative drafts of the  Storting . It was an organ of the royal government. 
 The strong Kingdom was opposed by a strong  Parliament . It was incompatible to 
be a member of the latter while holding a government position. The  Storting con-
sisted of two departments, the  Lagting and the  Odelsting (§ 49) 341 and convened 
every three years. A true two-chamber system did not fi nd a majority, since it was 
not the goal to create a specifi c representation of the  nobility . According to § 76, the 
 Odelsting that had the right of the legislative initiative had to present bills in the 
 Lagting . In the case of the refusal by the  Lagting , the bill had to be dealt with once 
more in the  Odelsting . In the case of three refusals, the  Odelsting could either drop 
the draft or present it to the plenum of the  Storting , which required a two thirds 
majority. The division of the  Storting in two, procedurally defi ned departments was 
a structure taken from the Batavian Republic of 1798, the institution of the Imperial 
Court from the Constitution of the USA, namely of Massachusetts and from the 
tradition of the British constitutional law, the French constitution of 1795, the 
Spanish Constitution of Cádiz (1812) as well as the Polish Constitution of 1791 and 
even the Danish-absolutistic  Lex Regia of 1665. The research depicts a certain simi-
larity with the Constitution of Batavia of 1789, which also possessed a two-part 
parliament. 342 
 The ‘ Storting ’ by means of which ‘the people’ exercised the legislative power (§ 
49), the right of budget as well as the decision on taxes, custom duties and levies (§ 
75); it was the legislating and controlling power. According to an unusually extended 
right to vote, the Norwegians elected the  Storting every three years, which after its 
constituting session elected one fourth of its 75 to 100 members to the ‘ Lagting ’; the 
341  The separation into  Lagting and  Odelsting was abolished with the parliamentary term beginning 
in 2009. 
342  Holmøyvik ,  Eirik, Maktfordeling og 1814, Bergen 2012, p. 436. 
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rest was referred to as ‘ Odelsting ’. 343 The latter, fi rst of all voted on statutes that 
were then submitted to the  Lagting . If the  Lagting  had rejected a draft twice, the 
whole of the Storting plenum had to vote in favour of it with a two-thirds majority 
(§ 76). The members of the royal government did not have access to the meetings of 
the  Storting . 
 The legislative initiative was seizable both by the King or the State Council man-
dated by him as well as every member of the  Odelsting (but not the Parliament as a 
whole, one of its departments or one of its commissions), even by every Norwegian 
citizen by making use of an Odelsting-man (“private” legislative initiatives). 
Furthermore, the  Storting had the right to summon every citizen, even State Councils 
and to look into the bills on state revenues and expenditure, state protocols and 
contracts (§ 75). The King had the right to make use of his veto twice against stat-
utes passed by Parliament. If the resolution had been confi rmed thrice, he had to 
sanction it (§§ 78, 79). 
 A democratic constitution was never on the agenda of the  Eidsvoll Assembly and 
the extraordinary November-Storting. They wanted a constitutional monarchy with 
the separation of powers between King, Parliament und justice. Democratic ele-
ments can be traced in the active and passive right to vote. 344 The decision for an 
indirect election 345 and for the non-exclusion of civil servants 346 was motivated by 
the skepticism against unknowledged and unacquainted farmers as deputies. Only 
civil servants and members of the state council, who were in duty of the state coun-
cil or the court, were not eligible due to the separation of powers. 
343  On the term of the “Odels” compare  Frängsmyr, Tore, Svensk idéhistoria. Bildning och vetens-
kap under tusen år, Del 2: 1809–2000, Stockholm 2002, p. 10–100; in this context, the following 
oeuvres have to be referred to:  Andersson, Ingvar, Sveriges historia, Stockholm 7th edition 1961, 
p. 338 et seq.;  Carlsson, Sten, Svensk historia, Vol. 2, edited by Carlsson, V. S. u. J. Rosén, J., 
Stockholm, Second edition 1961, p. 356 et seq., p. 383–389. 
344  Following the information by the  Handbuch (1184) every man older than 25, who was a civil 
servant or owner of a land with a value of at least 300  Rigsbankdaler in silver, who has been living 
for at least three years on the land. This corresponds to 45 % of the male population. Excluded 
from the right to vote have been women (although this has not been mentioned explicitly in the 
constitution) and persons without land, namely Samen and Roma (“travelers”). 
345 Again relying on the  Handbuch : Persons entitled to vote elected electors, which gave their vote 
on the members of the  Storting . Later on, this procedure led to a real monopoly of power of the 
estate of the civil servants who have ruled the country earlier in the name of the King, then in the 
name of the nation. The passive electoral right was attached to an age at least 30 years and a resi-
dence in Norway for at least 10 years. 
346  In contrast to many similar constitutions, the proposal to exclude all the civil servants, who 
could be dismissed by the King without justifi cation or judgment was not accepted. 
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3.6.4  Monarchical Right to Veto on Constitutional Amendments 
and the Smooth Transition to the Parliamentary System 
 Under the special circumstance that the  Storting only met every three years, the 
separation between the legislature and the executive power could not consequently 
be assured. Since certain problems could not wait long for a solution, the King 
received the power to adopt preliminary regulations that were only to endure until 
the next session of the  Storting , but which de facto developed to a legislation of the 
King (§ 17). Furthermore, the legislation was to be restricted in order to assure the 
balance between the powers. Therefore, a suspensive  veto of the King was intro-
duced. The King could refuse the adoption of a bill in two consecutive legislative 
sessions, but not after the third. Thus, the  Storting could only prevail over the King 
after the expiration of six years. 
 In 1821, King Carl Johan tried to enforce an  absolute  veto on legislative proce-
dures of the  Storting . Furthermore, he wanted to establish a new  nobility in Norway 
after the  Storting had abolished the former nobility in 1821. He wanted to determine 
the President of the  Storting and he wished to be able to dismiss civil servants at his 
liking. Moreover, he desired to be able to enact provisions by means of decrees 
between the parliamentary sessions 347 of the  Storting and to weaken the Imperial 
Court. As court for impeachment, the Imperial Court was an effective means of the 
Storting to require the King to adhere to the constitution through the medium of 
ministerial responsibility by requiring ministers to refuse their participation con-
cerning unconstitutional matters. The  Storting rejected all demands of the King. 
The same happened in 1824. After that, Carl Johan put his plans concerning the 
absolute right of veto on ice. He repeated his demands until his death and the 
 Storting rejected them every time. 
 § 110 of the Constitution of November provided that the amendment decision 
had to be published and could only come into effect, if it has been passed in two 
successive sessions of the  Storting between which an election had taken place. 
Nothing was said about the right to veto constitutional  amendments . This question 
concerned the foundation of the state theory. The relationship between  King and 
 Storting was interpreted as a contract about the exercise of state authority, which 
could not be modifi ed one-sidedly. 348 Despite the fact that the statutory term appears 
not to have been fully clear in the constitutional deliberations of early 1814, the 
ranking of the Fundamental Law as  lex superior which bound both the King and the 
people’s representation was explicitly provided for in the constitution. It stated that 
potential future alterations may only take the form of modifi cations not altering the 
‘spirit’ of the law. According to the November Fundamental Law (§ 112), resolu-
tions on constitutional changes had to be consented twice by a two-thirds majority 
of the  Storting . A new election had to take place in the meantime. For a long time, 
347  The Storting is said to be convened only every three years. 
348  Holmøyvik ,  Eirik, Maktfordeling og 1814, Bergen 2012, p. 499. 
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it was unclear 349 if a royal  veto in the case of alterations to the Fundamental Law 
corresponded with the ‘spirit’ of the constitution. 
 The discussion about a royal  veto on constitutional modifi cations arose from the 
controversial participation of the state councillors (ministers) on the sessions of the 
 Storting . On March 17, 1880, the  Storting accepted the proposal of the members of 
the  Storting from the year 1877 concerning the constitutional regulation ‘about the 
participation of the state councillors (ministers) on the sessions of the  Storting ’ with 
33 to 20 votes. The same proposal had already been accepted by the  parliament four 
times, but was never sanctioned by the king, “because the resolution did not comply 
with the spirit of the constitution [§ 112]“. Since the sanction had been repeatedly 
refused, this was not about the original topic of the participation of the state council-
lors anymore, but about the royal right to sanction. On June 9, 1880, the  Storting 
decided that no royal  veto on constitutional modifi cations was to exist. That is the 
reason why on August 30, 1880 a royal resolution was made “to ask for a remark of 
the highest academic authority in the country on the fi eld of jurisprudence, namely 
the faculty of law”. 350 
 All in all, the faculty commission consisting of Fredrik Peter  Brandt 351 /Torkel 
Halvorsen  Aschehong 352 /Ludvig Maribo Benjamin  Aubert 353 /Marcus Pløen 
349  Legal opinion, p. XVIII: “The Norwegian Fundamental Law does not contain a paragraph that 
explicitly states that the King has a veto when it comes to alterations”. The legal opinion of the 
Faculty of Law of Christiania on the right of sanction of the King during alterations of the 
Fundamental Law, emitted due to the royal resolution of August 30, 1880, dated March 23, 1881, 
translated [into German] and edited by Jonas, Emil, Leipzig/Oberhausen 1881, in the following 
refered to as legal opinion, page number. 
350  Legal opinion, ibid. (n. 349), p. V. 
351  Brandt ,  Fredrik Peter, (1825–1891) Norwegian Professor of Law and Legal History at the 
Kongelige Frederiks Universitet of Kristiania (Oslo). He was the prominent author of the dissent-
ing opinion 1880, cf.  Maurer ,  Konrad , Der Verfassungskampf in Norwegen, München, 1882, p. 8; 
 Stang, Fredrik , Art. ‘Aubert, Fredrik’, in: Bull, Edv./Krogvig, Anders/Gran, Gerhard (ed.), Norsk 
Biografi sk Leksikon, vol. II, Kristiania, 1925, Forlagt AV H. Aschehoug & Co. (W. Nygaard), 
p. 138–140; ( E.H .)  Abs. T ., Art. ‘Brandt, Frederik Peter’, in: Anden Udgave (ed.), Salmonsens 
konversationsleksikon, vol. III, Kopenhagen, 1915, p. 854. 
352  Aschehoug ,  Torkel Halvorsen, (1822–1909) Norwegian legal counse, historian and politician. 
cf.  Worm-Müller, Jac S ., Art. ‘Aschehoug, Torkel’, in: Bull, Edv./Krogvig, Anders/Gran, Ferhard 
(ed.), Norsk Biografi sk Leksikon, Vol. I, Kristiania (=Oslo) 1923, p. 275–287. 
353  Aubert ,  Ludvig Maribo Benjamin, (1838–1896) Norwegian lawyer, law professor and politician. 
He is deemed to be the main author of the faculty’s assessment cf. Fredrik Stang, Art. ‘Aubert, 
Ludvig’, in: Krogvig, Edv. Bull-Anders/Gran, Gerhard (ed.), Norsk Biografi sk Leksikon, vol. I, 
Kristiania (=Oslo) 1923, p. 314–316. 
U. Müßig
63
 Ingstad 354 /Bernhard  Getz 355 /Ebbe Carsten Hornemann  Hertzberg 356 agreed on the 
result ‘that according to the Constitution, the King has the right of an absolute veto 
concerning modifi cations of the constitution’, 357 and more detailed in the summary 
at the end of the report: ‘that this constitutional rule of law has its complete entitle-
ment in the principle of the Constitution, that the sovereignty of the state powers 
shall be equitably shared, as well as the nature of the things does not allow one state 
power to expand its own constitutional power ( Botmäßigkeit ) or limit the other one; 
that this rule has been the basis while elaborating our current constitution; – and that 
this constitutional practice has gained a recognition which avoids every doubt’. 358 
 Frederik Peter Brand derives the precedence of constitution from § 112 of the 
Norwegian Constitution: ‘That the constitution cannot be subject to the common 
rule of the state powers. […] Because neither the  Storting , nor the King or both 
together hold the full sovereignty, they hold it just to the extent that the constitution 
provides them with it alone or together’. 359 His other line of argumentation in the 
dissenting vote is the qualitative difference between constitutional modifi cations 
and amendments in simple laws. 360 
 The differentiation between constituent  sovereignty and representation of the 
people during the legislative procedure also dominates the argumentation of the 
majority vote, which outlines the basically absolute character of the royal  veto and 
the exceptional suspensive nature in relation to §§ 76–79: ‘The principle of the sov-
354  Ingstad ,  Marcus Pløen (1837–1918) Norwegian law professor at the Kongelige Frederiks 
Universitet von Kristiania (Oslo) after studies in Roman Law at Leipzig and Zurich. cf. Lindvik, 
Adolf, Art. ‘Ingstad’, in: Jansen, Einar (ed.), Norsk Biografi sk Leksikon, vol. VI, Oslo 1934, 
p. 525. 
355  Getz ,  Bernhard , (1850–1901) infl uental Norwegian lawyer, former mayor of Oslo and legal 
reformer (“lavreformator”). Cf.  Augdahl, Per , Art. ‘Getz, Bernhard’, in: Bull, Edv./Jansen, Einar 
(ed.), Norsk Biografi sk Leksikon, vol. IV, Kristiania (=Oslo) 1924, p. 430–437; ( E.H .)  Abs. T ., Art. 
Getz, Bernhard‘, in: Anden, Udgave (ed.), Salmonsens konversationsleksikon, vol. IX, Kopenhagen 
1919, p. 652–654. 
356  Hertzberg ,  Ebbe Carsten Hornemann, (1847–1912) Norwegian legal historian, professor of sta-
tistics and state economy, cf.:  Koht, Halvdan, Art. ‘Hertzberg, Ebbe’, in: Jansen, Einar (ed.), Norsk 
Biografi sk Leksikon; vol. VI, Oslo 1934, p. 55–60. 
357  Paraphrased transl. of the German version ed. by Emil Jonas, Leipzig/Oberhausen 1882, p. 1. 
Translations are done by Ulrike Müßig. 
358  Paraphrased transl., ibid. (n. 357), p. 81. The majority vote (the royal veto is absolute, and has 
just a suspensive effect on decisions, which are in harmony with §§ 76–79 of the constitution) 
deviates in its justifi cation from the minority vote of Professor Brand (p. 84). Brand assumes a 
suspensive nature of the royal veto in the Norwegian constitution and only considers the veto to be 
absolute on modifi cations of the constitution”. 
359 And the quotation continues: “The Storthing is empowered by the constitution to modify it if the 
experiences have made it necessary and if “it does not contradict the principles, but only modifi es 
individual regulations that do not change the spirit” – and the constitution does not mention a royal 
right to sanction such decisions of the Storthing […]” Legal opinion, ibid. (n. 349), p. 84. 
360  “For Frederik Peter Brand, modifi cations of the constitution itself are, due to a legal concept, an 
issue of the constitution itself, separated from the legislative or the regular executive power” and 
form “a group of constitutional functions of their own” and are to be treated “due to its own nature 
and spirit, which can be found in the entire constitution” Legal opinion, ibid. (n. 349), p. 85. 
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ereignty of the  people  has been adhered to by giving “the people” the power to 
modify the constitution. In this case, the sovereignty is performed in the name of the 
people either by an original meeting of the voters in association with an elected revi-
sion council (like in the Dutch constitution of 1758, as in the draft of Adler-Falke), 
or in a special, therefore elected constitutional assembly with previous decisions of 
the national representation, hence a revision council and a specifi cally therefore 
elected constitutional assembly. […] 361 Nothing would have been more unfamiliar 
for the constitutional law at that time than giving the right to the general national 
representation to modify, even by just one single resolution, the constitution fi nitely 
and to widen its power towards the people or another state power; such a right 
would contradict the theories, which were based on the principle of the distribution 
of power which has paid homage at the time and mistrusted the tendency of the 
single state powers to widen their competences’. 362 
 What is important for the faculty report is the justifi cation of the royal right of 
sanction concerning constitutional modifi cations with the principle of the constitu-
ent  sovereignty : ‘Our constitution is one of those which exists because of the prin-
ciple of  sovereignty of the  people . It has been given by the people on behalf of 
representatives at a time when the people have completely obtained the state power 
and had the right to defi ne the constitution”. 363 The principle of sovereignty of the 
people has only been expressed in the constitution by the existence of the constitu-
tion, it has not reserved the right for the people to exercise their sovereignty at 
constitutional modifi cations in the future, as it has been regulated in other constitu-
tions from that time. Even though the constitution has limited the authority of the 
common state power concerning the constitution – where the principles count – the 
power to make modifi cations has not been given to the people. The relationship of 
the constitution to the principle of sovereignty had as result that for any exercise of 
the whole state power – like modifi cations of the constitution […] – an interaction 
of both powers which only hold the sovereignty together is necessary. This power to 
modify the constitution has been in some older constitutions, as already mentioned, 
361  The missing quotation in the main text body complements: “Then following the French 
Constitution of 1791 and the subsequent constitutions of 1793 and 1795; comparing the North 
American constitution or a series of resolutions of the national representation which have been 
passed by a qualifi ed majority and need to be provided with special powers, to determine the modi-
fi cation (especially the Spanish one of 1812). All the constitutions of this time, even if they do not 
request the sanction of the King, like the Swedish Constitution of 1809 or the Dutch Constitution 
of 1815 contain other guarantees against rushed modifi cations of the constitution than our constitu-
tion would contain, if the sanction of the King was not necessary.” Legal opinion, ibid. (n. 349), 
p. 28 et seq. 
362  Legal opinion, ibid. (n. 349), p. 28 et seq. On the difference between constitutional revision and 
legislation also compare legal opinion, p. 35: “Fundamental Law provisions often relate to the 
general laws as the more important to the less important”. Again legal opinion, p. 37: “The power 
to create new provisions of the fundamental law is different from the legislative power. The funda-
mental law itself strictly differs between the Fundamental Law (state form) and the law. Where it 
aims at making a provision that is applicable to both, the Fundamental Law regularly names both 
side by side; see §§ 9, 17, 30 and 44“. 
363  Legal opinion, ibid. (n. 349), p. 43 et seq. 
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originally reserved to the sovereignty of the people , namely by a representation 
which differs from the common representation. Our constitution does not do this. It 
is fully corresponding to the ideas of the time when the full sovereignty has been 
transferred to the common state powers, which have to comply with the 
modifi cations.’. 364 
 In the Court of Impeachment decision of 1884, 365 it was held – against the ana-
lyzed Faculty’s report – that the King’s right to suspensively  veto ordinary legisla-
tion (thereby postponing them §§ 78, 79) did not include the right to veto 
constitutional  amendments . The background of the impeachment procedure was the 
constitutional amendment proposal calling for a constitutional obligation for gov-
ernment ministers to appear before the  Storting . The King’s veto against the precur-
sors of parliamentarism was rejected by the Court of Impeachment in 1884, 
cancelling any executive veto against constitutional  amendments . This led to the 
appointment of a new government, headed by the majority party’s leader, Johan 
Sverdrup, as prime minister. According to Inger-Johanna Sand and her substantive 
contribution ‘The Norwegian Constitution and Its Multiple Codes’, the monarch 
gradually embraced the majority parties’ impact on the appointment of the prime 
minister and the government, thus refl ecting the Stortinghet’s political formation. 
The decision was still, for some years, the King’s, though his surroundings and the 
King himself got ready to accept “closer operational relations between the execu-
tive and the legislative branches, the government and Stortinghet, respectively.” 366 
However, besides the formal constitutional changes, an informal change of the 
political system was also taking place by means of which the Norwegian Constitution 
of May 17, 1814 was de facto altered. These informal alterations enabled a smooth 
transition from the separation of powers of the nineteenth century to today’s parlia-
mentary system in which the  King no longer plays a political role. 367 
 The parliamentary system was introduced in Norway in  1884 without an altera-
tion of the constitution as a consequence of a highly disputed verdict in a trial on the 
removal from offi ce. Article 12 of the Constitution provides that the King is to 
appoint a government to his liking. However, since the 1880s, the King has never 
appointed a government that has not been supported by the parliamentary 
majority. 
364  Legal opinion, ibid. (n. 349), p. 45 et seq. 
365  Sand, Inger-Johanne, The Norwegian Constitution and its multiple codes: Expressions of his-
torical and political change, in: Writing democracy, ibid. (n. 323), p. 141. 
366  Sand , ibid. (n. 365), p. 142. 
367 Another key element of the Norwegian constitutional law, judicial review , is not provided for in 
the constitution. Yet, already since the 1820s, the Høyesterett, the highest Norwegian court, has 
suspended the application of statutes violating the constitution. The Norwegian system of judicial 
review is thus presumably the oldest in Europe, it is only the United States (where judicial review 
is also not fi xed in the constitution) that are able to look back to an even longer tradition. 
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3.7  The Lack of the Notion Sovereignty in the  French Charte 
 Constitutionnelle 1814 
 In contrast to the particular model of the Norwegian  Grunnloven , the French  Charte 
Constitutionelle (1814) illustrated the successful continental model for the link of 
constitutional binding between monarchical  sovereignty and divine reign in early 
European constitutionalism. The monarch by the Grace of God 368 Louis  XVIII  369 
appears as constituent sovereign. 370 The king one-sidedly imposed the  Charte 
Constitutionnelle , and its label as a charter ( charte ) tried to create the impression 
that it was a royal privilege. The  Charte avoids the term sovereignty; the reference 
to authority ( l’autorité tout entière )  371 in the  preamble permits the subsumption of 
prerevolutionary positions of power of the doctrine of divine right. 372 Due to his 
absolute power, 373 the monarch is the sole bearer of executive power (Art. 13), of 
the exclusive right of legislative initiative (Art. 45, 46), 374 and of jurisdiction 
(Art. 57). 375 Nevertheless, the restoration of the French monarchy in 1814 was, 
368  The opening words of the preamble of the Charte Constitutionnelle:  Louis, par la grâce de Dieu, 
roi de France et de Navarre, à tous ceux qui ces présentes verront, salut . (cited in: Hélie, Faustin-
Adolphe, Les Constitutions de la France, ouvrage contenant outre les constitutions, les principales 
lois relatives au culte, à la magistrature, aux élections, à la liberté de la presse, de réunion et 
d’association, à l’organisation des départements et des communes, avec un commentaire, 3. fasci-
cule : Le premier empire et la restauration, Paris 1878, p. 885). 
369  Governing 1814–1824. 
370  Preamble of the  Charte Constitutionnelle: “ En même temps que nous reconnaissions qu’une 
constitution libre et monarchique devait remplir l’attente de l’Europe éclairée, nous avons dû nous 
souvenir aussi que notre premier devoir envers nos peuples était de conserver, pour leur propre 
intérêt, les droits et les prérogatives de notre couronne … qu’ainsi, lorsque la sagesse des rois 
s’accorde librement avec le voeu des peuples, une charte constitutionelle peut être de longue 
durée ” (cited in: Hélire, ibid. (n. 368), p. 885). 
371  Preamble : “ Nous avons considéré que, bien que l’autorité tout entière résidât en France dans la 
personne du Roi, nos prédécesseurs n’avaient point hésité à en modifi er l’exercice, suivant la dif-
férence des temps ”. (cited accordingly to Constitutions qui ont régi la France depuis 1789 jusqu’à 
l’élection de M. Grévy comme Président de la République, conférées entre elles et annotées par 
Louis Tripier deuxième édition augmentée d’un supplément, Paris 1879, p. 232). 
372  For detailed references compare  Seif ,  Ulrike, Einleitung (Introduction), in: Willoweit/Seif, 
(=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. XXVI. 
373  Preamble of the  Charte Constitutionnelle : Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 481, “ Nous 
avons considéré que, bien que l’autorité tout entière résidât en France dans la personne du Roi, 
[...]” (cited in: Hélie , ibid. (n. 368), p. 885). 
374  “La personne du roi est inviolable et sacrée. Ses ministres sont responsables. Au roi seul appar-
tient la puissance exécutive.’’  (cited in: Hélie , ibid. (n. 368), p. 887). 
375 Art. 45: La Chambre se partage en bureaux pour discuter les projets qui lui ont été présentés de 
la part du Roi. Art. 46: Aucun amendement ne peut être fait à une loi, s’il n’a été proposé ou con-




despite the objectives of the  Charte to ‘preserve the rights and amenities of our 
crown in its entire purity’, 376 not able to whisk off the outcomes of the revolution. 
Above all, the renewed monarchy held on to the Napoleonic administrative system 
with the appointment of all offi ce bearers by the centre. Furthermore, the  Charte 
seeks the support of the previous political elite. The new (Napoleonic)  nobility is 
assured of the renunciation of the sale of the national property, of the guarantee of 
national debt and retention of its titles (Art. 9, 70, 71). Legislation and sovereignty 
in budgetary matters rested with a bicameral legislative after English models with a 
chamber of pairs and a chamber of deputies. The  charte constitutionnelle  1814 was 
imitated numerously until 1830, including its intrinsic systematic incompatibilities 
(between the monarchical  principle and parliament’s legislative and budgetary 
rights). 377 
4  The Undecisiveness Between Popular and Monarchical 
Sovereignty in the Constitutional Movement 
After the French July Revolution 1830 
4.1  The Constitutional Movement After the French July 
Revolution 1830 
 The revision plans of the chambers of representatives and Pairs for the Charte of 
1814 were out-dated by the revolutionary protest against the July ordonnances of 
Charles X (1757–1836). Among the substantial changes under the French July  revo-
lution 1830  were the right of legislative initiative of both chambers (Art. 15), the 
reorganisation of the chamber of Pairs as assembly of notables (Art. 23), the pri-
macy of law for regulations (Art. 13) and the deletion of the ordinances ‘for national 
security’ (Art. 14 in the end of the 1814 Charte). 378 The strong monarchical execu-
tive of 1814 persisted in 1830 (Art. 12). The ministers were appointed and dis-
missed by the monarch and took over legal responsibility for the lawfulness of 
monarchical acts of government by contrasignature (Art. 12). This legal responsi-
bility was sanctioned by ministerial impeachment. A political responsibility of the 
ministers was not envisaged. 
376  Cited in accordance to Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 483. 
377  Müßig, Ulrike, Konfl ikt und Verfassung, in:  idem (ed.), Konstitutionalismus und 
Verfassungskonfl ikt, Tübingen 2006. 
378  “ et fait les règlements et ordonnances nécessaires pour l’exécution des lois et la sûreté de 
l’État ” cited in accordance to  Willoweit/Seif , (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 486. 
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 The  Charte Constitutionelle 1830 was not imposed, but rather agreed upon 
between the  chambres assemblées and the monarch. 379 The appointment of Louis- 
Philippe as ‘King of the French’, 380 who took an oath on the  Charte on August 9, 
1830 in front of the  chambres assemblées , 381 communicated the monarchy as  pou-
voir  constitué . The July revolutionaries, coming from the middle and lower classes 
were kept away from the chambers by the relatively high electoral census, saving 
the status quo of the propertied bourgeoisie and the property-owning nobility ( juste 
milieu ). 
 In the February  revolution of 1848 the civil-liberal modifi ed constitutional mon-
archy was replaced with a radical-democratic (second) republic, though a shift of 
power in favour of the  parliament did not happen, because there was no fi rmly 
structured party system. 382 The  députés fonctionnaires were under the infl uence of 
Louis-Philippe and middle and lower classes followers of republican groups did not 
cope with the high electoral census. 383 In the interaction between Monarch and the 
representation of the people, consensus was the prevailing aim of the constitutions 
after 1830. Instead of the old dualism of  Monarch and the assembly of the estates, 
it rather mattered that the monarch acted in accordance with the people’s represen-
tations. This principle of concensus was specifi ed by the necessary approval of the 
monarch to the laws, passed by the people’s representation, or by the monarchical 
right to veto against legal proposals, be it defi nite or just dilatory. 
 Hence, an acting of the Monarch in accordance with the majority of the people’s 
representation could result in the constitutional practice, particularly since the 
establishment of a trusting relationship was politically smart due to the budgetary 
right of the people’s representations. The necessity of balancing the monarchical 
 government and the other constitutional powers was formulated by François Pierre 
Guillaume  Guizot , Prime Minister of the July monarchy 1840–1848:  “Le devoir de 
cette personne royale … c ’ est de ne gouverner que d ’ accord avec les autres grands 
pouvoirs publics…“. 384 Consequently, an ongoing need for negotiation about the 
limitations of monarchical competencies about the responsibility of the ministers 
and about the treatment of the chambers in order to obtain the majority, originates 
379  The proposal made by a representative to submit the amended constitution to a  referendum was 
declined by the other representatives. 
380  Instead of King of France ( Bastid ,  Paul, Les institutions politiques de la monarchie parlamenta-
ire française (1814–1848), Paris 1954, p. 114 et seq., p. 118 et seq.;  Collingham ,  Hugh A.C. , The 
July Monarchy. A Political History of France 1830–1848, London etc. 1988, p. 26 et seq.). 
381  The coronation oath was not taken in the coronation cathedrals of Reims or Notre Dame de Paris 
on the Bible, but before the chambers on the Constitution. 
382  There were only the two big movements of the liberal conservative “ résistance ” ( Centre droit 
and  Doctrinaires ) and the reform-liberal “ mouvement ” ( Centre gauche and  Gauche dynastique ). 
383  Chevallier, Jean-Jacques/Conac, Gérard, Histoire des institutions et des régimes politiques de 
la France de 1789 à nos jours, 8. éd., Paris 1991, p. 177 et seq.;  Jardin, André/Tudesq ,  André-Jean, 
La France des notables, Vol. 1: L’èvolution générale 1815–1848 (Nouvelle histoire de la France 
contemporaine 6), Paris 1973, p. 140 et seq., 146 et seq.;  Ponteil ,  Félix, Les institutions de la 
France de 1814 à 1870, Paris 1966, p. 151 et seq. 
384  Cited  Ponteil ,  Félix , Les institutions de la France de 1814 à 1870, Paris 1966, p. 151. 
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according to  Guizot’s argumentation:  “Quelque limitées que soient les attributions 
de la royauté, quelque complète que soit la responsabilité de ses ministres, ils auront 
toujours a discuter et à traiter avec la personne royale pour lui faire accepter leurs 
idées et leurs résolutions, comme ils ont à discuter et à traiter avec les chambres 
pour y obtenir la majorité. “. 385 Thus, a fl uent passage from the constitutional to the 
parliamentary system can be observed. Evident for this is the understanding of the 
constitutional practice after 1830/1831 as shaped in French research as  ‘parlemen-
tarisme à double confi ance’ 386 : the government of the monarch is admittedly for-
mally not bound to the parliamentary majorities, however, their consideration is 
political normality. The fl uent passage from the constitutional to the parliamentary 
system could be accelerated, curbed or stopped. 
 This  Charte 1830 led to a Europe-wide constitutional  movement , and due to the 
connection of the constitutional  movement with national struggles for freedom, the 
people and its representation were invigorated as constitutional factors. Like in 
France, a  parliament  took over the task of drafting a constitution in Belgium after 
the  Revolution of 1830 : The constituent  assembly , dominated by the liberal-catholic 
union, is  pouvoir  constituant , the newly-to-be-appointed King is just taking on the 
role as ‘ pouvoir constitué ’ . Contrary to the French model, the  Belgian  Constitution 
is not negotiated with the monarch, but freely proclaimed by a national congress in 
its own right. 387 
385  Cited  Ponteil , ibid. (n. 384), p. 151. 
386  Duverger refers to a “ parlamentarisme orléaniste ”, marked by parliamentarism “ à double confi -
ance ”, which he saw realized not only in France in the time of 1830–1848, but also in the Great 
Britain of the eighteenth century until 1834 ( Duverger ,  Maurice, Le système politique français. 
Droit constitutionnel et systèmes politiques. 19. éd., Paris 1986, p. 24 et seq., p. 85). 
387  “In the name of the Belgian people,” the National Congress concludes the beginning of the 
Belgian Constitution (Gosewinkel, Dieter/Masing, Johannes (ed.), Die Verfassungen in Europa 
1789–1949 (The Constitutions in Europe 1789–1949), Munich 2006, p. 1307). 
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4.2  Belgian Constitution of 1831 
 The Belgian national congress, elected by a mixed capital and educational census, 388 
passed the new constitution on February 7, 1831, 389 largely based on the draft con-
stitution, revised by  Nothomb and  Devaux . 390 Though the national congress could 
decide on the constitutional question as  pouvoir constituant , it had to take numerous 
diplomatic questions into account when looking for a suitable candidate to the 
throne. 391 The election of Prince Leopold von Saxony-Coburg-Gotha 392 as ‘Leopold 
I, King of the Belgians’ 393 guaranteed London’s support for the Belgian 
 independence . 
 National  sovereignty (Art. 25)  394 was compatible with the constituted monarchy 
(Art. 78: ‘The King has no other power, but the one, which the constitution and 
other laws made in accordance with the constitution formally attribute’). 395 The 
King had the executive power at his disposal ‘according to the regulations of the 
constitution’ (Art. 29). With regard to the monarchical power of legal ordinances, 
the hierarchy of law and regulation, as established in the French July-Charte, was 
inserted word by word into the Belgian constitution (Art. 67). 396 This added the non- 
applicability of non-legal ordinances and regulations reserved by Courts (Art. 
107). 397 The legislative power was mutually due to the King and the two Chambers, 
the House of Representatives and the Senate as an elected regional representation of 
388  Only 46.000 of about 4 Mio. Belgians had the right to vote, within which the liberal-catholic 
union with aristocrat big landowners, educated bourgeoisie, and clergy had a strong majority. 
389  Gilissen ,  John, Die belgische Verfassung von 1831 – ihr Ursprung und ihr Einfl uß (The Belgian 
Constitution of 1831 – its origin and infl uence), in: Conze, Werner (ed.), Beiträge zur deutschen 
und belgischen Verfassungsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert (Articles concerning the German and 
Belgian constitutional history of the nineteenth century), Stuttgart 1967, p. 42 et seq.  Witte, Els/
Craeybeckx, Jan , La Belgique politique de 1830 à nos jours : les tensions d’une démocratie bour-
geoise, traduit du néerlandais par Serge Govaert, Brussels 1987, p. 9 et seq.; about the importance 
of the French revolution at the discussions of the national congress:  Thielemanns ,  Marie-Rose, 
Image de la Révolution française dans les discussions pour l’adaption de la constitution belge du 7 
février 1831, in : Vovelle, Michel (ed.), L’image de la Revolution française 2, Paris etc. 1990, 
p. 1015 et seq. 
390  108 of the 131 articles of the constitution were adopted literally – while the newly integrated 
provisions did not address the fundamental structure of the governmental structure leaving aside 
the mode of appointment of the senate and the relationship between church and state. 
391  The decision for Louis-Philippe’s son failed on London’s veto, whose support for the Belgian 
Independence depended on the ensuring of balance of power. 
392  Related to the British royal house by marriage and uncle of the later Queen Victoria. 
393  In the publication formula of Belgian laws, the monarchic title is still called “King of the 
Belgians”. 
394 All powers are coming from the nation. They are exercised as stipulated in the constitution. Cit. 
in: Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 513. 
395  Cit. in: Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 522. 
396  Cit. in: Willoweit/Seif, (=Müßig), ibid. (n. 32), p. 520. 
397 Addressing Art. 107 of the Belgian constitution in depth:  Errera ,  Paul, Das Staatsrecht des 
Königreichs Belgien (The state law of the Belgian Kingdom), Tübingen 1909, p. 137 et seq. 
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notables. Each of them had the right of legislative initiative (Art. 27 S. 1). The judi-
ciary was exercised by independent courts. A detailed catalogue of fundamental 
rights, inspired by the French role model of 1830 amended the equality of the 
Belgians before the law. The rights of the Belgians (Second Title of the Constitution) 
particularly entailed the freedom of assembly and of association (Art. 19, 20). 
 The monarch dismissed ‘his ministers’ just like in the French July monarchy 
(Art. 65). According to the role model of Art. 12 of the 1830 French Charte, the 
responsibility of the ministers remained undefi ned in the text of the constitution 
(Art. 65 at the end). The ministerial responsibility by countersignature (Art. 64) was 
normatively just regulated as judicial responsibility, which could lead to ministerial 
impeachment (Art. 90). Neither the ministerial responsibility nor the parliamentary 
exertion of infl uence on the formation of government was envisaged in the text of 
the Belgian constitution, but they developed on this basis in constitutional practice. 
Even though the Belgian constitutional system is often termed parliamentary mon-
archy in the literature since its early days, 398 it has to be differentiated. There were 
phases of the stronger and weaker infl uence of the monarch on the formation of 
government. In the early years after the revolution, Leopold I held a comprehensive 
right of political participation also regarding the formation of government, so that 
the ministers needed ‘double trust’ in the sense of the French connotation of  par-
lementarisme à double confi ance . The King also had great infl uence regarding the 
organisation of governmental policy. The period of Unionism 399 with loose party 
structures and uncertain majorities left ample space for the king, especially as he 
was the central fi gure to secure the Belgian  independence because of his personal 
contacts with England, Germany, and France. Thus, the Belgian King projected 
national independence. Leopold made sure that the ministers had a majority in the 
Chambers, but then also needed his trust. The new King naturally led the cabinet 
himself, and the governmental programme, which had to be realised, had to be dis-
cussed with him and possibly changed in his view. He had the “ cabinet du roi ” at his 
disposal for his personal policy planning, an own brain trust, independent of the 
 parliament and not envisaged in the constitution. 400 
398  Mirkine-Guetzévitch ,  Boris, 1830 dans l’évolution constitutionelle de l’Europe, in: Revue 
d’histoire moderne 6, 1931, p. 248 et seq.;  Fusilier ,  Raymond , Les monarchies parlementaires. 
Études sur les systèmes de gouvernement (Suède, Norvège, Danemark, Belgique, Pays-Bas, 
Luxembourg), Paris 1960, p. 360 et seq.;  Stengers ,  Jean, L’action du Roi en Belgique depuis 1831, 
Pouvoir et infl uence. Essai de typologie des modes d’action du Roi, Paris inter alia 1992, p. 28 
et seq., 34 et seq. 
399  The Union of Liberals and Catholics , already formed in the opposition against the Dutch, also 
persisted in the new parliament after 1831. 
400  Witte, Els/Craeybeckx, Jan, La Belgique politique de 1830 à nos jours: les tensions d’une 
démocratie bourgeoise, traduit du néerlandais par Serge Govaert, Brussels 1987, p. 24 et seq., p. 44 
et seq.;  Stengers , ibid. (n. 398), p. 47 et seq.;  idem , Evolution historique de la royauté en Belgique: 
modèle ou imitation de l’évolution européene, in: Res publica 1991, p. 88 et seq.;  Noiret ,  Serge, 
Political Parties and the Political System in Belgium before Federalism, 1830–1980, in: EHQ 24 
(1994), p. 87 et seq. 
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 The government did not obtain a more independent position until the end of 
Unionism in 1846/57 permitting the formation of homogenous cabinets, born by 
one political belief. But even at this time, a great independent scope of action regard-
ing foreign policy remained with the King. His son Leopold II, who succeded him 
to the throne in 1865, led the cabinet in fundamental questions himself, and he man-
aged to dismiss a cabinet, entrusted with parliamentary confi dence, thrice, even 
though the parliamentary system was fi rmly structured, and thereby enforced his 
own beliefs. In the year of 1871, the King tried at fi rst to edge individual ministers 
out of the government, and when he was not successful, he dismissed the whole 
moderately-clerical cabinet of Anethan. A few years later, he brought down the 
strictly clerical government of  Malou , which had altered the radically liberal school 
law of 1876 after the narrow election victory of 1884. Even though the King sanc-
tioned the auditing law, he achieved the resignation of the government, which was 
superseded by the moderately-clerical cabinet of  Beernaert , so that the aspired mod-
eration was fi nally achieved by the King. In the year of 1907, a whole government 
had to step down because of a confl ict with the monarch, when the cabinet of Smet 
de  Naeyer was not any longer able to prevail against the stubborn old monarch in the 
 confl ict on the drafting of the annexation treaty of Congo by the Belgian state. The 
revocations under Leopold II indicate, that the dualistic character partially contin-
ued and was regarded as a fundamental principle in the fi eld of foreign policy and 
the military. 
4.3  Parliamentarism in England 
 Under the impression of the French and Belgian revolutions, a storm of petitions 
burst forth in favour of the extension of the right to vote in England. In accordance 
with the English fondness for the historical legitimation of the Common Law, the 
revolutionary ideals of 1789 were disparaged to be ‘without any taste for reality or 
for any image or representation of virtue’. 401 The Parliament of  Westminster  claimed 
the representation of the nation. The population however was not represented ( real 
representation ), but only the spheres of interest of the high nobility ( virtual repre-
sentation ), landowning aristocracy and bourgeois merchants of the autonomous 
 City of London . Corruptive exertion of infl uence was a common occurrence. George 
III. (reg. 1760–1820) based his government upon the representatives, who were 
loyal to the royal interests, the so-called  King’s Friends . On the other hand, the 
economic centres of the industrial revolution in Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffi eld, 
with their explosively growing population, were not represented. 
 As early as 1780, claims for a reform of  Parliament  arose, also due to the loss of 
reputation of the crown after the defeat in North America and the empowerment of 
the cabinet government of the younger Pitt (reg. 1783–1802; 1804–1806) due to the 
401  Burke ,  Edmund, Refl ections on the Revolution in France, ed. with an introduction and notes by 
Leslie George Mitchell, Oxford 1999, p. 117. 
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broad Tory-majority in Parliament. The worker’s movement, taking hold since the 
end of the eighteenth century, claimed to pursue these reform movements. By doing 
that, it met the aligned interests of the ascending middle class. At the same time, the 
royal succession of George IV (rul. 1820–1830) to William IV (rul. 1830–1837) 
opened the way for new elections, which brought a majority of liberal-minded 
Whigs into the House of Commons, who were ready for reforms. After several 
oppositions of the House of Lords in the years of 1831 and 1832, the  Representation 
of the People  Act 1832 402 obtained the Lord’s approval. This franchise reform, per-
ceived as revolutionary by contemporaries, reorganised the constituencies and 
broadened the right to vote. Considering the high census, the moderate amplifi ca-
tion did not amount to democratisation, 403 all the more so as this was far beyond the 
highly aristocratic mindscape of the Whiggist reformers. However, the slight 
changes to the constituencies and the right to vote suffi ced to aggravate manipula-
tions of the electoral and parliamentary votes. Neither the electoral nor the parlia-
mentary voting results were any longer foreseeable. The parliamentary majorities 
were thus withdrawn from the defaults of the Crown and its related high  nobility . 
 Additionally, the successful enforcement of the reform proposal against Crown 
and House of Lords strengthened the political weight of the House of Commons 
substantially. The self-consciousness of the House of Commons grew at that, due to 
which it challenged the Crown’s prerogative regarding the formation of govern-
ment. Wilhelm IV fell out with the government of Melbourne over the question of 
the right religious policy of the Anglican Church in Ireland, and dismissed the cabi-
net, which had the genuine support of the parliamentary majority, just because it had 
lost his trust. The successive government of Peel was, despite the dissolution of 
parliament and new elections, not able to obtain a stable majority in the Lower 
House. After several defeats in vote, Robert Peel resigned in 1835. The King now 
saw himself forced to appoint Melbourne again, even though he did not have his 
trust, but solely the trust of the  parliament . 
 Thus, the principle of the parliamentary responsibility of the government was 
established. This practical case was raised to be a constitutional principle by the 
Lower Chamber in 1841: The motion of no-confi dence, which was called for by 
Peel as leader of the opposition against the minority cabinet of Melbourne, installed 
by  Queen Victoria , included the statement, that the resumption of an offi ce without 
the necessary trust of the Lower Chamber is against the spirit of the constitution: 
‘That her Majesty’s Ministers do not suffi ciently possess the Confi dence of the 
House of Commons, to enable them to carry through the House measures which 
they deem of essential importance to the public welfare: and that their continuance 
in offi ce, under such circumstances, is at variance with the spirit of the Constitution.’ 404 
402  2 & 3 Will. IV, c. 45. 
403  In relation to 14 million inhabitants, about 7 % of the adult male population was eligible to vote. 
Only the well-off middle classes profi ted from the reform while smaller craftsmen and naturally 
also wageworkers were still denied the right to vote. 
404  Confi dence in the Ministry-Sir Robert Peel’s motion, that the Ministry have lost the confi dence 
of the House of Commons-Debate, in: Hansards Parliamentary Debates, third series (commencing 
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Even though this motion of no-confi dence passed only with the majority of one 
vote, 405 Victoria felt compelled, after the dissolution of parliament and new elec-
tions, to entrust Robert Peel with the formation of a government, who did not have 
her trust, but rather only the trust of the Lower Chamber. 406 
 Even though the Crown’s national power to integrate reinvigorated as a political 
factor of power in the quarrel of the parties on the grain tariff from 1846 onwards, 407 
the loss of the royal right of prerogative to form a certain government, was irrevers-
ible. When the second great electoral reform of 1867 408 favoured a stronger structur-
ing of the political organisations, and thus allowed for a stable majority situation in 
the  House of Commons , the only remaining option for the crown was to appoint the 
head of the majority party of the Lower Chamber as Prime Minister. 
5  Octroi of the  Statuto  Albertino 1848 
5.1  The Octroi of the Piedmontese  Statuto Albertino 
and the Lack of an Italian Parliamentary Assembly 
 Although  the sensational news of the Neapolitan constitution of February 10, 1848 
quickly found their way to  Turin ,  Carlo Alberto (1831 to 1849 King of Sardinia and 
Duke of Savoy) himself did not go beyond the already conceded reforms at the 
beginning of February 1848, he rather considered abdicating on February 2. It was 
the note of his minister that the abdication would lead to a political destabilization 
and thereby may provoke an Austrian military intervention in Piedmont that caused 
the King to reconsider the Statuto – as was the constitutional name in the Savoy 
tradition. Driven by the upheavals in Genoa on February 2, which demanded a con-
stitution comparable to the Neapolitan example of February 10, 1848 and driven by 
the City Council of Turin that was dominated by liberal  noblemen and which 
demanded from the King the introduction of a representative system and the cre-
ation of a citizens’ militia, the constitutional promise of February 8, 1848 ( Proclama 
dell’8 febbraio ) was issued. It fi xed as foundations of the statuto the collective exer-
cise of the legislative power, the mutual legislative initiative or the sole executive 
with the Accession of William IV. 4° Victoriae, 1841), Vol LVIII, London 1841, p. 802. Compare 
also  http://www.hansard-archive.parliament.uk . 
405  312 yes und 311 no-votes. 
406  Kleinhenz ,  Roland , Königtum und parlamentarische Vertrauensfrage in England 1689–1841 
(Kingdom and the parliamentary vote of confi dence), Berlin 1991, p. 19 et seq., p. 79 et seq., p. 90 
et seq., p. 148 et seq.;  Cox ,  Gary W., The Development of Collective Responsibility in the United 
Kingdom, Parliamentary History 13 (1994), p. 32 et seq., p. 46 et seq. 
407  The Queen therefore found herself in the role of the mediator between the parties and she suc-
ceeded in keeping certain personalities from obtaining ministerial posts. 




power of the King as well as the reduction of the price for salt in order to calm down 
the explosive political-social situation, “ a benefi zio principalmente delle classi più 
povere ”. 409 
 The Piedmontese Statuto Albertino of March 4, 1848 is not an oeuvre of a par-
liamentary assembly. 410 The  octroi of the constitutional  text by Carlo Alberto rather 
points to the similarities with the development conditions of the French Charte of 
1814, the constitutions of Bavaria and Baden 1818 or the  Prussian Constitution 
1848/50 – ‘in order … to protect the sovereigny dignity, royal authority and peace 
throughout the land.’ 411 The Savoy ruler granted it as holder of the sole  pouvoir 
 constituant and did not even have to adhere to an already existing constitutional 
draft of a Parliament. In anxiety of ‘French constitutional imports’ 412 the Piedmontese 
King made every effort to impose the constitution since – as Duke Giacinto  Borelli 
(1783–1860), 413 author of the Statuto, puts it – “ il faut la donner, non se laisser 
imposer ”. 414 With his strict monarchical-conservative attitude,  Borelli called for the 
introduction of a constitution inspired by the French Charte 1814 in order to pre-
serve his beloved Savoy royal house. In the light of the feared triple danger of the 
young constitutional monarchy – a Republican revolutionary export of France in 
combination with the supporters of  Mazzini at home and the military intervention of 
the  Metternich  Austria  – the moderate-liberal movement in the Savoy Kingdom was 
ready to accept the constitution and not to demand further reform despite its not 
very progressive character. 
 The act of granting the fundamental law ( statuto fondamentale in the wording of 
the constitutional promise) was communicated to maintain the  plenitudo potestatis 
of the absolute monarchy, to rationalize the old royal sacredness. 415 Therefore the 
 preamble declares the participation of the Council ( Consiglio di conferenza ) as a 
409 Art. 14, constitutional promise of February 8, 1848 cit. according to Dippel, Horst (ed.) 
Constitutions of the World from the late 18th Century to the Middle of the 19th Century, Vol. 10, 
Berlin/New York 2010, p. 246. 
410 As it was the case in revolutionary France, in Spain, or in Belgium. 
411  English paraphrase by  Mecca, Giuseppe (his essay in this volume, note 29) on the minutes, cit. 
according to  Ciaurro Luigi , Lo Statuto albertino illustrato dai lavori preparatori, Rome 1996, 
p. 118. 
412  Like the September Parliament  1791 having used its  pouvoir constituant for the normative fi xa-
tion of the political pre-eminence of itself. 
413  For Borelli’s sympathies with the effectiveness of the napoleonic adminstration cf.  Giuseppe 
Locorotondo , Art. Borelli, Giacinto, in: Dizionario biografi co degli Italiani. Vol. 12, Rome 1970 
p. 536 ff: Borelli is seen as a “ uomo fermo e severo ” and to him are attributed “ simpatie per il 
governo forte ed autorevole e nostalgie per la ‘regolare amministrazione Napoleonica ”, p. 537. 
414  Cit. According to  Locorotondo, ibid. (n. 413), p. 539. Cit. According to  Emilio Crosa , La statuto 
del 1848 e l’opera del ministro Borelli, Nueva Antologia, June 1915, p. 540 f. Cf. Borelli at the 
Consiglia di conferenza from 3rd Feb. 1848: cit. according Archivio di Stato Torino, Miscillanea 
Quirinale, Consiglia di conferenza 1848, m. 6, n. 3, Bl. 62. 
415  Lacchè ,  Luigi, Le carte ottriate, La teoria dell’octroi e le esperienze costituzionali nell’Europa 
post-rivoluzionaria, Giornale di storia costituzionale 18 (2009), 229 et seq.;  Mecca, Giuseppe , 
here, note 31. 
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simple gathering of an opinion. According to art. 2, the state is based on the ‘monar-
chical constitutional foundation’, the legislative power is ‘exercised’ (art. 3) both by 
the King and the two chambers. 416 ‘The person of the King is holy and inviolable’ 
(art. 4). The oath of the Senators and Representatives contained fi rst the loyalty 
towards the King and then towards the constitution and the laws (art. 49). Compared 
to the French  discourse before 1791 (see above III., 1.-3.), the Italian coincidence of 
the monarchical  sovereignty in its absoluteness with the granting of the  Albertine 
Statute 417 was meant to avoid any scope for the differentiation between  pouvoir 
constituant  and  pouvoir  constitué . 
5.2  Italian  costituzione fl essibile Under the  Statuto Albertino 
 Even though the Statuto  Albertino , 1848 decreed for Piedmont-Sardinia, is not a 
product of a constitutional assembly but of royal counselors ( Consiglio di confer-
enza ), its extension 1860 to the kingdom of Italy can be evaluated under the tertium 
comparationis ‘Juridifi cation by Constitution’: The  parliament act 1861 , comple-
menting the monarchical  legitimacy by God’s grace with the nation’s consent, 418 is 
a remarkable example for  constitutionalisation by constitutional practice:  costituzi-
one  fl essible . Despite its octroyed start, the monarchical-constitutional Statuto 
 Albertino made the development of a dominating  Parliament possible . 419 
 The fi rst prerequisite for the evolution of a dominating Parliament was the loss 
of the head start by the Savoy leaders in the wars of 1848/49. After the outburst of 
a revolution in the Kingdom of (Austrian) Lombardy-Venetia Carlo Alberto  declared 
war on  Austria on March 23, 1848, on the advice of  Camillo Benso of  Cavour 
(1810–1861). After initial successes (Battle of Goito, May 30, 1848), the 
Piedmontese monarch suffered a defeat in the battle at Custozza near Lake Garda 
against Feldmarshall Josef Radetzky and concluded a ceasefi re agreement on 
August 9, 1848. Venetia proclaimed the Republic. After an upheaval in the Toscana, 
another war took place in which Charles Albert at Novara was beaten by Radetzky 
on March 23, 1849. He thereupon decided to abdicate in favour of his son Victor 
Emmanuel II (1849–1878). The latter concluded the peace of Milan in August 1849. 
Venetia capitulated and  Austria kept Lombardy-Venetia and thereby the hegemony 
in North-Western Italy. 
416  For the unsolved incompatibilites of the monarchical constitutionalism cf.  Müßig, Ulrike , 
Konfl ikt und Verfassung, in: idem (ed.),  Konstitutionalismus und Verfassungskonfl ikt , Tübingen 
2006, p. 9 et seq. 
417  Cf.  Mecca, Giuseppe , here, at p. 159. 
418  Ghisalberti, Carlo, Storia costituzionale d’Italia 1848–1948, 8th ed., Roma  et al. 2012 ;  Riall, 
Lucy, The Italian Risorgimento. State, society, and national unifi cation, London  et al. 1994;  idem , 
The History of Italy from Napoleon to Nation-State, Basingstoke/New York 2009. 
419  The evolution of a dominating Parliament in the constitutional practice under a monarchical-
constitutional text regime is exactly what ReConFort is interested in. 
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 The military weakness of the monarchic executive resulted in his dependency on 
the Piedmontese-Sardinian  parliament . In 1852, Cavour then Prime Minister of 
Sardinia-Piedmont, 420 began his liberal reconstruction of the Albertine monarchy by 
his free trade policy, judicial reform and church legislation (free church in a free 
state). His program for national unifi cation under the leadership of Sardinia- 
Piedmont comprised the renouncement of a revolutionary upheaval and a self- 
liberation in the sense of  Mazzini , the reduction of  absolutism by means of liberal 
evolution and the freeing of Italy with foreign help. 421 With the foundation of the 
national association ( societa nazionale italiana ) in 1857, he wanted to unite all 
patriots against Austria while drawing attention to the Italian question by participat-
ing in the Crimean war in 1855/56. By making use of the assassination attempt 
against Napoleon III by the nationalist Felice Orsini, Cavour received the French 
commitment to military support against  Austria for the creation of an Italian state 
federation chaired by the Pope. After victories of the allies against Austria in 
Magenta and Solferino, the Peace of Zurich passed over Italian interest in 1859, 422 
making Cavour resign in protest (January 1860). In the Treaty of Turin of 1860, 
France won Nizza and Savoy against Lombardy. In Southern Italy, the  Mazzini sup-
porters organized upheavals by the democratic Action Party (Crispi 1819–1901) 
and – after the failure of the insurgency of Palermo in 1860 – received the support 
of the Red Shirts under  Giuseppe  Garibaldo (1807–1882), which were to land in 
Marsala. The March of the Thousand ( mille , May-September 1860) through Sicily 
and Calabria was to lead to the capitulation of the Papal troops in Ancona (September 
1860) and the fall of the Bourbons (1861 capitulation of Gaeta). With plebiscites in 
Umbria, Marche and Sicily in favour of the affi liation to Sardinia, the unifi cation 
process ended. 
5.3  On the Extension of the Statuto  Albertino 1848 to Italy 
1860: From the Octroi to the Referenda 
 During this development towards an Italian national unifi cation, the question of the 
 pouvoir constituant was asked anew. A  new  octroi by the Piedmont King was incon-
ceivable given the strong position that parliament had acquired in constitutional 
practice. The agreement with a constituant assembly, too, was not discussed in Italy. 
The fears of the moderate-liberal politicians surrounding Cavour against the dynam-
ics of the supporters of  Mazzini 423 and Garibaldi in a constituant assembly were far 
too big. 
420 Victor Emmanuel had to appoint Cavout due to the parliamentary majority of his  destra 
storica . 
421  He is one of the editor of the naming journal “ Il Risorgimento (1847)”. 
422  Contrary to French promises Venetia remained Austrian and the Lombardy came to France. 
423  Cf. Mazzini’s claim for a constituant assembly at Giuseppe Mecca’s paper, p. 202, note 155. 
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 The plebiscites were instruments to confi rm monarchical choices through the 
‘will of the nation’. Though less than 2 % of the population had the right to vote for 
the fi rst pan-italian  parliament , 424 the plebiscites served as ‘a posteriori 
legitimisation’. 425 The Piedmontese liberal architects of the Italian unifi cation 
instrumentalized the general consent of the people with regard to the unifi cation 
process as a source of legitimation for the ruling class in Parliament (“ doppio livello 
di legittimazione ” 426 ; “ dual level of legitimation ” 427 ). This was only possible by the 
re- interpretation of representative government ( monarchia rappresentativa ) in the 
light of the omnipotence of Parliament as Giuseppe Mecca has pointed out in this 
volume. 428 The extension of the Statuto Albertino to Italy 1860 under the ‘absolute, 
unlimited, undefi ned [authority of the Parliament]’ 429 saved the Savoy Monarchy 
from being converted into a  pouvoir  constitué :  Vittorio Emanuele II was proclaimed 
by the fi rst  Parliament of Italy , opened at Turin on 18th February 1861, to be the 
‘King of Italy’ by the grace of God and the will of the nation ( per grazia di Dio, per 
volontà della nazione ). 430 Adhering strictly to the Savoy state tradition, however, it 
preserved the previous name and did not change it in favor of the new Kingdom. 
 The overall Italian  parlamento subalpino also declared Rome the capital in 1861, 
but it was still to take until 1871 when Rome became the capital by pushing back 
the Papal supremacy. In the Peace of  Vienna of 1866, Italy received Venetia, while 
Southern Tyrol (Trentino) and Istria became the core territory of the  Irredenta . With 
the September-Convention between Piedmont and France in 1864, the French 
troops were withdrawn for the protection of the Church State. 
424  Ghisalberti ,  Carlo, Storia costituzionale d’Italia 1848–1948, 4th ed. Rome a.o. 1992, vol. I, 
p. 438 et seq.;  Riall ,  Lucy , The Italian Risorgimento. State, society, and national unifi cation. 
London a.o. 1994, p. 70 et seq.;  Ballini, Pier Luigi ; Le elezioni nella storia d’Italia dall’Unità al 
fascismo. Profi lo storico-statistico, Bologna 1988 p. 43 ff. 
425  Mecca , ibid. (n. 417), p. 196. 
426  Lacchè ,  Luigi, L‘ opinione pubblica nazionale e l‘ appello al popolo: fi gure e campi di tensione, 
in: Burocracia, poder político y justicia, Libro-homenaje de amigos del profesor José María García 
Marín, Madrid 2015, p. 467. 
427  Mecca , ibid. (n. 417), p. 196. 
428  Mecca , ibid. (n. 417), p. 206 et seq. 
429  Broglio ,  Emilio , Delle forme parlamentari, Brescia 1865, p. 103: “l’autorità del Parlamento è 
assoluta, illimitata, indefi nita; non riconosce altro confi ne als suo potere che le leggi fi siche e 
morali di natura.” 
430  Cit. according to  Ghisalberti , ibid. (n. 418), p. 101. 
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6  Improvised Parliamentarism in the Frankfurt National 
Assembly 
 The ideologisation of a western kind of constitutional monarchy 431 in Friedrich 
Julius  Stahl’s work “ Das monarchische Prinzip ” (The Monarchical Principle, 
1845) 432 seems to be still manifest in the cemented state-of-the-art 433 perceiving the 
Frankfurt draft constitution as a specifi cally German form of constitutionalism, 
whose dualism between  monarch and popular representation is said to have pre-
cluded a parliamentary governmental practice. Such an ex post-explanation of the 
St. Paul’s church constitution ( Paulskirchenverfassung ) 1848/49 separates the con-
stitutional  text from societal context, political practice and constitutional  interpreta-
tion and tends to misunderstand German constitutionalism after 1849 as an 
irreversible one-way road via the  Prussian constitutional confl ict to the exaggeration 
of the executive after 1933. Having in mind both ‘improvised parliamentarism’ in 
the National Assembly, as well as the  debates about ministerial accountability in 
June 1848, such a static opposition between constitutionalism and parliamentarism 
is not plausible, especially when considering the fundamental  politicisation of the 
March  Revolution. 
 The constitutional  text carefully regulated the relationship between government 
and  parliament through several provisions: The imperial right to convene and post-
pone the  Reichstag (§§ 79, 104, 106, 109) is precisely fi xed. It is only the  Volkshaus 
431  Bluntschli, Johann Caspar in his “Allgemeines Staatsrecht” (General Constitutional Law) (Vol. 
I, 3. Aufl ., Munich 1863, Chap. 21) calls the constitutional monarchy a Westeuropean type of con-
stitution. Paul Laband’s “Staatsrecht des Kaiserreichs” then intensifi es the polarisation between 
constitutional and parliamentary constitutions (Vol. 2, 2. Aufl ., Leipzig 1913, 6. Chapter § 54). In 
1911, the historian Otto Hintze (Das monarchische Prinzip und die konstitutionelle Verfassung, in: 
Staat und Verfassung: Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur allgemeinen Verfassungsgeschichte, 3rd 
edition, Göttingen 1970, p. 359) hails the constitutional monarchy to be “ das eigenartige preußisch-
deutsche System ” (“the curious Prussian-German system”). 
432  Das monarchische Prinzip, eine staatsrechtlich-politische Abhandlung (The monarchical prin-
ciple, a constitutional-political dissertation), Heidelberg 1845, p. IV, Reprint Berlin 1926, p. 5. 
433  Huber ,  Böckenförde and  Kühne conceive a specifi c German type of constitutionalism in the 
draft of the Paulskirchen assembly which rendered impossible parliamentary government politics 
due to its dualism of monarchy and popular representation ( Huber ,  Ernst Rudolf, Deutsche 
Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789 (German Constitutional History since 1789), Vol. 3, 2. ed., 
Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln 1978, p. 3 et seq.;  idem , Das Kaiserreich als Epoche verfassungsstaatlicher 
Entwicklung (The Empire as era of constitutional development), in: Josef Isensee/Paul Kirchhof 
(ed.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts, Volume 1, 3rd edition, Heidelberg 2003, § 4 Rdnr. 52 et seq.; 
 Böckenförde ,  Ernst-Wolfgang, Der deutsche Typ der konstitutionellen Monarchie im 19. 
Jahrhundert (The German type of constitutional monarchy), in: Conze, Werner (ed.), Beiträge zur 
deutschen und belgischen Verfassungsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1967, p. 70 et seq. 
 Kühne ,  Jörg-Detlef, Die Reichsverfassung der Paulskirche, Vorbild und Verwirklichung im 
späteren deutschen Rechtsleben (The Paulskirchen Constitution of the Reich, role model and reali-
sation in the German legal life to come) 2nd edition, Neuwied and others more 1998). Concerning 
the present state of research compare  Fehrenbach ,  Elisabeth, Verfassungsstaat und Nationsbildung 
1815–1871 (Constitutional State and nation building 1815–1871), Munich 1992, p. 71–75 and 
75–85. 
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(§§ 79, 106) that could be dissolved. The Emperor’s veto concerning ordinary laws 
(§ 101 Abs. 2) and those altering the constitution (§ 196 Abs. 3) was only  suspen-
sive in nature and could be overcome by the  Reichstag . Interior matters (Executive 
Commitee, Membership, Standing Orders) could be regulated by the fi rst and sec-
ond chamber without any need for the participation of the executive (§§ 110–116). 
Beyond this, the text of the constitution left open many questions, in particular the 
question of the political-parliamentary accountability of the imperial government. 
The analysis of the public debate provides profound arguments that the consensus 
between the monarchical  government and the parliamentary majority dominated 
political thinking in the National  Assembly . 434 This can even be confi rmed by the 
constitutional deliberations on ministerial accountability in June 1848. They reveal 
a consensus between left, ‘old’ and constitutional liberals about a political ministe-
rial accountability, even if the text of the constitution framed it merely judicially. So, 
for the representative Friedrich, of the Casino faction, an accountable Ministry 
could ‘not govern one day long without the majority of the National Assembly’. 435 
Accountability to parliament was thought of not as a problem to be clearly regulated 
by law, but as a question of political style. So in the explanatory statement of the 
draft for the law ‘Concerning the Accountability of the Imperial Ministers’, the 
expectation was expressed, that a minister ‘against whom a vote of no confi dence is 
pronounced, or whose behaviour becomes the object of constant complaint from 
sides of the house, will as a man of honour, resign’. 436 The political practice in the 
National  Assembly corresponded to this. As long as the parliament was capable of 
functioning, the composition of the Imperial Ministry would be adapted to fi t the 
changing majorities in the Frankfurt  Parliament . The establishment of a minority 
cabinet in June 1849 provoked protest. The political linking of the government to 
the parliamentary majority was ultimately fostered by the compatibility between a 
mandate from the representative house and the assumption of ministerial offi ce (§ 
123). 437 Together with the role modelling of the Belgian  constitution in the Frankfurt 
consultations, the mentioned topics of the German debate indicate the readiness for 
a parliamentary governmental practice on the basis of the Imperial Constitution, 438 
had it come into force. 
 The possibility for a de facto parliamentary system of government on the basis of 
a ‘constitutionalist’ constitution corresponds with the openness of the ‘Sovereignty 
of the Nation’, 439 which Heinrich von  Gagern ’s addressed to inaugurate the 
434  Grimm, Dieter, Gewaltengefüge, Konfl iktpotential und Reichsgericht, in: Müßig (ed.), 
Konstitutionalismus und Verfassungskonfl ikt, p. 257–267 (261). 
435  Wigard , Stenographischer Bericht I [1848], p. 370 et seq. 
436  Hassler , Verhandlungen der Reichsversammlung II: Berichte [1848, ND 1984], p. 145. 
437  Such a combination was excluded by the  Reichsverfassung 1871 from the very beginning. 
438  Botzenhart ,  Manfred , Die Parlamentarismusmodelle der deutschen Parteien 1848/49, in: Ritter, 
G.A. (ed.), Gesellschaft, Parlament und Regierung, 1974, p. 121 et seq.;  Langewiesche, Dieter, Die 
Anfänge der deutschen Parteien – Partei, Fraktion und Verein in der Revolution 1848/49, 1983, 
p. 17 et seq. 
439  Wigard , Stenographischer Bericht I [1848], p. 17. 
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Paulskirchen-assembly. Such a formula implies the unique and unlimited  pouvoir 
 constituant of the National  Assembly and the claim of the nation to self- 
government. 440 This avowal to the singular and unlimited  pouvoir  constituant of a 
not existing German nation does not make sense as a programmatic claim to self- 
government, but refl ects the indecisiveness of the post-kantian  liberalism between 
monarchical and popular  sovereignty . It avoided the open commitment to popular 
 sovereignty and thus the  confl ict with the monarchy, enabling a consensual frame-
work between imperial government and parliamentary majority. 
7  Summary and Outlook 
 Juridifi cation by Constitution seems to be a suitable  tertium comparationis for the 
comparative research of ReConFort on national  sovereignty , and also adequate for 
the next key passage: the precedence of constitution. 441 The research on this next 
topos for ReConFort (Vol. II) leads back to the origins of the constitutional  seman-
tics at the end of the eighteenth century. The terms  Verfassung ,  Konstitution and 
constitution were already in use, denoting the political condition of a state. Originally, 
as shaped by historical development and natural features; later, in its formation 
through basic laws and sovereign treaties. Besides this political terminology, medi-
eval jurisprudence coined the maxim in the commentary to Isodore’s “ lex est consti-
tutio scripta ”, which linked  constitutio with positive law. The American federal 
constitution of 1787 and the French revolutionary constitution of 1791 tied together 
the threads of the political and legal argumentation: the revolutionary caesuras in 
relation with the British motherland and the  Ancien Régime necessitated a new legal 
fi xture of the political order. A constitution as such became the legal text to fi x the 
political order as a legal order. As a consequence,  juridifi cation =  normativity marked 
440  The concept of national sovereignty was discussed in German newspapers and political writings 
in the wake of the Paulskirchen-assembly, i. e. in the Neue Berliner Zeitung, No. 62, Aug 30, 1848, 
p. 925, l. 17 et seq: “ Zuvörderst ist ein […] Volk noch nicht von selbst ein Staat, sondern es muss die 
Kraft haben, ihn zu schaffen […], wie es keine Volkssouverainetät giebt, wo das Volk nicht wirklich 
mit dem Bewußtsein derselben Willen und Tat verbindet .” (First, a […] people does not constitute a 
state by itself, but it must have the strength to build it […], just like there is no national sovereignty 
where the people do not think and act on it.). Compare also Der Freund der Wahrheit und des 
deutschen Volkes, No. 73, Nov 7, 1848, p. 300, l. 15 et seq. “ Das Volk ist und bleibt souverän, sein 
Selbstbestimmungsrecht ist unveräußerlich […] ” (The people is and remains sovereign, its right of 
self-determination is inalienable […]) and  von Hermann ,  Friedrich , Die Reichsverfassung und die 
Grundrechte, Zur Orientierung bei der Eröffnung des bayerischen Landtags im September 1849, 
p. 3 et seq.: “Sie [die Nationalversammlung] ruhte nicht auf der rohen Auffassung der Volks-
Souveränität, […] sondern sie ist hervorgegangen aus dem Zusammenwirken aller Organe der 
Staatsgewalt und der Gesetzgebung […] oder dem Willen der Nation” (It [the national assembly ] 
was not based on the coarse concept of sovereignty of the people […], but it resulted from the coop-
eration of all bodies of state authority and legislation […] or the will of the nation.) Here, national 
sovereignty is distinguished from the sovereignty of the people, which is seen in a negative way. 
441  Cf. the outline of the whole ReConFort programme above. 
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the new constitutional  semantics . The heart of the modern normative constitutional 
 concept is the positivity of the constitutional law as one unifi ed law, to be the mea-
sure for the legality of all other law. As foundation for all law and legislation, the 
constitution is the primary norm. This conceptual differentiation of constitution and 
other kinds of law is not only of interest for lawyers, but also for legal historians. Its 
appearance is documented by the American protagonists using the antagonism 
‘unconstitutional – constitutional’ to justify their legal right of resistance against an 
illegally-acting Westminster  Parliament and to articulate their claim of being more 
true to the constitution than the British themselves. 442 These intentions of the 
American protagonists exemplify the communicative power of 
constitution-formation. 
 And last but not least, ReConFort’s historical approach to the mutual constitution- 
forming impact of communication may have an actual impact. It is congruent with 
the political postulates on EU-level following the disaster of the failed referenda on 
the ‘Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’ in 2005. On request of the 
European Council, 443 the Commission developed “Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue 
and Discussion” in 2005. 444 In its fi rst White Paper on a European Communication 
Policy (2006), the Commission gave voice to the problem that the “public sphere” in 
Europe is largely a national sphere. 445 In the Joint Declaration “Communicating 
Europe in Partnership” (2008), the European Parliament, the European Council and 
the Commission identify the interplay between constitutional process and public 
debate as a crucial prerequisite for democratic participation in the Union. 446 According 
to the programme “Europe for Citizens to promote active European citizenship” 
(2007–2013), European democracy presupposes a European citizenry in the sense of 
a European society. 447 The current refugees’ movement towards Europe and the 
British challenge to the European Integration make it more necessary than ever 
before to elaborate the historically coined constitutional values Europe stands for. 
 Open Access  This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, 
 duplication, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give 
442  Stourzh ,  Gerald , Constitution: Changing Meanings of the Term from the Early Seventeenth to 
the late Eighteenth Century, in: Ball, Terence/Pocock, John G.A. (ed.), Conceptual Change and the 
Constitution, Lawrance 1988, p. 35–54, p. 35, 45 et seq. 
443  Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the European Union 
on the Ratifi cation of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (European Council, June 16 
and 17, 2005), D/05/3, 18th June 2005, Section 4. 
444  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘The Commission’s contribu-
tion to the period of refl ection and beyond: Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate’, COM 
(2005) 494, 13/10/2005. 
445  White Paper on a European Communication Policy, COM (2006) 35, 01/02/2006. 
446  Joint declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission ‘Communicating 
Europe in Partnership’ signed on October 22, 2008, OJ 2009/C 13/02 20.1.2009, p. 3. 
447  Decision No 1904/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on December 12, 
2006 (recitals 4 and 9). 
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 National Sovereignty in the Belgian 
Constitution of 1831. On the Meaning(s) 
of Article 25 
 Brecht  Deseure 
 Abstract  Article 25 of the Belgian Constitution of 1831 specifi es that all powers 
emanate from the nation, but fails to defi ne who or what the nation is. This chapter 
aims at reconstructing the underdetermined meaning of national sovereignty by 
looking into a wide array of sources concerning the genesis and reception of the 
Belgian Constitution. It argues, fi rstly, that ‘nation’ and ‘King’ were conceptually 
differentiated notions, revealing a concern on the part of the Belgian National 
Congress to substitute the popular principle for the monarchical one. By vesting the 
origin of sovereignty exclusively in the nation, it relegated the monarch to the posi-
tion of a constituted power. Secondly, it refutes the widely accepted defi nition of 
national sovereignty as the counterpart of popular sovereignty. The debates of the 
constituent assembly prove that the antithesis between the concepts ‘nation’ and 
‘people’, supposedly originating in two rivalling political-theoretical traditions, is a 
false one. Not only were both terms used as synonyms, the Congress delegates 
themselves plainly proclaimed the sovereignty of the people. However, this did not 
imply the establishment of universal suffrage, since political participation was lim-
ited to the propertied classes. The revolutionary press generally endorsed the popu-
lar principle, too, without necessarily agreeing to the form it was given in practice. 
The legitimacy of the National Congress’s claim to speak in the name of the people 
was challenged both by the conservative press, which rejected the sovereignty of the 
people, and by the radical newspapers, which considered popular sovereignty inval-
idated by the instatement of census suffrage. 
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1  Introduction 
 On 27 October 1830 the Constitutional  Commission , instated by the Belgian 
Provisional  Government , fi nished its activities. 1 The creation of the Commission 
had been announced on 6 October, 2 days after the Provisional  Government offi -
cially proclaimed Belgian  independence . 2 The Commission’s main task was to draw 
up a  draft Constitution for the new country, which would then be discussed by the 
National  Congress , Belgium’s constituent  assembly . 3 The publication of the  draft 
Constitution immediately sparked up public discussions about the basic features of 
the new state. 4 F.  Grenier , an otherwise unknown author, was only one of many 
Belgian citizens who took to the press to express his views on the  draft Constitution. 
In his  Examen du projet de constitution de la Belgique et idées sur une nouvelle 
forme de gouvernement (“Examination of the  draft Constitution for Belgium and 
ideas for a new form of government”),  Grenier staged a passionate defence for the 
 sovereignty of the  nation :
 Je conçois la possibilité de rendre permanente, dans notre patrie, l’action de la souveraineté 
nationale, de manière à ne plus revoir les effroyables désordres des bouleversemens poli-
tiques. Nous savons maintenant que toute monarchie tempérée est un confl it presque con-
tinuel des deux éléments de puissance souveraine. L’institution du Congrès et le simple 
raisonnement font comprendre que la souveraineté est déplacée quand elle est ailleurs que 
dans la nation, et que toute division quelconque dans la souveraineté est la source des com-
motions sociales, toujours si dangereuses. 5 
 The battle cry of the Belgian  revolution aries was ‘liberty for everyone in 
everything’. 6 According to  Grenier , this implied the victory of the  democratic prin-
ciple over the  monarchical one. The  nation no longer wished to share  sovereignty 
with a monarchial power, he contended, because the perpetual combat between the 
two elements undermined the order of the state. Therefore, only the delegates of the 
sovereign  nation , united in the Chamber of  Representatives , were to make laws 
under the new Constitution.  Grenier criticised the  draft Constitution for being 
1  Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie (oktober–november 1830): tekst van haar 
notulen en ontstaan van de Belgische grondwet , 40. 
2  Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique no. 5, p. 13, 10/10/1830. 
3  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 4, p. 43–49. 
4  Magits ,  De Volksraad en de opstelling van de Belgische grondwet, 352;  Nothomb ,  Essai histo-
rique et politique sur la révolution belge , 98. 
5  “I can imagine a possibility to render the operation of national  sovereignty in our fatherland per-
manent, in such a way as to avoid the terrible disorders of political upheaval. We now know that 
every tempered monarchy is an almost continuous confl ict between the two elements of supreme 
power. The institution of the Congress as well as simple reasoning learn that sovereignty is out of 
place when it is anywhere else than in the nation, and that every division of sovereignty is the 
source of dangerous social commotion”.  Grenier ,  Examen du projet de constitution de la Belgique 
et idées sur une nouvelle forme de gouvernement. 
6  Hymans,  Le Congrès national de 1830 et la Constitution de 1831 ;  Nothomb ,  Essai . Demoulin 
attributes this motto to De  Lamennais . Demoulin, Le courant libéral à l’époque de royaume des 
Pays-Bas et dans la Révolution de 1830, 32. 
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ambiguous on this point, and for including a  Senate which, being composed of 
hereditary members, would infringe on the free exercise of power by the  sovereign 
 nation . He especially warned against the vague defi nition of ‘ nation’ in the  draft 
Constitution, which allowed for diverging  readings :
 L’art. 4 du projet déclare que tous les pouvoirs (ceux politiques sans doute), émanent de la 
nation. Prenant pour accordé que les pouvoirs ne sont rien que par elle; c’est à elle qu’il 
appartient de les instituer. La souveraineté nationale doit rester au-dessus de tout pouvoir 
ordinaire; mais il faut que la constitution défi nisse ce que c’est que la nation. Il importe de 
savoir quels sont les individus qui forment la nation. Les termes qui n’ont pas de valeur 
convenue obscurcissent les idées, enfantent les aberrations. L’art. 8o dit que les députés 
représentent la nation, ce qui autorise de croire que le sénat ne la représente pas. L’art. 79 
dit que les députés sont élus directement par les citoyens; le projet ne dit pas ce que c’est 
qu’un citoyen. 7 
 As it turned out,  Grenier cried in the wilderness.  Article 4 of the  draft Constitution 
was literally copied in the fi nal Belgian  Constitution of 1831. Up to this day,  article 
25 of the Constitution reads: “Tous les pouvoirs émanent de la nation. Ils sont 
exercés de la manière établie par la Constitution” (“All the powers emanate from the 
nation. They are exercised in the manner established by the Constitution”).  Grenier 
was right about the ambiguousness of the formulation. It is therefore all the more 
striking that the National  Congress adopted the  article virtually unanimously and 
without  debate , on 3 January 1831. One single dissenting voice was heard, as the 
priest Vander  Linden pleaded the cause of divine  sovereignty as the only  legitimate 
source of law. 8 He received no support from the benches, not even from the side of 
the ultramontane  Catholic delegates. The formulation of  article 25 apparently suited 
the needs of all parties in the great compromise that was being forged between 
 Catholic and  liberal elites over the new Constitution. 
 As the Constitution was not preceded by a  preamble specifying its great underly-
ing principles, the concept of national  sovereignty remained as vague as  Grenier had 
feared. The underdetermined meaning of national  sovereignty in the Belgian 
 Constitution of 1831 is the subject of this contribution. The meaning(s) of the term 
will be reconstructed by looking into a variety of sources that shed light on the con-
text of the constitutional  formation  process as well as on its reception. Central to 
this investigation are the  debates of the National Congress, which allow to gauge the 
ideas and intentions of the members of the Belgian constituent  assembly . On the 
reception side, evidence is provided by pamphlet literature,  newspapers and consti-
tutional  manuals . The fi rst section of this chapter goes into the meaning of national 
 sovereignty from the point of view of the balance of  power between  King and 
7  “Article 4 of the  draft declares that all the powers (the political ones, that probably is) emanate 
from the nation. Taking for granted that the powers are nothing without her, it is she who is entitled 
to instate them. National  sovereignty must remain superior to ordinary power; but the Constitution 
must defi ne what the nation is. It is important to know which individuals make up the nation. 
Terms without a fi xed meaning obscure the ideas and produce aberrations. Article 80 states that the 
delegates represent the nation, suggesting that the Senate does not. Article 79 states that the dele-
gates are directly elected by the citizens; the  draft does not specify what a citizen is”. 
8  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 14, 03/01/1831. See also:  Magits ,  De Volksraad, 8. 
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 Parliament . In the second section, the implications of  article 25 for the distinction 
between national and popular  sovereignty will be examined. Finally, the fi ndings of 
the fi rst two sections will be tested against the evidence provided by the debates in 
contemporary society as refl ected by the  press . The focus will be on the understand-
ing of national  sovereignty at the time of the Constitution’s  genesis , i.e. on the 
intended meaning of the term. Its application in practice by successive generations 
of Belgian politicians falls outside of this chapter’s scope. 
2  Parliament Versus  King 
2.1  Parliament as the Sole Representative of the  Nation 
 Like most of the articles of the Belgian  Constitution ,  article 25 was not newly 
invented. 9 Article 3 of the  Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du  Citoyen of 
1789, which served as  preamble to the French  Constitution of 1791 , reads: “Le 
principe de toute souveraineté réside essentiellement dans la nation”. 10 Similar for-
mulations fi gure in the Cádiz  Constitution of 1812, the Portuguese  Constitution of 
1822 and the declaration of the First Chamber of the French Parliament of 1830. 11 
In their haste to confection of a  draft Constitution for the new country, the members 
of the Constitutional  Commission did not care for originality. 12 The Commission’s 
president, Etienne de  Gerlache , commented:
 On a choisi dans les constitutions existantes, et particulièrement dans la charte française 
 actuelle , les dispositions qui ont paru s’approprier le mieux à notre pays; et on y en a ajouté 
beaucoup d’autres qui sont désirées par les meilleurs publicistes européens. (…) Il ne ren-
ferme rien ou presque rien de nouveau; et c’est ce qui en fait, selon moi, le mérite. Il ne faut 
rien donner à l’aventure quand il s’agit des institutions d’un pays. Et personne de nous n’a 
été assez osé pour improviser des nouveautés. 13 
 Indeed, 90 % of the  articles  of the Belgian  Constitution of 1831 , which closely 
followed the  Commission’s  draft , were  textually copied from older examples. 14 The 
articles of the  draft Constitution mainly derived from the French  Constitution of 
9  Descamps,  La mosaïque constitutionnelle. Essai sur les sources du texte de la Constitution belge. 
10  “The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the people”. 
11  Harris, European Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century, 506. 
12  Descamps,  La mosaïque constitutionnelle , 51; Van den  Steene ,  De grondwetscommissie , 60. 
13  “From the existing constitutions, and particularly from the present French  Charte , we have 
selected those dispositions that seemed best suited to our country; and we have added many others 
that are desired by the best publicists in Europe. (…) It contains nothing or almost nothing new; 
and that I consider its merit. When the institutions of a country are concerned, adventures are out 
of place. And none of us have been daring enough to improvise novelties”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions , 
vol. 1, p. 324, 25/11/1830. For De Gerlache, see: Demoulin, Gerlache (Etienne-Constantin, baron 
de)  ; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 14–16 . 
14  Gilissen , Die belgische Verfassung von 1831. Ihr Ursprung und ihr Einfl uss, 60. 
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1791 , the  Charte of  1814 / 1830 and the Dutch  Fundamental Law of  1815 . All except 
one of the  Commission members were  jurists , who had either been trained at French 
institutions or at the universities of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which heavily 
relied on the French legal tradition. 15 Nonetheless, in its totality, the Belgian 
 Constitution of 1831 offered something new, as contemporaries were quick to 
realise. 16 
 As David Harris remarks, the dropping of the qualifi cation ‘essentially’ is signifi -
cant in this respect. 17 The sovereignty of  nation acquired a more radical quality, 
which has often been described as a turn towards a defi nite break with the monarchi-
cal  principle . 18  Article  32 of the Constitution, specifying the modalities of the exer-
cise of the  sovereign power, points in the same direction: “Les membres des deux 
Chambres représentent la Nation, et non uniquement la province ou la subdivision 
de province qui les a nommés”. 19 Equally derived from the French  Constitution of 
1791 (and later copied in its successors of the year  III and  1848 ), this provision had 
originally been conceived as a turn away from the imperative  mandate of the Old 
 Regime Estates  General , which was deemed incompatible with the unitary concept 
of nation consecrated by the French  Revolution . 20 Its inclusion in the Belgian 
 Constitution was partly inspired by a desire to stave off a repetition of the fate of the 
 United Belgian Provinces . 21 This short-lived Belgian republic, born from the 
 Brabant Revolt against the rule of the Austrian Emperor Joseph  II in 1789-’90, had 
partly failed due to its excessively  regionalist inner structure. 22 
 More important to our present goal, the fi rst section of the  article unambiguously 
designated the members of  Parliament as the exclusive representatives of the sover-
eign  nation . In another move away from tradition, the  Congress discarded both 
15  Idem, 59; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie . 
16  De  Smaele , Eclectisch en toch nieuw. De uitvinding van het Belgisch parlement; Descamps,  La 
mosaïque , 90; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 62. 
17  Harris, European Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century , 506. 
18  L’article 25 de la constitution proclame que la souveraineté réside dans la nation elle-même. La 
nation ne délègue que l’exercice des pouvoirs: de là résulte qu’elle peut révoquer tout mandat 
donné et que les mandataires ne peuvent gouverner que d’après sa  volonté . Une semblable disposi-
tion n’est que la négation théorique du principe des théocraties, des monarchies et des  aristocrat-
ies ”. Tempels, Droit constitutionnel, 440. Other authors consider it rather as an expression of the 
compromise, in the sense of their cohabitation, between royal sovereignty of Old  Regime origin 
and popular  sovereignty born from the  Revolution : Müβig, L’ouverture du mouvement constitu-
tionnel après 1830: à la recherche d’un équilibre entre la souveraineté monarchique et la souver-
aineté populaire. Pierre Wigny rejects this thesis on the ground of the Nation’s initial consent to the 
monarch’s  mandate , which can at any time be retracted:  Wigny ,  Droit constitutionnel. Principe et 
droit positif , 222. 
19  “The members of the two chambers represent the  Nation , and not only the province or the sub-
division of a province which has elected them”. 
20  Lefebvre ,  The Belgian Constitution of 1831: the Citizen Burgher , 90; Roels,  Le concept de 
représentation politique au dix-huitième siècle français , 122. 
21 Alen,  Treatise on Belgian Constitutional Law , 12. 
22  Defoort, Particularisme en eenheidsstreven. De Verenigde Nederlandse Staten. For the Brabant 
Revolt, see: Polasky,  Revolution in Brussels. 
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heredity and monarchical  prerogative for the appointment of the  senators . 23 The 
members of both chambers were designated via direct  election and by the same 
electorate (art. 47, 53). In this light it cannot be maintained that the conception of 
 sovereignty in the Belgian  Constitution bore the marks of the monarchical  principle . 
A constitutional  manual published immediately after the proclamation of the 
Constitution indeed attributed  article 32 to ‘the triumph of popular  sovereignty’ . 24 
 The structure of the constitutional  document mirrors this  interpretation . The 
powers were discussed in the third title, after the territory and the personal liberties. 
Within this title, the  chambers were discussed fi rst, then the  King and his ministers 
and then the  judiciary . 25 This order of precedence is especially revealing when com-
pared to the Dutch Fundamental  Law of 1815, the fi rst chapter of which was entitled 
“On the sovereign monarch” . A lengthy catalogue of royal  prerogatives preceded 
the chapter on the Estates  General , thus exemplifying the underlying monarchical 
 principle . 26 A comparison of the  preambles  of both documents is just as revealing. 
The absence of a proper  preamble  in the Belgian  Constitution is remarkable in 
itself. Nonetheless, the preceding formula in the act of proclamation, which came 
closest to a  preamble , was programmatic: “Au nom du people belge, le Congrès 
national décrète” (“In the name of the Belgian people, the National  Congress 
decrees”). It could not contrast more with the opening lines of the  preamble of the 
Fundamental  Law : “We,  William , by the grace of  God ”. Despite not technically 
being a  charte  octroyée , the Fundamental  Law was a typical product of  Restoration 
constitutionalism. 27 The Belgian  Constitution of 1831 may rightly be read as a 
counter-reaction against the political order under William  I enshrined by it, or, in 
Niek van Sas’ words, as its “programmatical indictment”. 28 
 As a result of the frustration of the Belgian opposition with William  I’s  autocratic 
style of government, the new Constitution expressed the distrust of royal power 
23  De  Smaele , Eclectisch en toch nieuw; Stevens, Een belangrijke faze in de wordingsgeschiedenis 
van de Belgische grondwet: de optie voor een tweekamerstelsel. 
24  N.N.,  Manuel constitutionnel de la Belgique contenant le portrait, la vie et la nomination de M. 
le régent, la Constitution et la loi électorale de la Belgique, expliquées et conférées avec l’ancienne 
loi fondamentale , p. 46: “La crainte du despotisme et l’esprit de parti, le triomphe de la souver-
aineté du peuple, a porté la majorité du Congrès national à cette disposition. En France ( Charte , art. 
23), la nomination des sénateurs ou des pairs appartient au Roi; leur nombre est illimité; il peut en 
varier les dignités, les nommes à vie ou les rendre héréditaires, selon sa volonté. Les Belges usent 
d’une initiative qui peut devenir dangereuse”. 
25  Koll, Belgien, 495. The structure of the Belgian Constitution closely followed the French 
 Constitution of 1791 : Descamps,  La mosaïque . 
26  De  Gerlache ,  Histoire du Royaume des Pays-Bas depuis 1814 jusqu’en 1830 , 316; Koch, Le Roi 
décide seul/de Koning alleen besluit. Het ‘systeem Willem I’;  Marteel ,  Inventing the Belgian 
Revolution. Politics and Political Thought in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (1814-1830) , 
31. 
27  Mirkine- Guetzévitch , L’histoire constitutionnelle comparée, 93. 




which prevailed both in the  Congress and in public opinion. 29 The keystone of the 
system of national  sovereignty instated in 1831 was  article 78: “Le Roi n’a d’autres 
pouvoirs que ceux que lui attribuent formellement la Constitution et les lois particu-
lières portées en vertu de la Constitution même”. 30 Here too, the sovereignty 
arrangement of the Fundamental  Law was reversed so as to become its exact oppo-
site. Under the Fundamental  Law , the Estates  General had only possessed attributed 
powers, whereas all residual powers fell to the  King . The Belgian  Constitution of 
1831 created the opposite constellation. 31 A very precise list of royal  prerogatives 
was followed by the formal limitation of royal power by  article 78. 32 This highly 
original prescription marked the end of the monarchical principle. 33 All residual 
powers were henceforward legally assumed by the representatives of the  nation 
united in  Parliament . 
 The  articles 25, 32 and 78 combined in an arrangement where sovereignty no 
longer worked top down but bottom up. The origin of  sovereign power was exclu-
sively popular.  Parliament moreover disposed of effective means to control and, if 
necessary, to blow the whistle over the executive, by the yearly vote over the  budget 
(art. 115). 34 Although  sovereignty emanated from the  nation , it was constitutionally 
made sure that the latter did not exercise it in its entirety. Parliamentary despotism 
was precluded by a clear  separation of powers . Or rather, in André  Alen ’s words, a 
division of powers. 35 The English system of checks and  balances , as it had been 
interpreted by  Montesquieu and, above all, by Benjamin  Constant , was the great 
example followed by the members of the Belgian constituent  assembly . 36 The three 
powers were thus organised to infl uence and counterbalance each other. Therefore, 
the legislative  power was shared between both chambers and the  King , who also 
headed the executive. 37 
29  Senelle, Le monarque constitutionnel en Belgique; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscom-
missie , 53. 
30  “The  King has no other powers than those formally attributed to him by the Constitutions and by 
the ordinary laws established under the Constitution”. 
31  Lefebvre ,  The Belgian Constitution , 25. Errera stresses the omnipotence of  Parliament within the 
boundaries of the Constitution, providing it with a dominant position vis-à-vis the other powers: 
“il [le parlement] est virtuellement omnipotent dans les limites constitutionnelles; il occupe une 
place prépondérante à l’égard des autres pouvoirs de l’Etat. Ainsi en est-il en Belgique. Seule la 
Constitution restreint sa compétence, par l’établissement des autres pouvoirs et par la garantie des 
libertés individuelles”.  Errera ,  Traité du droit public belge , 121. 
32  Errera ,  Traité du droit public belge , 19. 
33 Alen ,  Treatise on Belgian Constitutional Law , 4. 
34  Senelle, Le monarque constitutionnel en Belgique, 55. 
35 Alen ,  Treatise on Belgian Constitutional Law , 9. 
36  De  Smaele , Eclectisch en toch nieuw, 410;  Lefebvre ,  The Belgian Constitution of 1831 ;  Marteel , 
 Polemieken over natievorming in het Verenigd Koninkrijk der Nederlanden. Een blik op de intel-
lectuele wortels van het Belgisch nationalisme , 2012; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grond-
wetscommissie , 63. 
37  Vile,  Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers , 72. 
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2.2  Congress as the Sole Constituting  Power 
 Given the  genesis  of the Belgian  Constitution of 1831, anything less than a popular 
origin of  sovereignty would have come as a surprise. Contrary to the Fundamental 
 Law of 1815 and the French Charters of  1814 and  1830 , the Belgian  Constitution 
was not the result of a negotiation between a national representation and a monarch. 
At the time of the National  Congress , royal authority had come to an end due to the 
Belgian  Revolution . The executive  power was exercised by a collective Provisional 
 Government , whereas the legislative and  constituent powers were entirely in the 
hands of the National  Congress . The Congress acted as the sole representative of the 
Belgian people. It was thus the only and omnipotent  pouvoir constituant . The for-
mula ‘omnipotence of Congress’ was literally used in the  debates . 38 
 The Congress members were designated through direct  elections on 3 November 
1830. 39 The electorate consisted of about 30,000 male citizens, 40 representing 
around 0.7 % of the population. 41 Census franchise was combined with capacity 
franchise, giving the vote to all holders of university degrees (as well as certain 
intellectual professions) and clerics. 42 Capacity  suffrage and direct elections (as 
opposed to the complicated indirect system under the Kingdom of the Netherlands) 
were innovations introduced so as to fulfi l the Provisional  Government ’s intention 
to create “the most popular  election method possible”. 43 Jean-Baptiste  Nothomb , 
secretary to the Constitutional  Commission (which was also responsible for the 
electoral regulations) commented: “Jamais assemblée nationale n’a dérivé plus 
directement de la masse de la nation”. 44 
 The  Congress members were fully aware of their quality of representatives of the 
people, in whose name they spoke and acted. President Jean-François  Gendebien 
38  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 2, p. 502, 11/02/1831. 
39  Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique no. 12, p. 14, 25/10/1830. 
40  Of the 46,099 citizens who had the right to vote, 28,766 participated in the  elections for the 
Congress:  Magits ,  De Volksraad, 408. 
41  Gilissen,  Le régime représentatif en Belgique depuis 1790 , 84;  Magits ,  De Volksraad , 408. 
42  Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 30;  Magits ,  De Volksraad , 33. 
43 As declared in its proclamation of 6 October 1830: “Elle [la Commission] s’occupera, avant tout 
autre chose, du nouveau mode d’élection qui sera le plus populaire possible”.  Bulletin des arrêtés 
et actes du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique no. 5, p. 13, 10/10/1830. See also: Van den 
 Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie, 32. In its proclamation of 10 October, the Provisional 
 Government had announced: “Considérant que le congrès appelé à décider des intérêts de la 
Belgique doit être une véritable représentation nationale, qu’il est donc nécessaire d’adopter, dès à 
présent, un système d’élection directe et libérale” (“Considering that the Congress, called upon to 
decide on the interest of Belgium, must be a true national representation, and that it is thus neces-
sary to adopt, from the present moment on, a direct and liberal electoral system”).  Bulletin des 
arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique no. 7, p. 5, 16/10/1830. 
44  “Never has a national  assembly been derived more directly from the mass of the nation”. National 
Archives of Belgium, Papiers  Nothomb , ‘Note sur la Constitution belge’. See also: Van den Steene, 
 De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 32. For Nothomb, see: De Borchgrave, Nothomb (Jean-
Baptiste, baron) and Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 25–26. 
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opened the fi rst session of the Congress in the Palace of the Nation in Brussels on 
10 November 1830 with the words: “Le congrès national s’installe au nom du peu-
ple belge”. 45 Its decrees, as well as the  Constitution , were likewise issued in the 
name of the Belgian people. The  newspaper  Le Courrier wrote:
 (…) la décision du congrès constituera pour tous une loi souveraine, un arrêt sans appel. 
C’est au congrès que la nation a délégué l’exercice de ses pleins pouvoirs; tout ce qui émane 
du congrès est censé émaner de la nation elle-même. Sa décision sera donc obligatoire pour 
tous et la moindre tentative de violation dirigée contre elle, serait un crime de rébellion 
contre la loi. 46 
 The  Congress jealously guarded its position as the only  legitimate authority on 
the grounds of its direct  election by the people. It didn’t tolerate any other source of 
power, as its distrustful attitude towards the Provisional  Government proves. 47 The 
issue immediately came to the fore when, at the start of the opening session, dele-
gate De Gerlache proposed to offi cially inform the Provisional Government of the 
Congress’s reunion and to invite it to attend. De  Mûelenaere objected that delegat-
ing a group of  Congress members to convey this message would degrade the 
Congress, since, on the grounds of its  election by the people, it didn’t recognise any 
authority higher than its own:
 Je crois qu’un tel mode serait contraire à la dignité du congrès nommé directement par le 
peuple belge qu’il représente. Le congrès se constitue de son propre mouvement et ne paraît 
pas devoir être installé par aucune autre autorité, puisqu’il ne reconnaît aucun  pouvoir con-
stitué supérieur au sien. En conséquence, je suis d’avis que le gouvernement provisoire soit 
averti par un de messieurs les membres du bureau ou par un des huissiers. 48 
 The Provisional  Government had been created in the midst of  revolutionary con-
fusion to assure public order after the collapse of the Dutch government. It had 
grown out of the  Commission administrative that had been established in Brussels 
on 24 September 1830 to replace the existing urban administration. 49 In a quick 
45  “The Congress installs itself in the name of the Belgian people”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, 
p. 99, 10/11/1830. 
46  “(…) the Congress’s decision will constitute for us a sovereign law, a decree without appeal. The 
nation has delegated the exercise of its full powers to the Congress. All that emanates from the 
Congress must be considered to emanate from the nation itself. Its decision will therefore be oblig-
atory for everyone. The slightest attempt of violation against it, will be a crime of rebellion against 
the law”.  Le Courrier no. 35, 04/02/1831. For  Le Courrier and its predecessor, the  Courrier des 
Pays-Bas , see footnote 211. 
47  Gilissen , Le caractère collégial des premières formes de gouvernement et d’administration de 
l’Etat Belge (1830-1831), 621. 
48  “I believe that to act in such a way would run counter to the dignity of the Congress, directly 
elected by the Belgian people which it represents. The Congress constitutes itself and it does so of 
its own accord. It mustn’t seem to have to be installed by any other authority, because it doesn’t 
recognise any other  constituted  power superior to its own. Consequently, I think that the Provisional 
 Government must be informed by one of the gentlemen of the bureau or by one of the ushers”. 
 Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 100, 10/11/1830. 
49  Gilissen , Le caractère collégial, 611;  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 4, p. 2; Witte,  De constructie 
van België, 1828–1847 , 63. 
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 succession of events, it succeeded in extending its authority over the whole Belgian 
territory. 50 Within this body, power was in the hand of the fi ve-strong  Comité 
Central . 51 It was this organ which, by its proclamation of the 4th of October, declared 
Belgian  independence from the Kingdom of the Netherlands and convened the 
National  Congress . 52 Although it spoke and acted in the name of the Belgian people, 
the powers of the Provisional  Government did not rest on a democratic  mandate . It 
exercised both  legislative and executive  power , while at the same time intervening 
in the  judiciary sphere by appointing and dismissing magistrates. 53 In one of its fi rst 
resolutions, it decreed the expiration of its  mandate as soon as “worthier hands” 
would be ready to take over. 54 The underlying  justifi cation was that, in the power 
vacuum between the ending of Dutch authority and the  election of the people’s 
representatives, the circumstances had forced it to exercise  sovereignty in the name 
of the Belgian people. 55 
 The  Congress followed this reasoning. Despite De  Mûelenaere ’s objections, the 
members of the  government were invited into the meeting hall and met with enthu-
siastic applause. The eldest member, the journalist and revolutionary hero Louis de 
 Potter , delivered a speech in which he  justifi ed the coming to power of the Provisional 
 Government by its endeavours to protect the Belgian  Revolution as well as by the 
consent of the people. 56 Bringing to mind the revolt against the Dutch government, 
he said:
 Le fruit de cette victoire était  l’indépendance . Le peuple l’a déclarée par notre organe. 
Interprète de ses vœux, le gouvernement provisoire vous a appelés, messieurs, vous, les 
hommes choisis par la nation belge, pour constituer cette indépendance et pour la consol-
ider à jamais. Mais, en attendant que vous puissiez venir remplir cette tâche, un centre 
d’action était nécessaire pour pourvoir aux premiers, aux plus urgents besoins de l’Etat. Un 
gouvernement provisoire s’est établi, et il a suppléé temporairement à l’absence de tout 
pouvoir. La nécessité d’un gouvernement quelconque justifi ait sa mission; l’assentiment du 
peuple confi rma son mandat. 57 
50  Gilissen ,  Le régime représentatif, 80. 
51  Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique no. 1, p. 6, 01/10/1830. 
52  Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique no. 4, p. 3, 08/10/1830. 
53  Gilissen ,  Le régime représentatif , 79;  Witte ,  De constructie, 64. 
54  Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique no. 1, p. 3, 01/10/1830. 
55  “Il tenait son mandat de la nécessité. Lorsqu’un ordre de choses périt, il y a, entre le passé qui 
n’est plus et l’avenir qui n’est pas encore, un interrègne où le pouvoir appartient momentanément 
à qui le prend; si la lacune n’était pas remplie, la société elle-même serait et resterait dissoute; il 
faut bien que quelqu’un vienne prononcer le  fi at tout-puissant qui doit la maintenir et la réorgan-
iser. C’est là une légitimité incontestable”. Nothomb,  Essai historique , 75. 
56  For De  Potter , see: De Potter et. al.,  Louis de Potter, révolutionnaire belge en 1830 ; Juste,  Louis 
de Potter: membre du gouvernement provisoire. D’après des documents inédits . 
57  “The fruit of this victory was  independence . The people has declared it via us. Interpreter of its 
wishes, the Provisional  Government has called upon you, the men chosen by the Belgian Nation, 
to constitute this  independence and to consolidate it forever. But, in anticipation of your being able 
to come and fulfi l this task, a centre of action was needed to foresee in the fi rst, the most urgent 
needs of state. A Provisional Government has been created to temporarily make up for the absence 
of all power. The need for any kind of government justifi ed its mission; the approval of the people 
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 Acting as “the interpreter of the people’s  wishes ”, the Provisional  Government 
had met the most urgent needs of the State until the moment the people’s representa-
tives convened in  Congress . De  Potter didn’t proceed to offi cially lay down the 
powers of the Provisional  Government however, causing alarm among some of the 
delegates. 58 In the third session, De  Foere intervened to demand urgent clarifi cation 
with regard to the  mission of the Provisional Government. Although he agreed that 
the Government had  legitimately held provisional power in the interest of the  nation , 
he insisted that its mission had ended at the fi rst meeting of the  Congress :
 (…) les gouvernements se constituent de deux manières: d’abord, dans des temps ordi-
naires, par l’assentiment librement exprimé des nations; ensuite, dans des temps extraordi-
naires, par leur assentiment tacite. J’appelle des temps extraordinaires ces transitions 
violentes par lesquelles les États passent d’une forme d’existence à une autre, et pendant 
lesquelles les nations ont recours à l’impérieuse loi de la nécessité pour établir l’ordre et la 
sécurité, pour garantir les États contre les horreurs de l’anarchie. Tous les publicistes 
admettent cette loi de la nécessité comme principe provisoirement constitutif des États 
anarchiques. Les  jurisconsultes la rangent parmi les causes des exemptions légales, et les 
moralistes l’adoptent comme raison suffi sante de se croire dispensé de l’observance des 
devoirs qui nous sont imposés par des lois humaines. Mais cette loi de la nécessité, de 
l’aveu de tous, a ses règles et ses bornes. II est généralement admis que cette loi, recevant 
son existence de la nécessité, rentre dans le néant par la cessation de cette nécessité même. 
Il est incontestable que notre gouvernement provisoire se soit établi sur cette loi de la néces-
sité, incontestable encore qu’il ait reçu son mandat de l’assentiment tacite de la nation 
belge; mais aussi il me semble qu’il n’est pas moins évident que cette loi a cessé par la 
cessation de sa cause, et que, depuis la vérifi cation des pouvoirs des membres du congrès 
national, l’assentiment tacite, par lequel la nation belge avait conféré l’administration de ses 
intérêts communs au gouvernement provisoire, reste désormais sans application. Il résulte 
de ces principes, messieurs, que le pouvoir du gouvernement provisoire est expiré. 59 
confi rms its mandate”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 101, 10/11/1830. Thonissen in his authori-
tative constitutional  manual approved of this  legitimation by “the force of circumstances and the 
approval of the nation”.  Thonissen ,  La Constitution belge annotée, offrant sous chaque article 
l’état de la doctrine de la jurisprudence et de la législation, 335. 
58  The delay effectively refl ected the Provisional  Government ’s reluctance to release power. 
Especially De  Potter feared that this move would thwart his plans for the foundation of a Belgian 
 Republic , with himself as its fi rst president. De Mulder,  De republikeinse beweging, 14. 
59  “(…) governments are generally constituted in two ways. Firstly, in ordinary times, by the freely 
expressed approval of nations. Secondly, in extraordinary times, by their tacit approval. I call 
extraordinary times those violent transitions when states pass from one form of existence to 
another, and during which nations take recourse to the imperious law of necessity for establishing 
order and security, for safeguarding states against the horrors of anarchy. All the publicists admit 
this law of necessity as the provisionally constitutive principle of anarchic states. The jurists cat-
egorise it under the causes of legal exemptions, and the moralists accept it as a suffi cient reason to 
consider one exempted from the obligations imposed by human laws. But this law of necessity has 
its rules and its limits, as all will agree. It is generally accepted that this law, originating from 
necessity, is nullifi ed as soon as this necessity ceases to exist. It is an uncontested truth that our 
Provisional  Government has been established under this law of necessity. It is equally true that it 
has received its  mandate  from the tacit approval of the Belgian Nation. But I consider it no less 
evident that this law has ceased to exist by the disappearance of its cause and that, since the 
moment of the verifi cation of the powers of the members of the National Congress, the tacit 
approval by which the Belgian Nation had conferred the administration of its common interest to 
National Sovereignty in the Belgian Constitution of 1831. On the Meaning(s) of Article 25
104
 The extraordinary circumstances which had  legitimised the Provisional 
 Government ’s mission having ceased, its very right of existence had ended. The 
anxieties of De  Foere and others were soon quelled, when during the very same ses-
sion the Provisional  Government delegated Jean-Baptiste  Nothomb to lay down its 
powers in the hands of the  Congress . 60 The Congress responded by rendering thanks 
to the Provisional  Government for its services and by charging it with the continued 
exercise of the executive  power until the defi nite settlement of the state 
organisation. 
 However, the question of  legitimacy continued to produce bouts of distrust 
towards the Provisional  Government on the part of the National Congress. Tellingly, 
it refused to accept the  draft Constitution drawn up by the Constitutional 
 Commission . 61 Since the Commission had been convened by the Provisional 
 Government  before the  election of the Congress, the  draft could not be said to ema-
nate from the  will  of the  nation . Joseph  Forgeur , himself the author of another con-
stitutional proposal, protested:
 Le projet de constitution doit émaner du congrès lui-même: non que je veuille diminuer le 
mérite du projet imprimé qui est le fruit de consciencieuses études, mais il n’est pas conven-
able que le congrès donne la priorité à un projet quelconque rédigé hors de son sein. 62 
 Joseph  Lebeau , member of the Constitutional  Commission , protested that the 
 draft had received the approval of the  nation by the  election of its authors to the 
 Congress . The Commission’s president De  Gerlache fi nally submitted the proposal 
in his own name, so as to strip it from its connection to the Provisional  Government 
and make it “emanate from the Congress itself”. 63 
 After being accepted, the Commission’s  draft was in effect used as the guiding 
document for the  debate s of the  constituent  assembly. Preliminary discussions over 
each individual  article took place in ten committees or ‘sections’ composed of 20 
delegates each, who reported to a Central  Section . 64 The reports drawn up by the 
latter served as the starting point for the subsequent plenary  debates in Congress. 65 
In the end, 80 % of the  articles  of the Commission’s  draft were included in the fi nal 
the Provisional Government, is now void. As a result of these principles, gentlemen, the powers of 
the Provisional Government have expired”. Huyttens,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 117, 12/11/1830. 
60  Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement Provisoire de la Belgique no. 31, p. 7, 18/11/1830. 
61  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 325, 25/11/1830;  Gilissen , Le caractère collégial, 621; Van den 
 Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 47. 
62  “The  draft Constitution must emanate from the Congress itself: not that I wish to diminish the 
merits of the printed  draft , which is the result of conscientious study, but it is not appropriate for 
the Congress to give priority to any  draft drawn up outside of its bosom”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions , 
vol. 1, p. 324, 25/11/1830. For  Forgeur , see: Caulier-Mathy, Forgeur, Joseph; Heptia, Joseph 
Forgeur. 
63  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 325, 25/11/1830. For  Lebeau , see: Devillers, Lebeau (Joseph) 
and Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie, 24–25. 
64  Ganshof Van der Meersch and Vanwelkenhuyzen, La constitution belge, 575. 
65  Magit ,  De Volksraad , Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie . 
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Constitution. 66 Its basic features were generally respected, with the arrangement for 
the  Senate as the main exception. 67 At least 20 other constitutional  drafts , of diver-
gent quality and ideological persuasion, were offered to the  Congress in this peri-
od. 68 Of these, only the one by the delegates  Forgeur ,  Barbanson ,  Fleussu and  Liedts 
seems to have received any attention. 69 Its major innovation, unicameralism, was 
however not adopted. 
 Out of the same concern of safeguarding its position as the sole representative of 
the nation, the  Congress rejected the idea of submitting the new Constitution, or 
parts of it, to popular  referendum . 70 The proposal of the  democratic delegates 
Alexandre de  Robaulx and Pierre-Guillaume  Seron to let the people sanction the 
decision over the form of  state was subsequently not supported. 71  Forgeur  reacted 
furiously to De  Robaulx ’s proposal, accusing him of calling into question the 
 Congress’s  constituent  mandate :
 On a cherché un appui hors de cette enceinte (…) on vous a contesté votre mandat; on a 
refusé de vous reconnaître comme  pouvoir constituant . 72 
 This line of reasoning was continued in the new Constitution. Article  25  stated 
that all the powers must be exercised “in the manner established by the Constitution”. 
This provision ruled out the option of lawmaking by way of  referendum . Since the 
legislative  power was exclusively exercised by the  chambers and the  King , the elec-
torate was not allowed to directly intervene in the legislative process. Additionally, 
as we have seen above,  article 32 excluded the imperative  mandate , whereas  article 
43 forbade to personally present petitions to the chambers. The representatives of 
the  nation were considered to decide freely and without pressure by the 
electorate. 73 
66  Gilissen , Le caractère collégial, 86. 
67  Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 57. 
68  Magits ,  De Volksraad. 
69  ‘Projet de constitution présenté par MM. Forgeur, Barbanson, Fleussu et Liedts, dans la séance 
du 25 novembre 1830’,  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 4, p. 50–55;  Gilissen ,  Le régime représentatif , 
86. 
70  Magit,  De Volksraad ,  397 . 
71  Huyttens,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 253–260, 20/11/1830. Delegate François Pirson made a similar 
proposal in the discussion over national  independence , Huyttens,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 161, 
17/11/1830. In addition, several  draft constitutions submitted to the Congress, by authors of 
diverging political persuasions, proposed to submit the Constitution to popular  referendum . See: 
National Archives of Belgium, Gouv. Prov. I, no. 197: Un patriote belge, ‘Projet de constitution’; 
 Courrier de la Meuse no. 260, 27/10/1830: ‘De notre nouveau pacte fondamental’. 
72  “One has looked for support outside of this assembly. (…) one has contested your  mandate ; one 
has refused to acknowledge you as constituent  power ”. Huyttens,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 229, 
20/11/1830. 
73  Lefebvre ,  The Belgian Constitution , 38. 
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2.3  The  Legitimacy of the  Senate 
 A similar concern for the free expression of the will of the  nation  infl uenced the 
debate over the  Senate . The Constitutional  Commission had proposed a bicameral 
system, with a Senate appointed by the  King . As to the senators’ term of offi ce, it 
left the choice between hereditary peerage and appointment for life. The proposal 
was a source of much controversy. 74 Many feared that a  Senate appointed by the 
 monarch would confer too much power to the latter, while putting political power in 
the hands of a hereditary  peerage was seen as a violation of the principle of equality 
before the law. The  newspaper  Den Antwerpenaer wrote: “Het is eene zottigheyd, 
want dit riekt al te veel nae het oud voorrecht van leenstelsel”. 75 Supporters of the 
 Senate saw it as a necessary institution for moderating the impetuous  democratic 
forces of the elected  Chamber and as an intermediary between the latter and the 
monarch. 76 
 In the  republican political club  Reunion Centrale , 77 a speech against the  Senate 
and the royal  veto was delivered by Joseph-Ferdinand  Toussaint , a clerk of the 
Provisional  Government with Saint-Simonian sympathies. 78 According to Toussaint, 
the concept of a  Senate so contravened the principle of national  sovereignty that, 
should it become reality, a new revolution would be unavoidable:
 Unissons tous nos efforts pour constituer une représentation nationale vraie, réelle, hors de 
l’infl uence des privilèges et des cours, une représentation qui, expression de vos besoins, et 
de tous les intérêts, soit nombreuse et digne de notre confi ance. Qu’à elle seule appartienne 
la puissance législative; qu’à la volonté  générale , dont elle est l’organe, obéissent reli-
gieusement tous les volontés particulières; et que la loi soit l’objet d’un culte sacré. Nous 
assurerons ainsi la liberté et le bonheur de la patrie, en restant fi dèle à notre principe fonda-
mental: la souveraineté réside dans la nation. 79 
74  Magits ,  De Volksraad ; Stevens, Een belangrijke faze; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische 
grondwetscommissie. 
75  “This is a folly because it reeks too much of the old privilege of feudalism”.  Den Antwerpenaer 
no. 98, 23/11/1830.  Den Antwerpenaer was a popular,  democratic oppositional journal from 
Antwerp, expressing a  liberal  Catholic point of view. De Borger,  Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van 
de Antwerpse pers. Repertorium, 1794–1914, 157–159;  Witte , Het natiebegrip in het Zuidelijk 
krantendiscours aan de vooravond van de Belgische opstand (augustus 1829-juni 1830), 225. 
76  Stevens, Een belangrijke faze. 
77  Leconte, La Réunion Centrale, club patriotique, révolutionnaire et républicain;  Witte , De 
Belgische radicalen: brugfi guren in de democratische beweging (1830–1850), 16. 
78  Geldhof, Een orangistisch rivaal van Alexander Rodenbach. Jozef-Ferdinand Toussaint: 
Meulebeke 1806-Elsene 1885; Goffi n, Toussaint (Joseph-Ferdinand). 
79  “Let us unite all our efforts to constitute a real, true, national representation, free from the infl u-
ence of privileges and courts, a representation which, expressing your needs and every interest, is 
numerous and worthy of our trust. To it exclusively must the  legislative power belong; all the 
particular wills must religiously obey the general  will  in whose name it speaks; and the law must 
be the object of a sacred cult. Thus will we be able to guarantee the liberty and happiness of the 
fatherland and be faithful to our fundamental principle:  sovereignty resides in the nation”. 




 Within the  Congress too, the proposed  Senate met with fi erce resistance. 
Unicameralism was one of the most conspicuous elements of the counterproposal 
launched by Joseph  Forgeur and his associates. 80 Especially those delegates whose 
political ideals were rooted in the tradition of French  republicanism considered an 
appointed  Senate as a dangerous threat for the national  sovereignty , as illustrated by 
the speech by Van  Snick . Stating that legislative  power was an inalienable and indi-
visible attribute of  sovereignty , he argued that it should exclusively belong to the 
delegates of the  nation :
 Chez nous, depuis notre régénération politique, la souveraineté est reconnue émaner de la 
nation exclusivement; la puissance législative est un des attributs essentiels, inaliénables de 
cette souveraineté; partager cet attribut, qui doit être exclusif à cette souveraineté, entre les 
délégués de la nation et les délégués de celui aux mains duquel elle aurait confi é le pouvoir 
exécutif, me semble un acte attentoire à cette souveraineté: c’est la détruire au moment où 
on la proclame. 81 
 The  Congress fi nally opted for an elected  Senate which, due to the very high 
property requirements for eligibility, would automatically take on an  aristocratic 
character. This original choice refl ected its concern to safeguard the operation of 
national  sovereignty , unhindered by privilege or the intervention of a power of non- 
popular origin, while simultaneously building a conservative element into the 
national representation. 
2.4  Nation Versus King 
 The  debates  of the  Congress time and again pointed at a conception of  sovereignty 
where the nation governs itself through its representatives. The delegates were regu-
larly reminded that they took their  mandate from ‘the Belgian people’. The question 
of  sovereignty most explicitly surfaced in the  debate over the form of  state . At this 
occasion, Jean-Baptiste  Nothomb , secretary to the Constitutional  Commission and 
future prime minister, declared:
 L’hérédité et  l’inviolabilité sont deux fi ctions politiques, deux nécessités publiques, deux 
exceptions dans l’ordre social. En face de ces fi ctions apparaît, toujours menaçante, la 
80  Gilissen ,  Le régime représentatif ;  Magits ,  De Volksraad ; Nandrin, Le bicaméralisme belge et le 
Sénat en 1830–1831: fondements doctrinaux. 
81  “Since the moment of our political regeneration, it is recognised that sovereignty emanates from 
the nation exclusively; the  legislative power is one of the essential, inalienable attributes of that 
sovereignty; to subdivide this attribute, which must exclusively belong to that sovereignty, between 
the delegates of the nation and the delegates of him to whom the executive  power is entrusted, is 
in my opinion an attack on that sovereignty; it is to proclaim and to destroy it in the same instant”. 
 Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 404, 13/12/1830. See also: De  Smaele ,  Omdat we uwe vrienden 
zijn. Religie en partij-identifi catie, 1884–1914 , 19. 
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 souveraineté du peuple, qui, dans les cas extrêmes, vient infailliblement les briser. En 
dernier résultat, c’est toujours le pays qui l’emporte. 82 
 Nothomb almost literally referred to  sovereignty as a last resort, and placed it in 
the hands of the people. His words contained an implicit  legitimation of the Belgian 
 Revolution . Royalty, according to  Nothomb , was nothing but a ‘necessary political 
fi ction’. The people legally held the right to revolt against it in defence of their  sov-
ereignty .  William I had forfeited his rights to the throne for having infringed on the 
 sovereignty of the people, which was the utter source of  legitimacy . 
 Congress delegates systematically used the terms ‘ nation’ and ‘ king’ or ‘head of 
state’ in opposition to each other. Both were treated as mutually exclusive entities. 
In the report of the Central  Section on the discussion on the powers of the head of 
state, delegate Joseph-Jean  Raikem wrote:
 On a pensé que le droit de déclarer la guerre devait rester au chef de l’Etat; que la nation 
avait une garantie suffi sante dans le refus des subsides qui aurait lieu de la part des cham-
bres dans le cas d’une guerre injuste. 83 
 The citation indicates that only the  chambers were considered to represent the 
nation, and that the latter was conceptually different from the head of state. Also, it 
confi rms the interpretation of the  nation as a last resort, since the chambers were, by 
their control over the  budget , able to block any unwanted initiative of the  executive , 
even when it stemmed from the royal  prerogatives . In the discussion over the form 
of  state , De  Robaulx proclaimed:
 Je ne veux pas de monarchie, parce que sous elles les fonctionnaires s’habituent à croire 
qu’ils ne tiennent leurs places que du maître et non de la nation. 84 
 Again, the nation and the  King were treated as opposites, and the  nation was 
recognised as the source of all powers. 85 
 Article  80  stated that the  King only takes function after having sworn loyalty to 
the  Constitution in the presence of the united  chambers . Since the  King was only 
vested with his constitutional powers on the moment of taking the  oath , periods of 
interregnum occurred every time between the death of the reigning monarch and the 
taking of the  oath by his successor. 86 In the meantime, the  monarch’s constitutional 
powers were exercised by the Council of Ministers, under their  responsibility (art. 
82  “Heredity and inviolability are two political fi ctions, two political necessities, two exceptions in 
the social order. Opposite these fi ctions appears, ever menacing, the sovereignty of the people 
which, in extreme cases, comes and destroys them. In the end, the country always wins”.  Huyttens , 
 Discussions, vol. 1, p. 193, 19/11/1830. 
83  “It is our opinion that the right to declare war must stay with the head of state; the nation has a 
suffi cient guarantee in the refusal of the subsidies to which the chambers will resort in case of an 
unjust war”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 4, p. 84. 
84  “I don’t want a monarchy, because it makes the functionaries believe that they hold their place 
from the master and not from the nation”. Huyttens,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 255, 22/11/1830. 
85  Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie, 63. 
86  Ganshof Van der Meersch, Des rapports, 182. 
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79). Delegate  Beyts , insisting on the importance of establishing a  contract with the 
 King as a precondition of his taking power, said:
 Je n’admets guère (…) le principe admis en France: Le roi est mort, vive le roi! Je ne crie 
pas, Vive le roi, s’il n’a pas juré. 87 
 As with the French citizen- king who had come to power the previous  summer , 
the royal style was ‘ King of the Belgians’, not ‘of Belgium’, indicating that the 
monarch or the dynasty was not entitled to claim rights of possession on the territo-
ry. 88 Royalty in the Belgian  Constitution was, indeed, merely a constituted  power . 89 
In a speech aimed at stressing the importance of the monarch’s full acceptance of 
the Constitution, delegate Pierre Van  Meenen – who had been one of the main theo-
rists of the constitutional resistance against  William I – provided an accurate yet 
rather unmajestic description of the  monarch’s position. 90 He compared it to the 
obligation on the part of an employee to fully subscribe the  contract  offered to him 
by his future employer as a condition for his entering in function:
 On a dit qu’elle [la Constitution] ne serait arrêtée défi nitivement que par l’acceptation du 
chef de l’État. Il est vrai qu’il se forme un  contrat entre lui et la nation, mais la constitution 
ne forme pas la matière de ce contrat, c’est l’acceptation du mandat que lui confère la 
nation. Le mandant est ici un être collectif de la nation constituée. L’acceptation ne peut 
mettre en question toutes les parties du  contrat . S’il en était autrement, chaque employé 
n’aurait qu’à dire, en entrant en fonctions, qu’il n’accepte que sauf des modifi cations à faire 
aux lois qu’il est appelé à exécuter. 91 
 The same reasoning underlies De  Robaulx ’s heated intervention in the  debate of 
6 February 1831 on  article 7 of the transitory dispositions, concerning the timing of 
the convening of the fi rst elected  Parliament . Upon  Osy ’s remark that the future 
 King might possibly not agree to these regulations, De  Robaulx exclaimed: “S’il 
n’accepte pas nos  conditions , il ne sera pas roi”, sparking applause from the benches 
87  ”I hardly agree to the principle allowed in France: the King is dead, long live the King! I will not 
cry ‘Long live the King’ if he hasn’t sworn the  oath ”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 2, p. 487, 
07/02/1831. On the absence of this principle in the Belgian Constitution:  Errera ,  Traité du droit 
public , 198. 
88  Errera ,  Traité du droit public , 195; Koll, Belgien, 493;  Witte ,  De constructie , 95. 
89 Alen ,  Treatise on Belgian Constitutional Law , 4; Molitor, Réfl exions sur la fonction royale, 16; 
 Müβig , L’ouverture du mouvement constitutionnel, 495. 
90  For Van  Meenen , see: Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 17–19; Le Roy, 
Meenen, Pierre-François Van. 
91  “It has been said that the Constitution will only become defi nite upon its acceptance by the head 
of state. It is true that a contract is established between him and the nation, but the Constitution is 
not the subject matter of that contract, it is the acceptance of the  mandate  conferred to him by the 
nation. The mandator here is the collective being of the constituted nation. The acceptance cannot 
call into question the parts of the contract. Otherwise, every employee could simply refuse, when 
entering into function, to accept, unless modifi cations were made to the laws he was called upon 
to execute”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 492, 08/02/1831. 
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and the galleries. 92 The  Catholic  newspaper  Courrier de la Meuse wrote, in reaction 
to  article 4 of the  draft Constitution (the later  article 25):
 Si tous les pouvoirs émanent de la nation, celui du prince en émane certainement aussi; et 
dans ce cas, ce pouvoir ne serait qu’une délégation, qu’une commission; et c’est bien ainsi 
qu’on l’entend. 93 
 In short, royal  power was to be exercised on the terms dictated by the  nation . 
2.5  The Royal  Veto and the National  Will 
 However, this interpretation seems to be invalidated by the establishment of the 
absolute royal  veto . Article  69 stated that the  King sanctions and promulgates the 
laws. Since he cannot be forced to sign the laws presented to him by the  chambers , 
this arrangement amounts to the absolute royal  veto in  legislative matters. 94 At fi rst 
sight, the  article contradicts the free exercise of national  sovereignty by the nation’s 
representatives, since it provides the  King with the power to block the legislative 
process. The Congress  debates shed a different light on the question. The  veto was 
not being discussed as a reinforcement of royal power, but as a safeguard of the will 
of the  nation . Due to the representative system, it was possible that the  chambers did 
not correctly refl ect the nation’s opinion. In that case the monarch was called upon 
to guarantee that opinion by vetoing the proposed law or by calling new  elections 
(via the royal right to dissolve the chambers under  article 71), as the report of the 
Central  Section on the powers of the head of state makes clear:
 Les résolutions des chambres doivent être l’expression du vœu de la nation qu’elles 
représentent. Mais il peut arriver que l’élection ait pour résultat d’y appeler les hommes 
d’un parti, et non ceux du peuple qui les élit. Dans ce cas, la marche du chef de l’Etat serait 
entravée, ou bien il se trouverait obligé d’agir dans un sens contraire à l’intérêt général. Il 
92  “If he doesn’t accept our conditions, he will not be King”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 484, 
06/02/1831. 
93  “If it is true that all powers emanate from the nation, those of the prince surely do so too; and if 
that be the case, his power would be nothing but a delegation or a commission; and this is precisely 
what is proposed”.  Courrier de la Meuse no. 266, 04/11/1830. The reactionary  Courrier de la 
Meuse deplored this arrangement because the Courrier favored a strong position for the monarch. 
The  newspaper represented the conservative,  Catholic opposition in Liège. Among its collabora-
tors was Etienne-Constantin de  Gerlache . See: Capitaine,  Bibliographie liégeoise. Recherches his-
toriques sur les journaux et les écrits périodiques liégeois , 166–172; Cordewiener,  Etude de la 
presse liégeoise de 1830 à 1850 et répertoire général ; Harsin,  Essai sur l’opinion publique en 
Belgique de 1815 à 1830 , 34; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 15. 
94  Bivort ,  Constitution Belge expliquée et interprétée par les discussions du Pouvoir Législatif, les 
arrêts des cours supérieures de Belgique et les opinions des jurisconsultes , 14;  Errera ,  Traité du 
droit public belge , 120; Senelle,  La Constitution belge commentée , 246;  Tempels , Droit constitu-




doit donc avoir le droit de faire un appel à l’opinion du pays par la dissolution des 
chambres. 95 
 Or, in  Nothomb ’s words:
 (…) les deux chambres se contrôlant réciproquement, le roi réserve son veto pour les cas 
rares où toutes les deux ont erré. 96 
 Instead of being tools to increase the power of the  monarch , allowing him to 
pursue his own policies, the royal  veto and the right of dissolution were meant to 
guarantee the correct expression of the will of the  nation . When he thought that the 
legislative work of the  chambers did not refl ect the wish of the majority of the 
people, it was the monarch’s duty to intervene on their behalf. In the terms of the 
 debates , he had to make an “appeal to the nation”, 97 so as to ensure that the  cham-
bers correctly represented “the country’s opinion” (“l’opinion du pays”). 98 In the 
 draft Constitution, only the Chamber of  Representatives was subject to the royal 
right of dissolution, since the  senators were to be appointed by the  King . Upon the 
 Congress’s decision to make the  Senate elective, the right of dissolution was 
extended to both chambers, because both now were supposed to represent the 
national  will . 
 Remarkably little attention was devoted to the choice between an  absolute and a 
 suspensive veto. Although the  suspensive veto was well known from earlier modern 
constitutions (such as the French  Constitution of 1791 ), the option counted only a 
few supporters among the delegates. The issue had been raised in two out of ten 
sections, but failed to obtain a majority in the Central  Section . During the plenary 
 debates , only delegates  Wannaar and  Henry spoke in favour of the  suspensive veto . 
Henry referred to the constitutional project proposed by  Forgeur ,  Barbanson , 
 Fleussu and  Liedts in response to the Constitutional  Commission ’s more conserva-
tive  draft Constitution. The proposal allowed  Parliament to overrule the royal  veto 
when the succeeding legislature passed the same bill with a three-quarters majori-
ty. 99  Henry elaborated on the issue by warning his fellow delegates against the threat 
95  “The decisions of the chambers must express the will of the nation which they represent. But it 
is possible that an  election results in men being called to them who are of a party and not of the 
people which elects them. In that case, the course of the head of state will be hindered, or else he 
will be obliged to act in a sense contrary to the general interest. He must therefore have the right 
to make an appeal to the opinion of the country by dissolving the chambers”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, 
vol. 4, p. 85. 
96  “(…) since the two chambers mutually control each other, the King reserves his veto for those 
rare cases when both have erred”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 426, 14/12/1830. 
97  Delegate  Henry , in his intervention in favour of the suspensive royal  veto , spoke of an appeal “to 
the sovereign nation”, implying yet again that the latter did not include the King.  Huyttens , 
 Discussions, vol. 2, p. 79, 10/01/1831. For the concept of the appeal to the nation, see:  Bacot , 
 Carré de Malberg et l’origine de la distinction entre souveraineté du peuple et souveraineté natio-
nale , 72; Baker, Constitution, 467; Roels,  Le concept de représentation, 94. 
98  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 4, p. 85. 
99 Art. 40: “Il [le Roi] sanctionne et promulgue la loi, ou y appose son  veto . Ce veto est suspensif. 
Il cesse et la sanction est obligée, si la même loi est reproduite et adoptée à la législature sub-
séquente par la majorité des trois quarts”. Huyttens,  Discussions , vol. 4, p. 52. 
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of royal despotism inherent in the  absolute veto . According to him, granting the 
absolute royal  veto equaled turning the  King into the sole  legislator and relegating 
 Parliament to the status of a consultative body. 100 The interventions by  Henry and 
 Wannaar failed to stir up any  debate however, and fi nally they were the only ones to 
vote in favour of their amendments. 
 Clearly, the majority in  Congress was satisfi ed with the reasoning developed by 
 Raikem in the report of the Central  Section on the powers of the head of state. The 
report spoke of the “grave inconveniences” caused by the introduction of the  sus-
pensive veto . By making the veto suspensive, the  monarch would in effect be 
deprived of his share in the legislative  power , thus turning it into the exclusive ter-
rain of the  chambers . Such an arrangement was dangerous for the constitutional 
powers of the monarch, the report warned:
 (…) de cette manière les chambres pourraient aller jusqu’au point de faire des lois qui por-
teraient atteinte aux pouvoirs constitutionnels du chef de l’état: celui-ce se trouverait sans 
défense; car, entre les chambres et lui, qui serait le juge de la question? 101 
 In other words, the veto needed to be  absolute  so as to prevent a  Parliament hos-
tile to royal power from attacking the monarch’s position. This consideration 
bespeaks a concern for  balancing the constituted  powers typical for the Belgian 
 Constitution . The delegates may have had the example of the French  Constitution of 
1791 in mind, when continual constitutional confl icts had resulted from parliamen-
tary attacks on a weak royal power, fi nally leading to the downfall of both the 
Constitution and the monarchy. 
 Errera in his 1918 constitutional treatise commented that the  Congress had fore-
seen the impossibility for the  King to use his veto under a  parliamentary regime. He 
interestingly suggests that, under these circumstances, a  suspensive veto would 
have provided him with a much more important political infl uence. 102 Since the 
 absolute veto was clearly intended for exceptional use only, it was of little conse-
quence in practice. Although the  Constitution did not technically contain suffi cient 
guarantees for  parliamentary  government (cfr. infra),  Errera is right in asserting that 
the  King was not supposed to use the  veto against  Parliament , that is, against the 
will of the  nation . The report of the Central  Section reveals that such a use would go 
directly against the spirit of the Constitution. 
 It is nevertheless striking that the restrictions imposed on the use of the  veto were 
not made explicit in the constitutional  text . The  Congress delegates did not stop to 
consider the most extreme consequence of the constitutional system they created. 
For in the event of the  monarch blocking the legislative through his use of the  abso-
lute veto , and  Parliament paralysing the executive through its rejection of the  budget , 
100  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 79, 10/01/1831. 
101  “(…) in this way, the Chamber could get to the point of making laws which would harm the 
constitutional powers of the head of state: the latter would fi nd himself without defense, because 
who could judge the question between him and the chambers?”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 4, 
p. 84. 
102  Errera ,  Traité du droit public belge, 121 . 
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complete deadlock would be at hand. 103 Writing about the situation at the beginning 
of the twentieth century,  Errera remarked that the royal  veto had fallen in complete 
disuse, and considered its application by the monarch “unimaginable”. Even though 
the  King was constitutionally entitled to do so, his use of the  veto would not be 
tolerated by public opinion, and would therefore lead straight to a popular uprising. 
The same argument against the monarch’s  overstepping of his constitutional  man-
date was regularly used in the  Congress . In the citation above,  Nothomb mentioned 
the “ever threatening  sovereignty of the people”, standing ready to break royal 
power in the case of an extreme occurrence. Similar references to the revolutionary 
power of the people, faced with irresponsible or  unconstitutional  government, 
abound. 
 Despite this apparent weakness in the constitutional construction, political prac-
tice after 1831 neatly conformed to the  Congress’s intentions. In the course of the 
nineteenth century, the royal  veto was used on merely three occasions (1842, 1845, 
1884). 104 Each time the  King took care not to simply refuse his sanction but to issue 
a Royal Decree, thus bringing his royal  prerogative  under ministerial  responsibility . 
On all three occasions, the  veto had been debated in the Council of Ministers before-
hand and was motivated by a turnabout in the political balance. 105 As the project of 
law concerned was no longer supported by the new majority, letting it pass would 
go counter to the will of the  chambers . Vetoing it came down to applying the solu-
tion provided for by the  Constitution against the introduction of laws which did not 
correctly express the will of the  nation . 
2.6  Republican Monarchism 
 The popular origin of  sovereignty was most clearly epitomised by the choice of a 
monarch. To be sure, many delegates recognised that a people can most truly be said 
to govern itself when the offi ce of head of state is not hereditary but  eligible . The 
Constitutional  Commission had in its  draft Constitution opted for the monarchy. 106 
It did however yield to popular  republican sentiments by using the neutral term 
103  Tempels plays down the importance of the  absolute veto since its persistent use could only lead 
to anarchy. Tempels, Droit constitutionnel, 453. 
104  Errera ,  Traité du droit public belge, 121; Ganshof Van der Meersch and Vanwelkenhuyzen, La 
constitution belge, 583. Lefebvre’s assertion that the royal  veto has never been used is not sup-
ported by the facts.  Lefebvre ,  The Belgian Constitution of 1831 , 26. 
105  Errera ,  Traité du droit public belge, 121. 
106  Only one member of the Commission,  Tielemans , voted for the  republic . Tielemans was an ally 
of the republican revolutionary leader Louis de  Potter . When his colleagues voted for the monar-
chy, he resigned from the Commission. Hymans , Le Congrès national de 1830 et la Constitution 
de 1831 , 19; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie, 35. Two others members, Van 
 Meenen and  Nothomb , voted with the majority although they were of the opinion that the choice 
between a monarch and a republic should on principle be left to the Congress.  Nothomb ,  Essai 
historique , 77. 
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‘head of state’ instead of ‘king’, hinting that the matter had not been defi nitively 
settled yet. 107 Between 19 and 22 November 1830 a heated  debate , with interven-
tions by over thirty delegates, was held over the question of the form of  state . 108 The 
intensity of the  debate is somewhat surprising given the prevailing international 
political situation. The great European powers, assembled at the London  Conference , 
had made it suffi ciently clear that they would not under any circumstances accept a 
republic. Since the young state depended entirely on the support of the powers for 
its survival, many delegates adopted a pragmatic attitude towards the matter. 109 
 Nevertheless, all the classical arguments of political theory were brought to bear. 
 Montesquieu was omnipresent in the arguments of both camps, turning the question 
into a  debate over the character of the Belgians and its compatibility to either form 
of  state . Interestingly, both parties agreed that the question of hereditary leadership 
was a fairly technical one. Above all, the Constitution needed to make sure that the 
 nation governed itself. The arguments used in the  debate were mainly of a practical 
nature and centered on the question which form of  state would most benefi t the 
 nation’s interests as well as befi t the character of its inhabitants. 110 They did not, 
however, touch on the underlying principles of the Constitution. 
 These principles were, many speakers agreed,  republican . 111 This meant, accord-
ing to their own terminology: far-reaching personal liberties, self-government (in 
the sense of lawmaking by the representatives of the people) and the responsibility 
of government to  Parliament . 112 To this end it was considered essential that all pow-
ers rest on the agreement of the people. In other words, as in the quote by  Nothomb , 
the people was considered  sovereign . There was a consensus in the  Congress that 
the new Constitution needed to contain all the elements which had for so long been 
called for by the Belgian opposition against William  I , and which would ensure the 
government’s subordination to the will of the  people : ministerial  responsibility , 
 inviolability ,  countersignature , the yearly voting of the  budget , etcetera. 113 
 Moreover,  republican and  monarchist speakers alike conceded that, except for 
 inviolability and ministerial  responsibility , this system could work under a  monarch 
as well as under a president. 114 In his infl uential treatise on royal power of 1830, 
later member of the Constitutional  Commission and prime minister Joseph  Lebeau 
107  Gilissen ,  Le caractère collégial , 88;  Nothomb ,  Essai , 78. 
108  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, 184–260. 
109  Hymans,  Le congrès national , 34;  Magits ,  De Volksraad ; Molitor,  La fonction royale en 
Belgique , 16. 
110  De Dijn, In overeenstemming met onze zeden en gewoonten. De intellectuele context van de 
eerste Belgische constitutie (1815–1830). 
111  Nothomb ,  Essai , 306; 428. 
112  Banning defi nes self-government as “le gouvernement du pays par ses mandataires directs”, 
identifying it with the legislative work of the chambers. Banning, Histoire parlementaire depuis 
1830, 475. 
113  De  Smaele , Eclectisch en toch nieuw, 409; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 
61. 
114  Barthélemy ,  Des gouvernements passés et du gouvernement à créer ; Harris, European 
Liberalism, 512; Jennings, Conceptions of England and its Constitution in Nineteenth-century 
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had already remarked that only heredity and  inviolability distinguished kingship 
from presidency. 115 What counted for Lebeau was that the political order enshrined 
liberty, regardless of the exact form that order took. He considered the English mon-
archs the only ones to have fully understood this, since, discarding any non- 
constitutional  legitimation of their power, they fully bowed to the  will of the nation. 
 The  republican priest Désiré de  Haerne admonished his fellow delegates that a 
constitutional  monarchy was nothing but a republic in disguise. It would prove 
unstable, since a monarch would not sit easy with the  sovereignty of the people 
upon which the system was based. He found it wiser therefore to declare a republic 
straight away:
 (…) il ne s’agit pas de balancer les avantages et les désavantages des deux systèmes de 
gouvernement; il s’agit de savoir si nous pouvons nous tenir à une monarchie  constitution-
nelle  représentative, qui n’est qu’une république déguisée, puisqu’elle est basée sur la sou-
veraineté du peuple. (…) Un roi  inviolable est un souverain en présence du peuple 
souverain. 116 
 Many speakers agreed that the days of the European monarchies were numbered. 
In time, they expected the  republican  form of  state to gain all of them, including 
Belgium. However, such times were not believed to be yet upon them. 117 
 Whereas the  republican  delegates warned against the struggle for power that was 
to result from the cohabitation of popular  sovereignty and monarchy, the majority 
believed that the two could coexist in harmony. Since sovereignty was safely vested 
in the  nation , a hereditary head of the executive did not threaten the ‘republican’ 
essence of the Constitution. Indeed, the expression ‘republican monarchy’, attrib-
uted to  Lafayette , was repeatedly used to describe the compromise:
 Wannaar : “Alors nous aurons les formes républicaines compatibles avec l’hérédité du chef; 
tous l’ont dit à cette tribune; ce sera la monarchie républicaine”. 118 
Alexandre  Rodenbach : “Je vote en faveur d’une monarchie républicaine (…), parce que 
sous un pareil gouvernement le peuple marche avec sécurité entre deux précipices, l’abus 
du pouvoir et l’excès de la liberté”. 119 
French Political Thought, 72; Nicolet,  L’idée républicaine en France. Essai d’histoire critique , 
407;  Stengers ,  L’action du Roi , 14. 
115  Lebeau ,  Observations sur le pouvoir royal ou examen de quelques questions relatives aux droits 
de la couronne dans les Pays Bas , 9. 
116  “(…) this is not about balancing the advantages and disadvantages of the two systems of govern-
ment; this is about knowing whether we can stick to a constitutional, representative monarchy, 
which is nothing but a republic in disguise, because it is based on the sovereignty of the people. 
(…) An inviolable  King is a sovereign in the presence of the sovereign people”.  Huyttens , 
 Discussions, vol. 1, p. 216, 20/11/1830. 
117  De Dijn, In overeenstemming met onze zeden; De Lichtervelde, Introduction, 12. 
118  “Thus, the republican forms will be made compatible with the heredity of the chief; all present 
have reiterated this: it will be a republican monarchy”. Huyttens,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 222, 
20/11/1830. 
119  “I vote for a republican monarchy (…), because under such a government the people safely 
navigates between two abysses: abuse of power and excess of liberty”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 
1, p. 248, 22/11/1830. 
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Charles Vilain  XIIII : “Je me prononcerai, messieurs, en faveur de la monarchie constitu-
tionnelle, mais assise sur les bases les plus libérales, les plus populaires, les plus républic-
aines. Je rejette la république, parce que, rêve des âmes généreuses, elle me semble 
impraticable. Une république devrait être composée d’anges, et la société de l’an 1830 ne 
me paraît pas encore arrivée à la perfection angélique”. 120 
 In the end “la monarchie constitutionnelle représentative,  sous un chef hérédi-
taire” (“constitutional, representative monarchy, under a hereditary chief” ) was 
adopted by an overwhelming majority of 174 against 13. 121 
 Constitutional  monarchy was credited with the immense advantage of guarantee-
ing ‘ republican’ liberty without the accompanying instability. As  Wyvekens put it:
 (...) il  me paraît (…) démontré que sous la garantie d’une bonne constitution qui assure les 
droits et les devoirs de tous, nous jouirons de tous les avantages du système républicain sans 
avoir à craindre son instabilité. 122 
 Devaux , too, appreciated the combination of  republican liberty with the advan-
tages of stability and order, which he believed would result in an even greater degree 
of liberty:
 La monarchie constitutionnelle  représentative , telle que je l’entends, c’est la liberté de la 
république, avec un peu d’égalité de moins dans les formes, si l’on veut; mais aussi avec 
une immense garantie d’ordre, de stabilité, et par conséquent, en réalité, de liberté de plus 
dans les résultats. 123 
 A republican  system , it was feared, would entail continual power struggles 
between parties and ambitious individuals. Presidential  elections especially were 
dreaded.  Monarchist delegates depicted them as recurring moments of profound 
crisis. The passions and rivalries they unleashed threatened to undermine the state 
in its very existence. The choice for a  hereditary head of state would prevent these 
disorders, on the condition that its powers were clearly circumscribed by the 
Constitution. In  Destriveaux ’ words:
 Dans le pacte qui nous unira, rédigeons en lois de précaution les prévisions contre les dangers 
de l’hérédité, élevons un roi sur un trône national, donnons-lui d’une main la couronne et de 
l’autre l’acte qui enferme les conditions de son pouvoir et les garanties de nos libertés. 124 
120  “Gentlemen, I will pronounce in favor of the constitutional  monarchy , but based upon the most 
liberal, popular, republican foundations. I reject the republic, that dream of generous minds, 
because I think it is impracticable. A republic would need to be composed of angels, and society in 
1830 has not yet, I think, reached such angelic perfection”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 199, 
19/11/1830. 
121  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 259, 22/11/1830. 
122  “(...) I think (…) it has been proven that, under the protection of a good Constitution guarantee-
ing the rights and duties of all, we will enjoy all the advantages of a republican system without 
having to fear its instability”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 185, 19/11/1830. 
123  “Constitutional, representative  monarchy  as I understand it, means the liberty of the republic, 
with a little less equality in its forms maybe, but with an immense guarantee of order and stability, 
and consequently, with more liberty in its results”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 213, 
20/11/1830. 
124  “Let us, in the pact that will unite us, formulate the measures against the dangers of heredity as 
precautionary laws, let us raise a King on a national throne, let us give him in one hand the crown 
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 The proof of the  republican  foundations was that the  monarch received his  man-
date from the people via its representatives in  Congress . According to the  monar-
chist delegate  Leclercq , the essence of the system consisted in the people making its 
own laws, and in the power of the  monarch as the head of the  executive being clearly 
circumscribed by the Constitution and being subject to ministerial  responsibility :
 Qui fait les lois dans une monarchie constitutionnelle  représentative ? Des hommes élus par 
tous les citoyens que leur position sociale intéresse au maintien et aux progrès de l’ordre et 
de la prospérité générale; des hommes qui représentent tous les intérêts, et par eux la nation; 
des hommes qu’enchaînent des principes consacrés par la Constitution. (…) Qui exécute les 
lois sous ce gouvernement? Un chef héréditaire il est vrai, et ce chef peut être vicieux; mais 
de combien de barrières ses vices ne seront-ils pas entourés? 125 
 Even when the head of state proved vicious, his vices were safely surrounded by 
unshakeable constitutional barriers. Another description of the system was provided 
by Viscount Hippolyte Vilain  XIIII in a brochure he published shortly before the 
meeting of the  Congress , to which he was subsequently elected. For Vilain  XIIII , 
constitutional  monarchies  were characterised by their combination of  republican 
 customs and monarchical calm. The vigilance of the Belgian people would make 
sure to remind the future  monarch of his duties laid down in the Constitution. Being 
the cornerstone of the whole edifi ce, it established a  contract  between the  sovereign 
people and himself:
 La monarchie constitutionnelle est là pour remplir ce but admirable, institution des sociétés 
modernes qui concilie la force des mœurs républicaines avec le calme et l’élégance des 
habitudes monarchiques, surtout quand par un pacte consacrant la  souveraineté du peuple, 
celui-ci trouve la garantie du  contrat , non dans les serments du chef héréditaire, mais dans 
la ligne impérieuse des devoirs que le souverain doit suivre, et dans l’énergie toujours 
prompte, toujours active des citoyens à la lui faire observer. (…) Le congrès national sera 
appelé avant tout à poser cette pierre angulaire de l’édifi ce; ce n’est qu’après la confection 
de la charte qu’on procèdera à l’élection du chef (…). Toute souveraineté émane du peuple; 
ce principe doit être l’intitulé de la nouvelle loi, plus de droit  divin , plus de loi octroyée, 
plus de légitimité en dehors de la  volonté nationale. Tel est le pacte constitutio[n]nel ainsi 
que nous le concevons entre le peuple Belge et son futur souverain. 126 
and in the other the charter containing the conditions of his power and the guarantees of our lib-
erty”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 199, 19/11/1830. 
125  “Who makes the laws in a constitutional, representative  monarchy ? Men elected by all the citi-
zens whose social position gives them an interest in the maintenance and the progress of order and 
in general prosperity; men who represent all interests, and by these the nation; men who are bound 
by the principles consecrated by the Constitution. (…) Who executes the laws under such a gov-
ernment? A hereditary chief, it is true, and this chief may be vicious; but think of all the barriers 
that will surround his vices!”  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 185, 19/11/1830. 
126  “Constitutional  monarchy is there to fulfi l that admirable goal, that institution of modern societ-
ies which reconciles the power of republican manners with the calm and elegance of monarchical 
customs. Especially so when, by a pact consecrating the  sovereignty of the people, the latter fi nds 
the guarantee of the contract not in the  oath taken by the hereditary chief, but in the imperious line 
of duties which the monarch must follow, and in the ever prompt and active energy of the citizens 
to make him respect it. (…) The National  Congress will, before anything else, be called upon to lay 
this cornerstone of the building; only after the confection of the charter will we proceed to elect a 
chief (…). All sovereignty emanates from the people, this principle must be the title of the new 
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2.7  The King-Magistrate 
 Once the choice for the form of  state was made, a candidate for the throne needed 
to be found. The quest for a  king was harder than foreseen. Contrary to most of its 
constituent deliberations, the  Congress’s choice for a monarch heavily depended on 
the opinion of the  European powers. 127 Initially, the Prince of  Orange seemed to 
stand a good chance. However, due to the growing animosity against the House of 
Nassau, the  Congress voted the perpetual exclusion of that dynasty. 128 In early 
February 1831, it presented the Belgian crown to the Duke of  Nemours , a son of 
Louis- Philippe . 129 The latter declined the offer under the pressure of international 
diplomacy, which agitated against an expansion of France’s sphere of infl uence. 130 
The  Constitution had in the meantime been adopted on the 7th of February 131 and 
proclaimed on the 11th, with the name of the future  King provisionally left blank. 132 
 The function of head of state was entrusted to a  Regent in the person of Baron 
Erasme-Louis Surlet de  Chokier , who had until that time acted as president of the 
Congress. 133 The  Constitution came into force on 25 February, the day of the 
 Regent’s taking of the constitutional  oath . 134 Surlet de  Chokier  prudently respected 
his pledge of allegiance to the representatives of the nation, up to the point of being 
accused of indecisiveness. 135 Just like the laws issued by the National  Congress , his 
decrees were promulgated ‘in the name of the Belgian people’. He regularly stressed 
that all the powers he held emanated from the ‘sovereign Congress’, as in a procla-
mation of 6 July 1831:
 Elle [l’assemblée] seule représente la nation; elle seule a le droit de donner des lois au pays. 
C’est du Congrès que je tiens mes pouvoirs, et je ne les ai reçus que pour faire exécuter les 
lois. Si je manquais à ce devoir, je violerais et mon mandat et mes sermens. 136 
law, no more divine right, no more granted law, no more  legitimacy outside of the national will”. 
Such is the constitutional pact, as we conceive it, between the Belgian people and its future sover-
eign”. Vilain  XIIII , Appel au Congrès, par un ami de la patrie. For the author, see: Van Kalken, 
Vilain XIIII (Charles-Hippolyte, vicomte). 
127  Magits,  De Volksraad , xxxii;  Witte ,  De constructie, 79. 
128  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 319, 23/11/1830. 
129  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 455, 03/02/1831. 
130  Fishman,  Diplomacy and Revolution. The London Conference of 1830 and the Belgian Revolt , 
105;  Witte ,  De constructie, 79. 
131  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 488, 07/02/1831;  Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement 
Provisoire de la Belgique no. 14, p. 175, 07/02/1831. 
132  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 502, 07/02/1831. 
133  François, Surlet de Chokier, Erasme, Louis. 
134  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 592, 25/02/1831;  Bulletin des arrêtés et actes du Gouvernement 
Provisoire de la Belgique no. 16, p. 228, 25/02/1831. Except the legislative and constituent  powers 
 and the competence to appoint the head of state, which remained in the hands of the Congress. 
135  Witte , De Belgische radicalen, 17. 
136  “(…) Only she [the assembly] represents the Nation; only she has the right to give laws to the 
land. I hold my powers from the Congress and I have only received them to execute its laws. If I 
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 Thus, the  Constitution was fully operative several months before Leopold of 
Saxe- Coburg was elected  King . His candidature was agreed to on the condition of 
his full acceptance of the Constitution drawn up by the  Congress .  Le  Courrier 
commented:
 Pour porter tous les fruits que nous avons droit d’en attendre, notre révolution doit monter 
sur le trône du premier roi des Belges, et s’y asseoir intacte à côté de lui. 137 
 Newspapers tellingly referred to the monarch as the “ King -magistrate” or “the 
supreme magistrate”. 138 Some even feared that it would be hard to fi nd a candidate 
for the throne who was willing to accept so many limitations to royal power, espe-
cially when he descended from any of the ancient royal dynasties:
 Le rejeton d’une famille souveraine qui règne par le droit de naissance, à travers une longue 
série de générations, serait mal assis sur un trône grossièrement refaçonné par les mains 
révolutionnaires du people 139 ; Qui sait si un roi est possible dans la vaste démocratie que le 
congrès organise? (…) Qui sait si un prince quelconque se soutiendra sur le trône nominal 
que le congrès lui élève? 140 
 Leopold indeed only grudgingly accepted the Constitution. To the  Congress del-
egation that came to offer him the crown, he replied:
 Messieurs, vous avez rudement traité la royauté, qui n’était pas là pour se défendre. Votre 
charte est bien démocratique; cependant, je crois qu’en y mettant de la bonne volonté de 
part et d’autre, on peut encore marcher. 141 
would fail to meet this duty, I would violate both my  mandate  and my oaths”.  Courrier de la Meuse 
no. 161, 07/07/1831. 
137  “In order to bear all the fruits that we are entitled to expect from it, our revolution must mount 
the throne of the fi rst King of the Belgians, and take its seat there, next to him, undamaged”.  Le 
Courrier no. 120, 20/04/1831. 
138  Courrier de la Meuse no. 310, 25/12/1830;  Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 343, 09/12/1830;  Le 
Courrier no. 104, 01/05/1831. In the French  Constitution of 1791 , the term ‘premier fonctionnaire 
public’ was used.  Wigny ,  Droit constitutionnel, 222. 
139  “The scion of a sovereign family that has reigned by right of birth, through a long series of 
generations, would sit uneasily on a throne so grossly refashioned by the hands of a revolutionary 
people”.  Le Courrier no. 25, 25/01/1831. 
140  “Who knows whether a  King is possible in the vast democracy organised by the Congress? (…) 
Who knows whether a prince will sustain himself on the nominal throne erected for him by the 
Congress?”  Le Courrier no. 15, 15/01/1831. See also  Le  Courrier de la Meuse no. 310, 25/12/1830: 
“La crainte du despotisme des rois (…) fera triompher la république dans toutes les institutions 
importantes. La monarchie ne sera qu’un mot, et la république sera un fait. Et par conséquent, on 
pourra se demander aujourd’hui si l’on trouvera pour un pareil royaume un prince grande proprié-
taire et généralement respecté? A bien envisager la chose, cette dignité, quoique déclarée hérédi-
taire, ne doit pas tenter beaucoup; car cette prétendue hérédité n’aveuglera aucun homme sensé”. 
141  “Gentlemen, you have rudely treated royalty, which was not there to defend itself. Your charter 
is democratic indeed; nonetheless, I think that, with some goodwill on both sides, it can still work”. 
Molitor,  Réfl exions sur la fonction royale , 14. It seems that these initial hopes were soon dissi-
pated, for in 1842 he wrote to his niece,  Queen Victoria : “A herd of mad  democrats , in the absence 
of anything or anyone representing a government, fabricated in 1830 a Constitution in which they 
collected every means hitherto invented to render government, whatever be its name, next to 
impossible”.  Stengers ,  L’action du Roi , 26. 
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 Leopold , who on a later occasion called the Belgian institutions “quasi- 
republican” , fully realised that the  Constitution was not based on the monarchical 
 principle . 142 The inauguration ceremony on the Brussels Place Royale on 21 July 
1831 was organised around  Leopold’s public taking of the  oath . Upon his arrival in 
Brussels, he was greeted by mayor Nicolas Rouppe as the “elect of the nation” and 
reminded of his due respect for the Constitution:
 Elu de la nation, prince magnanime, venez prendre possession du trône où vous appellent 
les acclamations unanimes d’un peuple libre. Vous maintiendrez, Sire, notre charte et nos 
immunités. 143 
 In his inaugural speech,  Leopold emphasised the popular origin of the  Constitution 
and the power which had created it:
 Cette constitution émane entièrement de vous, et cette circonstance, due à la position où 
s’est trouvé le pays, me paraît heureuse. Elle a éloigné des collisions qui pouvaient s’élever 
entre divers pouvoirs et altérer l’harmonie qui doit régner entre eux. 144 
 After  Leopold ’s taking of the  oath in the hands of the president of the  Congress , 
the delegates retreated to their assembly hall in order to conclude their fi nal session. 
In his closing speech, president De  Gerlache stressed the popular origin of the 
power held by the newly appointed  King :
 Vous avez une charte, un gouvernement régulier, un roi, un roi légitime de par le peuple, et 
certes il est permis de croire qu’ici la voix du peuple est encore la voix de Dieu! 145 
 De  Gerlache ’s formulation of the voice of the people as the ultimate source of 
 legitimacy was quoted in the article covering the events of 21 July in the offi cial 
 newspaper  Moniteur belge .  Leopold was not only said to have recognised the prin-
ciples of the Belgian  Revolution , but also to incarnate it in his person:
 La Révolution avait adopté Léopold;  Léopold adopte à son tour la  révolution ; il n’en renie 
aucun principe, aucune conséquence. Elle s’est faite homme en lui. Il n’y a là ni droit  divin , 
ni quasi-légitimité; toutes les fi ctions tombent devant la réalité. 146 
142  Stengers ,  L’action du Roi , 28. 
143  “Elect of the  nation , magnanimous prince, come and take possession of the throne to which you 
are called by the unanimous acclamations of a free people. You will, Sire, maintain our charter and 
our immunities”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 3, p. 615, 21/07/1831. 
144  “This Constitution emanates entirely from you, and this circumstance, which is due to the posi-
tion in which the country found itself, is, I think, a happy one. It has averted potential collisions 
between the various powers which would alter the harmony that must reign between them”. 
 Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 3, p. 619, 21/07/1831. 
145  “You have a Constitution, a regular government, a King; a King who is  legitimate because of the 
people, and it can certainly be imagined that in this, the voice of the people is the voice of God!” 
 Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 3, p. 622, 21/07/1831. 
146  “The Revolution had adopted  Leopold ; Leopold in turn adopts the Revolution; he renounces 
neither its principle nor its consequences. In him, it takes form. There is neither divine right, nor 
quasi- legitimacy ; all these fi ctions succumb before reality”.  Moniteur belge no. 37, 22/07/1831. 
The  Moniteur was created as offi cial  newspaper on 16 June 1831. Els  Witte ,  De Moniteur belge, 
de regering en het parlement tijdens het unionisme, 1831–1845 . 
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 On  Leopold ’s arrival in Belgium,  Le  Courrier wrote:
 Que  Léopold , en mettant le pied sur le rivage de sa nouvelle patrie, se dépouille de ce qui 
pourrait rester encore au fond de ses souvenirs de préjugés gothiques, d’infl uences 
étrangères: qu’il prenne la ferme résolution de ne jamais renier son origine, le peuple, qui 
seul l’a fait roi. (…) Qu’il se rappelle surtout qu’en se rendant en Belgique, il vient sanc-
tionner une révolution. 147 
 Le  Belge wrote:
 (…) il faut aussi que le prince, que le choix du congrès appela à régner sur nous, se pénètre 
de la grande vérité si souvent répétée et presque toujours inutilement: les rois sont faits pour 
les peuples, et non les peuples pour les rois. 148 
2.8  The Constitutional Powers of the King 
 Given the arguments above, it can safely be said that ‘ nation’ in  article 25 of the 
Belgian  Constitution does not refer to any kind of compromise between royal and 
popular power, but instead expresses the exclusively popular origin of sovereignty. 
The  mandate  of the  King rested on the  popular will, thus relegating his role in the 
Belgian constitutional edifi ce to that of a  pouvoir constitué . However,  article 25 
clearly distinguishes the origin of sovereignty from its exercise: “They [the powers] 
are exercised in the manner established by the Constitution”. Although the  Nation is 
the sole source of sovereignty, it does not exercise it in its entirety. The sovereign 
powers are delegated to a series of bodies which exercise them in the way estab-
lished by the Constitution. The question of the constitutional powers of the  King 
must therefore be distinguished from their origin. 
 The role and functions of the monarch were extensively debated in the  Congress 
when the issue of the form of  state came to the fore. The  debates  were strongly 
pervaded by the spirit of Benjamin  Constant . Paraphrasing the second chapter of his 
 Principes de politique ,  monarchist speakers described the monarch as a neutral 
power, whose task it was to moderate between the other powers so as to guarantee 
their harmonious collaboration. To be sure, the delegates reinterpreted  Constant’s 
147  “May Leopold, on setting foot on the shores of his new fatherland, shake off every trace that 
could possibly remain in the depths of his memories of those gothic prejudices, of foreign infl u-
ences; may he take the fi rm resolution never to renounce his origin: the people, which alone has 
made him King. (…) May he particularly remember that, in coming to Belgium, he comes to sanc-
tion a Revolution”.  Le Courrier no. 197, 16/07/1831. 
148  “(…) the Prince, called to reign over us by the choice of the Congress, must enshrine this great 
truth, which has so many times been repeated, but almost always in vain: Kings are made for the 
people, and not the other way around”. Pinheiro- Ferreira traces the quote back to  Vattel : Vattel and 
Pinheiro-Ferreira,  Le droit des gens, p. 480.  Le Belge no. 288, 15/10/1830.  Le Belge was a  liberal 
 oppositional  newspaper with  radical tendencies, based in Brussels. Its editor, Adolphe  Levae , was 
a sympathizer of Louis de  Potter , who also published in it. Harsin,  Essai sur l’opinion publique, 
29,  Witte , Het natiebegrip, 225; Wouters, De Brusselse radikale pers in de eerste roes van de onaf-
hanklijkheid (1830–1844), 141. 
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theory rather freely, since he himself had intended his neutral monarch as a fourth 
power, ‘fl oating above the others’, whilst the executive  power was entrusted to a 
separate body. 149 
 While the delegates saw no wrong in putting both the  executive and ‘neutral’ 
powers in the hands of the  King , they strongly insisted on his moderating role. 150 He 
was not to act on any power of his own, but he had to intervene in the actions of the 
other  powers when the interests of the nation required it. For him to be able to do so, 
the heredity principle was considered an essential prerequisite. It was often repeated 
that, in order to survive, every state organisation must contain elements of both 
movement and stability. The permanent character of royal power was necessary to 
counterbalance the volatility and changeability of the elected  chambers , since insta-
bility was harmful to the State. The most comprehensive argumentation of this kind 
was provided by  Nothomb :
 Il y a stabilité dès qu’il existe au centre de l’ordre politique un pouvoir qui se perpétue de 
lui-même et qui échappe à toutes les vicissitudes humaines. (…) Le pouvoir qui se main-
tient par l’hérédité et  l’inviolabilité n’est qu’un pouvoir modérateur. La souveraineté se 
compose de la volonté et de l’exécution. La volonté est placée dans la représentation natio-
nale, l’exécution dans le ministère. Le pouvoir permanent infl ue sur la volonté par l’initiative 
et le  veto , et par la dissolution de la chambre élective; sur l’exécution par le choix des 
ministres et par le droit de grâce. Il n’a pas d’action proprement dite, mais il provoque ou 
empêche l’action de tous les autres pouvoirs qui, autour de lui, se créent ou se renouvellent 
par l’élection. 151 
 Defi ning ‘will’ and ‘execution’ as the component parts of sovereignty,  Nothomb 
placed the fi rst in the  Parliament and the second in the  ministry . The  King or ‘per-
manent power’ was in a position to infl uence both via his  prerogatives , without 
however having a terrain of action of his own. Thus, the monarch was granted a 
share in  sovereignty , but exclusively by delegation, and on the conditions stipulated 
by the  nation and listed in the Constitution. The same idea underlies the intervention 
of De Theux de Meylandt, who spoke of:
 (...) une dynastie qui sera de notre choix, qui ne sera appelée à la souveraineté que lorsque 
nous aurons établi une constitution éminemment libérale, et lorsque nous aurons complété 
toutes les lois organiques de cette constitution. 152 
149  Constant ,  Principes de politique, 40. 
150  E.g. the intervention by  Forgeur : “Le chef de l’État n’aura qu’un pouvoir neutre; il rectifi era 
l’action de tous les pouvoirs. L’exécution sera dans le ministère; si le ministère est inhabile, il sera 
privé des moyens de gouvernement”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 226, 20/11/1830. 
151  “There is stability when in the center of the political order exists a power which perpetuates 
itself and which escapes all human vicissitudes. (…) The power which maintains itself through 
heredity and  inviolability  is only a moderating power. Sovereignty is composed of will and action. 
The will is placed in the national representation, the execution in the ministry. The permanent 
power infl uences the will through the initiative and the veto, and through the dissolution of the 
elected Chamber; the execution through the choice of the ministers and the right of pardon. He 
doesn’t really act himself, but he provokes or prevents the action of the other powers around him 
which are created or renewed via  election ”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 193, 19/11/1830. 
152  “(...) a dynasty which will be of our own choice, and which will only be called to sovereignty 
after we will have established an eminently liberal Constitution, and after we will have completed 
all the organic laws of this Constitution”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 1, p. 224, 20/11/1830. 
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 Nonetheless, the  monarch’s constitutional  powers were extensive. Alongside 
being part of the legislative  power (art. 26), heading the executive (art. 29) and dis-
posing of the absolute legislative veto (art. 69) and the right to dissolve  Parliament 
(art. 71), his  prerogatives included the command of the armed forces, the rights to 
declare war and conclude treaties and the rights of pardon and coinage (art. 68). He 
furthermore appointed the ministers as well as a range of civil servants and judges 
(art. 65, 66, 99, 101) and created  nobility (art. 75). Moreover, the  Constitution 
granted the King a share in constituent  sovereignty in the case of  constitutional revi-
sion (art. 131). When the sitting  chambers declared a number of articles subject to 
revision, Parliament was dissolved and new  elections ensued. The new chambers 
decided on the  revision in common agreement with the King. 153 This arrangement is 
consistent with the argumentation of the Central  Section concerning the royal  veto 
for normal  legislation . If it was feared that a  Parliament hostile to the  King might 
attempt to threaten the latter’s constitutional position through legislative initiatives, 
the same was a fortiori true for a constituent  assembly . 
 It was however impossible for the  monarch to use these powers autonomously. 
Except for the ‘passive’ use of the royal  veto and the appointment and dismissal of 
ministers, all of his actions were subject to ministerial  responsibility through the 
obligatory  countersign . As  Lebeau put it:
 La royauté, en effet, n’est pas, à proprement parler, un pouvoir. Comment dire qu’il y ait 
pouvoir, lorsque toute faculté d’agir est interdite sans l’assentiment d’autrui? Telle est la 
position de la couronne, assujettie qu’elle est par le contreseing à la volonté du conseil. 154 
 Lebeau went on to say that the Council of Ministers itself was controlled by the 
 Parliament . Even if few speakers went as far as  Lebeau , it is clear from the  debates 
 that the  King was expected to act in accordance with the will of  Parliament . For the 
delegates, the ultimate guarantee for aligning the monarch’s conduct with the 
national  will  was the yearly vote over the  budget . Time and again they testifi ed to 
their belief that the budget was Parliament’s key to controlling the government. 
 Lebeau for example used the argument to cut down the discussion over the royal 
 prerogatives . To Van  Meenen ’s insistent demand for a constitutional clause forbid-
ding the monarch to conclude treaties that risked to fi nancially burden the State, 
 Lebeau replied:
153  Pierre Wigny’s objection that the King cannot really refuse to sanction a constitutional  revision 
rests on evidence provided by Belgian political custom rather than by the provisions of the 
Constitution itself:  Wigny ,  Droit constitutionnel , 223; 618. 
154  “Indeed, royalty doesn’t really have any power. How can one say that it has power, when its 
every faculty of action is forbidden without the approval of someone else? That is the position of 
the Crown, subjected as it is, by the countersign, to the will of the council”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions , 
vol. 1, p. 208, 20/11/1830. 
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 C’est inutile, parce que les chambres votent le  budget , et que par conséquent on ne peut 
grever l’État sans leur assentiment; et quand le roi reconnaîtrait une dette de vingt millions, 
il ne pourrait en grever l’État, parce qu’on lui refuserait les subsides. 155 
 A similar remark was made by the Count  d’Arschot in reply to Le  Bègue ’s pro-
posal to abolish the royal  prerogative  to declare war. Le  Bègue found this a too 
dangerous  prerogative  because it gave the  monarch the right to put the people’s lives 
at risk.  D’Arschot reminded him “that the vote over the army is annual, and that the 
 King consequently disposes as little of our lives as he disposes of our pennies”. 156 
 Lebeau predicted a  parliamentary system in which the vote over the  budget came 
down to a vote of confi dence over the cabinet:
 La chambre, une fois composée, confi rme, modifi e ou renvoie le ministère, selon le degré 
de confi ance ou de défi ance qu’il lui inspire. La chambre élective, ouvrant et fermant à 
volonté la bourse des contribuables, tient dans sa main la destinée du cabinet; elle impose à 
la couronne ses exclusions et ses choix; elle élit donc en réalité, quoique indirectement, le 
ministère tout entier. Or, le ministère, ainsi élu ou confi rmé, ne peut vivre qu’à la condition 
d’administrer selon le vœu de la majorité de la chambre; c’est-à-dire selon le vœu du pays 
qu’elle est censée représenter. 157 
 The monarch’s only real action was the choice of ministers, but even that was 
imposed on him by the chambers. 
 One cannot fail to remark that the keystone of the system described by  Lebeau , 
the political responsibility of  ministers to  Parliament , was missing from the 
 Constitution . 158 Although the question wasn’t explicitly discussed, it is clear from 
 Lebeau ’s account that he considered it an unnecessary measure. In his view, the 
control over the  budget suffi ced to force the  King to take his ministers out of the 
 parliamentary  majority. By not inscribing the political responsibility of  ministers 
155  “It is useless, because the chambers vote the  budget , and consequently one cannot burden the 
State without their consent; and when the King would contract a debt of 20 million, he could not 
burden the State with it, because one would refuse to vote his subsidies”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, 
vol. 2, p. 77, 10/01/1831. 
156  “(…) le comte  d’Arschot rappelle que le vote sur l’armée est annuel et que, par conséquent, le 
roi ne dispose pas plus de nos vies que de nos écus”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 77, 
10/01/1831. 
157  “Once it will have been composed, the Chamber will confi rm, modify or dismiss the ministry, 
according to the degree of confi dence or distrust it inspires in it. The elective Chamber, opening or 
closing the taxpayers’ purse at will, holds the cabinet’s destiny in its hands. It imposes its exclu-
sions and its choices on the King; so that in reality it elects the whole ministry, be it indirectly. The 
ministry, being elected or confi rmed in this way, can only live on the condition of administering 
according to the will of the majority of the Chamber; in other words, according to the will of the 
country it must represent”.  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 208, 20/11/1830. 
158  Ganshof Van der Meersch, Des rapports entre le Chef de l’Etat et le gouvernement en droit 
constitutionnel belge, 183;  Gilissen , Die belgische Verfassung von 1831, 62; Koll, Belgien, 499. 
Articles 63 and 64 stipulated the juridical responsibility of  ministers , but not their political respon-
sibility to  Parliament . See:  Müβig , L’ouverture du mouvement constitutionnel, 499; Van Velzen, 
 De ongekende ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid. Theorie en praktijk, 1813–1840. This fact tends 
to be overlooked in accounts that attribute a pivotal position to the Belgian Constitution in the turn 
from constitutional to parliamentary  government . See for example: Luyten and Magnette, Het 
parlementarisme in België; Mirkine- Guetzévitch , L’histoire constitutionnelle comparée. 
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into the Constitution, the  Congress did however create ambiguity. Even if the limi-
tation of royal power in favour of the representatives of the people certainly was one 
of the Congress’s guiding principles, the  debates do not allow to assess to what 
extent  Lebeau ’s vision on  parliamentary government was shared by his colleagues. 
Further research is therefore needed. It is however certain that the realisation of this 
vision in practice came only much later. 
 Contrary to what some authors have concluded with hindsight on developments 
in the second half of the nineteenth century,  parliamentary  government didn’t mate-
rialise in the fi rst decades after the  Constitution’s promulgation. 159 True, from a very 
early stage  Leopold I took care to appoint ministers who enjoyed parliamentary 
support. As soon as 1833, after using his prerogative to dissolve the Chamber of 
 Representatives because it proved unable to form a government,  Leopold stipulated 
by decree that governments could only function when being supported by stable 
parliamentary majorities. 160 Nonetheless, the fi rst decades of  Leopold ’s reign have 
been characterised as “a semi- parliamentary  system with a monarchical 
counterpart” 161 or even a “monarchical constitutionalism with precedence for 
 Parliament ”. 162 Due to the unionist composition of cabinets (i.e. composed of min-
isters from both rivalling political blocs,  Catholic and  liberal , alike) and the absence 
of formal party organisations in this period, it was not exactly clear which parlia-
mentary majority they actually represented. 163 Belgium’s fi rst  King used the advan-
tage to strengthen his position vis-à-vis the  Parliament and to keep a fi rm grip on the 
 executive . 164 Only after 1857, when the last unionist alliance shattered, did the 
 King ’s infl uence on the government diminish. 165 Thus, the exact balance of  powers 
in the Belgian political order bore the mark of political custom as much as of con-
stitutional provisions. 166 
159  For examples of such accounts, see: Böckenförde, Der Verfassungstyp der deutschen konstitu-
tionellen Monarchie im 19. Jahrhundert; Fusilier,  Les monarchies parlementaires. Etudes sur les 
systèmes de gouvernement , 360; Mirkine- Guetzévitch , 1830 dans l’histoire constitutionnelle de 
l’Europe. 
160  Gilissen ,  Le régime représentatif , 114. 
161  Witte , De evolutie van de rol der partijen in het Belgische parlementaire regeringssysteem, 96. 
162  Kirsch, Monarch und Parlament im 19. Jahrhundert: der monarchische Konstitutionalismus als 
europäischer Verfassungstyp - Frankreich im Vergleich, 190. In 1918,  Errera remarked that the 
form of  state inscribed in the Constitution did not conform to political practice any more: “La 
monarchie belge est strictement parlementaire et non point seulement constitutionnelle et  représen-
tative ”.  Errera ,  Traité du droit public belge , 116. Parliamentarism developed over time, resting on 
political custom as much as on constitutional provisions. See also:  Müβig , L’ouverture du mouve-
ment constitutionnel, 515. 
163  De  Smaele , Politieke partijen in de Kamer, 1830–1914. 
164  Senelle judges that  Leopold , despite faithfully respecting the letter of the Constitution, mani-
festly overstepped the limits of the role intended for him by the Congress. Senelle, Le monarque 
constitutionnel en Belgique, 56. 
165  Van den Wijngaert et al.,  België en zijn koningen. Monarchie & macht, 165 . 
166  For the evolution of this balance over time, see:  Stengers ,  L’action du Roi en Belgique depuis 
1831: pouvoir et infl uence ; Van den Wijngaert et al.,  België en zijn koningen. 
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3  National or Popular Sovereignty? 
3.1  A False Opposition 
 In spite of its underdetermined formulation,  article 25 can thus safely be said to 
proclaim national  sovereignty in the sense of  sovereignty from below. 167 This did 
not, however, avert the dangerous ambiguity pointed at by  Grenier at the beginning 
of this chapter. Although it may have been clear to all that the  nation was the ulti-
mate source of  legitimacy and that the members of  Parliament represented it (at the 
exclusion of the  King ), the  article did not specify of whom the sovereign  nation was 
composed, nor who was entitled to membership.  Grenier ’s warning bespeaks his 
fear of a narrow, elitist interpretation of the concept of  nation , as foreshadowed by 
the composition of the  Congress itself:
 (…) le Congrès ne représente que ceux qui l’ont nommé; c’est-à-dire, la propriété notable, 
quelques professions libérales et le corps du clergé. Il s’ensuit que le Congrès, bien qu’il 
n’agisse entièrement que dans l’intérêt de la nation, ne représente point la nation, mais les 
notabilités seulement. Tous les citoyens n’ont pas concouru à son élection. 168 
 With his remark,  Grenier laid bare the thorny issue of the distinction between 
 popular and national  sovereignty . It is surprising how little attention has been given 
to this  semantic question, especially given the almost complete lack of  debate in the 
 Congress over  article 25. At no point in its lengthy deliberations did the Congress 
take care to defi ne the central concept on which in grounded the  legitimacy of its 
existence as well as of its primary legacy, the  Constitution . Whether the undisputed 
acceptance of this notion must be seen as a sign of a commonly shared understand-
ing about its meaning among the delegates, or whether the vagueness of the term 
conveniently cloaked fundamental disagreement, or whether the pressing circum-
stances of the  Revolution simply did not allow enough time for profound theoretical 
refl ection, remains a matter of debate. What is sure is that it has facilitated the 
development of diverging interpretations over time. 
 Today’s constitutional  manuals are unambiguous over the  meaning of ‘ nation ’ in 
the Belgian  Constitution . For André  Alen , it is: “an abstract, indivisible collectivity 
comprising the citizens of the past, the present and the future”. 169 John  Gilissen , 
while admitting that the term didn’t have a fi xed meaning in the political science of 
the time,  defi nes it as “a community of people who want to live together” but not 
coinciding with the members of that community. 170 Pierre  Wigny calls it “collective 
being to which a political organisation has given a juridical unity which expresses 
167  De  Smaele ,  Omdat we uwe vrienden zijn , 30. 
168  “The Congress represents only those who have constitued it; in other words: landed property, 
some liberal professions and the clergy. It follows that the Congress, although it entirely acts in the 
interest of the  nation , doesn’t represent the nation but only the notables. Not all citizens have con-
tributed to its  election ”.  Grenier ,  Examen du projet de constitution. 
169 Alen ,  Treatise on Belgian Constitutional Law, 11. 
170  Gilissen ,  Le régime représentatif , 13. 
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itself by a personality distinct from the one of each of its members”. 171 In every case 
the  nation is defi ned as a collective, abstract being transcending the concrete com-
munity of people. Their unanimity is deceiving however, for the cited  defi nitions 
are of much later origin than the Constitution. Upon careful inspection, they cannot 
be traced back to the time of the Constitution’s  formation or to the years immedi-
ately following it. Constitutional  manuals and comments from the fi rst decades after 
the  Constitution’s promulgation offer very diverging  interpretations  of the meaning 
of  article 25. 
 The oldest constitutional  manual , the  Manuel constitutionnel de la Belgique pub-
lished in April 1831, proclaimed:
 (...) cet  article établit la souveraineté du peuple que la République française proclama la 
première (…). La  légitimité  divine (la grâce de Dieu) des rois a disparu devant la  volonté , la 
 force et  l’union des peuples. 172 
 The  liberal university professor Antoine  Becart wrote in 1848:
 Le peuple est souverain, car il est l’objet de la souveraineté, mais s’il est la raison de tout ce 
qui se fait, il ne doit pas en être l’auteur lui-même: tout doit se faire pour lui mais non par 
lui. Donc la souveraineté ne réside pas réellement dans le peuple. 173 
 Jean  Stecher in his  Onpartydige volkshistorie des Belgische grondwet (“Impartial 
national history of the Belgian  Constitution ” ) of 1851 wrote:
 Het Bestuer bezit geene andere magte dan diegene, welke het Volk hem heeft toevertrouwd. 
Het Volk, als soeverein, is de oorsprong aller staetsmagten. In den maetschappelyken kring 
is de volksmagt boven alles – behalve boven God. 174 
 The same stance was taken in a  liberally inspired article published in the  Catholic 
 Journal  historique et  littéraire in 1852. It called the people  sovereign and defi ned 
the  nation as:
 l’ensemble des membres dont la société se compose dans un Etat, c’est la réunion de tous 
les individus. Les individus meurent et sont remplacés par d’autres individus; la nation ne 
meurt pas, elle ne fait que se renouveler sans cesse. 175 
171  Wigny ,  Droit constitutionnel , 224. 
172  “(...) this  article established the sovereignty of the people, fi rst proclaimed by the French 
Republic (…). The divine  legitimacy (the grace of God) of kings has disappeared before the will, 
the power and the union of the people”. N.N.,  Manuel constitutionnel de la Belgique , 40. 
173  “The people is sovereign because it is the object of sovereignty. But, despite being the reason of 
all that is done, it mustn’t itself be the author of it: all must be done for it but not by it. So  sover-
eignty doesn’t really reside in the people”.  Le Progrès belge no. 8, 23/07/1848. 
174  “The Government has no other powers that those it has been entrusted with by the people. The 
people, being the sovereign, is the source of all powers of state. In society, the power of the people 
is superior to everything except God”.  Stecher ,  Onpartydige volkshistorie des Belgische grondwet , 
15. 
175  “(…) the whole of all the members of which society is composed in a State; it is the reunion of 
all individuals. The individuals die and are replaced by other individuals; the nation doesn’t die, it 
perpetually rejuvenates itself”. Kersten, De la Constitution belge et de l’infl uence qu’elle exerce 
sur l’esprit et les mœurs, 86. 
National Sovereignty in the Belgian Constitution of 1831. On the Meaning(s) of Article 25
128
 A somewhat less popular interpretation was defended by Hippolyte-Jérôme 
 Wyvekens , who in his  Notions élémentaires sur la Constitution belge et les lois 
politiques et  administratives (“Elementary notions on the Belgian Constitution and 
the political and administrative laws”) of 1854, wrote:
 Le gouvernement de la Belgique est constitutionnel, monarchique, représentatif. La souver-
aineté y est partagée entre le Roi, les représentants du peuple et les tribunaux, de la manière 
fi xée par la Constitution. (…) Tous les pouvoirs émanent de la nation: l’exercice en est 
conféré au Roi, aux représentants du peuple et aux tribunaux. 176 
 In his  Manuel  des institutions constitutionnelles & administratives, des droits et 
des devoirs des belges of 1856 , the historian A.  Docquier  defi ned  the  Nation as:
 (...) la totalité des hommes réunis en un même Etat (…). Ils forment un peuple lorsqu’ils ont 
la même origine ou la même langue. 177 
 Docquier continued by calling Belgium’s  Constitution a mixed government 
because it contained element of  democracy , monarchy and oligarchy. Later in the 
century, a very different sound was heard in the work of  Masson and  Wiliquet 
(1883):
 Le gouvernement de la Belgique est essentiellement démocratique, la Constitution le 
déclare nettement: tous les pouvoirs émanent de la nation (Const. 25). L’institution de la 
royauté elle-même, qui n’a conservé de la royauté d’autrefois que la majesté, le respect, la 
grandeur, est essentiellement populaire: c’est la nation qui a conféré l’autorité royale à 
Leopold de Saxe- Cobourg ; c’est par sa volonté solennellement proclamée en 1831, que 
cette autorité est héréditaire. 178 
 The cited works can hardly be said to be unanimous about the  meaning  of  nation 
and national  sovereignty . More importantly, many other constitutional  manuals and 
comments simply chose not to  defi ne  these concepts at all, confi ning themselves to 
repeating the vague formula of  article 25. Clearly, the nineteenth-century interpret-
ers of the Belgian  Constitution could not fall back on a generally accepted standard 
formula of national  sovereignty . The diversity of their writings disclaims the exis-
tence of a common theoretical concept of  nation shared by all the parties involved, 
176  “The Belgian government is constitutional, monarchical, representative.  Sovereignty is divided 
between the King, the representatives of the people and the tribunals, in the way fi xed by the 
Constitution. (…) All the powers emanate from the nation: their exercise is attributed to the  King , 
the representative of the people and the tribunals”.  Wyvekens ,  Notions élémentaires sur la 
Constitution belge et les lois politiques et administratives, à l’usage des athénées, des écoles moy-
ennes et primaires et des aspirants aux emplois civils, 14–15. 
177  “(…) the totality of all men united in the same State (…). They constitute a people when they 
share the same origin and the same language”.  Docquier ,  Manuel des institutions constitution-
nelles & administratives, des droits et des devoirs des belges, ou principes du droit public et privé 
de la Belgique , 10. 
178  “The Belgian government is essentially democratic, the Constitution straightforwardly declares 
it: all the powers emanate from the Nation (Const. 25). The institution of royalty itself, which of 
the royalty of former times has only conserved its majesty, its respect, its grandeur, is essentially 
popular: it is the nation which has conferred royal authority to Leopold of Saxe- Coburg ; this 
authority is hereditary by its own will, solemnly proclaimed in 1831”.  Masson and  Wiliquet , 
 Manuel de droit constitutionnel , 39. 
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such as the one that is accepted by the leading constitutional  manuals  of today. The 
meaning of  article 25 has, instead, been a battlefi eld were authors of diverging polit-
ical persuasions met in an effort to ascertain who was entitled to membership of the 
 nation and, more importantly, to the exercise of political rights. 
 More is therefore at stake than simply a question of  defi nitions . Henk de  Smaele 
has shown that the presently accepted  interpretation  of national  sovereignty in the 
Belgian  Constitution  was only developed  post factum . It goes back to Carré de 
 Malberg ’s classical distinction between national and popular  sovereignty in his 
 Contribution à la théorie générale de l’État (1920–22). De  Smaele follows the lead 
of Guillaume  Bacot in arguing against the validity of this distinction when applied 
to the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. 179 Carré de 
 Malberg distinguished between two mutually exclusive conceptions of  sovereignty 
and traced them back to the works of  Rousseau and  Sieyès respectively. 180 Hence 
the well-known binary opposition still associated with these thinkers and concepts 
today: the  sovereignty of the concrete, physical people versus the sovereignty of an 
abstract, transcendent and ahistorical  nation ; political participation as a right versus 
a function; universal versus limited  suffrage ; the French  Constitution of 1793 versus 
the one of  1791 . 181 
 Bacot argues that Carré de  Malberg exaggerated the antithesis between the ideas 
of  Rousseau and  Sieyès . 182 According to him, the  meaning of the terms ‘nation’ and 
‘people’ was not at all fi xed in this period. Both were often used as synonyms, which 
counters the importance usually attributed to the choice of words in the  Constitutions 
of 1791 and  1793 .  Rousseau ’s and  Sieyès ’ conceptions of  sovereignty are further-
more obscured by the internal paradoxes characterising the writings of both think-
ers. It is not the aim of this chapter to take a stance in the debate.  Bacot ’s observations 
do prove helpful however for coming to terms with the underdetermined character 
of national  sovereignty in the Belgian  Constitution . 
 What is striking about the constitutional  manuals  and commentaries cited above, 
is that many explicitly  identifi ed  national  sovereignty with the sovereignty of the 
 people . In this they were consistent with the language employed in the National 
 Congress . When used in combination with ‘ sovereignty’ , the meaning of the terms 
‘ nation ’ and ‘people’ was interchangeable. Often both were alternately used by the 
same speaker, without entailing a change of meaning. Tellingly, in the offi cial Dutch 
version of the  Constitution , which had no legal force, ‘nation’ was translated as 
‘people’. Article  25  thus read: “Alle gezag komt van het volk” (“All the powers 
179  Bacot ,  Carré de Malberg ; De  Smaele ,  Omdat we uwe vrienden zijn. Roels too, despite his oth-
erwise faithful adherence to Carré de  Malberg , recognises that the latter exaggerated this distinc-
tion. Roels,  Le concept de représentation , 97. 
180  Bacot ,  Carré de Malberg , 7. 
181  Space does not allow to do justice to this complicated subject matter here. For more comprehen-
sive accounts, read: Baker, Constitution; Baker, Souveraineté; Brunet,  Vouloir pour la nation. Le 
concept de représentation dans la théorie de l’Etat ; Roels, Le concept de représentation; Deinet, 
The Development of the Constitutional Concepts in the First Part of 19th Century France. 
182  Bacot ,  Carré de Malberg. 
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emanate from the people”). 183 This use of language indicates that the creators of the 
Constitution of 1831 did not presuppose a theoretical difference between  national 
and popular sovereignty. In fact, they did not hesitate to call popular  sovereignty the 
guiding principle of the new constitutional system. When the priest Vander  Linden 
intervened against the proposed formulation of  article 25, his arguments were tell-
ingly directed against the  sovereignty of the people. 184 None of his colleagues con-
tradicted him. 
 Equally indicative is Etienne de  Gerlache ’s brochure  Essai sur le mouvement des 
partis en Belgique (“Essay on the movement of parties in Belgium”) of 1852, in 
which he fulminated against the popular  sovereignty enshrined in the Belgian 
 Constitution . De  Gerlache was not just anybody. He had been president of both the 
Constitutional  Commission and the National  Congress . His brochure was aimed 
against the new tendency of one party governments that put an end to almost two 
decades of unionism in Belgian politics. Most  Catholics deplored this evolution. 
They saw  parliamentarism as a threat to national unity and to the preservation of 
conservatism. 185 De  Gerlache ’s critique on popular  sovereignty was meant to dis-
credit  republicanism  in the French tradition:
 Le dogme de la souveraineté du  peuple , sur lequel reposent toutes nos théories constitution-
nelles, est gros de révolutions, inconciliable avec l’ordre et la paix, et avec tout Gouvernement 
régulier. C’est la plus détestable fl atterie, le plus insigne mensonge que les démagogues 
aient jamais pu jeter aux masses”. 186 
 Although his feelings about it had visibly changed, De  Gerlache thus recognised 
popular  sovereignty as the basis of the Belgian institutions, just as he had done in 
the closing speech he delivered in the  Congress’s fi nal session. In this speech, cited 
above, he insisted on the “voice of the people” as the Constitution’s ultimate source 
of  legitimacy . Marnix Beyen’s research into the use of political languages in 
 Parliament has furthermore shown that the reality of the principle of popular  sover-
eignty was generally accepted by the Belgian political parties in the nineteenth cen-
tury. In parliamentary debates, the concept was referred to in a positive way, lending 
legitimacy to the arguments it was associated to. 187 All of this is rather hard to 
183  Recueil des décrets du Congrès national de la Belgique et des arrêtés du pouvoir exécutif , 4th 
series, vol. 2, 135. Likewise, the French name of the Congress’s assembly hall,  Palais de la Nation 
(“Palace of the Nation”), was translated into Dutch as  Volkshuys (“House of the People”). 
184  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 2, p. 14, 03/01/1831. 
185  De  Smaele , Politieke partijen in de Kamer, 147; Witte, De evolutie van de rol der partijen in het 
Belgische parlementaire regeringssysteem; Van den Wijngaert,  België en zijn koningen , 162. 
186  “The dogma of popular  sovereignty , on which all our constitutional theories rest, is full of revo-
lutions and irreconcilable with order and peace, and with every regular government. It is the most 
detestable, the most extraordinary lie ever thrown at the masses by the demagogues”. De  Gerlache , 
 Essai sur le mouvement des partis depuis 1830 jusqu’à ce jour, 65. In his history of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands of 1859 he wrote that the Belgian Constitution, as opposed to the Dutch 
Fundamental  Law , was dominated by “the popular principle”. De  Gerlache ,  Histoire du Royaume 
des Pays-Bas depuis 1814 jusqu’en 1830 , 317. 
187  In the debates of the Dutch Estates  General , the opposite was true. Beyen and Te Velde, Modern 
Parliaments in the Low Countries . 
B. Deseure
131
 reconcile with the antithesis between  national and popular  sovereignty that is sup-
posed to have existed at the time of the Constitution’s creation. 
3.2  The Limitation of Political Participation 
 De  Smaele classifi es the application of the absolute distinction between  popular and 
national  sovereignty to the  Constitution of 1831 as part of the ‘liberal myth’ by 
which liberal  politicians have, later in the nineteenth century, canonised their  rein-
terpretation  of  article 25. 188 As they grew conscious of the  radical potential of the 
formulation of the  article and its roots in the French republican  tradition , they theo-
rised a concept of national  sovereignty distinct from the idea of popular  sovereignty . 
In doing so, they relied heavily on the works of the French doctrinal  liberals , who 
had successfully developed a liberal interpretation of sovereignty that precluded 
popular political participation. 189 Liberty, according to this tradition, mainly con-
sisted of personal, administrative liberties without automatically supposing political 
rights. 190 
 The Belgian  Constitution was indeed famed for the ‘catalogue of liberties’ it 
contained and which were an important object of political propaganda fostered by 
the political elites. 191 Political rights were presented as a different thing altogether. 
Since the  nation was conceived of as impersonal and trans-historical, citizenship by 
no means automatically implied entitlement to political participation. 192 The func-
tion of representing the nation could safely be delegated to that part of the popula-
tion which by its socioeconomic situation was most suited to the task. The exact 
turning point in the constitutional  interpretations  is as yet unascertained, but it must 
in all likelihood be sought in the second half of the nineteenth century and possibly 
even towards the end of the century. 193 In any case, our analysis confi rms that apply-
ing Carré de  Malberg ’s ‘liberal’ defi nition of national  sovereignty to the  Constitution 
of 1831 amounts to an anachronistic reading of it. 
 In the National  Congress there was no trace of a theoretical distinction between 
both kinds of  sovereignty . However, counting few disciples of  Rousseau , the assem-
bly evidently shared  Sieyès ’ concern for the limitation of political participation. 
188  De  Smaele , Eclectisch en toch nieuw. 
189  Demoulin, Le courant libéral. 
190  Bacot ,  Carré de Malberg , 131; Brunet,  Vouloir pour la nation , 33; Collins,  Liberalism in 
Nineteenth-century Europe, 8; Jennings, Conceptions of England;  Marteel ,  Inventing the Belgian 
Revolution , 151. 
191  Huygebaert, Les quatres libertés cardinales. De iconologie van pers, onderwijs, vereniging en 
geloof in België, als uitdrukking van een populariserende grondwetscultus vanaf 1848; Janssens, 
 De Belgische natie viert. De Belgische nationale feesten, 1830–1914 ;  Marteel ,  Inventing the 
Belgian Revolution. 
192  Brunet,  Vouloir pour la nation , 31. 
193  De  Smaele , Eclectisch en toch nieuw, 413. 
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Along with  Montesquieu , the political scientist most cited in its midst was Benjamin 
 Constant , who himself was infl uenced by  Sieyès . 194 His ‘English’ system, with its 
checks and balances, its limited  suffrage and pluralistic vision of politics, appealed 
greatly to the founders of the Belgian  Constitution. 195 Nevertheless,  Constant explic-
itly recognised that the French  Acte Additionnel of 1815 was based, and could only 
be based, on the  sovereignty of the people:
 Notre Constitution actuelle reconnaît formellement le principe de la  souveraineté du peu-
ple, c’est-à-dire la suprématie de la volonté  générale sur toute volonté particulière. 196 
 At the same time,  Constant agreed with  Sieyès that the people must by necessity 
delegate the exercise of  sovereignty to its representatives, so that direct  democracy 
was out of the question. 197 Also, both considered the restriction of  suffrage to a part 
of the population as an obvious necessity. 
 In other words, in the language of political theory of the day, and contrary to later 
interpretations, popular  sovereignty did not equate to universal  suffrage . The same 
is evidently true for the Belgian National  Congress . It seems logical to assume that 
the lack of  debate over the theoretical nature of  sovereignty in the Congress refl ected, 
among other things, a tacit common opinion over its practical manifestation. After 
all,  article 25 merely indicated the nation as the  source of sovereignty, leaving open 
every option as to the modalities of political participation. It is true that all its talk 
of popular  sovereignty did not prevent the  Congress from carefully restricting polit-
ical rights. Not a single call for universal  suffrage was heard in the assembly room. 198 
Even delegates from the  republican left, like  Seron , explicitly rejected it. 199 Despite 
his former Jacobinism –  Seron had been secretary to Georges  Danton – he denounced 
the anarchy inherent in systems of ‘pure  democracy’ . 200 The conservative,  Catholic 
 newspapers  Courrier de la Meuse , protesting against the proclamation of popular 
 sovereignty in the Constitution, accused the  liberals of inconsistency:
 Nos confrères libéraux eux-mêmes n’exigent pas de notre part un aussi grand sacrifi ce; que 
disons-nous? Eux-mêmes reculent devant la démocratie pure, et personne d’entr’eux ne 
demande ni ne songe à établir le  suffrage universel. 201 
194  Idem, 31;  Gilissen , Die belgische Verfassung von 1831, 59;  Marteel , Polemieken over 
natievorming, 45. 
195  Gilissen ,  Le régime représentatif , 11; Van Velzen, De invloed van de theorie van Benjamin 
Constant op het regime van koning Willem I, 42. 
196  “Our present Constitution enshrines the principle of the sovereignty of the people, that is the 
supremacy of the collective will over any private wishes.”  Constant ,  Principes de politique, 13. 
197  Hoogers,  De verbeelding van het souvereine. Een onderzoek naar de theoretische grondslagen 
van politieke representatie , 143. 
198  Gilissen ,  Le régime représentatif , 90. 
199  Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 32. For Seron, see: Discailles, Seron 
(Pierre-Guillaume). 
200  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1, p. 198, 19/11/1830. 
201  “Even our liberal colleagues do not demand such a sacrifi ce from us. They themselves shrink 
from pure democracy, and not one of them either asks for nor thinks of establishing universal suf-
frage”.  Courrier de la Meuse no. 1, 01/01/1831. 
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 Much as the National  Congress recognised the people as the source of all  legiti-
mate authority, it had no intentions of letting the voice of the people dictate politics. 
The Congress was a socially conservative body. 202 Almost 75 % of the members 
belonged to the moneyed  bourgeoisie ; the remaining 25 % consisted of  nobles . The 
delegates held clear views on who was to represent the  nation and who was not. In 
the words of Joseph Forgeur:
 La meilleure des garanties à demander aux électeurs, c’est le payement d’un cens qui 
représente une fortune, une position sociale, afi n qu’ils soient intéressés au bien-être et à la 
prospérité de la société. 203 
 The Constitutional  Commission had proposed to fi x the property requirements 
for the franchise by ordinary law. Delegate Eugène  Defacqz , however, successfully 
proposed to include these requirements in the Constitution itself, so as to ensure 
their permanent character.  Defacqz even motivated his proposal by a concern to 
stave off calls for universal  suffrage in the future. By the introduction of direct  elec-
tion , the  nation would fi nally have real representatives (as opposed to the indirectly 
elected members of the Estates  General under the Dutch regime). This did not mean 
however that the whole nation was called to the urns:
 Cependant la nation ne peut pas concourir directement et en entier à l’élection, car quelque 
beau, quelque séduisant que fût le spectacle d’un peuple concourant tout entier à l’élection 
de ses mandataires, nous savons malheureusement que cela est impossible. 204 
 Joseph  Forgeur agreed and warned his colleagues that the whole constitutional 
edifi ce depended on immutable franchise requirements:
 (…) si vous n’avez pas dans la constitution une disposition qui fi xe le cens électoral, comme 
c’est là-dessus que repose tout l’édifi ce constitutionnel, il se pourrait que les législatures à 
venir, en le modifi ant, renversassent tout votre ouvrage. 205 
 The resulting census  suffrage  requirements inscribed in the  Constitution were 
higher even than under the preceding Dutch regime. 206 Capacity  suffrage , which had 
been allowed for the  election of the  Congress itself, was abolished under the pre-
tense that it created privilege. Property requirements for the  Senate were so high 
that only a group of about 400 landowners, most of them  aristocrats , was 
eligible. 207 
202  De Lichtervelde,  Le Congrès National de 1830, 64;  Magits , De  Volksraad , 272. 
203  Huyttens ,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 29, 06/01/1831. 
204  “But the nation cannot in its entirety and directly participate in the election.  However beautiful, 
however seductive the spectacle of an entire people participating in the election of its representa-
tives may be, unfortunately we all know that it is impossible”. Huyttens,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 28, 
06/01/1831. 
205  “(…) if you don’t include in the Constitution a stipulation fi xing the census suffrage require-
ments, for on them rests the entire constitutional edifi ce, future legislatures may, by changing it, 
overturn your entire work”. Huyttens,  Discussions, vol. 2, p. 29, 06/01/1831. 
206  Witte,  De constructie , 87. 
207  Stevens, Een belangrijke faze, 658. 
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 The  debates  of the  Congress do not allow to distill a distinct picture of the  nation 
as it existed in the minds of the delegates. This was all the more so because in ques-
tions of  sovereignty , the  nation and the people were treated as synonyms. If the 
nation was indeed conceived of as an entity different from the concrete people, that 
difference was not put into  words . What is clear, however, is that the idea of limited 
 suffrage was not considered to contradict the  sovereignty of the nation or the peo-
ple.  Suffrage had by necessity to be delegated to a portion of the population that 
could speak for the whole. In this sense, the principle of representation operated not 
only on the level of the Chamber of  Representatives , but also on that of the electors. 
The limitation of political participation was inherent to it, if only for pragmatic 
reasons. 
4  Reception 
4.1  The Contested Nature of Popular  Sovereignty 
 The  newspapers too, agreed on the meaning of  article 25. Regardless of their politi-
cal inclination, they interpreted it as the proclamation of popular  sovereignty . The 
anti-democratic, conservative  Courrier  de la  Meuse called it “(…) le principe de la 
souveraineté populaire absolue, lequel vient d’être nettement posé dans la 
constitution”. 208 The  radical  Le  Belge wrote:
 C’est dans le peuple que réside aujourd’hui la souveraineté. Cette souveraineté il l’exerce 
par ses représentans. Tout pouvoir, toute société qui voudrait décider nos grandes questions 
avant que le peuple n’ait eu le temps de se prononcer par l’organe de ses représentans, 
attenterait véritablement à la souveraineté nationale. 209 
 The  radical  Courrier de la Sambre  defi ned  nation as:
 (...) une réunion d’hommes qui s’associent pour tout ce qui concerne la garantie des leurs 
intérêts privés et communs: de ce fait il découle nécessairement qu’à eux seuls appartient le 
droit de déterminer le mode le plus avantageux et le moins onéreux de parvenir à ce but. 210 
208  “The principle of absolute popular sovereignty, which has been clearly enshrined in the 
Constitution”.  Courrier de la Meuse no. 6, 07/01/1831. 
209  “Sovereignty nowadays resides in the people. It exercises this sovereignty by way of its repre-
sentatives. Every power, every society wishing to decide our great questions before the people has 
had time to pronounce via its representatives, would veritably be attacking national sovereignty”. 
 Le Belge no. 287, 14/10/1830. 
210  “A nation is nothing but a reunion of men who associate for everything which concerns the 
guarantee of their private and communal interests. It necessarily follows that the right to determine 
the most advantageous and least onerous way to obtain this goal, exclusively belongs to them”. 
 Courrier de la Sambre no. 189, 20/11/1830. The  Courrier de la Sambre was the mouthpiece of the 
liberal, constitutional opposition in Namur. Its editors were involved in the  radical  club  Réunion 
patriotique de Namur, the reports of which it published. See: Doyen,  Bibliographie namuroise, no. 
1764; Dulieu,  Namur 1830: une fringale de liberté ; Fivet,  Le Pays de Namur et la Révolution de 
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 The  liberal  Courrier des Pays-Bas  very literally identifi ed the  nation with the 
people:
 Deux êtres qui n’étaient au fond que le même, sous deux modes différens d’existence: la 
nation, c’est-à-dire, tout le peuple; et la représentation nationale, c’est-à-dire, le peuple 
encore, mais agissant sous une forme convenue, pour se faciliter à lui-même l’exercice de 
sa  volonté . 211 
 Elsewhere the  newspaper jubilantly exclaimed:
 Qu’elle est noble, majestueuse, imposante, l’assemblée qui remplit l’auguste mission de 
fonder les institutions politiques d’un peuple libre! Son existence est la preuve la plus 
éclatante, la plus solennelle que la  souveraineté est dans le peuple, source et origine de tout 
pouvoir social. Qu’on vienne, en présence du congrès belge, nous persuader que les rois 
tiennent leur pouvoir directement de Dieu, et non pas de la volonté des peuples; qu’on 
vienne, en présence des débris de la couronne de Guillaume 1 er , nous dire que l’insurrection 
n’est pas l’acte extrême, mais légitime, de la souveraineté national outragée. 212 
 The  radical  L’Emancipation wrote that  sovereignty by necessity resided in the 
 nation and equated it with popular  sovereignty . 213 These fi ndings are consistent with 
Els  Witte ’s research into the concept of  nation used in the period directly preceding 
the Belgian  Revolution . Via  discourse analysis methods she concluded that, although 
the term ‘nation’ was used more often in Belgian  newspapers than ‘people’, the 
former concept was positively associated with popular  sovereignty . 214 
1830: récit des événements ; Istace-Deprez, Le Courrier de la Sambre et la Révolution de 1830; 
Warnotte,  Etude sur la presse à Namur, 1794–1914 , 127. 
211  “Two beings which were essentially the same, under two different forms of existence: the 
nation, in other words the people; and the national representation, in other words, the people again, 
but acting in an agreed-upon form, to facilitate the exercise of its will”.  Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 
321, 17/11/1830. The  Courrier des Pays-Bas , based in Brussels, was one of the leading liberal and 
anticlerical  newspapers of the opposition against the regime of William I. Among its collaborators 
were prominent revolutionary leaders, several of whom rose to political power in the course of the 
Revolution: Louis de  Potter , Edouard  Ducpétiaux , Alexandre  Gendebien , Lucien  Jottrand , Jean-
Baptiste  Nothomb , Jean-François  Tielemans , Pierre Van  Meenen . On 1 January 1831, the title of 
the  newspaper changed into  Le Courrier .  Gilissen , Jean-Baptiste Nothomb, 6; Harsin,  Essai sur 
l’opinion publique, 29;  Witte , De Belgische radicalen, 16; Wouters, De Brusselse radikale pers, 
139. 
212  “How noble, how majestic, how imposing is the assembly, fulfi lling its august mission of found-
ing the political institutions of a free  people ! Its existence is the most solemn, the most brilliant 
proof of the sovereignty of the people, the source and origin of all social power. Who will, in the 
presence of the Belgian Congress, persuade us that kings hold their powers directly from God, and 
not from the will of peoples? Who will, in the presence of the debris of William I’s crown, tell us 
that insurrection is anything else than an extreme, but legitimate act of injured national sover-
eignty?”  Le Courrier no. 34, 03/02/1831. 
213  L’Emancipation no. 34, 23/11/1830.  L’Emancipation , based in Brussels, was a  radical  newspa-
per sponsored by French republican émigrés. Its contributors moved in the circles of radical think-
ers and revolutionaries such as  Buonarroti and De  Potter . Its principle editor was the republican 
delegate to the National Congress De  Robaulx . Kuypers,  Les égalitaires en Belgique. Buonarroti 
et ses sociétés secrètes d’après des documents inédits (1824–1836) ; Leconte, La Réunion centrale; 
Wouters, De Brusselse radikale pers, 141–142. 
214  Witte , Het natiebegrip. 
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 In the  newspapers  under investigation,  popular and national  sovereignty were 
treated as exact synonyms. The  newspapers systematically contrasted popular  sov-
ereignty with Old  Regime royal  sovereignty and divine  right . Whether they sup-
ported or rejected the principle, they presented its proclamation in Belgium in a 
historical perspective. The Belgian  Revolution was depicted as yet another phase in 
the fi ght to the death which had been going on between both conceptions of  sover-
eignty since  1789 . The Belgians were said to have been inspired by the French July 
 Revolution , and to have taken it further by explicitly ruling out the last traces of 
monarchical  sovereignty : “Après ce principe, l’origine du pouvoir a été déplacé; elle 
n’a plus sa source dans la dynastie, mais dans la nation”. 215 
 However, the exact  meaning of popular  sovereignty was a source of controversy. 
The concept was explicitly discussed by journalists and led to sharp disputes 
between rival  newspapers . The  Courrier de la Meuse , while supporting the 
 Revolution , deplored the course taken by the Congress. While it recognised that the 
Revolution had been driven by the popular principle, it fi ercely opposed turning it 
into a principle of government. The  newspaper considered it a dangerous concept, 
since it was unfi t to serve as the basis of a stable government:
 (…) si on veut combattre effi cacement le despotisme populaire, le despotisme des partis, la 
tyrannie des tribuns et des anarchistes, non seulement il n’est pas nécessaire, d’admettre le 
principe de la  souveraineté du peuple , mais il est même très dangereux de l’admettre. (…) 
Malheur à nous, malheur au pays si notre nouvelle charte consacrait ce principe funeste! Ce 
serait le germe de sa mort, et par conséquent la cause de nouveaux bouleversements. Un 
gouvernement quelconque  fondé sur ce principe , n’a que la force brute pour se 
défendre. 216 
 What the  newspaper feared above all was the reign of the populace:
 (…) la  souveraineté des rues, souveraineté terrible, brusque, aveugle, sourde, cruelle et 
inexorable. (…) cette souveraineté monstrueuse qui parcourt les rues une torche à la main 
et qui ne vit que des désordres. 217 
 Following the  newspaper , the principle of popular  sovereignty was not only dan-
gerous, but also impracticable. It endorsed the  Journal des Flandres ’ description of 
the principle as “an absurd and chimeric supposition” since it considered it impos-
sible to fully realise. 218 In every human society, the exercise of power is by necessity 
delegated to a fraction of the population. Whichever political regime would be 
215  “By this principle, the origin of power has shifted, it is no longer in the dynasty but in the 
nation”.  Le Courrier no. 139, 19/05/1831. 
216  “(…) when wishing effectively to combat popular despotism, the despotism of parties, the tyr-
anny of tribunes and anarchists, it is not only unnecessary to admit the principle of popular sover-
eignty, but it is even very dangerous to do so. (…) Woe to us, woe to the country, should our new 
charter consecrate this fatal principle! It will be the seed of its death, and consequently the cause 
of new upheavals. Any government founded on this principle has nothing but brute force to defend 
itself”.  Courrier de la Meuse no. 262, 29/10/1830. 
217  “(….) the sovereignty of the streets, which is a terrible, sudden, blind, deaf, cruel and inexorable 
sovereignty. (…) this monstrous sovereignty which roams the streets torch in hand and which lives 
from disorders only”.  Courrier de la Meuse no. 169, 15/07/1831. 
218  Courrier de la Meuse no. 271, 10/11/1830. 
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instated by the  Constitution , it would never fully conform to the implications of 
 article 25. Therefore new revolts, followed by new failed attempts at popular gov-
ernments, were unavoidable:
 Vouloir que ces faits [the establishment of a new government] aient lieu véritablement en 
vertu de la souveraineté du peuple, c’est vouloir l’impossible, c’est vouloir ce qui ne s’est 
jamais vu. (…) c’est vouloir tous les jours une nouvelle révolution, c’est vouloir anéantir la 
société. (…) il faut, de toute nécessité, qu’il y ait un pouvoir souverain et ce pouvoir sou-
verain sera toujours, quoi qu’on fasse et quoi qu’on veuille, celui d’un ou de plusieurs 
individus, celui d’un ou de plusieurs corporations. 219 
 The  newspaper arrived at this conclusion by its identifi cation of  sovereignty with 
the actual exercise of power. While it did approve of the idea that every power 
needed to rest on the consent of popular opinion, it rejected as impossible the idea 
of entrusting the exercise of power to the entire people. This would require a distri-
bution of power among all citizens, which meant its annihilation altogether. In every 
society, power is held by a limited group of people who command, while the rest of 
the population obeys. Only the holders of power can truly be called  sovereign : “(…) 
car toute souveraineté est absolue en ce sens qu’elle décide en dernier ressort et que 
personne ne résiste”. 220 In line with the  newspaper ’s  Catholic and reactionary back-
ground, it defended the view that sovereignty emanates not from the people but 
from  God and that it should be vested in the powerful hands of a hierarchically 
constituted government, preferably of a monarchical kind. The  newspaper went on 
to observe that even the National  Congress , by its own composition, contravened 
the popular  principle it so proudly proclaimed. Far from taking its  mandate from the 
hands of the entire people, it took it from the infi nitesimal minority that had been 
allowed to vote. Without the introduction of universal  suffrage , to which even the 
 liberals objected, power could not be said to really emanate from the  nation :
 Chez nous, la souveraineté appartiendra vraisemblablement désormais à un vaste collège 
d’électeurs, qui sera composé peut-être d’environ 50,000 membres; ce sera  une quatre- 
vingtième de la nation ; et les 79 autres 80 mes , seront nécessairement sujets. (…) jamais on 
ne pourra, et quand on le pourrait, jamais on n’oserait y placer la nation toute entière. 221 
 Liberal and  radical  newspapers contested the  Courrier de le  Meuse ’s critique on 
the concept of popular sovereignty.  Le Vrai Patriote accused it of confusing the 
219  “To wish that the establishment of a new government really takes place by virtue of the sover-
eignty of the people is to wish the impossible, is to wish something that has never been seen before. 
(…) it is to wish a new revolution every day, to wish the annihilation of society. (…) it is necessary 
to have a sovereign power and this sovereign power will always, despite what one does or wishes 
for, belong to one or several individuals, to one or several groups”.  Courrier de la Meuse no. 269, 
07/11/1830. 
220  “(…) because all sovereignty is absolute in the sense that it decides in last resort and that no one 
resists”.  Courrier de la Meuse no. 59, 10/03/1831. 
221  “Henceforward, sovereignty will probably belong to a vast college of electors, which will be 
composed of around 50,000 members; it will consist of one eightieth part of the nation, and the 
other 79 parts will by necessity consist of subjects. (…) never will one be able to place sovereignty 
in the hands of the entire people, nor would one dare to do so, if one were able to”.  Courrier de la 
Meuse no. 269, 07/11/1830. 
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origin and the exercise of power. It considered popular  sovereignty to be self- evident 
because a government only exists where a people exists, and a people always has the 
power to change its mandataries. However, this by no means implied the establish-
ment of pure  democracy . 222 The  radical  Courrier de la Sambre  likewise pointed out 
that the origin and the exercise of power were two different things. It furthermore 
argued that the formulation of  article 4 of the  draft Constitution (“emanates from” 
instead of “resides in”) clearly  implied government by representation, not direct 
 democracy . 223 The  liberal  Courrier des Pays  Bas held a similar view:
 Nous convenons que la  souveraineté est absolue. Mais la souveraineté n’est pas dans les 
pouvoirs; elle est dans la nation. Les pouvoirs, loin d’être souverains, sont liés par la con-
stitution, qui est le véritable acte de la souveraineté. Ils peuvent, je le sais, franchir les 
limites  constitutionnelles , mais dans ce cas il y a rébellion des pouvoirs contre la souver-
aineté nationale. 224 
 The point was that, even if  sovereignty was undividable, a careful balance of 
 powers could be built upon its base. Also, universal  suffrage was absolutely out of 
the question. Nonetheless, popular  sovereignty was a reality, because the people 
was the source of all powers. 225 
 The  Courrier de la Meuse could not be convinced. Its fears were made worse by 
the composition of the National  Congress , which it judged to be all too  democratic . 
Already  sovereignty was fatally divided among so many electors and so many 
Congress delegates. Furthermore, the new  Constitution accorded a far too prepon-
derant position to the Chamber of  Representatives , at the expense of the  monarch . 
Instead of monarchy, the  Congress had created a pure  democracy in disguise:
 Notre congrès s’est, à la vérité, d’abord décidé pour une monarchie constitutionnelle; mais 
des résolutions postérieures ont complètement détruit cette décision; et maintenant il est 
évident que nous ne pouvons avoir qu’une vraie démocratie. Le roi ou le duc que nous 
aurons ne fera rien à l’affaire. 226 
222  Le Vrai Patriote no. 29, 10/11/1830.  Le Vrai Patriote, based in Brussels, was the short-lived 
successor of the defunct Orangists  newspaper  Gazette des Pays-Bas . It systematically criticised the 
Provisional  Government and favoured the return of the Nassau dynasty. Wouters, De Brusselse 
radikale pers, 140. 
223  Courrier de la Sambre no. 189, 20/11/1830. 
224  “We agree that sovereignty is absolute. But sovereignty is not in the powers, it is in the nation. 
The powers, far from being sovereign, are bound by the Constitution, which is the veritable act of 
sovereignty. It is true that they can transgress the constitutional limits, but in that case there is 
rebellion of the powers against the national sovereignty”.  Le Courrier no. 64, 05/03/1831. 
225  However, the  newspaper expected universal suffrage to become a reality in the future, as the 
people, by its progressive enlightenment, would develop the necessary capacities: “En effet, 
quelque avantage qu’on attende de l’abaissement du cens électoral, et de l’abolition intégrale du 
cens d’éligibilité, il est évident que les législateurs futures, sortant d’une société moralement et 
politiquement progressive, étendront successivement le cercle des capacités électorale et élective, 
et le jour viendra où les masses populaires seront assez éclairées pour concourir, sans aucune 
exception, et sans danger, à l’élection des députés”.  Le Courrier no. 118, 28/04/1831. 
226  “At fi rst our Congress has, to be sure, decided for constitutional  monarchy ; but posterior resolu-
tions have completely destroyed this decision; and now it is evident that we can have nothing else 
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 The popular  principle was fated to cause the downfall of the  Constitution  which 
enshrined it:
 (…) nous ne pensons pas que ce que nous constitutions maintenant, soit pour l’avenir, c’est- 
à- dire, qu’il puisse durer. La charte à laquelle nous travaillons (nous croyons pouvoir le 
prédire) ne sera qu’une de ces constitutions éphémères dont le vieux et le nouveau monde 
ont vu des exemples par douzaines depuis une quarantaine d’années. 227 
 The controversy goes to show that, despite a general understanding that national 
 sovereignty , as enshrined in  article 25, was synonymous with popular  sovereignty , a 
widely shared  defi nition of it was not at hand. All parties agreed that the new prin-
ciple implied that all powers derived from below. They differed on the questions of 
the division of powers and the extent of political participation. 
4.2  Legal Order, Legitimate Representation and Political 
Participation 
 The question of who was entitled to represent the  nation was a cause for controversy 
from the very beginning. It directly concerned the  legitimacy of the  Revolution and 
the source of  sovereignty . At fi rst, the Belgian opposition had taken recourse to the 
Fundamental  Law for legitimising its claims. The years 1827-‘29 were marked by 
systematic attacks on the Dutch government, based on the real or supposed provi-
sions of the  Constitution of 1815. 228 It earned the Belgian opposition the nickname 
‘constitutionals’, as opposed to the ‘ministerials’ siding with the government. 229 The 
French  newspaper  Le Constitutionnel commented: “L’insurrection est décidemment 
nationale et constitutionnelle”. 230 The  Courrier des Pays-Bas encouraged the 
Belgian delegates to the Estates  General to persist in their “legal resistance” against 
“the  violations  of the Fundamental  Law ” and against the “anti-constitutional proj-
ects of the ministers”. 231 It confi rmed that what the opposition desired was respect 
for the will of the Fundamental  Law , and added: “Nous le répétons, nous ne sommes 
ni en révolution, ni en insurrection”. 232 
but a pure democracy. Our future King or Duke will change nothing to the fact”.  Courrier de la 
Meuse no. 6, 07/01/1831. 
227  “(…) we do not think that the thing we are currently constituting, will be the future, in other 
words, that it will last. The charter we are working on (we believe we can predict) will be but one 
of these ephemeral constitutions of which the old and the new world have seen scores of examples 
in the last forty years or so”.  Courrier de la Meuse no. 8, 09/01/1831. 
228  Cordewiener,  Etude de la presse liégeoise , 65; Harsin,  Essai sur l’opinion publique. 
229  Marteel , Polemieken over natievorming. 
230  “The insurrection is defi nitely national and constitutional”. Quoted in:  Courrier de la Sambre 
no. 140, 13/09/1830. 
231  Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 260, 17/09/1830. 
232  “We repeat that we are neither waging a revolution nor an insurrection”.  Courrier des Pays-Bas 
no. 244, 01/09/1830. 
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 Soon afterwards, however, a new  legitimation was needed. Violent actions in the 
streets of Brussels led to the creation of new forms of authority alongside the offi cial 
ones. As the Belgian protests started to resemble a proper rebellion, the government 
denounced them as illegal. In his Royal Message of 5 September, King  William 
announced that a debate over the grievances of the Belgian opposition could only be 
opened on the condition of the latter’s “return into the legal order”. 233 The opposi-
tion replied that the legal order, as it was meant by William, was tyrannical because 
it harmed the rights of the Belgian  Nation . The  Courrier des Pays-Bas 
commented:
 Nous ne sommes plus dans l’ordre légal tel que le ministère Van  Maanen l’avait organisé, 
parce que cet ordre légal était tyrannique pour nous, et ce prétendu ordre légal n’étant autre 
chose que l’oppression organisée et couverte d’un vernis de légalité, c’est lui qu’il faut 
modifi er et corriger. 234 
 It contested the legality of the existing order on account of its tyrannical charac-
ter and of the harm it caused to the Belgian  Nation : “Cet ordre, c’est l’oppression de 
le Belgique systématiquement organisée avec un faux semblant de légalité”. 235  Le 
Vrai  Patriote maintained that a people was free to choose a new leader when the 
social  contract was being  violated . 236 As the opposition left the legal order behind, 
the rights of the nation were increasingly being named as the only  legitimate source 
of authority. The  Courrier de la Sambre  wrote:
 Et qu’on ne dise pas qu’il faut le consentement des états-généraux; nous sommes aujourd’hui 
en dehors de l’ordre légal; toute mesure est légale en ce moment dès qu’elle a pour base 
l’assentiment de la nation. 237 
 Towards the end of September, Dutch troops violently clashed with an impro-
vised army of insurrectionists on the streets of Brussels, sparking general rebellion 
against the Dutch government. The killing of Belgian citizens by the Dutch troops 
was presented as a fi nal attack on the Belgian  Nation by which the Dutch govern-
ment forfeited its remaining claims to  legitimate authority.  Le Courrier  proclaimed 
233  Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 252, 09/09/1830. 
234  “We are no longer under the legal order organised by the Minister Van Maanen, because that 
legal order was tyrannical for us. Since it is nothing but organised oppression covered with a var-
nish of legality, this supposed legal order must be modifi ed and changed”.  Courrier des Pays-Bas 
no. 256, 13/09/1830. Cornelis Felix van  Maanen (1769–1846) was  William I’s Minister of Justice. 
As the driving force behind the press trials directed against prominent opposition members in the 
years preceding the Belgian Revolution, and as a staunch supporter of William’s autocratic style of 
government, he became the personifi cation of the ‘ministerial’ regime abhorred by the Belgian 
opposition. Van Sas, Het politiek bestel onder koning Willem I; Vermeersch, Willem I en de pers 
in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden, 1814–1830. 
235  “This order is the systematically organised oppression of Belgium with a fake semblance of 
legality”.  Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 260, 17/09/1830. 
236  Le Vrai Patriote no. 29, 10/11/1830. 
237  “Don’t tell us that we need the consent of the Estates  General . We are now outside of the legal 
order. Presently, every measure is legal as soon as it is founded on the approval of the nation”. 
 Courrier de la Sambre no. 137, 09/09/1830. 
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that the only  legitimate source of authority in the contemporary world was the peo-
ple’s right to self-determination:
 Aujourd’hui ce n’est pas le fait antérieur, ni les convenances de tel souverain qui peuvent 
autoriser sans leur consentement respectif la réunion de deux peuples en une seule famille 
politique. Le principe qui a triomphé en septembre est l’association consentie. (…) Le 
principe de l’association consentie, est aujourd’hui tellement inhérent au principe du gou-
vernement populaire, que le règne de la liberté ne pourra pas autrement s’établir en Europe, 
qu’en laissant à chaque peuple la faculté de s’unir à l’association politique qui est le plus 
conforme à ses vœux. 238 
 As Dutch authority was eroded, the Provisional  Government fi lled the void. 
From that moment on, respect for the old legal order needn’t concern the Belgians 
any more, the  newspapers  agreed.
 “(…) cette question a été résolue dans les journées de 23, 24, 25 et 26 septembre; c’est cette 
solution qu’il fallait solennellement faire connaître; c’est le seul titre du gouvernement 
provisoire; il y puise sa légitimité”. 239 
“La guerre a prononcé, c’est la légitimité de son mandat improvisé au milieu de la lutte”. 240 
“Secondons de tous nos efforts l’autorité naissante, autorité éminemment populaire et qui 
est avoué par la nation”. 241 
 The Provisional  Government ’s  mandate was considered  legitimate by its acting in 
the interest of the  nation . 242 The latter was said to have endorsed it by tacit 
agreement:
 “La nation qui ne pouvait agir par elle-même, laissait agir en son nom le gouvernement 
provisoire, tant que les circonstances le rendaient indispensable”. 243 
“Il arrive parfois que des hommes montent au pouvoir vacant sans élection directe et que le 
peuple les souffre sans répugnance manifeste. Le peuple les élit en ne le renversant pas. 
C’est la position de notre gouvernement provisoire. 244 
238  “Nowadays neither prior facts nor the liking of such or such sovereign can authorise, without 
their respective consents, the reunion of two peoples into one political family. The principle which 
has triumphed in September is that of consented association. (…) The principle of consented asso-
ciation is today so inherent to popular government that the reign of liberty cannot establish itself 
in Europe but by leaving each people the faculty to unite with the political association most con-
forming to its wishes”.  Le Courrier no. 173, 22/06/1831. 
239  “(…) this question has been answered during the days of 23, 24, 25 and 26 September; this solu-
tion had to be solemnly announced; it is the only title of the Provisional  Government ; it is the 
source of its  legitimacy ”.  Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 278, 05/10/1830. 
240  “War has pronounced, it is the  legitimacy of its  mandate improvised in the middle of the battle”. 
 Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 274, 01/10/1830. 
241  “Let us support with all our efforts the nascent authority. This eminently popular authority is 
avowed by the nation”.  Courrier de la Sambre no. 162, 11/10/1830. 
242  Gilissen,  Le régime représentatif , 80. 
243  “Not being able to act by itself, the nation let the Provisional  Government act in its name as long 
as the circumstances rendered it indispensable”.  Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 321, 17/11/1830. 
244  “It sometimes happens that men ascend to the vacant power without being directly elected and 
that the people tolerates them without manifest repugnance. The people elects them by not over-
throwing them. Such is the position of our present government”.  Le Vrai Patriote no. 29, 
10/11/1830. 
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 The Provisional  Government therefore  legitimately represented the nation until 
such time as the  nation was in a position to designate the representatives of its own 
choice:
 Le gouvernement  provisoire , comme seule représentation nationale d’alors, avait au nom de 
la nation et comme si c’eût été cette nation elle-même qui agissait, déterminé, pour une 
époque postérieure, une autre forme de représentation nationale. Cette nouvelle forme réali-
sée, la première était anéantie, à moins qu’on ne soutînt qu’il fût convenable que la nation 
fût représentée à la fois de deux manières. 245 
 The  newspapers thus endorsed De  Potter ’s  justifi cation of the Provisional 
 Government ’s actions presented in the opening session of the National  Congress . 
The argument was essential for the  legitimacy of the  mandate  of the  Congress itself. 
For if the Provisional  Government hadn’t legitimately represented the  nation , how 
could a body that had been single-handedly convened by its initiative be said to do 
so? At stake was the very origin of  sovereignty . In general, few observers outright 
rejected the  legitimation provided by the Provisional  Government for taking power. 
However, this sensitive question did now and then surface in the  press in the follow-
ing months, in particular when a  newspaper didn’t agree with the line taken by the 
Government or the Congress. 
 In its crusade against the principle of popular  sovereignty , the  Courrier de la 
Meuse  didn’t hesitate to qualify the Provisional  Government ’s claim to represent the 
people as pure fi ction:
 Deux cent hommes, choisis par quelques milliers de notables du pays, vont se réunir à 
Bruxelles; ils y vont exercer les droits de la souveraineté; de qui les tiennent-ils, ces droits? 
De nous électeurs; et nous électeurs, de qui tenons-nous les nôtres? Du gouvernement pro-
visoire; et le gouvernement provisoire ne tient les siens de personne, il les tient de 
lui-même. 246 
 The Provisional  Government could not by right claim to represent the  nation . 
Neither could the  Congress , since, as the Fundamental  Law had been abolished, it 
had been convened in the absence of a valid electoral law:
 La nécessité veut que les hommes qui vont décider de notre avenir, ne doivent leur droit de 
voter qu’à une simple ordonnance, émanée d’un pouvoir provisoire qui ne tient son mandat 
que de lui-même: nouvelle preuve de l’impossibilité d’appliquer au corps social le principe 
de la souveraineté du peuple. 247 
245  “Being the sole representative of the nation at that moment, the Provisional  Government had in 
the name of the nation, and as if through the action of the nation itself, determined for a later 
moment another form of national representation. As soon as that new form was realised, the fi rst 
one was nullifi ed, unless one had found it suitable for the nation to be represented in two ways at 
the same time”.  Courrier des Pays-Bas no. 321, 17/11/1830. 
246  “Two hundred men, chosen by a few thousand of the country’s notables, will unite in Brussels; 
there they will exercise the sovereign rights. But from whom do they take these rights? From us, 
the electors. But from whom do we, electors, take ours rights? From the Provisional  Government . 
And the Provisional Government doesn’t take them from anyone, it takes them from itself”. 
 Courrier de la Meuse no. 269, 07/11/1830. 
247  “By way of necessity, the men who are to decide over our future owe their right to vote to a 
simple ordinance, issued by a provisional power which took its  mandate  from itself only: another 
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 Whereas the  newspaper approved of the Provisional  Government ’s actions, it 
denied that its  mandate rested on popular or national  sovereignty . 
 Most  newspapers didn’t contest the Provisional  Government ’s popular  mandate 
though, and praised its members for their competent government. They did however 
show a measure of distrust towards this non-elected authority. The  mandate  of the 
Constitutional  Commission in particular was a matter of debate in the  press , just as 
it was in the  Congress .  Le Belge published a letter by Alphonse  Dujardin , who con-
tested the Commission’s right to present a  draft Constitution to the Congress, since 
only the latter represented the people:
 (…) car il n’appartient à aucun pouvoir, ni fraction de pouvoir, non seulement d’octroyer ou 
de concéder, mais même de proposer une constitution. 248 
 Whereas the Provisional  Government was considered to  legitimately exercise 
public authority in anticipation of the installation of a proper national representa-
tion, it was felt that drawing up a new Constitution, even when it was only a  draft 
version, should not be within its competence. To a great extent these critiques were 
motivated by a rejection of the conservative slant of the  draft Constitution, which 
was generally poorly received in the press. 249 
 The most  radical protest was indeed heard on the left side of the ideological 
spectrum. The conservative  Courrier de la Meuse signalled that many  democrats 
and  republicans had been disappointed by the property requirements for  suffrage of 
the constituent  elections :
 Le mécontentement fut même si grand que beaucoup d’entre ces derniers annoncèrent très- 
clairement qu’ils ne se croiraient pas liés par les décisions du congrès. 250 
 Since it had been elected by less than 1 % of the population, the  Congress was 
not considered by these people to truly represent the  nation . The  democratic  news-
paper  L’Emancipation blamed the Provisional  Government for its ‘unlawful’ intro-
duction of census  suffrage :
 Nous disions au gouvernement qu’il se fît dictateur pour le bien du pays. Il a abusé de ses 
pouvoirs pour dépouiller de leurs droits les neuf dixièmes de la nation. Il s’est privé de tous 
ceux-là surtout qui faisaient sa force et son appui. 251 
proof of the impossibility to apply to the social body the principle of popular sovereignty”. 
 Courrier de la Meuse no. 252, 17/10/1830. 
248  “(…) for it does not belong to any power, nor to any fraction of a power, not only to grant or to 
concede, but even to propose a Constitution”.  Le Belge no. 304, 31/10/1830. Dujardin further 
expounded his opinion in a separately published brochure:  Dujardin ,  La Belgique au 16 octobre 
1831 . See also:  Magits ,  De Volksraad , 354. 
249  Magits ,  De Volksraad , 354;  Nothomb ,  Essai , 78. 
250  “So discontented were they, that many of them publicly announced their conviction that they 
were not bound by the decisions of the Congress”.  Courrier de la Meuse no. 40, 16/02/1831. 
251  “We told the government to become dictatorial for the well-being of the country. It has abused 
its powers so as to rob nine tenths of the nation of its powers. It has especially discarded power 
from those who constituted its power and its support”.  L’Emancipation no. 15, 03/11/1830. 
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 The  Courrier de la Sambre  likewise protested against the ‘arbitrary’ and ‘absurd’ 
limitation of  suffrage introduced by the Provisional  Government , which in its view 
completely undermined the principle of national  sovereignty :
 Le congrès tient son mandat d’une petite fraction de la nation belge, mais cette petite frac-
tion ne tient le sien que du percepteur des contributions . 252 
 Very few  radicals  were elected to the  Congress , since most of their sympathisers 
did not have the vote. 253 The few of them that were involved in the Provisional 
 Government and the  Congress quickly realised that they belonged to an infi nitesi-
mal minority. 254 Jean-François  Tielemans quit the Constitutional  Commission when 
his colleagues decided to maintain the monarchy instead of establishing a  repub-
lic . 255 His friend and mentor Louis de  Potter stepped down from the Provisional 
 Government soon after the National  Congress ’s fi rst session. 256 He too found the 
 draft Constitution a far too conservative piece of work and slightingly commented: 
“Ce n’était pas la peine de verser tant de sang pour si peu de chose”. 257 Since his 
 republican and  democratic programme had no chance of being endorsed by those 
who had now come to power, he shifted his actions to other terrains. 
 Disappointment over the  suffrage requirements indeed prompted some  radicals 
 to dispute the  Congress’s aptitude to represent the  nation . 258 Typical examples of 
this line of reasoning are  Grenier ’s calling into question the  mandate  of the  Congress 
and  Toussaint’s threat of a new popular revolution against the institution of a  Senate 
(both cited above).  Radicals took their cue from  Rousseau in arguing that the  sover-
eignty needed to be shared by the whole nation, which they identifi ed as the physi-
cal people. They typically accused the government of depriving those who didn’t 
have the vote of their citizenship, as in a letter to the  Courrier  de la  Sambre signed 
by “un ex-citoyen à fl . 49,99 ¾” (“an ex-citizen” who fell short of the  suffrage 
requirements by less than one cent). 259 
252  “The Congress takes its  mandate from a small fraction of the Belgian nation, but that small frac-
tion takes its own from the tax collector only”.  Courrier de la Sambre no. 202, 26/11/1830. 
253  With Els  Witte , we count as  radicals  those who contested the social inequality upon which the 
power position of the  bourgeoisie was based. This heterogeneous group of people shared the com-
mon goal of striving for the introduction of democratic and social reforms, usually via parliamen-
tary action.  Witte ,  Politieke machtsstrijd , 349;  Witte , De Belgische radicalen;  Witte ,  De constructie 
van België , 109. For the radical  press , which was often of a republican persuasion, see: Vermeersch, 
De structuur van de Belgische pers, 1830–1848, 104–115 and Wouters, De Brusselse radikale pers. 
254  Witte , De Belgische radicalen, 16. 
255  Hymans,  Le Congrès national , 19; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 35. For 
 Tielemans , see: Freson, J.F. Tielemans; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 18–19. 
256  Witte ,  De constructie , 88. 
257  “There was no point in spilling so much blood for so little result”.  Nothomb ,  Essai , 98; Van den 
Steene,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 41. 
258  In the spring of 1831 the  radicals’  dissatisfaction culminated in a failed attempt at a democratic 
coup.  Witte , De Belgische radicalen, 17. 
259  Courrier de la Sambre no. 205, 29/11/1830. 
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 The  radical  club  Réunion centrale used the questionable representativeness of 
the Congress as an argument against the ‘reactionary’  draft Constitution of the 
 Commission , formally petitioning the Provisional  Government to substitute it with 
a new,  republican alternative:
 L’ordonnance électorale dictée par le même esprit, enlève à 9/10 des citoyens leurs droits 
civiques. Quand l’état se reconstitue, tout citoyen a le droit de concourir à la formation de 
la  constitution qui doit le régir. Si on lui refuse ce droit, il conserve celui de protester contre 
l’œuvre anti-populaire qu’une représentation manquée pourrait produire, ainsi que le droit 
d’exprimer ses vœux, et de déclarer ses volontés par une autre voie que celle dont il est 
 illégalement exclu. Ce droit, nous l’exerçons au nom du peuple, en vous faisant connaître 
qu’il regarde le projet de constitution comme indigne d’un peuple libre. 260 
 It predicted a new outbreak of revolutionary violence if the ‘tyrannical’  draft 
Constitution was put into force. The  Courrier  de la  Sambre put into doubt the man-
date of the  Congress on the same grounds. It did so in response to the  Congress’s 
decision in favour of a monarchical form of  state , whereas the majority of the peo-
ple, according to the  newspaper , desired a  republic :
 Tous les doutes devraient disparaître si les élections des membres du congrès eussent été 
plus populaires, si les neuf-dixièmes de la nation n’eussent pas été arbitrairement destitués 
de l’exercice de leurs droits politiques par le gouvernement provisoire. Mais, à la manière 
dont les choses ont été, il est bien permis à l’immense majorité du peuple de protester contre 
la décision de la  majorité d’une chambre qui ne représente que la  minorité. 261 
 L’Emancipation too, fi ercely attacked both the Constitutional  Commission and 
the National  Congress , neither of which, in its view, really represented the people. 
After vividly describing the Belgian  Revolution as the triumph of the people over 
the despotism of monarchs, it expressed its indignation over this fact:
 (…) que quelques hommes arriérés, stationnaires, d’une société qui n’est plus, que d’autres 
trop timides, trop faibles, trop craintifs pour être du siècle auquel ils appartiennent par leur 
âge, osent sans mandat vous présenter une constitution qui, sous d’autres formes, n’est que 
la loi  fondamentale que vous avait imposée Guillaume  le sanguinaire . (…) Ce congrès, 
nous l’appellerons impopulaire, déplorable, parce qu’il ne peut être l’expression du vœu 
général; le gouvernement provisoire ayant limité le droit électoral, droit que nul pouvoir, 
nulle puissance ne peut limiter, qui est inhérent au caractère du citoyen, et que dans une 
260  “The same spirit dictated the electoral regulation, which deprives 9/10 of the citizens of their 
civic rights. When a state is being reconstructed, every citizen has the right to contribute to the 
formation of the  Constitution  which is going to govern him. If he is being denied this right, he 
preserves the right to protest against the anti-popular piece of work which a failed representation 
may produce, as well as the right to express his wishes and to declare his will by another means 
than the one from which he has illegally been excluded. We exercise this right in the name of the 
people when we let you know that we consider the  draft Constitution unworthy of a free people”. 
 L’Emancipation no. 20, 09/11/1830; National Archives of Belgium, Gouv. Prov. III, no. 412. See 
also: Leconte, La Réunion Centrale, 969. 
261  “All doubts should have disappeared, if the  elections of the members of the Congress had been 
more popular, if nine tenths of the nation had not arbitrarily been deprived of the exercise of their 
political rights by the Provisional  Government . But given the turn things have taken, the great 
majority of the people has every right to protest against the decision of the majority of a chamber 
which represents only a minority”.  Courrier de la Sambre no. 202, 26/11/1830. 
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société qui se reconstitue on a encore moins le droit de limiter, si on veut que les lois adop-
tées par le congrès soient obligatoires pour tous. 262 
 It, too, predicted the outbreak of a new revolution and more bloodshed in order 
to establish a Constitution based on the true principles of the Belgian  Revolution . 
5  Conclusions 
 Since the end of the nineteenth century it is a commonplace in Belgian constitu-
tional  manuals to remark that whereas the terms of the Constitution are fi xed, their 
meaning changes over time. Due to its longevity, the Belgian  Constitution has 
shored up a succession of political systems, each of which has been shaped by the 
needs and expectations of an evolving society. Although the political mechanism 
has for a long time been made up of the same fi xed set of components, the mutual 
relations between the components and the impact of each component on the whole 
have undergone remarkable evolutions. Some of these changes have been for-
malised via constitutional  revisions (the fi rst two of which, made in 1893 and 1921, 
mainly concerned electoral  law ), but considerable parts of the 1831  Constitution 
survive until this day, although their meaning for political practice has changed 
dramatically. 263 Notable examples concern the stipulations on the role of the  mon-
arch in the legislative process, such as the royal  veto and the royal right to dissolve 
the chambers, his right to appoint and dismiss the ministers and his function as 
commander-in-chief of the army. 
 Article 25’s chances for survival were no doubt enhanced by its concise and 
underdetermined formulation. 264 Under its fl ag several diverse  systems have fared: 
census  suffrage with an electorate of less than 1 % of the population (1831), univer-
sal plural manhood suffrage (1893), universal manhood suffrage (1919) and univer-
sal suffrage for all citizens of over 18 years of age (1948). Despite the historical 
consciousness displayed by some authors of constitutional  manuals , debate over the 
exact meaning of national  sovereignty as intended by the creators of the Constitution 
in 1830–1831 has been scarce. Moreover, diverse ideological  readings have post 
factum been projected on the term. This chapter has attempted to restore  article 25 
to its proper historical context within the  genesis of the Belgian Constitution. 
262  “(…) that some retarded, stationary men, stemming from a society which no longer exists, and 
others who are too timid, too weak, too faint-hearted to be of the century to which they by their age 
belong, dare, without a  mandate , to present to you a Constitution which is nothing other than the 
Fundamental Law, imposed unto you by William  the Bloody , under a new form. (…) We call this 
Congress unpopular and deplorable because it cannot be the expression of the general  will , since 
the Provisional  Government has limited the electoral rights. No force or power can limit these 
rights, which are inherent to the character of the citizen, and which in a society which is recon-
structing itself must be even less limited, if one wishes the laws adopted by the Congress to be 
obligatory for all”.  L’Emancipation no. 14, 04/11/1830. 
263  Gilissen ,  Le régime représentatif , 18. 
264  Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 64. 
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 It can come as no surprise that a diversity of political  languages was present in 
Belgium’s constituent  assembly . Terms and concepts associated with thinkers like 
 Montesquieu ,  Constant ,  Rousseau or De  Lamennais , carrying diverging theoretical 
and ideological implications, can be distinguished. The language used by a minority 
of  republican  delegates, like  Seron and De  Robaulx , probably stands out most for its 
consistency. 265 However, it would be a mistake to assume that impenetrable barriers 
separated these languages. In fact, many terms and concepts, although often central 
to the debates, lacked a generally accepted  defi nition . The confusion over words like 
 republic ,  democracy  and monarchy was at times complete. Different terms were 
used for the same concept, whereas different concepts could hide under the same 
term. The interpenetrability of the languages used in the  Congress was refl ected by 
the sometimes very slight minorities by which key elements of the new state system, 
like the  Senate, were decided upon. 266 It must not be forgotten that the confection of 
the Belgian  Constitution was an ad hoc affair. While the Constitutional  Commission 
concluded its work on the  draft Constitution in 6–10 days, the  Congress needed a 
little over 2 months for debating and approving the fi nal  Constitution . 267 Although 
around half of the delegates held a degree in law, they were for the most part  homi-
nes novi , without extensive prior experience with the workings of a legislative 
assembly, let alone a  constituent  one. 268 
 In this context it may be easier to understand why a central concept like the 
nation did not have an unambiguous  meaning , not even for the creators of the 
Constitution. The  debates  in the National  Congress clearly show that for many del-
egates ‘ nation’ and ‘people’ meant the same thing. Indeed, ‘sovereignty of the  peo-
ple’ was freely used as a synonym for ‘national  sovereignty’ . It can therefore not be 
maintained that the choice for the term ‘nation’ in  article 25 mirrors a specifi c 
political- theoretical position. The  interpretation of the term was not fought out in 
bouts of abstract theorisation (even  article 25 was passed with very little discussion) 
but in very practical  debates  over the division of and access to power, most notably 
in the questions of census  suffrage , the powers of the  monarch and bicameralism. 269 
As a result, the state system organised by the Belgian  Constitution bears traces of 
different political-theoretical traditions, just as the constitutional  text  itself is a 
mosaic of articles borrowed from existing examples. 270 
 What can be ascertained beyond a doubt is that  article 25 was meant to enshrine 
a system where sovereignty came from below. Since the  mandate  of the  Congress 
265  De  Smaele , Eclectisch en toch nieuw. 
266  Gilissen and Magits, Les déclarations de droits dans l’historiographie du droit des provinces 
belges , 7. 
267  Huyttens ,  Discussions , vol. 1–2;  Magits ,  De Volksraad , 346; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische 
grondwetscommissie , 39. 
268  De Lichtervelde, Introduction;  Magits ,  De Volksraad , 261. 
269  Descamps,  La mosaïque , 51; Van den  Steene ,  De Belgische grondwetscommissie , 37. 
270  Descamps,  La mosaïque. De Smaele highlights the resulting eclecticism of the Constitution, 
calling it a mixture of elements from the liberal and republican traditions. De  Smaele , Eclectisch 
en toch nieuw. 
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originated in a  revolt directed against irresponsible royal government, its members 
were logically concerned with safely vesting the key to state power in the hands of 
the  nation . This is made abundantly clear by the stipulations on ministerial  respon-
sibility (with  countersignature and royal  inviolability ), the limitation imposed on 
royal power, the yearly vote of the  budget and the  election of both  chambers . At the 
same time, the Congress was a socially conservative body elected by and composed 
of members of the  aristocracy and the upper  bourgeoisie . 271 It was as anxious to 
prevent the tyranny of the masses as royal despotism. National or popular  sover-
eignty was therefore perfectly compatible, in its view, with the limitation of  suffrage 
to the propertied classes. 
 This is not to say that the  Congress’s interpretation of national  sovereignty went 
uncontested. In the  press , the meaning of  article 25 was a cause of heated and some-
times bitter  debate . Whereas all  newspapers agreed that it enshrined popular  sover-
eignty ,  opinions diverged over the desirability and the possibility of constructing a 
functional political system on its basis, and on the conditions for doing so. Whereas 
moderate  liberal  and  Catholic  journals generally backed the interpretation of the 
 Congress in these matters, their counterparts on the far right and the far left loudly 
protested against it. For them, national or popular  sovereignty was indissolubly 
linked to universal  suffrage . Its realisation was a source of apprehension for some, 
a source of frustrated craving for others. Both camps, being underrepresented in the 
 Congress , reacted by calling into question the  legitimacy of the constituent  assem-
bly . Their efforts remained without effect, however, just as their bleak auspices of 
imminent state collapse or popular revolution remained unfulfi lled. 
6  Summaries (French & Dutch) 
6.1  La souveraineté de la Nation dans la Constitution belge 
de 1831. Sur les signifi cations de l’article 25 
 L’Article 25 de la Constitution belge de 1831 prévoit que tous les pouvoirs émanent 
de la Nation. Pourtant la Constitution reste silencieuse sur ce que recouvre le con-
cept de Nation. Curieusement, la question n’a guère soulevé de discussions dans le 
Congrès national. En conséquence, la défi nition de la souveraineté nationale proc-
lamée dans la Constitution de 1831 reste indécise. Paradoxalement, les manuels de 
droit constitutionnel contemporains l’interprètent comme l’antithèse de la souver-
aineté du peuple. Ils s’inspirent pour cela d’une longue tradition intellectuelle, qui 
relie ces deux concepts à autant de courants mutuellement excluant en théorie poli-
tique. Abstraite et transhistorique, l’idée de ‘nation’ de l’abbé Sieyès aurait été 
délibérément préférée à celle du ‘peuple’, conçue comme réelle et historique, pro-
posée par Rousseau. Alors que cette dernière notion aurait été presque 
271  Magits ,  De Volksraad, 1977. 
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automatiquement associée à la démocratie directe et au suffrage universel, la pre-
mière fournirait la justifi cation théorique pour limiter la participation politique aux 
seules couches sociales supérieures. Ce dernier but a sans aucun doute été poursuivi 
par le Congrès national belge. Aucun des délégués n’a appelé à l’introduction du 
suffrage universel ou à n’importe quel autre élargissement signifi catif de la partici-
pation politique. 
 Néanmoins, la dichotomie peuple/nation ne suffi t pas à expliquer la formulation 
de l’article 25. D’autres auteurs soulignent qu’à la fi n du XVIIIe et au début du 
XIXe siècle, ces deux termes n’avaient pas de signifi cation précise dans la théorie 
politique. Il s’avère en outre que dans les débats du Congrès national, les deux 
termes étaient utilisés de façon interchangeable. Dans la discussion sur la souver-
aineté, les deux étaient considérés comme synonymes. Le Congrès lui-même n’a 
pas hésité à expliquer l’article 25 comme la proclamation de la souveraineté du 
peuple. Le Congrès et le Gouvernement Provisoire se référaient explicitement au 
mandat qu’ils tenaient du peuple. Dans le contexte de la Révolution belge, dirigée 
contre le gouvernement autocrate du roi Guillaume I, cela est à peine surprenant. La 
Constitution de 1831 peut en effet être lue comme l’antithèse du système de gouver-
nement précédent, basé sur le principe monarchique. Elle limitait expressément le 
pouvoir royal à une liste de domaines spécifi ques. Tous les pouvoirs résiduels étaient 
désormais du ressort du parlement. Dans la pratique, le régime parlementaire a failli 
se réaliser pendant les premières décennies après la promulgation de la Constitution. 
Néanmoins, l’origine de la souveraineté avait incontestablement changé de place. 
Désormais le pouvoir émanait d’en bas au lieu d’en haut. Le vocabulaire utilisé dans 
les débats du Congrès le confi rme d’ailleurs: ‘nation’ et ‘roi’ y étaient traités comme 
des unités conceptuellement séparées, voire opposées l’une à l’autre. En ce sens, 
l’article 25 proclame bel et bien la souveraineté populaire. Les membres du Congrès 
ne voyaient pas de contradiction entre ce principe et la restriction de la participation 
politique à l’élite socio-économique par l’introduction simultanée du suffrage 
censitaire. 
 Les débats menés dans les journaux confi rment cette analyse. Aucun des jour-
naux analysés ne contestait l’idée que l’article 25 impliquait la souveraineté du 
peuple. Vu les évènements révolutionnaires précédents, ils considéraient ce principe 
comme une évidence. Néanmoins, sa pertinence était vivement débattue par cette 
même presse. Le journal liégeois le Courrier de la Meuse, d’opinion catholique et 
réactionnaire, rejetait la souveraineté populaire, qu’il considérait comme un prin-
cipe dangereux et impossible à réaliser. Selon lui, il allait également à l’encontre de 
la souveraineté divine. De son côté, la presse radicale et démocratique était critique. 
La façon dont le principe proclamé par l’article 25 était converti en un règlement 
électoral s’est heurtée à une vive résistance de leur part. Alors que les journaux 
libéraux et catholiques modérés soutenaient l’introduction du suffrage censitaire, la 
presse radicale la considérait comme une violation injustifi able de la souveraineté 
du peuple. Cette critique les a poussés à remettre en cause la légitimité du mandat 
du Congrès national et du Gouvernement Provisoire. Les vues radicales n’étant 
guère représentées dans le Congrès, ces idées ont trouvé peu d’écho cependant. 
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 En guise de conclusion on retient que, malgré le fl ou entretenu autour du concept 
de souveraineté nationale dans la Constitution belge de 1831, les auteurs de cette 
dernière avaient à l’esprit un système politique assez bien défi ni. Souveraineté 
nationale et souveraineté populaire étant pour eux synonymes, les deux concepts ne 
pouvaient pas, dans ce cas-ci, être considérés comme contraires. Ce sont des inter-
prétations ultérieures qui les ont investis d’un sens qu’ils n’avaient décidemment 
pas à l’époque. Cependant, s’il est sûr que la constituante a placé la source de la 
souveraineté dans le peuple, il est également certain qu’elle n’a pas voulu lui confi er 
l’exercice du pouvoir. Les membres du Congrès, convoqués à la hâte et pressés par 
les évènements, étaient moins attentifs à des débats abstraits sur la signifi cation des 
concepts politico-théoriques, qu’à l’établissement du pouvoir d’Etat dans les mains 
de l’élite socio-économique (pour autant qu’elle était hostile au régime 
hollandais). 
6.2  Nationale soevereiniteit in de Belgische Grondwet van 
1831. Over de betekenis(sen) van artikel 25 
 Artikel 25 van de Belgische Grondwet van 1831 bepaalt dat alle machten uitgaan 
van de Natie. Over wie of wat de Natie precies is, zwijgt de Grondwet echter. 
Opvallend genoeg werd er in het Belgisch Nationaal Congres ook nauwelijks debat 
gevoerd over de kwestie, waardoor de precieze betekenis van de geproclameerde 
nationale soevereiniteit allesbehalve eenduidig is. Hedendaagse handboeken grond-
wettelijk recht interpreteren haar onomwonden als tegenpool van de volkssoevere-
initeit, waarbij ze zich laten inspireren door een invloedrijke traditie die beide 
concepten terugleidt tot twee elkaar uitsluitende politiek-theoretische stromingen. 
Sieyès’ abstracte, transhistorische natieconcept zou doelbewust de voorkeur hebben 
gekregen boven Rousseau’s concrete en historische opvatting van het volk. Terwijl 
het laatste concept automatisch associaties met directe democratie en universeel 
stemrecht zou hebben opgeroepen, zou het eerste een vrijgeleide zijn geweest voor 
de beperking van de politieke participatie tot de maatschappelijke toplaag. Dit laat-
ste doel werd ongetwijfeld nagestreefd door het Belgisch Nationaal Congres. Geen 
enkele afgevaardigde deed een oproep tot de invoering van het algemeen stemrecht 
of tot een andere aanzienlijke verruiming van de politieke participatie. 
 Toch voldoet de tweedeling natie/volk niet om de formulering van artikel 25 te 
verklaren. Eerdere auteurs wezen er al op dat de precieze betekenis van deze termen 
in de politieke theorie aan het einde van de achttiende en het begin van de negent-
iende eeuw nog niet vastlag. Ook in de debatten van het Nationaal Congres bleken 
ze in grote mate inwisselbaar: wanneer ze voorkwamen in combinatie met soever-
einiteit, deden beide termen dienst als synoniem. Meer nog, de politieke leiders van 
het moment aarzelden niet om artikel 25 uit te leggen als de proclamatie van de 
volkssoevereiniteit. De Congresleden en het Voorlopig Bewind beriepen zich uit-
drukkelijk op hun door het volk verleende mandaat. In de context van de Belgische 
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Revolutie, die gericht was tegen het als autocratisch ervaren bewind van koning 
Willem I, verbaast dit nauwelijks. De Grondwet van 1831 kan gelezen worden als 
de antithese van Willems op het monarchale principe gestoelde regeersysteem. De 
koninklijke macht werd uitdrukkelijk beperkt tot de door de Grondwet vastgelegde 
domeinen. Alle residuele bevoegdheden waren voortaan het terrein van de volks-
vertegenwoordiging. Hoewel het zwaartepunt van de macht in de eerste decennia na 
de afkondiging van de Grondwet in de praktijk nog niet verschoof naar het par-
lement, kwam de soevereiniteit volgens deze regeling voortaan ondubbelzinnig van 
onderuit. Het woordgebruik van de Congresleden bevestigt dit: ‘natie’ en ‘vorst’ 
werden als conceptueel gescheiden en zelfs aan elkaar tegengestelde eenheden 
behandeld. In die zin proclameerde het Congres met artikel 25 dus inderdaad de 
volkssoevereiniteit. De gelijktijdige beperking van de politieke participatie tot de 
elite via het cijnskiesrecht werd door de betrokkenen meestal niet als een contradic-
tie ervaren. 
 Dit blijkt ook uit een analyse van de krantendebatten. Alle onderzochte kranten 
interpreteerden artikel 25 uitdrukkelijk als de proclamatie van de volkssoevereinit-
eit die ze, gezien de revolutionaire gebeurtenissen, als vanzelfsprekend beschou-
wden. Toch was het principe de inzet van verhitte debatten. Een reactionair katholiek 
blad zoals de Luikse  Courrier de le Meuse verwierp de volkssoevereiniteit omdat 
het haar beschouwde als een gevaarlijk en niet te realiseren principe, dat bovendien 
inging tegen de goddelijke soevereiniteit. Vooral in de radicale, democratisch gez-
inde pers klonk de kritiek echter hard. De manier waarop het in artikel 25 geprocla-
meerde principe werd omgezet naar een kiesreglement, stootte bij hen op grote 
weerstand. Terwijl de gematigde katholieke en liberale bladen het Congres steunden 
bij de invoering van het cijnskiesrecht, beschouwde de radicale pers deze als een 
onrechtmatige aantasting van de volkssoevereiniteit. Deze kritiek leidde hen er zelfs 
toe om de legitimiteit van het mandaat van het Nationaal Congres en het Voorlopig 
Bewind in vraag te stellen. Aangezien de radicale standpunten nauwelijks in het 
Congres waren vertegenwoordigd, vonden ze echter weinig weerklank. 
 Als conclusie kan gelden dat, hoewel de nationale soevereiniteit in de Belgische 
Grondwet van 1831 geen eenduidige politiek-theoretische betekenis had, de opstell-
ers ervan wél een duidelijk politiek systeem voor ogen stond. Aangezien nationale 
soevereiniteit en volkssoevereiniteit voor de betrokkenen synoniem waren, kunnen 
beide concepten in dit geval niet worden beschouwd als elkaars tegendeel. Latere 
interpretaties hebben er een invulling aan gegeven die ze op het moment zelf nog 
niet hadden. Zeker is echter dat, hoewel de oorsprong van de soevereiniteit door de 
grondwetgever overduidelijk in het volk werd gevestigd, er geen sprake van was om 
haar ook door het volk te laten uitoefenen. De inderhaast bijeengeroepen 
Congresleden hadden minder aandacht voor abstracte politiek-theoretische debatten 
dan voor het vestigen van de staatsmacht in handen van (het antihollands gezinde 
deel van) de sociaal-economische elite. 
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 The  Omnipotence of Parliament 
in the Legitimisation Process 
of ‘Representative Government’ under 
the Albertine Statute (1848–1861) 
 Giuseppe  Mecca 
 Abstract  The present contribution is a study concerning the legitimization of rep-
resentative government in Piedmont-Savoy. The essay considers normative factors 
alongside with constitutional practice, public debate and juridical representations. 
The purpose is to highlight the wider community’s perceptions of the Constitution. 
The focal points of the argument are ‘Constitution’, ‘Sovereignty’ and ‘Parliament’, 
terms whose meaning in a specifi c context is explored in depth. 
 What is at stake here is not the philosophical or constitutional affi rmation of the 
concept of sovereignty, but rather the notion as to how the sovereign power was 
supposed to take shape and operate within the institutional system. 
 The formula used by the Albertine Statute to describe the new constitutional 
regime is «representative government» (Art. 2 St. Alb.). This formula assumes dif-
ferent meanings depending upon the specifi c socio-political conjuncture. So, in the 
Italian case, the question of sovereignty is closely intertwined with the form of 
government, as well as with the legitimization of the representative government. 
 The meanings of sovereignty and representative government are analysed in 
terms of their dictionary defi nitions, the political catechism of Michelangelo Castelli 
and Giorgio Briano, and newspaper articles. The essay also takes into account con-
temporary culture and the range of available foreign models. In the Piedmont-Savoy 
the absolute power of the Sovereign had been circumscribed by the gracious con-
cession of the Constitution. The monarchical principle was not in fact understood in 
the same way as the  Charte of 1814 had been, since in France supreme authority 
had been enclosed within the person of the King, whereas the Albertine Statute 
presuppose the more modern meaning of a monarchy which through the granting of 
the constitution, bound itself fully and irrevocably to it. On the other hand, repre-
sentation was considered to be a genetic  element of the new legal order. Furthermore, 
the metaphor of the pact between sovereign and people served to legitimize the new 
constitutional regime. The theory of the omnipotence «omnipotence of Parliament» 
was intended to steer a middle path between the monarchical principle and the 
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excesses of popular sovereignty. The British theory avoided the serious inconve-
nience of constituent power. There was, indeed, but a single ordinary sovereignty. 
 Keywords  Parliament •  Consensus •  Representative government •  Legitimation • 
 Omnipotence of Parliament •  Sovereignty •  Constituent power •  Constitution • 
 Albertine Statute •  Italy •  Piedmont-Savoy 
1  Parliament , Consensus and Public Opinion 
 In Italy, throughout 1848, there was an ongoing battle of representations through 
which a redefi nition of the sources of legitimisation of  politics is reached. This phe-
nomenon is to be inserted within a European-type context. Indeed, following the 
French  Revolution and throughout the nineteenth century, the  Monarchy had to face 
up to the diffi cult passage from one form of dynastic legitimisation to a new  legiti-
misation of a national-representative type. 1 The restored Monarchies established 
strategies oriented towards rethinking traditional foundations of  sovereignty . 
Spaces, rituals and symbols of traditional politics would have the constitutional 
winds, which will blow throughout Europe, and the affi rmation of national 
 Parliaments to reckon with. A mirror effect will be created, therefore; Parliaments 
will soon have to engage with royal power, cut out their own spaces for autonomy, 
and fi nd formulas capable of  legitimising themselves as representative entities of 
common interests. 2 Forcing the intentions of the very same sovereigns and the 
1  Guazzaloca, Giulia (ed). 2009.  Sovrani a metà. Monarchia e legittimazione in Europa tra Otto e 
Novecento . Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino. Also, see: Rials, Stéphane.  1987 . Monarchie et philoso-
phie politique: un essai d’inventaire. In  Révolution et contre-révolution au XIXème siècle , Paris: 
DUC Albatros. Lauvaux, Philippe.  1996 . Les monarchies: inventaire des types.  Pouvoirs 78: 
23–41. Kirsch, Martin.  1999 .  ID=”ITerm6”Monarch  und Parlament im 19. Jahrhundert. Der monarchische 
Konstitutionalismus als europäischer Verfassungstyp – Frankreich im Vergleich , Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Kirsch, Martin.  2006 . La trasformazione politica del monarca europeo 
nel XIX secolo.  Scienza & Politic a 34: 21–35.  ID=”ITerm7”Colombo, Paolo .  1999 .  Il re d’Italia. Prerogative 
costituzionali e potere politico della Corona (1848–1922) . Milano: Franco Angeli. 
2 An initial attempt at writing the history of the  ID=”ITerm11”Parliament of the  ID=”ITerm12”Kingdom of Sardinia accompa-
nied by an abundant collection of documents will be accomplished by one of the protagonists: 
 ID=”ITerm13”Brofferio, Angelo .  1865 –1869.  Storia del Parlamento Subalpino . Milano: Eugenio Belzini. 
Analogously, as regards the Italian parliament see Mauro, Matteo Auguro and Magni, Basilio. 
1882–1891.  Storia del parlamento italiano . Roma: A. Sammaruga (later the Tipografi a della 
Camera dei Deputati and Stabilimento Tipografi co dell’Opinione). Generally, literature is abun-
dant. Nevertheless, we must highlight the lack of organic works regarding the legitimisation of 
Parliaments in Italy. However, among old and new studies on the Parliament, we may recall: Flora, 
Emanuele.  1958 . Lo Statuto  ID=”ITerm14”Albertino e l’avvento del regime parlamentare nel regno di Sardegna – 
Premesse per una ricerca.  Rassegna storica del risorgimento XLIV: 26–38;  ID=”ITerm15”Caracciolo, Alberto . 
 1960 .  ID=”ITerm16” l Parlamento  nella formazione del Regno d’Italia . Milano: Giuffrè; Perticone, Giacomo. 
 1960 .  Il Regime parlamentare nella storia dello Statuto  ID=”ITerm17”Albertino . Roma: Edizioni dell’ateneo; 
Sardo, Giuseppe.  1963 –1966.  Storia del Parlamento italiano . Palermo: Flaccovi. Vol. 1:  Le assem-
blee elettive del ‘48 ; Vol. 2:  Dal Ministero Gioberti all’ingresso di  ID=”ITerm18”Cavour  nel Governo ; Vol. 3: 
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governments that constituted them,  parliaments tied  legitimisation to the forceful 
topic of presenting themselves as ‘voices of the people’ and ‘voices of the  nation ’. 3 
Public opinion, which follows the constitutional wave, was destined to break up in 
numerous places and printed pamphlets, observed the work of the legislative assem-
blies, criticised their works, suggested choices and methods. With the advent of 
representative regimes, the idea that the constitutional system worked as long as 
there were balance and harmony between the institutions and public opinion took 
root. 4 
 Above all, for the success of a constitutional regime the consensus of the gov-
erned people was indispensable. 5 On these aspects, we may recall a refl ection of 
Domenico  Berti , who highlighted the importance of a link between constitutional 
process and consensus. First of all, the author noticed those differences between the 
movement of 1820–1821, which had led to adopting the Spanish  constitution of 
Cádiz , and Italian constitutionalism of 1848. 6 According to  Berti , the difference was 
to be looked for in the character of spontaneity, or rather, the presence of public 
discussion. 7 In other words, the 1848 constitutional process was the fruit of a 
«popular- governmental  movement ». 
 Dall’ingresso di  ID=”ITerm19”Cavour  nel governo alla crisi Calabiana ; Vol. 4:  Dalla crisi Calabiana alle 
annessioni ; AA.VV.,  1988 .  Il Parlamento italiano (1861–1887). Vol. 1: L’Unifi cazione italiana 
(1861–1870). Da  ID=”ITerm20”Cavour  a Menabrea . Milano: Nuova CEI Informatica spa;  ID=”ITerm21”Violante, Luciano 
(ed.).  2001 .  Il Parlamento. Annali 17 Storia d’Italia . Torino: Einaudi. AA.VV.  2011 .  Il Primo 
parlamento italiano. Catalogo della mostra . Roma: Camera dei deputati. We may add a substantial 
work on the fi rst law-making activity of the Parliament of the Kingdom of Sardinia by Ferrari 
Zumbini, Romano.  2008 .  Tra identità e ideologia. Il Rinnovamento costituzionale nel Regno di 
Sardegna fra la primavera 1847 e l’inverno 1848 . Torino: Giappichelli. Besides these studies, 
some important pages in more general works on the history of constitutional law are dedicated to 
the theme. I especially refer to:  ID=”ITerm22”Allegretti ,  ID=”ITerm23”Umberto .  1989 .  Profi lo di storia costituzionale italiana . 
Bologna: il Mulino;  ID=”ITerm24”Ghisalberti, Carlo .  2002 .  Storia costituzionale d’Italia (1848–1994) . Roma-
Bari: Laterza and Martucci, Roberto  2002 .  Storia costituzionale italiana. Dallo Statuto albertino 
alla Repubblica (1848–2001) . Roma: Carocci. 
3  Petrizzo, Alessio.  2012 . La legittimazione contesa. L’avvento dei parlamenti nell’Italia del 1848. 
 Passato e presente 86: 39–61. 
4  ID=”ITerm28”Lacchè, Luigi .  2003 . Per una teoria costituzionale dell’opinione pubblica. Il dibattito italiano 
(XIX secolo).  Giornale di storia costituzionale 6: 273–290 (especially 284–286). 
5  Costa, Pietro.  1986 .  Lo Stato immaginario. Metafore e paradigmi nella cultura giuridica italiana 
fra Otto e Novecento . Milano: Giuffrè, 197–207. 
6  Cf.  ID=”ITerm31”Berti , Domenico.  1849 . Statuto, stampa e Parlamento sardo.  Rivista italiana. Giornale men-
sile 2: 1–33. The author refers to events which happened in  ID=”ITerm32”Piedmont in 1821 where the young 
 ID=”ITerm33”Carlo Alberto , as Prince  ID=”ITerm34”Regent,  granted – with the aim of quelling the insurrectionary move-
ments – the  ID=”ITerm35”constitution of Cádiz which remained in force for 3 months. On these aspects, please 
see:  ID=”ITerm36”Colombo, Paolo . 1998. La costituzione come ideologia. La rivoluzione italiana del 1820–
1821 e la costituzione di Cadice. In  ID=”ITerm37”La Nazione  cattolica. Cadice 1812: una costituzione per la 
Spagna , Jose Maria Portillo Valdes ed., 129–157. Manduria: Lacaita. Corciulo, Maria Sofi a. 2000. 
La Costituzione di Cadice e le rivoluzioni italiane del 1820–1821.  Le Carte e la storia VI, 18–29. 
Corciulo, Maria Sofi a. 2011. Costituzionalismo (1820–1821). In  Dizionario del liberalismo ital-
iano . Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, vol. I, 293–300. 
7  ID=”ITerm39”Berti , Domenico.  1849 . Statuto, stampa e Parlamento sardo, cit., 3: «Esso fu spontaneo perché 
non prodotto dall’azione della società segrete o da infl uenza straniera, ma dallo svolgimento natu-
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 The remarks, which above we refer to, are also interesting since they gather 
together certain key themes concerning the institutional renewal of Savoy  Piedmont . 
As can be assumed from the same title,  Berti understands the connection between 
 Parliament ,  legitimisation and the  press . For the author, the representative  govern-
ment is synonymous with democratic  government in keeping with eclectic thinking 
adapted to the Italian monarchical context:
 «per governo democratico o forma democratica di governo, noi intendiamo il governo che 
ha per base la sovranità  nazionale o più chiaramente l’assenso del popolo, e per fi ne, il 
razionale miglioramento delle classi povere. La quale parola usata come qualifi cativo della 
monarchia  costituzionale , ha per unico oggetto di sceverarla dalla monarchia oligarchica o 
censitaria. Perciò i principii fondamentali di quella sono i diritti politici in ragione della 
capacità, mentre i principii fondamentali di questa sono i diritti politici in ragione del censo. 
Il fi ne di quella è il bene dell’universale, il fi ne di questa è il bene dei particolari, in quella 
il re è fatto pel re. Ecco il senso che noi diamo alla parola democrazia o monarchia 
democratica». 8 
 It would appear that for  Berti , a  government is democratic and it is legitimate 
whenever it enjoys the consent of the people and thus is the constitutional  monar-
chy . In such a way, the Author draws close to the ideologies of moderate  liberal 
groups, defending the statutory legality against any future democratic excesses. A 
central role in the politics of consensus was played by the press, which, abandoning 
all polemics and abstract reasonings, had to take on the function of ‘practical pol-
icy’, that is guarantee publicity and transparency. 
 The topic of consensus and  legitimisation came forcefully back close to the 
national unifi cation (1860). By way of an example, we may still recall a page of  La 
Nazione which underlined the constitutional role of public opinion so much so as to 
establish that:
rale delle idee, accelerato dalle dottrine de’ migliori scrittori ed assecondato liberamente dai 
 governi … I governi vedessero o non vedessero, volessero o non volessero le conseguenze delle 
loro prime concessioni, il vero è che essi si arresero ai desideri dei popoli espressi con tanta 
moderazione, ed il movimento nostro pigliò quel carattere di spontaneità di cui parlammo: cioè fu 
un movimento popolare-governativo, senza lotta e senza uso della forza» (It was spontaneous 
since not produced by the action of secret societies or by foreign infl uence, rather by the natural 
unfurling of ideas, hastened by the doctrines of the best writers and seconded freely by the govern-
ments… The  ID=”ITerm40”governments saw or did not see, wished or did not wish the consequences of their 
initial concessions, the truth is that they gave in to the desires of the peoples which were expressed 
with such moderation, and our movement took on that character of spontaneity of which we spoke: 
i.e. it was a popular-governmental  ID=”ITerm41” ovement , without struggle and without the use of force). 
8  Ibidem , 23: «by democratic  ID=”ITerm52”government or democratic form of  ID=”ITerm53”government , we mean the 
 ID=”ITerm54”government which has national  ID=”ITerm55”sovereignty or more clearly the consent of the people as its base, 
and has the rational betterment of the poor classes as its goal. This word used as qualifi er of the 
constitutional  ID=”ITerm56” onarchy , has the sole aim of distinguishing it from oligarchical or based-on-census 
 ID=”ITerm57” onarchy . Therefore, the fundamental principles of the former are the political rights because of 
capability, while the fundamental principles of the latter are the political rights because of census. 
The fi nal goal of the former is the good of the whole, the end of the latter is the good of the indi-
viduals, in the former the king is made for the king. This is the meaning that we give to the word 
democracy or democratic  ID=”ITerm58” onarchy ». 
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 «ogni potestà deriva oggi da essa [l’opinione pubblica] la  legittimità sua, perché ella è la 
legittimità stessa, una cui goccia vale tutto l’olio, onde una volta erano fatti re in nome di 
Dio uomini scelleratissimi e indegni. La sua alleanza non si acquista per oro o per patti di 
famiglia e matrimoni abborriti: il suo arbitrato non si travolge per pratiche o macchinazioni. 
Ella è un magistrato dove i suffragi si contano a milioni: i suffragi paiono talvolta diversi, 
ma la sentenza è unanime. E quando ella ha parlato, la causa è defi nita, e non giova oppo-
sizione. Ciò che è ora l’opinione pubblica era una volta il papato». 9 
 These two examples taken from the sources have been used to highlight how, in 
two instances central to Italian constitutional history (the passage from absolute 
 monarchy to constitutional  monarchy ; the process of the unifi cation of the  Kingdom 
of Italy under the  monarchy of the royal House of Savoy) the topic of consensus and 
political  legitimisation is a question as fundamental as ever. The present essay is a 
contribution to the study of the  legitimisation of the form of representative  govern-
ment in Italy and it proposes some considerations which place the normative data 
together with constitutional practice, public debate and juridical representations. 10 
Through the use of juridical works on the  Statute , the portraying contained in the 
press as well as some comments of the main protagonists, this contribution aims to 
provide certain representations which the community has of the constitution. 11 
2  Between Lemmas and Culture 
 In Italy, a political-constitutional lexicon comes forward rather late compared to the 
nearby  France . Besides, a study on the sources of  legitimisation and  sovereignty has 
to consider the fl uidity of political language, as well as the diffi cult and slow formu-
lation of juridical concepts. In Italy, even during the 3-year Jacobin period, there is 
a «subordination of language to politics» and very often, words are used as propa-
ganda, for their evocative and ideological potentials or rather they are adapted to the 
9  ID=”ITerm66”La Nazione . Giornale politico quotidiano 8 Gennaio 1860, n° 8: «every power derives today its 
own  ID=”ITerm67”legitimacy from it [public opinion], since it is the legitimacy itself, a drop of which has the 
same value of all the anointment oil, by which once villainous and unworthy men were proclaimed 
kings in the name of God. Its alliance is not to be bought for gold or family pacts and loathed mar-
riages: its arbitration is not to be overturned by practices or scheming. It is a magistrate where 
votes number millions: the votes sometimes appear different, but the verdict is unanimous. And 
when she has spoken, the case is decided, and appeal does not help. That which is now public 
opinion was once the papacy». 
10  For every methodological reference within which this research work is included, please see 
 ID=”ITerm75”Müβig, Ulrike .  2014 . Reconsidering Constitutional Formation. Research challenges of 
Comparative Constitutional History.  Giornale di storia costituzionale 27: 107–131. 
11  On this point, some important considerations are contained in Mannori, Luca.  2010 . Il governo 
dell’opinione. Le interpretazioni dello Statuto  ID=”ITerm77”Albertino dal 1848 all’Unità.  Memoria e Ricerca. 
Rivista di storia contemporanea 35: 83–104. In order to understand the way in which the 
Constitution was perceived by the community and to come to an authentic interpretation of 
 ID=”ITerm78”Piedmont constitutionalism the author suggests combining together the fi rst comments to the 
 ID=”ITerm79”Statute with the reading of newspapers, with parliamentary debates, as well as with private sources. 
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mobile needs of the political battle. 12 This phenomenon is destined to widen 
throughout the Nineteenth century when language is linked to the need for a father-
land and nationality. 
 However if it is true that the birth of modern political language goes hand in hand 
with the appearing of new modern forms of political life which that language par-
tially mirrors and from which it fl ows, then we believe that, owing to the ambiguity 
and the delays with which modern political entities in Italy are formed, our investi-
gation would be unfruitful and sterile if not seen through the lens of the “anomaly” 
of the Italian context. 13 Indeed, if by sovereign  power we mean, according to mod-
ern traditional formulation, the sum of all powers or the absolute power of com-
mand from whence all the powers of the state would derive and fi nd their basis, it 
would not be easy to place, into this pattern, the observable phenomena and public 
debates in the period that goes from the granting of the  Albertine Statute to the birth 
of the  Kingdom of Italy . Besides, in the Italian experience, there lack a constituent 
 assembly , as for example is the case in revolutionary  France or in the Belgian expe-
rience (1831), and a public debate coeval to the publication of the constitutional 
text. All this, since, in the moment of granting the  Albertine Statute all reference to 
the genesis of legitimate  power is missing, yet  sovereignty is  in re ipsa in the act of 
granting the  Statute . 14 
 In other words, looking at  sovereignty in its dual, technical meaning of original 
and independent power, it would seem that it is a question presupposed to the draft-
ing of a constitution, the latter being the space wherein juridical and political exer-
cise of powers would be established and confl icts between them would be solved. 
In this sense, Fernanda Mazzanti Pepe has well made clear that in Subalpine 
12  Leso, Erasmo.  1991 .  Lingua e rivoluzione. Ricerche sul vocabolario politico italiano del triennio 
rivoluzionario 1796–1799 . Venezia: Istituto Veneto di scienze lettere ed arti, 30–31. In a more 
specifi c way on constitutional lexicon, terminology and the meaning of concepts, see Bambi, 
Federico (ed.).  2012 .  Un secolo per la Costituzione (1848–1948). Concetti e parole nello svolgersi 
del lessico costituzionale italiano. Atti del Convegno di Firenze , Villa Medicea di Castello, 11th 
November 2011. Firenze: Accademia della crusca. 
13  The author talks of “anomaly” to indicate that the Italian constituent process was not the fruit of 
a revolution, rather it places itself at the peak of a reforming movement.  ID=”ITerm83”Scirocco, Alfonso .  1999 . 
Costituzioni e Costituenti del 1848: il caso italiano.  Clio. Rivista trimestrale di studi storici 35: 
571–593. 
14  It is not possible to here provide exhaustive references on the topic of  ID=”ITerm93”sovereignty . For a long-
term, historical reconstruction: Quaglioni, Diego.  2004 .  La sovranità . Roma-Bari: Laterza. For a 
theoretical and philosophical framwork: Matteucci, Nicola. 1976. Sovranità. In  Dizionario di 
politica , eds. Norberto Bobbio and Nicola Matteucci, 973–981. Torino: Utet. Regarding our 
period,  ID=”ITerm94”Fioravanti, Maurizio .  1998 .  Costituzione e popolo sovrano. La costituzione italiana nella 
storia del costituzionalismo moderno . Bologna: il Mulino and also Fioravanti, Maurizio. 2012. 
Principio di sovranità e rigidità costituzionale: dallo Statuto alla Costituzione repubblicana. In  Un 
secolo per la Costituzione (1848–1948). Concetti e parole nello svolgersi del lessico costituzionale 
italiano , Federigo Bambi (ed.), cit., 67–83 are fundamental. 
G. Mecca
165
 Piedmont the  nation and its  sovereignty remained in the background, mere theoreti-
cal  legitimisation of a power in some ways self-referential. 15 
 Really, the question to be discussed does not so much regard the philosophical or 
constitutional affi rmation of the concept of (whether popular or national)  sover-
eignty , as rather, the idea by which sovereign power would take shape and the suf-
fi ciently organic and coherent ways of operating and ruling within the institutional 
system sketched out by the  Statute . With these premises, as regards the Italian case, 
the question of  sovereignty is closely intertwined with the question of the form of 
 government as well as with that of the  legitimisation of the representative  govern-
ment . The questions concerning  sovereignty can thus be summed up: in the case of 
contrast between powers who should have the fi nal say? The  Parliament or the 
 King ? What is the constitutional space within which the formation of consensus, 
general will and constitutional  legitimisation is outlined? Ultimately, the real issue 
is not so much the origin or the legal ownership of sovereignty rather the ways of 
exercising it. 
2.1  Constitution and Sovereignty Within the ‘ Consiglio di 
Conferenza ’. Some Choices Between Political Opportunity 
and Juridical Reasoning 
 The  Albertine Statute is proclaimed on 4th March 1848. 16 It is a well-known fact 
that the constitutional charter – preceded by the  Proclama dell’8 febbraio 
(Proclamation of 8th  February ) with which the impending issuing of «a  Statute 
15  Mazzanti Pepe, Fernanda. 2004.  Profi lo istituzionale dello Stato italiano. Modelli stranieri e 
specifi cità nazionali nell’età liberale (1849–1922) . Roma: Carocci, 25–34. 
16  The bibliography on the  ID=”ITerm112”Albertine Statute is boundless. As an example, I recall: Manno, Antonio. 
 1885 .  La concessione dello Statuto: notizie di fatto documentate . Pisa: Tipografi a F. Mariotti; 
Moscatelli, Alfredo.  1908 .  Lo Statuto del Regno . Roma: Stamperia Reale; Maranini, Giuseppe. 
 1926 .  Le origini dello Statuto albertino. Firenze: Vasecchi editore; Marchi, Teodosio  1926 . Lo 
Statuto  ID=”ITerm113”albertino e il suo sviluppo storico.  Rivista di diritto pubblico e della pubblica amministra-
zione in Italia XVIII: 187–209;  ID=”ITerm114”Crosa, Enrico .  1936 .  La concessione dello Statuto.  ID=”ITerm115”Carlo Alberto 
 e il ministro  ID=”ITerm116”Borelli  «redattore» dello Statuto . Torino: Istituto Giuridico della R. Università di 
Torino; Romano, Santi.  1969 . Le prime carte costituzionali. In  Lo Stato moderno e la sua crisi. 
Saggi di diritto costituzionale . Milano: Giuffrè; Enrico Guastapane, Enrico.  1983 . Lo Statuto 
albertino. Indicazioni bibliografi che per una rilettura.  Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico 3/
XXXIII: 1070–1093; Di Simone, Maria Rosa. 1988. Lo Statuto  ID=”ITerm117”Albertino . In  ID=”ITerm118” l Parlamento  ital-
iano 1861–1988. Vol. 1: 1861–1865: l’unifi cazione italiana da  ID=”ITerm119”Cavour  a La Marmora . Milano: 
Nuova CEI informatica, 77–106; Pene Vidari, Gian Savino.  1998 . Lo Statuto albertino dalla vita 
costituzionale subalpina a quella italiana.  Studi Piemontesi XXVII: 303–314; Rosboch, Michele. 
 1999 . Lo Statuto  ID=”ITerm120”Albertino dalla concessione all’applicazione.  Bollettino storico Veronese 1: 
59–86; Ulrich, Hartmut. 1999 . The Statuto  ID=”ITerm121”Albertino . In  Executive and Legislative Powers in the 
Constitutions of 1848–1849 , ed. Horst Dippel. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot; Rebuffa, Giorgio. 
 2003 .  Lo Statuto albertino. Bologna: il Mulino;  ID=”ITerm122”Colombo, Paolo .  2003 .  Con lealtà di Re e con 
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fundamental to establish (…) a completed system of representative  government » 17 
was announced – it was born already old, even though it will be the only constitu-
tion on the Italian peninsula to survive over time, so much so as to be extended over 
the  Kingdom of Italy . The main events that led to the publication of the Constitution 
and the feelings of the court of Charles  Albert are to be found in the well-known 
 Notes et souvenirs of the Chevalier Des  Ambrois De  Nevâche who will tell how the 
main constitutional norms were drawn up by the ministers of the king 18 examining 
every political constitution in force throughout Europe and particularly the French 
 Charte of  1830 . The king limited himself to small observations and to the sugges-
tions of little changes. The moment of the signature was a solemn act and marked 
the end of the absolute power of the  Monarchy . At the end of the ceremony all 
Ministers, upon the example of  Borelli , kissed the hand of the sovereign who 
granted the constitution and resigned from their ministerial post thus leaving room 
for the fi rst  government of the constitutional era. 19 
 The day following its coming into force, the press highlighted the limits of the 
constitutional text:
 «noi non vogliamo nascondere che alla prima lettura dello Statuto, siamo per un momento 
rimasti incerti se fosse il medesimo per corrispondere alla grande aspettazione che se ne 
aveva; modellato in gran parte sulla Costituzione francese del  1830 , esso ci parve a primo 
aspetto mancante e incompleto» 20 
 Also Bianchi Giovine noticed that
affetto di padre. Torino, 4 Marzo 1848: la concessione dello Statuto albertino . Bologna: Il Mulino; 
Soffi etti, Isidoro.  2004 .  I tempi dello Statuto albertino. Studi e fonti. Torino: Giappichelli. 
17  «uno Statuto fondamentale per istabilire (…) un compiuto sistema di governo  ID=”ITerm126” appresentativo ». 
18  The  ID=”ITerm131”Statute was elaborated within the bounds of the  ID=”ITerm132”Consiglio di Conferenza ( ID=”ITerm133”King ’s Council), 
a collegiate body of the  Ancien Regime , whose institution dated back to 1815 thanks to King 
Vittorio Emanuele I. The administrative organ was headed by the King and by the representatives 
of various ministries. With the reign of Charles  ID=”ITerm134”Albert , the institution had greater impulse and the 
possibility of convening  Consigli di Conferenza (King’s Councils) that were widened to include 
eminent people who belonged to military, administrative and judicial orders. Cf. Buraggi, Gian 
Carlo. 1939. Il Consiglio di Conferenza secondo nuovi documenti.  Atti della Reale Accademia 
delle scienze di Torin 74 and Salata, Francesco. 1939. Consiglio di Stato e Consiglio di conferenza 
nel Regno di  ID=”ITerm135”Carlo Alberto . In  Scritti giuridici in onore di Santi Romano, IV, 603–28. Padova: 
Cedam. At the sittings (from 7th February to 4th March 1848) for the drafting of the  ID=”ITerm136”Statute the 
following people intervened: Ministers  ID=”ITerm137”Borelli (Home Affairs),  ID=”ITerm138”Avet (Justice), Thaon di  ID=”ITerm139”Revel 
(Finance), Des  ID=”ITerm140”Ambrois De Nevâche (Public Works), Asinari di San Marzano (Foreign Affairs), 
 ID=”ITerm141”Broglia (War) and  ID=”ITerm142”Alfi eri (Education); the four Members of the  Consiglio di Stato (Council of 
State): Sallier de La  ID=”ITerm143” orre , Peyretti di  ID=”ITerm144”Condove ,  ID=”ITerm145”Raggi and Provana di  ID=”ITerm146”Collegno ; one diplomat: 
Beraurdo di Pralormo; two Judges of the Supreme Court:  ID=”ITerm147”Coller and  ID=”ITerm148”Gromo and fi nally:  ID=”ITerm149”Gallina , 
Querelli di  ID=”ITerm150”Lesegno , Sclopis di  ID=”ITerm151”Salerano . 
19  ID=”ITerm156” es Ambrois De Nevâche, Luigi Francesco .  1901 .  Notes et souvenirs inédits du chevalier Lois 
Des Ambrois De Nevâche . Bologna: Zanichelli. 
20  ID=”ITerm158” l Costituzionale Subalpino , Monday 6th March 1848, N° 5: «we do not wish to hide that upon 
the fi rst reading of the  ID=”ITerm159”Statute , we remained a bit uncertain as to whether it was the same one to 
correspond to the great expectation we had of it; modeled largely upon the  ID=”ITerm160” 830 French 
Constitution, it appeared to be incomplete and lacking at fi rst glance». 
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 «lo Statuto o la costituzione preconizzata l’otto febbraio e di cui il re ne annunciò gli ele-
menti preliminari, fu pubblicata nel suo intiero il 4 corrente; ma è notabile che se la prima 
concitò un giubilo straordinario, non fu così della seconda che anche in vista dei nuovi 
avvenimenti in Francia, avrebbe potuto essere un po’ più disimpacciata» 21 
 Nonetheless, it was recognised that
 «la costituzione Carl’Albertina in nessun altro articolo può essere inferiore alle altre due 
costituzioni italiane». 22 
 Against the ‘malevolent critics’ who complained about the brevity and the back-
wardness of the constitution text, intervened Camillo  Cavour who, in a famous 
article which appeared in the  Il Risorgimento newspaper, clarifi ed that
 «uno statuto organico deve racchiudere, a senso nostro, i principi fondamentali della costi-
tuzione e nulla di più. Onde siamo disposti a credere piuttosto essere sceso in troppi parti-
colari. Le leggi organiche che il legislatore ci annunzia, quella elettorale segnatamente, 
sono il completamento dello Statuto, sono esse che ne costituiranno in massima parte il 
merito reale». 23 
 The famous statesman underlined that:
 Una nazione non può spogliarsi della facoltà di mutare con mezzi legali le sue leggi 
politiche. Non può menomamente, in alcun modo, abdicare il potere costituente. Questo, 
nelle monarchie assolute, è riposto nel sovrano legittimo; nelle monarchie costituzionali il 
Parlamento, cioè il Re e le Camere, ne sono pienamente investiti … Ma se un tale potere sta 
nel Parlamento da noi dichiarato onnipotente, il Re solo non lo possiede più. Un ministro 
che gli consigliasse di fare un uso senza consultare la nazione, violerebbe i principi costi-
tuzionali, incorrerebbe nella più grave responsabilità. 24 
 With this article  Cavour contributed to spreading the idea that the constitutional 
text was fl exible and could be broadened and updated through organic laws. 25 
21  ID=”ITerm161”L’Opinione , Wednesday 8th March 1848, N° 30: «the  ID=”ITerm162”Statute or the constitution heralded on 
eighth February and whose preliminary elements the king announced, was published in its entirety 
on 4th day of the current month; yet it is noticeable that if the former provoked extraordinary joy, 
it was not thus for the latter one which, also because of the new events in  ID=”ITerm163”France , could have been 
a bit more untightened». 
22  «The Charles  ID=”ITerm164”Albert constitution in none of its aspects can be inferior to the other two Italian 
constitutions».  ID=”ITerm165”L’Opinione , 8th March 1848, N° 30. 
23  ID=”ITerm168” l Risorgimento , 10th March 1848, N° 63: «an organic statute must encompass, according to us, 
the fundamental principles of the constitution and nothing else. Therefore we are prepared to 
believe, rather, to have gone down into too much detail. Organic laws that the legislator announces 
to us, especially the electoral laws, are what completes the  ID=”ITerm169”Statute , it is they that will represent, to 
a large extent, its real merit». 
24  Ibidem: «A nation cannot wipe away the faculty of changing its political statute laws with legal 
means. It cannot remotely abdicate, in any way, its constituent  ID=”ITerm170”power . This, in absolute monar-
chies, lies with the legitimate sovereign; in constitutional  ID=”ITerm171” onarchies , with the  ID=”ITerm172”Parliament , that is 
the  ID=”ITerm173”King and the Houses are fully invested with it … However if such a power resides in Parliament, 
which has been declared omnipotent by us, the King alone does not possess it any more. A minister 
who suggested him to use it without consulting the nation, would violate the constitutional prin-
ciples, would incur the most serious responsibility». 
25  Concerning the character of fl exibility of the  ID=”ITerm175”Statute , see: Rossi, Luigi.  1940 . La “elasticità” 
dello Statuto italiano. In  Scritti giuridici in onore di Santi Romano , 1, 25–43. Padova: Cedam. 
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 Weighing upon these negative judgments, recalled Federico  Sclopis , there was 
the shadow of the second French republic which put an end to the  Monarchy of July 
raising the doubt that a constitution granted by the  King is one of those «po-tions of 
quacks». 26 It is opportune, however, to highlight that some choices and anachro-
nisms of the  Albertine Statute can be explained by the circumstance that Charles 
 Albert was determined to overcome the obstacle of the constitution in the political 
sense of the word, of the representative and democratic constitution, degrading and 
limiting royal authority with the granting of a legal order which profoundly changes 
the State, which constitutes real progress as regards the preceding regime. In other 
words, the  Statute of Charles  Albert served to defend the  monarchy from the threat 
of the people by way of a conciliatory act and renounced the word constitution in 
favour of the word statute thus recalling in such a way the constitutional statutes of 
the  Kingdom of Italy (1805–1810) as well as municipal tradition. 
 In the Minutes of the  Consiglio di Conferenza (Conference Council), 27 we can 
read that the royal granting had to
 «combinare e calcolare tutti gli elementi di cui si potrebbe disporre per formulare un pro-
getto conservatore capace di tutelare la dignità sovrana, l’autorità reale e la tranquillità del 
paese» 28 
 Marquis Cesare  Alfi eri di  Sostegno , the Minister for Education, noted that
 «l’opinione pubblica più o meno illuminata sulle questioni più gravi, ma sovraeccitata dalla 
stampa liberale, soverchia il Governo da ogni parte, al punto da intralciare nel modo più 
allarmante la sua azione e la sua iniziativa; e se ciò è così, non è meglio costituire  legalmente 
Pace, Alessandro. 1996.  La causa della rigidità costituzionale. Una rilettura di Bryce, dello 
Statuto  ID=”ITerm176”Albertino  e di qualche altra costituzione . Padova: Cedam. Bignami, Marco.  1997 . 
 ID=”ITerm177”Costituzione fl essibile , Costituzione rigida e controllo di costituzionalità in Italia (1848–1956) , 
Milano: Giuffrè. Soddu, Francesco. 2003. Lo Statuto albertino: una Costituzione «fl essibile» ID=”ITerm178”? In 
 Parlamento e Costituzione nei sistemi costituzionali europei ottocenteschi/Parlament und 
Verfassung in den konstitutionellen Verfassungssystemen Europas , eds. Anna G. Manca and Luigi 
Lacchè, 425–433. Bologna, il Mulino, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot. 
26  ID=”ITerm182”Sclopis, Federico .  1849 . Della introduzione del Governo rappresentativo in Piemonte. In 
I”Colombo, Adolfo.  1924 .  Dalle riforme allo Statuto di Carlo Alberto. Documenti editi ed inediti . 
Casale: Tipografi a Cooperativa Bellatore, Bosco e C.; Falco, Giorgio, 188. 
27  Numerous are the editions of the minutes of the  ID=”ITerm191”Consiglio di Conferenza (Conference Council): 
Manno, Antonio.  1885 . La concessione dello Statuto: notizie di fatto documentate, Pisa, Tip. 
F. Mariotti; Zanichelli, Domenico.  1898 .  Lo Statuto di  ID=”ITerm192”Carlo Alberto  secondo i processi verbali del 
Consiglio di Conferenza dal 3 febbraio al 4 marzo 1848, Roma: Società editrice Dante Alighieri; 
 ID=”ITerm193”Colombo, Adolfo .  1924 .  Dalle riforme allo Statuto di Carlo Alberto. Documenti editi ed inediti , 
cit.; Falco, Giorgio.  1945 .  Lo Statuto albertino illustrato dai lavori preparatori . Roma: Capriotti; 
Negri, Guglielmo and Simoni, Silvano. 1992.  Lo Statuto  ID=”ITerm194”Albertino  e i lavori preparatori . Roma: 
Fondazione di San Paolo Torino; Ciaurro, Luigi. 1996.  Lo Statuto albertino illustrato dai lavori 
preparatori. Roma: Dipartimento per l’informazione e l’editoria. 
28  In this current contribution, quotations from the Minutes are taken from Ciaurro, Luigi. 1996.  Lo 
Statuto albertino illustrato dai lavori preparatori , cit., 117: «combine and calculate all elements 
which could be at their disposal in order to formulate a conservative project able to protect sover-
eign dignity, royal authority and peace throughout the land». 
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l’opinione in Parlamento, anziché lasciar durare questo stato di antagonismo, il cui urto 
diretto ed immediato scuote ogni giorno la Monarchia fi n nelle sue fondamenta?»  29 
 For such reasons, within the  Consiglio di Conferenza (Conference Council), the 
idea strengthened that the constitution was a «calamity», but it was always the 
«lesser evil in order to avoid larger catastrophes». Therefore, for Count  Avet , the 
only alternative was a «moderate constitution, like that of  France , or any other that 
was compatible with the honor of the Crown». 30 
 Finally, the Albertine  charter attempted to sterilise popular sovereignty and con-
stituent  power by avoiding every reference to it. Royal sovereignty is the only 
source of political legitimacy and all the  auctoritas resides in the person of the 
 monarch who has decided to grant the constitution as well as limiting himself. In 
this way, it joined with the opinion of the time, expressed by  Talleyrand and by 
 Metternich and included for the fi rst time in the famous  preamble of the  Charte of 
 1814 , according to which the  monarchy maintained the  plentitudo potetastis of 
absolute  monarchy within the constitutional regime and via the granting of a funda-
mental law reaffi rmed its supremacy. An idea of “rational monarch” came to the 
fore in this way, one which went comfortably together with the old fi gure of the 
royal sacredness. 31 Therefore, the  Albertine Statute may be fully placed within that 
which Werner Daum defi ned monarchical  constitutionalism with monarchical pre-
dominance which saw, from 1814 to 1815, widespread radiation throughout Europe 
and opposed monarchical constitutionalism with parliamentary predominance, 
which remained a sporadic form, except for Spain (1820–1823),  Naples (1820–
1821),  Piedmont (1821), Portugal (1822–1823), at least till the  revolutions of 
1848. 32 
2.2  Culture, Foreign Models and Coeval  Experiences 
 From the minutes of the  Consiglio di Conferenza ( King ’s Council), it clearly 
emerges that the model which inspired the compilers was the French constitutional 
ordinances adapted to the context of  Piedmont . The King when entrusting the task 
was, however, careful to underline the non-servile imitation of the foreign 
29  Ibidem , 118: «public opinion which was more or less enlightened on the more serious issues, but 
overexcited by the liberal press, over-whelms the Government from all angles, to the point where 
it hampers its action and initiative in the most alarming way; and if it is so, is it not better to legally 
constitute opinion in  ID=”ITerm197”Parliament , rather than let this state of antagonism, whose direct and immedi-
ate impact every day shakes the  ID=”ITerm198”Monarchy to its very bones, persist?». 
30  Ibidem , 119. 
31  ID=”ITerm211”Lacchè, Luigi .  2009 . Le carte ottriate. La teoria dell’octroi e le esperienze costituzionali 
nell’Europa post-rivoluzionaria.  Giornale di storia costituzionale 18: 229–254. 
32  Daum, Werner. 2012. Verfassungsstruktur der zentralen staatlichen Ebene. In  Handbuch der 
europäischen Verfassungsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert. Institutionen und Rechtspraxis im gesell-
schaftlichen Wandel , Werner Daum, Peter Brandt, Martin Kirsch, Arthur Schlegelmilch (eds.), 
Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz Nachf. Vol. 2: 1815–1847. 
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constitutional texts, mindful of the events of 1812 that witnessed the promulgation 
of a constitution (the  Cádiz constitution) disconnected from the political and eco-
nomic situation of the kingdom. The foreign models were ‘adapted at a lower level’, 
fruit of practical and empirical changes determined more by the needs of events 
than by matured choices and organic, theoretic elaborations. 33 
 On the topic of  sovereignty , Italian authors found their theoretic reference points 
and began their rebuilding journey from Romagnosi and Sismondi with continual 
references to the English tradition as seen through French culture. 34 The choice of 
the French, restoration model meant the non-acceptance of the revolutionary tradi-
tion. The French  Revolution had dethroned the sovereign leaving the question of 
fi lling the ‘empty throne’. 35 The  sovereignty of the absolute monarch was trans-
ferred to the people. 
 The  Chartes of 1814 and  1830 had recourse to the contractual technique. 36 The 
Charte of  1814 makes express reference to the pact between sovereign and people. 
The  1830  Charte is not  octroyée (granted)  but it is the emanation of the French 
parliament and Louis- Philippe accepts subscribing to a pact becoming king of 
 France . The doctrinarians from Orléans qualifi ed  sovereignty in negative terms and 
formulated the doctrine of sovereignty of the Constitution. 37 François Guizot pointed 
out that both the sovereignty of the people and the  sovereignty of the absolute  mon-
arch led to tyranny. 38 The author used, moreover, the distinction between origin and 
33  On this point, cf.  ID=”ITerm222”Allegretti ,  ID=”ITerm223”Umberto .  1989 .  Profi lo di storia costituzionale italiana , cit., 
192–193. 
34  On the characters of Italian constitutionalism, see  ID=”ITerm225”Lacchè, Luigi .  2012 . Il Costituzionalismo 
liberale. In  Il Contributo italiano alla storia del Pensiero – Diritto . 
 The article can now be consulted on the website:  http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/
il-costituzionalismo-liberale_%28Il_Contributo_italiano_alla_storia_del_Pensiero:_Diritto%29/ . 
 The author has the merit of having faithfully summarised the peculiar characters of Italian 
constitutionalism which is greatly centred on the connection between freedoms of the press, public 
opinion, constitutional  ID=”ITerm226”government /representative  ID=”ITerm227” onarchy . He has, besides, underlined that the 
liberal constitutional culture has British roots but a French form, fi ltered through Constant, Rossi, 
Charles-Guillaume  ID=”ITerm228”Hello and other Orléanist writers. 
35  Viola, Paolo. 1989 .  Il trono vuoto. La transizione della sovranità nella rivoluzione francese . 
Torino: Einaudi. 
36 As regards French constitutionalism, see Saitta, Armando.  1975 .  Costituenti e Costituzioni della 
Francia rivoluzionaria e liberale (1789–1875). Milano: Giuffrè. Guchet, Yves.  1993 .  Histoire 
costitutionelle de la  ID=”ITerm232”France  1789–1974 . Paris: Economica. Rasanvallon, Pierre.  1994 .  La monar-
chie impossible. Les Chartes de 1814 et de  ID=”ITerm233”1830 . Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard.  ID=”ITerm234”Lacchè, Luigi . 
 2002 .  La libertà che guida il Popolo. Le Tre Gloriose Giornate del luglio  ID=”ITerm235”1830  e le «Chartes» nel 
costituzionalismo francese. Bologna: il Mulino. Alvazzi Del Frate, Paolo.  2013 . La Charte del 4 
giugno 1814: una introduzione.  Historia et ius. Rivista di storia giuridica dell’età medievale e 
moderna 3 ( http://www.historiaetius.eu/num-3.html ). 
37  ID=”ITerm242”Lacchè, Luigi .  2002 . La libertà che guida il Popolo. Le Tre Gloriose Giornate del luglio  ID=”ITerm243”1830  e 
le «Chartes» nel costituzionalismo francese , cit., 155 ff. 
38  Guizot, François Pierre Guillaume.  1851 .  Histoire des origines du gouvernement représentatif en 
Europe . Paris: Didier, Libraire-éditeur. The author said: «la souveraineté du peuple réduit à n’être 
plus que la souveraineté de la majorité. (…) la majorité n’a aucun droit que celui de la force même 
qui ne peut être, à ce titre seul, la souveraineté légitime. (…) la majorité en tant que majorité, c’est-
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exercise of  sovereignty . According to him, the people delegated the exercise of sov-
ereignty to the representatives to the end of guaranteeing the functioning of the new 
institutions via a contract. The distinction between the exercise and origin of sover-
eignty served the purpose of limiting and neutralising popular sovereignty. 39 Also 
Charles Guillaume  Hello , deputy of the July  Monarchy , noted that the English  con-
stitution was the work of the parliament while in France the parliament was the 
work of the Constitution. This historical fact caused that, in France, the illusion of 
constituent  power developed. Fruit of the rational method that wants a separation 
between creative moment and creation. This distinction was not however needed 
any more and was no longer present in the  Charte. 40 
 From this point, the  liberals recognised the attribute of sovereign entity to the 
Constitution and in it, was the absorption of the sovereignty of the  people , the 
Constitution became an  ab origine depositary of the supreme power. The theory of 
 sovereignty of the Constitution, elaborated throughout the course of the Restoration, 
constituted a phase for the ultimate defi nition of the concept of national 
 sovereignty . 41 
 The compilers of the  Albertine Statute were aware of the French debate on  sov-
ereignty and for this reason every reference to the origin of legitimate  power was 
left out. The protagonists of the constituent process in  Piedmont , even if imbued in 
French culture, did not think ill of looking beyond the Channel, the father-land of 
all liberties. Concerning the topic of  sovereignty and within the view of an evolu-
tionary  interpretation of the  Statute , there were several references to English works 
and among those most mentioned was the reconstruction contained in the 
Commentaries of  Blackstone :
 «The power and jurisdiction of parliament, says Sir Edward  Coke , is so transcendent and 
absolute, that it cannot be confi ned, either for causes or persons, within any bounds. And of 
this high court, he adds, it may be truly said, “si antiquitatem spectes, est vetustissima; si 
dignitatem, est honoratissima; si jurisdictionem, est capacissima”. It hath sovereign and 
uncontrollable authority in the making, confi rming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, 
repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible denomina-
tions, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal. (…) It can, in short, 
do everything that is not naturally impossible; and therefore some have not scrupled to call 
its power, by a fi gure rather too bold, the omnipotence of parliament. True it is, that what 
à-dire en tant que nombre, ne possède donc la souveraineté légitime ni en vertu de la force qui ne 
la confère jamais, ni en vertu de l’infaillibilité qu’elle n’a point (…) Le principe de la souveraineté 
du peuple, c’est-à-dire le droit égal des individus à l’exercice de la souveraineté, ou seulement le 
droit de tous les individus de concourir à l’exercice de la souveraineté, est donc radicalement faux; 
car, sous prétexte de maintenir l’égalité légitime, il introduit violemment l’égalité où elle n’est pas, 
et viole l’inégalité légitime. Les conséquences de ce principe sont le despotisme du nombre, la 
domination des infériorités sur les supériorité, c’est-à-dire, la plus violente et la plus iniques des 
tyrannies» (I, 106–108). 
39  Laquièze, Alain.  2002 .  Les origines du régime parlementaire en  ID=”ITerm247”France  (1814–1848). Vendôme: 
Presses Universitaires de la France, 109–119 (spec. 115–116). 
40  ID=”ITerm252”Hello , Charles  ID=”ITerm253”Guillaume .  Du régime constitutionnel . Paris: Gustave Pissin libraire, 114 ff. 
41  ID=”ITerm258”Bacot, Guillaume .  1985 .  Carré de Malberg et l’origine de la distinction entre souveraineté du 
peuple et souveraineté nationale . Paris: Éditions du CNRS. 
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the parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo: so that it is a matter most essential 
to the liberties of this kingdom that such members be delegated to this important trust as are 
most eminent for their probity, their fortitude, and their knowledge». 42 
 In these famous pages, the author contributed to the development of the doctrine 
of the  Sovereignty of  Parliament , 43 according to which there was no supreme author-
ity which could limit the powers of the legislature and there was no subject that 
couldn’t be discussed and approved in  Parliament . On the other hand, the authority 
of the Parliament did not fi nd constitutional limits so that it could change the 
Constitution. In particular,  Blackstone referred to Sir Edward  Coke . When  Coke 
spoke of «transcendent and absolute» authority, he recognized that the powers 
inherent in Parliament were derived from the law and no other authority. 44 By virtue 
of the supremacy of the law, all powers, including those of the  King , were subjected 
to the law.  Coke limited the prerogatives of royal power through parliamentary con-
trol and the common law. This was because the law did not include only the law of 
the reigning monarch, but also the laws of his predecessors and the Parliaments 
convened in the past. Following this line of reasoning, with simple and attractive 
42  C.f.  ID=”ITerm268”Blackstone , William. 1893 . Commentaries on the Laws of  ID=”ITerm269”England  in Four Books. Notes 
selected from the editions of Archibold, Christian, Coleridge, Chitty, Stewart, Kerr, and others, 
Barron Field’s Analysis, and Additional Notes, and a Life of the Author by George Sharswood. In 
Two Volumes . Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co. Book 1, Chaper 2. 
43  The doctrine of the Sovereignty of  ID=”ITerm271”Parliament is one of the fundamental elements underpinning 
the British constitution. Therefore, the literature in this respect is immeasurable. It should be 
remembered here the classic study of Goldsworthy. Jeffrey.  1999 .  The Sovereignty of  ID=”ITerm272”Parliament : 
History and Philosophy . Oxford: Clarendon Press. We can also refer to: Roy Stone De Montpensier. 
 1966 . The British Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty: A Critical Inquiry . Louisiana Law 26: 
753 ff. Dickinson, Harry T.  1998 . The ideological debate on the British constitution in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In  Il modello costituzionale inglese e la sua recezione 
nell’area mediterranea tra la fi ne del 700 e la prima metà dell’800. Atti del Seminario internazio-
nale di studi in memoria di Francisco Tomás y Valiente (Messina, 14–16 novembre 1996) , ed. 
A. Romano, Milano: Giuffrè, 145–192 (spec. 166–177).  ID=”ITerm273”Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, Joaquín .  2003 . 
Sovereignty in British legal doctrine.  Historia Constitucional (revista electrónica) 4 ( http://hc.
rediris.es/04/index.html ).  ID=”ITerm274”Müβig, Ulrike .  2008 . Constitutional confl icts in seventeenth-century 
 ID=”ITerm275”England .  Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis/Revue d’Histoire du Droit/The Legal History review 
76: 27–47. 
44  ID=”ITerm280”Coke , Eduard.  2002 .  The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of  ID=”ITerm281”England : Concerning the 
Jurisdiction of Courts . Union New Jersey: The Lawbook Enchange (originally published: London: 
W. Clarke, 1817), I, chap.  The high Court of  ID=”ITerm282”Parliament , 36 ff. C.f. Gough, John Wiedhofft.  1955 . 
 Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History . Oxford: Clarendon Press; Gray, Charles M 
 1980 . Reason, Authority, and Imagination. The Jurisprudence of Sir Edward  ID=”ITerm283”Coke . In  Culture and 
Politics from Puritanism to the Enlightenment , ed. Perez Zagorìn. Berkley-Los Angeles- London: 
University of California Press, 25–66; Boyer, Allen.  2003 .  Sir Edward  ID=”ITerm284”Coke  and the Elizabethan 
Age. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press; Berman, Harold J.  2010 .  Diritto e rivoluzi-
one. II. L’impatto delle riforme protestanti sulla tradizione giuridica occidentale . Bologna: il 
Mulino, 429–442 (originally published:  Law and Revolution. II. The Impact of the Protestant 
Reformation on the Western Legal Tradition . Cambridge-London: Harvard University Press). 
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lexicon,  Blackstone not only described the British parliamentary  system , but con-
tributed with his work to create the myth of the British  Constitution . 45 
 In 1822, the Commentaries of  Blackstone are translated and annotated in French 
and through this edition circulated in  Piedmont . M. Christian explained the meaning 
of “omnipotence of  Parliament ” to the public. The French judge said:
 «L’omnipotence du parlement n’est que le pouvoir souverain de l’État, ou un pouvoir 
d’action qui n’est contrôlé par aucun pouvoir supérieur. En ce sens, le roi dans l’exercice de 
ses prérogatives, et la chambre des lords dans l’exercice de l’interprétation des lois, sont de 
même tout-puissants; c’est-à-dire que la constitution n’a établi aucun supérieur pour 
restreindre en cela leur pouvoir». 46 
 Alexis de  Tocqueville , too, who had a great infl uence in Italy, noted that:
 «En Angleterre, on reconnaît au parlement le droit de modifi er la constitution. En Angleterre, 
la Constitution peut donc changer sans cesse, au plutôt elle n’existe point. Le parlement en 
même temps qu’il est corps législatif et corps constituants». 47 
 The British doctrine of Sovereignty of  Parliament occupied the place that else-
where was assigned to the sovereignty of people or the sovereignty of the State. 48 In 
45  See Schiera, Pierangelo. 1998. La costituzione inglese tra storia e mito. In  Il modello costituzi-
onale inglese e la sua recezione nell’area mediterranea tra la fi ne del 700 , cit., 39–58. 
46  C.f.  ID=”ITerm293”Blackstone , William. 1822–1823.  Commentaires sur les lois Anglaises, par W.  ID=”ITerm294”Blackstone , 
avec des notes de m. Ed. Christian. Traduits de l’anglais sur la quinzième édition par N.M. Chompré . 
Paris: Rey et Gravier, libraires. 1, 279: «the omnipotence of parliament is but the sovereign power 
of the State, or a power of action which is not controlled by any superior power. In this sense, the 
king in exercising his prerogatives, and the house of lords in exercising the interpretation of laws, 
are both all powerful; that is that the constitution has not established any superior to restrain their 
power in this». 
47  Tocqueville,  ID=”ITerm296”Alexis .  1954 .  Oeuvres complètes. De la Démocratie en Amérique . Paris: Gallimard, 
166–167: «In  ID=”ITerm297”England , the right to change the constitution is recognised to the parliament. In 
England, the Constitution may change umpteen times, or more accurately, it does not exist at all. 
 ID=”ITerm298”Parliament , at the same time as it is legislative body and constituent body». 
 As is known, Tocqueville never wrote systematic pages on English constitutionalism. For 
movement on the English model in  ID=”ITerm299”France from a wide literature see: Zeldin, Theodore.  1959 . 
English Ideas in French Politics during the Nineteenth Century.  The Historical journal 2: 40–58; 
Bonno, Gabriel.  1970 .  La constitution britannique devant l’opinion française de Montesquieu à 
Bonapart. Geneve: Slatkine.  ID=”ITerm300”Jennings, Jeremy.  1986 . Conceptions of  ID=”ITerm301”England and its Constitution 
in Nineteenth-Century French Political Thought.  The Historical Journal 29: 65–85;  ID=”ITerm302”Bacot, 
Guillaume .  1993 . Les monarchiens et la constitution anglaise.  Revue de la Recherche juridique 3: 
709–737; Tillet, Edouard.  2001 .  La constitution anglaise, un modèle politique et institutionnel 
dans la France des Lumieres. Aix-en-Provence: Presses universitaires d’Aix-Marseille; Griffo, 
Maurizio.  2002 . La Costituzione inglese in Francia all’epoca delle due carte: il giudizio dei con-
temporanei. In  Le costituzioni anglosassoni e l’Europa. Rifl essi e dibattito tra ‘800 e ‘900 , ed. 
Eugenio Capozzi. Rubettino. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 33–53; Ferrara, Gerri.  2005 . Il mod-
ello inglese: le Chartes del 1814 e del  ID=”ITerm303”1830 . In  La Costituzione britannica/The British Constitution. 
Atti del convegno dell’Associazione di diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo, Bari, Università 
degli studi, 29–30 maggio 2003 , eds. A. Torre and L. Volpi. Torino: Giappichelli, II, 1053–1075. 
48  Torre, Alessandro.  2005 . La circolazione del modello costituzionale inglese. In  Culture costituzi-
onali a confronto. Europa e Stati Uniti dall’età delle rivoluzioni all’età contemporanea. Atti del 
Convegno internazionale. Genova 29–30 aprile 2004 , ed. Fernanda Mazzanti Pepe. Genova: 
Name, 86. 
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 England , the concept of sovereignty would be tightly connected to the concept of 
freedom and people: sovereignty was no longer a vague, imprecise idea, rather it 
was the expression and the function of an individual sovereignty. Sovereignty was 
considered as belonging to the people since it was made up of individuals who each 
possessed rights wherein elements of sovereignty could be seen. In contrast to the 
French case, where the  pouvoir  constituant was an exceptional sovereignty, the doc-
trine of the Omnipotence of  Parliament considered constituent  power as a historical 
combination derived from the balance of powers. 49 Parliament had many functions, 
not only the legislative one. 50 The Parliament was the place where it resolved 
clashes. In addition, the legislature was the place which linked the consent of gov-
erned people with rulers. If  Blackstone insisted on the Sovereignty of Parliament, 
John  Locke had, however, the merit of recognizing a particular strength of the con-
sensus. 51 In fact, he said:
 «This legislative is not only the supreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred and unal-
terable in the hands where the community have once placed it. Nor can any edict of any-
body else, in what form soever conceived, or by what power soever backed, have the force 
and obligation of a law which has not its sanction from that legislative which the public has 
chosen and appointed; for without this the law could not have that which is absolutely nec-
essary to its being a law, the consent of the society, over whom nobody can have a power to 
make laws but by their own consent and by authority received from them; and therefore all 
the obedience, which by the most solemn ties any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately 
terminates in this supreme power, and is directed by those laws which it enacts». 52 
 Later, on this particular aspect, Walter  Bagehot clarifi ed that the link between the 
governed/rulers focused on the fact that «the mass of the English people yield a 
deference rather to something else than to their rulers. They defer to what we may 
call the  theatrical show of society». 53 According to Bagehot, the British constitu-
tional system was made up on the mass of the people who yielded obedience to a 
select few and «the few rule by their hold, not over the reason of the multitude, but 
over their imaginations, and their habits; over their fancies as to distant things they 
49  Pombeni, Paolo.  1992 . Introduzione. In  Potere costituente e riforme costituzionali , ed. Paolo 
Pombeni. Bologna: Il Mulino, 9. See also in the same volume: Burrow, John W.  Il dibattito costi-
tuzionale nella Gran Bretagna del diciannovesimo secolo , 13–32. 
50  Jennings, Ivor.  1969 .  ID=”ITerm309”Parliament . Cambridge: Univerity Press, 3–4, 8: «In emphasising the ‘tran-
scendent and absolute’ authority of Parliament we tend, moreover, to stress too strongly the legisla-
tive functions of the both Houses. (…) Here it is necessary to emphasise that, when the  ID=”ITerm310”Government 
has a majority in both Houses, the ‘transcendent and absolute’ authority of Parliament is the 
authority of the Government. It is not really transcendent and absolute. Behind the Government 
and behind the House of Commons stands public opinion». 
51  On this aspect see, diffusely, Steinberg, Jules.  1978 .  Locke,  ID=”ITerm313”Rousseau  and the Idea of Consent. 
An Inquiry into the Liberal-Democratic Theory of Political Obligation . London: Greenwood press 
and  ID=”ITerm314”Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, Joaquín .  2003 . Sovereignty in British legal doctrine.  Historia 
Constitucional , cit., 282 ff. 
52  ID=”ITerm315”Locke, John .  1952 .  The second treatise of  ID=”ITerm316”government , ed., with an introduction, by Thomas 
P. Peardon. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill company. Book II, Chapter 11: Of the Extent of the 
Legislative Power, § 134. 
53  ID=”ITerm318”Bagehot, Walter .  1873 .  The English Constitution . Boston: Little, Brown, and company, 198. 
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do not know at all, over their customs as to near things which they know very 
well». 54 
 Drawing experience from the English  Constitution , the Subalpine  liberals agree 
to the idea that the Constitutional  Government rests upon public opinion. Indeed, 
even in later moments, reference to the English experience remained a constant for 
Italian constitutionalists. 55 
 In conclusion, it is possible to observe that the  Albertine Statute was also coher-
ent with those Italian  octroyées constitutions of 1848 which, on this matter, opted 
for silence and drew inspiration from the French Charters. 56 Such were the 
 Constitution of the Kingdom of the Two  Sicilies , 57 published on 10th February 1848 
by Ferdinando II, the  Statute of the Grand Duchy of  Tuscany 58 published on 15th 
February by Leopoldo II, and the  Fundamental Statutes of the Papal  States , 59 elabo-
rated by a commission of clergymen in a single month (14th February – 12th March 
1848) during the papacy of  Pius IX . Being born in order to subdue the uprisings, 
they were similarly brief and laconic and left a lot to constitutional practice. 
Nevertheless, we are dealing with charters that had a very brief lifespan and were 
unable to translate themselves into experience. Diametrically opposed to Italian 
constitutional choices will be, the  Constitution of the Roman  Republic , 60 voted by 
54  Ibidem , 201. 
55 Alessandro Torre noted that the English constitutional experience is paradigmatic not so much in 
terms of the immediate reproduction of institutions but because of the processes activated. Cf. 
Torre, Alessandro.  2005 . La circolazione del modello costituzionale inglese. In  Culture costituzi-
onali a confronto , cit., 111: «Sia il caso dell’evoluzione costituzionale francese della prima metà 
dell’Ottocento sia quello dello Statuto  ID=”ITerm322”albertino confermano se non altro che il “modello inglese” 
ha assunto in alcuni momenti della storia europea una esplicita valenza paradigmatica non tanto 
sotto il profi lo dell’immediata riproduzione di istituti e del trapianto istituzionale, quanto piuttosto 
per i processi attivati. Gli slittamenti extra-formale delle esperienze costituzionali della Francia 
restaurativa e dell’Italia statutaria, che inevitabilmente si producono nel senso dell’affermazione di 
equilibri». 
56  Casanova, Paola. 2001.  Le costituzioni italiane del 1848-’49 . Torino: Giappichelli. 
57  For a general overview, see Morello, Maria. 2007. Per la storia delle costituzioni siciliane. Lo 
Statuto fondamentale del regno di Sicilia del 1848.  Studi Urbinati di scienze giuridiche politiche 
ed economiche 57, 309–361. References in Quazza, Romolo, 1942. Il governo napoletano nei 
primi due mesi del 1848.  Rassegna storica del Risorgimento 2–3/XXIX: 207–230 and 327–370. 
 ID=”ITerm326”Scirocco, Alfonso . 1993.  ID=”ITerm327” l Parlamento e la lotta politica a Napoli dopo il 15 maggio 1848.  Clio. 
Rivista trimestrale di studi storici 3/XXIX: 445–460. Spanoletti, Angeloantonio. 1997.  Storia del 
Regno delle Due Sicilie . Bologna: Il Mulino, 282–301. 
58 As regards this constitution, see Chiavistelli, Antonio. 2006.  Dallo Stato alla nazione. 
Costituzione e sfera pubblica in Toscana dal 1814 al 1849 . Roma: Carocci and Mannori, Luca. 
2015.  Lo Stato del Granduca 1530–1859. Le istituzioni della Toscana moderna in un percorso di 
testi commentati . Pisa: Pacini eitore, 267 ff. 
59  Wollenborg, Leo. 1935. Lo statuto pontifi cio nel quadro costituzionale del 1848.  Rassegna stor-
ica del Risorgimento XXII: 527–594 and Ara, Angelo. 1966.  Lo Statuto fondamentale dello Stato 
della Chiesa (14 marzo 1848). Contributo ad uno studio delle idee costituzionali nello Stato pon-
tifi cio nel periodo delle riforme di Pio IX . Milano: Giuffrè. 
60  Manzi. Irene. 2003.  La Costituzione della Repubblica romana del 1849 . Ancona: affi nità 
elettive. 
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the constituent assembly and approved on 3rd July 1849. At article 1 it affi rmed that 
«la sovranità è per diritto eterno nel popolo. Il popolo dello Stato Romano è costi-
tuito in repubblica democratica» (sovereignty is by eternal right within the people. 
The people of the State of Rome is constituted in a democratic republic). 
2.3  The Sovereign Power between Dictionaries, Political 
Catechisms and Newspapers 
 Above and beyond any explicit literal reference to the concepts of  sovereignty and 
to the origins of legitimate  power , in the period following the granting of the 
 Albertine Statute , lexical alchemies proper of the Italian constitutional tradition 
were created. It is on the level of an evolutionary  interpretation of the  Statute that 
the cares of the most enlightened minds of the Kingdom concentrated. 
 Sovereignty is a changeable concept: it changes physiognomy and was the sub-
ject of theoretic fl eeting treatments, as Cesare  Balbo recalled:
 «la parola sovranità è gravida di dubbi ed ambagi non è defi nita per anche unanimemente 
dalle scuole politiche, fi losofi che né teologiche; volendo alcune (dette storiche a’ nostri dì) 
che ogni  sovranità , quelle dei principi come delle repubbliche, abbia sua legittimità e suo 
diritto, o dal governo anteriore risalendo fi no al primitivo, ovvero dal tempo, cioè da un 
lungo, consentito possesso; e volendo l’altra (detta fi losofi ca) che ogni sovranità abbia 
 legittimità e diritto da un presupposto contratto tra sovrano ed il popolo. Né mi porrò a 
disputare quale delle due scuole parte da un principio più giusto; o se i due non possan forse 
confondersi in quel possesso consentito. Bensì farò osservare che, in tutte queste scuole, 
qualunque di questi principi implica il diritto che ha il sovrano di mutare epperciò di 
diminuire il governo, cioè la somma potenza, col consenso del popolo» 61 
 Eighteen Forty-eight is the  annus mirabilis in that it will impose new sentences 
and a redefi nition of the vocabulary caused by, above all, lexicographic initiatives, 
important in the history of political language. 62 What with the ambiguities and the 
diffi culties  Balbo noted, a tidying up will be attempted, trying to retie the old and 
the new, keeping the ghosts of the French  Revolution at bay. The effort is to present 
61  ID=”ITerm340” l Risorgimento 15 Febbraio 1848, N° 42, 1848: «the word ‘sovereignty’ is fi lled with doubts and 
ambiguities, it is neither defi ned unanimously by the schools of politics, philosophy nor by those 
of theology; certain ones wishing (so-called historical schools, nowadays) that every sovereignty, 
those sovereign-ties of princes as well as those of republics, has its legitimacy and its right, either 
from the previous  ID=”ITerm341”government going back to the original one, or rather from time, that is from a 
long and permitted possess; and willing the other (so-called philosophical) that every sovereignty 
has legitimacy and right from a presupposed con-tract between sovereign and people. Neither will 
I put myself in the position of disputing which of the two schools starts off from a more right prin-
ciple; or if the two cannot per-haps be intertwined in that permitted possess. Rather, I will bring it 
to everyone’s attention that, in all these schools, whichever of these principles implies the right that 
the sovereign has to change and therefore diminish the  ID=”ITerm342”government , that is the supreme power, 
with the consent of the people». 
62  Leso, Erasmo.  1994 . Momenti di storia del linguaggio politico. In  Storia della lingua italiana. 
II. Scritto e parlato , eds. Luca Serianni and Pietro Trifone. Torino: Einaudi. 
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change as continuity. These attempts are very evident in the language transforma-
tions, as it is possible to note through the analysis of dictionaries, catechisms and 
newspapers. As we will see, at the centre of the debate, there will be the precise defi -
nition of the representative  government as sole form of legitimate  government . 
2.3.1  Dictionaries 
 Public debate in 1848 went on at various levels. The need to discuss public matters 
created a real ‘community of the word’ and of print  media . Public discussions 
wished to infl uence the choices of the rulers, they recalled the previous tradition and 
they invented a constitutional maturity which did not exist and was not supported 
by adequate theoretical elaboration. 63 
 The need to spread new political content and make constitutional language sim-
ple and familiar is, fi rst of all, faced by editorial businesses who will give birth to 
new dictionaries. 
 In the  Dizionario politico popolare , published by Pomba in 1851, we read that 
 sovereignty 
 «è la somma dei poteri concentrati nell’autorità suprema di uno Stato indipendente. V’ha 
 sovranità di fatto, ve n’ha di diritto. La prima equivale all’usurpazione, la seconda emana 
dalla vera sua fonte. La vera fonte della  sovranità è il popolo, mentre, nascendo gli uomini 
liberi ed eguali, ed avendo pur bisogno di un’autorità suprema a cui siano affi dati i poteri 
governativi per reggerli nella società civile, appartiene ad essi l’elezione di tale autorità. 
Ogni  sovranità che non scaturisce dunque dal suffragio del popolo è razionalmente illegit-
tima. Eppure i pilastri del despotismo dicono, alla rovescia, essere anzi il legittimismo 
qualità della sovranità che non nacque dal popolo, ma dal diritto divino» 64 
 With regard to the political and constitutional vocabulary,  sovereignty refers to 
the concept of  legitimacy . This connection is recorded in the  Dizionario politico- 
giovanile , published in  Turin in 1849, which recognised how
 «in politica,  legittimità ha un senso affatto suo e comparativamente moderno. Pretendersi 
che nel Congresso di Vienna il Principe di  Talleyrand mettesse in campo e facesse prevalere 
la dottrina della legittimità nel signifi cato di diritto al potere sovrano, conferito da Dio 
stesso ereditariamente ad alcune famiglie». 65 
63  Pöttgen, Kerstin.  2001 . Il discorso pubblico sulle costituzioni del 1848.  Rassegna storica del 
Risorgimento 88: 43–64. 
64  Dizionario politico popolare .  1851 . Torino: Tip. L. Alnardi (new edition Paolo Trifone, Roma: 
Salerno Editrice, 1984: «it is the sum of powers, concentrated in the supreme authority of an inde-
pendent State. There is de facto  ID=”ITerm352”sovereignty , and legal  ID=”ITerm353”sovereignty . The former equals usurpation, 
the latter comes from its true source. The true source of sovereignty is the people, while, men being 
born free and equal and even though needing a supreme authority to which the ruling powers are 
entrusted in order to hold them through-out civil society, election of such authority belongs to 
them. Every  ID=”ITerm354”sovereignty that does not spring forth from the suffrage of the people is rationally 
illegitimate. And yet the pillars of despotism say, contrarily, that legitimism is a quality of sover-
eignty which was not born of the people, but of divine right». 
65  Dizionario politico nuovamente compilato ad uso della gioventù italiana .  1849 . Torino: Pomba: 
«In politics,  ID=”ITerm360”legitimacy has a sense of its own and one that is comparatively modern. Expecting 
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 More interesting is the defi nition of  legitimacy contained in the  Dizionario polit-
ico parlamentare :
 «La teoria politica della  legittimità è quella che ammette il diritto ereditario di regnare in 
alcune famiglie come emanate direttamente da Dio. È un dogma relioso politico, affatto 
contrario al principio della sovranità  popolare » 66 
 These examples taken from the principal dictionaries of the time show how the 
conceptual intertwining is delicate and is destined to ambiguous overlapping be- 
tween sovereignty of the people and monarchical  principle , constituent organ and 
royal prerogatives. The materials utilised are not coherent. The dictionaries include 
neologisms and record concepts and new ideas, but we know that the technical 
terms of which they avail themselves is very limited. Dictionaries, often, tend to 
present lemmas in a not-very problematic way, rather to provide for exemplifying 
and elementary notions. 
2.3.2  Political Catechisms 
 The Nineteenth century is also the century where the question of education of the 
people is strongly perceived and the entire liberal  movement is aware of the need to 
have its propaganda penetrate within the ranks of the popular classes. The propa-
ganda often goes hand in hand with popularisation, the printed page becoming 
instrument of persuasion and struggle. Political catechisms, too, contribute to the 
spreading of the representative monarchical regime inaugurated by the constitu-
tional charter. We are dealing with a literary genre in a dialogue form circulating in 
Europe from  France . Political catechisms aimed principally at circulating political 
institutions and new constitutional ideas. 67 
 The most important example in the  Kingdom of Sardinia is the very famous 
 Piccolo catechismo costituzionale ad uso del Popolo , published by Michelangelo 
 Castelli and Giorgio  Briano following the Proclamation of 8th  February with the 
aim of circulating knowledge of the fundamental  Statute . With regard to the nature 
of representative  government and on sovereign power as supreme power, it affi rmed 
that «the representative  government is that in which the  supreme judiciary , instead 
of possessing absolute  power , is subject to the control of one or more assemblies of 
notable citizens, who contribute to the formulation of the Laws of the land together 
that in the Congress of Vienna, the Prince of  ID=”ITerm361” alleyrand put forward and made the doctrine of 
 ID=”ITerm362”legitimacy , in the meaning of the right to sovereign power given hereditarily down to certain fami-
lies by God himself, prevail». 
66  Carrera, Arnaldo. 1887.  Dizionario politico parlamentare. Milano : Sonsogno. «Political theory 
of  ID=”ITerm366”legitimacy is that which permits hereditary rights to reign in certain families in that given 
directly by God. It is a political religious dogma, totally opposed to the principle of popular 
sovereignty». 




with it», 68 pointing out that in the monarchical constitutional form the  government 
rules by virtue of a pact and «the difference between a constitutional  Monarch and 
an absolute  Monarch is, therefore, in this: that the former possess the supreme 
power only on certain conditions allowed by his people». 69 
 The ideas contained in the catechism bearing the names of  Castelli and  Briano 
were corroborated by and were readily discussed in the press. Particularly, Pietro 
Luigi  Albini highlighted from the pages of  Il Costituzionale Subalpino the main 
errors contained therein. The famous professor remarked on the lexical inaccuracies 
contained in the popular work of  Castelli and  Briano . The defi nition of ‘representa-
tive  government ’ was fi rst of all criticised. The inexact idea of supreme authority 
was criticised noting that
 «se nelle monarchie costituzionali la  sovranità , o come il nostro autore si esprime, la 
suprema magistratura, non si possiede e non si esercita che in virtù di un patto, di un con-
tratto con il popolo, e solo a certe condizioni, la conseguenza che inevitabilmente e diret-
tamente ne deriva, si è che, non adempiendo il monarca dal canto suo il contratto, mancando 
ad alcune delle condizioni del medesimo, egli decade dalla  sovranità , dalla suprema magis-
tratura. (…) Posto ciò la  sovranità del Re è distrutta, il principio dell’inviolabilità della sua 
persona, della sua responsabilità è un’illusione» 70 
 Albini specifi ed that the idea that the sovereignty of the  King is exercised by 
virtue of a contract is an old idea which has its matrix in the thought of  Rousseau 
and which is not matched by the constitutional experience of  Piedmont , also because 
the contract is not the only source from where to make obligations descend down to 
the Crown.  Albini took up again the idea that sovereignty comes down from the 
Constitution itself:
 «una nuova legge fondamentale che stabilisce una nuova forma di governo, che regola 
l’esercizio della sovranità, il modo di essere della medesima com’è richiesto dalle con-
dizioni della civiltà, che determini i diritti e i doveri del sovrano e del popolo, obbliga per 
68  «il governo  ID=”ITerm379” appresentativo è quello nel quale la suprema magistratura, invece di possedere un 
potere  ID=”ITerm380”assoluto , è soggetta al controllo d’una o di più assemblee di notabili, che concorrono con 
esso alla confezione delle Leggi del paese». Cf.  ID=”ITerm381”Castelli ,  ID=”ITerm382”Michelangelo and  ID=”ITerm383”Briano ,  ID=”ITerm384”Giorgio .  1848 . 
 Piccolo catechismo costituzionale ad uso del popolo col programma dello statuto fondamentale 
dell’8 febbraio 1848 . Torino: Gianini e Fiore, 13–14. Both authors collaborated with the  ID=”ITerm385” l 
 Risorgimento and belonged to the circle of  ID=”ITerm386”Cavour . For biographical references, please see: 
Talamo, Giuseppe. 1978.  ID=”ITerm387”Castelli , Michelangelo. In  Dizionario biografi co degli italiani 21 ( http://
www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/michelangelo-castelli_%28Dizionario_Biografi co%29/ ) and 
Farone, Anna. 1972.  ID=”ITerm388”Briano , Giorgio. In  Dizionario biografi co degli italiani  14 ( http://www.trec-
cani.it/enciclopedia/giorgio-briano_%28Dizionario_Biografi co%29/ ) 
69  Ibidem : «la differenza tra un Monarca  ID=”ITerm393”costituzionale e un Monarca assoluto sta dunque in ciò: 
che il primo non possiede il potere supremo che a certe condizioni consentite col suo popolo». 
70  ID=”ITerm404”Albini , Pietro Luigi. 1848. Errori del piccolo catechismo costituzionale ad uso del popolo.  Il 
Costituzionale Subalpino 8, Thursday 9th March.: «if, in constitutional monarchies,  ID=”ITerm405”sovereignty , 
or else as our author says, the  ID=”ITerm406”supreme judiciary , is possessed and is exercised only by virtue of a 
pact, of a contract with the people, and only on certain conditions, the consequence, that inevitably 
and directly come from it, is that if the monarch, for his part, does not fulfi l the contract, not com-
plying with some of its clauses, he forfeits sovereignty,  ID=”ITerm407”supreme judiciary . (…) Given this, the 
 ID=”ITerm408”sovereignty of the  ID=”ITerm409”King is destroyed, the principle of the inviolability of his person, of his respon-
sibility is an illusion». 
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se stessa irrevocabilmente il sovrano che l’ha fatta e i suoi successori senza bisogna di 
ricorrere ad un contratto che non esiste, e che legalmente non sarebbe guari concepibile, od 
a un’ipotesi ripugnante alla realtà del fatto». 71 
2.3.3  Newspapers 
 Particularly, the newspapers will constitute the place where a modern public opin-
ion which will be critical and alert will develop. In  Piedmont , the edict on the press 
of 30th October 1847 favoured the birth of new periodical newspapers. 72 Previous 
to 1848, the only political newspaper was the  Gazzetta Piemontese , faithful expres-
sion of the  government . From 1848,  journalism affi rmed itself as a privileged place 
of political discussion, gradually abandoning the merely informative, denotative 
and referential function, in order to open up to thoughts of a theoretical nature, to 
reforming propositions and to critical reports of political discussions. It is in this 
context that newspapers autonomous of the  government are published among 
which, for example,  Il Risorgimento 73 and  La Concordia 74 but also  L’Opinione , 75  Il 
Costituzionale Subalpino . 76 
71  Ibidem . «A new fundamental law which establishes a new form of  ID=”ITerm415”government , which regulates 
the exercise of sovereignty, the way of being of the same  ID=”ITerm416”sovereignty as is required by the condi-
tions of civilisation, which determines the rights and the duties of the sovereign and the people, 
which, by itself, irrevocably binds the sovereign who made it and his successors without the need 
to resort to a contract that does not exist and that legally would not be almost conceivable, or to a 
hypothesis repugnant to the realty of the fact». 
72  For an evaluation of the press, please see: Della Peruta, Franco.  1979 . Il giornalismo dal 1847 
all’Unità. In  La stampa italiana del Risorgimento , eds. Valerio Castronovo and Nicola Tranfaglia. 
Roma-Bari: Laterza. Talamo, Giuseppe.  1999 . Il giornalismo. In  Il Piemonte alle soglie del 1848 , 
ed. Umberto Levra. Torino: Carocci, 413–429. 
73  Published by Camillo  ID=”ITerm424”Cavour from 15th December 1847. Some of his collaborators are: Cesare 
 ID=”ITerm425”Balbo , Michelangelo  ID=”ITerm426”Castelli , Massimo  ID=”ITerm427” ’Azeglio , Angelo  ID=”ITerm428”Brofferio , Giuseppe  ID=”ITerm429” orelli , Riccardo 
 ID=”ITerm430”Sineo . The programme foresees «motivate the governors, moderate the governed» [synthesis of 
Cesare  ID=”ITerm431”Balbo ,  ID=”ITerm432” l Risorgimento 3rd February 1848, N° 31]. About this newspaper and  ID=”ITerm433”La Concordia , 
besides the bibliography recalled, see specifi cally  ID=”ITerm434”Colombo, Adolfo .  1910 . I due giornali torinesi 
“Il Risorgimento” e “ ID=”ITerm435”La Concordia ” negli albori della libertà.  Il Risorgimento italiano III: 28–65. 
74  Published on 1st January 1848 by Lorenzo  ID=”ITerm437”Valerio . Among the collaborators are: Prof. Domenico 
 ID=”ITerm438”Berti , Prof. Giuseppe  ID=”ITerm439”Bertoldi , Domenico  ID=”ITerm440”Carutti , Domenico Marco, Francesco  ID=”ITerm441”Galgano . Among 
the objectives stated in the programme, there is: «to move the population closer in harmony around 
the Prince and to support the  ID=”ITerm442”government ». 
75  Published on 26th January 1848 by Giacomo  ID=”ITerm444” urando and, then, by Antonio Bianchi  ID=”ITerm445”Giovani . 
Among the collaborators are: Massimo di  ID=”ITerm446”Montezzemolo , Giuseppe  ID=”ITerm447” orelli , Carlo  ID=”ITerm448”Pellati , 
Giovanni  ID=”ITerm449”Lanza , Giuseppe Cornero, Nicolò  ID=”ITerm450”Vineis . In its programme, reference to Nationality, 
 ID=”ITerm451”Monarchy , Legality and Progress is made. 
76  Published on 1st March 1848 by the lawyer Luigi  ID=”ITerm453”Vigna . In the fi rst issue, among the collabora-
tors we fi nd: V. Aliberti, Prof. D. Biorci, G.M. Cargnino, Leonardo Fea, Doctor E. Leone; 
G. Pasquale, Prof. and the lawyer Antonio  ID=”ITerm454”Scialoja , Senator P.O. Vigliani. In the programme, we 
read: To discuss all interests concerning the Country, paying particular attention to the study and 
development of administrative problems. 
G. Mecca
181
 In the weeks that followed the promulgation of the constitutions and preceded 
the opening of  Parliament , in the columns of the newspapers the attempt to popula-
rise the new representative regime was never neglected. Within this framework, we 
can highlight that printed  journalism shows an impetuous innovative tension, 
accepting neologisms, words of a foreign hue, bureaucratic and regional usages, and 
forcing itself to elaborate a more agile style than the traditional one. 77 An example 
are the  Lezioni popolari sullo Statuto which appear in six issues of the newspaper 
 L’Opinione . During the fi fth lesson, the two main theories on  sovereignty are 
reviewed: popular  sovereignty and legitimism. As regards the fi rst theory, the article 
writer noted that
 «la  sovranità esercitata direttamente dal popolo, esiste come principio teorico in alcune 
repubbliche, nel fatto non fu mai se non una fi nzione: imperocchè la moltitudine è una 
massa bruta che si lascia costantemente guidare dagli intrighi di pochi ambiziosi che sono 
effettivamente i suoi sovrani. Nelle piccole repubbliche svizzere, massime dove il governo 
democratico è assoluto, la sovranità del  popolo si limita al diritto di darsi una volta all’anno 
delle bastonate, nell’occasione che elegge i suoi Landamanni, o per dire meglio, 
nell’occasione che i candidati gli sono imposti dai caporioni del paese che si contrastano il 
potere» 78 
 The consequence was that to reduce, in practice, popular  sovereignty meant 
anarchy and disorder. Opposite to popular sovereignty was the co-called theory of 
divine right founded upon the presupposition that the dignity and power of  Kings 
came from God. The author tries to neutralise the sovereignty as power concen-
trated in one, sole organ: the most lasting political societies are those where
 «l’autorità sovrana si trovasse condivisa in modo da tenere egualmente lontano e il dispo-
tismo dell’uno e il dispotismo dei troppi». 79 
 The idea which is affi rmed is that of the sharing and balancing of the powers 
where  sovereignty shall never be concentrated into one, single place:
 «quando uno stato è in rivoluzione, e che ha bisogno di fare molte cose al di dentro ed al di 
fuori, e di agire con vigore ed impeto, è necessario un potere unico che si arroghi le 
 attribuzioni legislative, esecutive e giudiziarie, come era la Convenzione, potere che in altri 
termini è il dispotismo trasferito da uno a molti individui, o dagli eccessi di una corte 
77  Masini, Andrea.  1994 . La lingua dei giornali dell’Ottocento. In  Storia della lingua italiana. 
II. Scritto e parlato , eds. Luca Serianni and Pietro Trifone, cit., 635–665. 
78  Lezioni popolari sullo Statuto V .  ID=”ITerm462”L’Opinione , 17th November 1850, N° 317: «sovereignty exer-
cised directly by the people, exists as a theoretical principle in certain republics, de facto it was 
only a fi ction: given that the multitude is a brute mass which continually lets itself be guided by the 
intrigues of a few ambitious ones who are effectively their sovereigns. In the small Swiss repub-
lics, especially where democratic  ID=”ITerm463”government is absolute, sovereignty of the people is limited to 
the right of giving oneself beatings once a year, on the occasion of the election of their Country 
Counsellors, or rather to put it better, on the occasion of the imposition of the candidates by the 
country ringleaders who dispute power between themselves». 
79  Ibidem : «sovereign authority should fi nd itself shared in such a way as to equally keep the des-
potism of one and the despotism of the too many far apart». 
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all’arena di un partito. Ma quando un paese si trova in condizioni normali, e che desidera 
conservare le sue libertà, ha d’uopo che i poteri siano controbilanciati» 80 
 Still having the goal of making the concepts and new language understandable in 
the newspaper  Concordia , Giuseppe  Bertinetti , a lawyer, concerned himself with 
making the theory of parliamentary  omnipotence familiar, in virtue of the fact that 
he learned from the columns of the same newspaper that the  Government had rec-
ognised this principle to itself. From here was the meaning of the principle of par-
liamentary  omnipotence in the legal order of  Piedmont clarifi ed:
 «se dietro lo statuto non vi sono altri poteri tranne quelli creati e defi niti dallo statuto 
medesimo, ne risulta che qualunque atto pari oltrepassare essi poteri sarà tassato di incosti-
tuzionalità epperciò di nullità radicale provocherà la dissoluzione delle Camere e si avrà 
ricorso ad un’assemblea  nazionale ». 81 
 Indeed, the Italian constitutional  charters (those of  Tuscany ,  Naples and 
 Piedmont ), noted  Bertinetti , did not foresee, even knowing of the Belgian model, 
any article for constitutional  revision neither the necessary recourse to a constituent 
 assembly . A consequence of all this, for proper practical reasons, was that, in Italy, 
the principle elaborated in  England was implemented. 
 Throughout the long nineteenth century, indeed, the constituent  power was mar-
ginalised due to cultural reasons: the  liberals identifi ed in it the causes of the politi-
cal instability which  France was going through. 82 Finally, in Italy the question 
debated was if the constituent  power should consider itself a separate power or 
whether internal to legislative power. Filipponeri Spanò noted that according to the 
traditional theoretical layout, the exercise of the constituent  power laid either in the 
persona of the sovereign who grants the Charter, or in a national  assembly of repre-
sentatives chosen by the people charged with a special ad hoc power and in- 
dependent from the legislative power. This, gave rise to the following questions in 
Italy: did modifi cations to the articles of the  Statute have to come about via an 
80  Ibidem : «when a state is in the throes of revolution, and needs to do many things on the inside 
and outside, and to act vigorously and with force, a single power is needed that claims legislative, 
executive and judicial competences, as was the Convention, power which in other terms is despo-
tism transferred from one to many individuals, or from the excesses of one court to the arena of a 
political party. However when a country fi nds itself in a normal state of affairs, and wishes to 
maintain its liberties, it is necessary that the powers are counterbalanced». 
81  ID=”ITerm474”Bertinetti , Giuseppe. 1848. Dell’onnipotenza del parlamento .  ID=”ITerm475”La Concordia 31th March 1848, 
N° 79: «if behind the statute there are no other powers except those created and defi ned by the 
statute itself, it results that whatever act which seems to supersede these powers will be taxed with 
unconstitutionality, i.e. with radical nullity, will cause the dissolution of  ID=”ITerm476”Parliament and recourse 
to a national  ID=”ITerm477”assembly will be needed». 
82  For this reconstruction, see  ID=”ITerm489”Fioravanti, Maurizio . 1992. Potere costituente e diritto pubblico. Il 
caso. In  Potere costituente e riforme costituzionali , cit., 55–77. The author noted that denying the 
existence of an autonomous constituent  ID=”ITerm490”power guaranteed that the public powers are not instituted 
from the bottom, rather, they form on a historical basis without the need for a  suprema potestas that 
claims special legislative powers. The Constitution was an objective order of things and, from 
 ID=”ITerm491”Cavour to Orlando, the widespread idea that the  ID=”ITerm492”Albertine Statute was a medium point between 
the  ID=”ITerm493” onarchical principle of the  ID=”ITerm494”Prussian Constitution of 1848/50 and parliamentarization of pow-
ers as foreseen by the Constitution of  ID=”ITerm495”Belgium developed (64–65). 
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extraordinary power different from the ordinary legislative one or else via the same 
constituted power? Is the constituent power a power or a function? According to the 
author, the answers to these queries was:
 «il Parlamento è una perpetua Costituente. Col sistema dell’onnipotenza  parlamentare si ha 
appunto una sola sovranità ordinaria, e si evita il grave inconveniente delle due sovranità, 
che volere o non volere, non puossi sfuggire col potere costituente». 83 
 Simply, the  Statute did absolutely not pose itself the problem of modifi ability 
and procedures for its  revision , because in the original intention it was non- 
negotiable. However, as happens for normative texts, as regards interpretations, 
wishes for its reform were not lacking. The constituent assembly being terms that 
reminded of  revolutionary events , the mellower road of a sovereign power shared 
by various parties:  King and Houses was chosen. 84 
3  The Represented “ Nation ”: A Pact Between Sovereign 
and People, the Force of the Constitution and Political 
Representation 
 We said that the granted charter of  Piedmont is based upon the monarchical  princi-
ple , anyway lacking a constituent  power which is anchored to the nation. From the 
very beginning, however, the theory of parliamentary  omnipotence circulated in 
Italy even though, as Maurizio  Fioravanti has noted, the English principle of the 
 King in  Parliament never fully took root on the continent, 85 rather, we may say that 
the theory of parliamentary  omnipotence acted as a shield to keep the ghost of con-
stituent power away. 
 In  Piedmont , the parliament was certainly not representative of popular sover-
eignty being constituted by the Senate of royal nomination and a chamber elected 
on the basis of census. Article 7 of the  Proclamation made it clear that the Chamber 
of  Deputies will be elected on the basis of the census to be determined. While, the 
 Statute defi ned the deputies representatives of the nation. Article 41 stated: «depu-
ties represent the Nation in general, and not only the provinces which elected them. 
83  Spanò, Filipponeri 1882. Lo Statuto e il Parlamento in Italia.  Rivista europea: rivista internazio-
nale 28: 248–264. « ID=”ITerm501”Parliament is a continual Constituent  ID=”ITerm502”Assembly . By way of the system of 
parliamentary  ID=”ITerm503”omnipotence , we have, precisely, a sole ordinary sovereignty, and we avoid the 
serious inconvenience of two sovereignties, which like it or like it not, cannot be escaped by way 
of the constituent  ID=”ITerm504”power ». 
84  Concerning the debate on constituent  ID=”ITerm509”power , see as well Costa. Pietro. 2012. Il problema del 
potere costituente in Italia fra Risorgimento e repubblica. In  Un secolo per la costituzione (1848–
1948). Concetti e parole nello svolgersi del lessico costituzionale italiano , Federigo Bambi (ed.), 
cit., 109–137. 
85  ID=”ITerm518”Fioravanti, Maurizio .  1998 .  Costituzione e popolo sovrano , cit., 63. 
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No imperative and representative  mandate can be given by Voters». 86 It is not pos-
sible to reconstruct the genesis of this article, which appears in analogous way also 
in the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Two  Sicilies and in the Electoral Law of 
 Tuscany of 1848. For certain people, the constitutional principle which sees depu-
ties representing the nation dated back to the revolutionary period with the law of 
22nd December 1789: «The representatives nominated to the national  assembly of 
the departments cannot be considered as representatives of one, particular depart-
ment, but as the representatives of the totality of departments, that is, of the whole 
nation». 87 Such a principle was reaffi rmed by the French Constitution of  1791 and 
by that of 1795, while it was not in the Constitutions of  1814 and  1830 . We could 
also hazard the hypothesis that the compilers of the  Statute found the rule also in 
article 32 of the Belgian  Constitution , even if the principle of national  sovereignty 
of the latter was not adopted. 88 
 The  Statute , because of its nature of  Charte  octroyée (granted Charter), was 
weak as regards legitimisation. The fi rst observers of the constitution immediately 
noted the lack of a democratic element which expressed itself via the constituent 
 power and sovereignty. In this context, even though trying to neutralise the supreme 
power into the hands of the people, the attempts to bridge this gap were numerous. 
 Among the various ideas that were gaining ground, there was that which saw a 
pact or an agreement between Sovereign and people in the  Statute . On the dawn of 
the promulgation of the constitution, Elia Benza noted that
 «la Costituzione dunque puramente donata o conceduta avrebbe sempre in sé un mal germe, 
un vizio d’origine che potrebbe condurre a pericoli e conseguenze funeste al principe e alla 
nazione» 89 
 If the constitution was a gift, the royal will remained the supreme power and the 
only foundation of the political regime. Oppositely, if the  Statute was a pact, a con-
vention between Sovereign and people, it would generate obligations and rights for 
both parties.
 «Sì veramente, la Costituzione, anche nel senso strettamente monarchico, signifi ca una 
convenzione o non signifi ca nulla. Dico nel senso monarchico, perché nel senso fi losofi co 
Costituzione signifi ca il complesso delle leggi politiche sotto le quali un popolo si costi-
tuisce in  nazione ». 90 
86  «I deputati rappresentano la Nazione in generale, e non le sole provincie in cui furono eletti. 
Nessun mandato rappresentativo imperativo può darsi dagli Elettori» (art. 41). 
87  Maranini, Giuseppe.  1926 .  Le origini dello Statuto albertino , cit. 209. 
88  Furlani, Silvio. 1989. L’infl uenza della Costituzione e dell’ordinamento costituzionale belga del 
1831 sulla stesura dello statuto e di altri testi istituzionali fondamentali del Regno di Sardegna nel 
1848.  Bollettino di informazione costituzionali e parlamentari 2: 111–201. 
89  ID=”ITerm538”La Concordia , 3rd March 1848, N° 55: «the Constitution, therefore, purely donated or conceded, 
would always bear within an evil germ, an original fl aw which may lead to dangers and conse-
quences fatal for the Prince and the  ID=”ITerm539”nation ». 
90  Ibidem: «Yes really, the Constitution, also in its strictest monarchical sense, means a convention 
or it means nothing. I say in the monarchical sense of the word, because in the philosophical sense 
of the word, ‘Constitution’ means the whole of the political laws under which a people constitutes 
itself into a  ID=”ITerm542”nation ». 
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 The idea that the representative  government bases its  legitimacy upon a pact 
between sovereign and people was also present in  Catechismo by  Castelli and 
 Briano . Of the opposite opinion was, however, Pier Luigi  Albini who noted that the 
 Statute , from a juridical point of view, was neither a convention nor a donation, but 
it was an «act of justice and political wisdom and magnanimity». 91 According to the 
eminent professor it would, technically, have been a mistake to speak of a pact 
between sovereign and people:
 «la legge con cui un re trasforma una monarchia assoluta in monarchia  costituzionale è il 
più grande atto di  sovranità ». 92 
 For  Albini , the salient element consisted in the fact that the sovereign, through 
the Constitution, decided to share his authority with the people. From this moment 
on, the people concurred to exercising  sovereignty . 
 It is within the force of the Constitution itself, that we have to fi nd the same 
 legitimisation of the representative  government and from there begins the normali-
sation and the codifi cation of civic life, so much so, that the exercise of supreme 
power would have to be employed according to the juridical rules contained therein. 
However, having considered that the  Statute is a political act of the  King , the  liber-
als concentrated their attention on the representation while realising that with regard 
to this, one of the most important games will be played. 
 Since, on the basis of the census, in collective thinking the elective presence 
qualifi ed the whole legal order making it fi nally “national”. On this layout, once 
again the comments of the Orléanist doctrinarians from Guizot to  Hello – who saw 
a convergence point of the exercise of sovereignty in the theory of representation – 
carried weight. Indeed, the French  liberals , wishing to limit the effects of popular 
 sovereignty , forcefully established that the people could not exercise, by itself, sov-
ereign power but it had to delegate it to representatives who took care of the general 
interest. The idea of national representation on the basis of individual and census 
where the selection of the most capable to govern occurred in accordance with the 
census criterion became manifest. 93 
 Representation was a topic which was continually placed in front of public opin-
ion. The Italian debate on this topic was characterised by the circulation of a  plurality 
91  ID=”ITerm549”Albini , Pierlugi. 1848. Errori del piccolo catechismo costituzionale – Seconda Parte.  Il 
Costituzionale Subalpino , 10th March, N° 9: «Lo Statuto pertanto non è, almeno per noi, né una 
donazione, nel senso letterale e legale di questa parola, che pure sarebbe una convenzione. È un 
atto di giustizia politica e di sapienza politica e di magnanimità. È un atto di giustizia politica, 
perché la sovranità è il complesso dei poteri necessari a dirigere la società al suo fi ne, e il modo di 
essere di essa e di esercitarla dee necessariamente variare nel progredire della civiltà». 
92  Ibidem: «the law with which a king transforms an absolute  ID=”ITerm552” onarchy into a constitutional 
 ID=”ITerm553” onarchy is the greatest act of  ID=”ITerm554”sovereignty ». 
93  On the theoretical constructions in  ID=”ITerm565”France , it is very useful to begin reading from Rasanvallon, 
Pierre. 2005.  Il popolo introvabile. Storia della rappresentanza democratica in Francia . Bologna: 
Il Mulino.  ID=”ITerm566”Lacchè, Luigi . La garanzia della Costituzione. Rifl essioni sul caso francese. In 
 Parlamento e Costituzione nei sistemi costituzionali europei ottocenteschi/Parlament und 
Verfassung in den konstitutionellen Verfassungssystemen Europas , eds. Anna G. Manca and Luigi 
Lacchè, cit., 49–94 (spec. 61–69). 
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of models which adapted the archetypes elaborated by the doctrine to political 
necessities imposed by circumstances. 94 The chance to discuss national representa-
tion was given by the promulgation of the electoral  law . Following the granting of 
the constitution,  King Charles  Albert constituted three different com-missions to 
intervene, respectively on the topic of freedom of the press, on electoral law and 
municipal militia. The commission for electoral  law , was presided over by Cesare 
 Balbo and among the members there appear also Camillo  Cavour and Ettore  Ricotti , 
the latter was the author of a pamphlet dedicated to national representation. 95 The 
electoral law was published on 17th March 1848 and was based upon the criteria of 
census and on capability. 96 Voters were whoever paid 40 lire of tax or an annual rent 
ranging from 200 to 600 lire. Effective members of royal academies were also vot-
ers because of capability, so too were teachers of secondary schools, irremovable 
magistrates, members of the Chambers or Committees of commerce and agricul-
ture, retired state offi cials and functionaries of the state who enjoyed a pension 
greater than 1200 lire. The right to be voted was recognised, with the payment of 
half of the census, to graduates, notaries public, legal representatives for colleges, 
retired state offi cials and state functionaries with a pension going from 600 to 1200 
lire. 
 The connection between representative system and electoral  law was destined to 
last in the thoughts of political  journalism to such an extent that the electoral law 
was seen as the key of a change of direction of the whole representative sys-tem. In 
the abovementioned article of 10th March 1848, bearing  Cavour ’s signature, it is 
affi rmed that the electoral  law was one of those fundamental laws which character-
ised the new constitutional regime. This article was preceded by another four with 
the specifi c subject of electoral law.  Cavour , after having shown his contrariness to 
the municipal model, 97 paused respectively over the number of the members of the 
94  Chiavistelli, Antonio. 2011. Rappresentanza. In  Atlante culturale del Risorgimento. Lessico del 
linguaggio politico dal Settecento all’Unità , eds. Alberto Mario Banti, Antonio Chiavistelli, Luca 
Mannori and Marco Meriggi. Roma-Bari: Laterza, 343–358. On more general aspects relating to 
representation, see Ballini, Pier Luigi. 1997. Idee di rappresentanza e sistemi elettorali in Italia tra 
Otto e Novecento. Venezia: Istituto veneto di scienze lettere ed arti.  ID=”ITerm567”Ghisalberti, Carlo . 1972. Il 
sistema rappresentativo nella pubblicistica subalpina del’48. In  Stato e costituzione nel 
Risorgimento , ed. Carlo  ID=”ITerm568”Ghisalberti . Milano: Giuffrè, p. 189–217. Pombeni, Paolo. 1995. La rap-
presentanza politica. In  Storia dello Stato italiano dall’Unità ad oggi , ed. Ramanelli. Roma: 
Donzelli editore, 73 SS. 
95  I refer to Ricotti, Ettore. 1848.  Della rappresentanza nazionale in Piemonte . Pensieri di Ettore 
 ID=”ITerm576”Ricotti . Torino: Dalla stamperia reale 
96  ID=”ITerm577”Cuciniello, Edoardo . 1910 . La legge elettorale politica 17 marzo 1848 . Milano: Bocca. For a 
general overview on the system of electoral  ID=”ITerm578”law , see Carlo Piscedda. 1998 . Il vecchio Piemonte 
liberale alle urne. Torino: Centro studi piemontesi. 
97  ID=”ITerm584” l Risorgimento N° 40, 12th February 1848. Specifi cally, it affi rmed: «La nomina dei deputati per 
mezzo dei Consigli municipali, contraria agli interessi generali dello Stato, non sarebbe meno dan-
nosa ai veri interessi dei comuni. Le parti e le passioni politiche eserciterebbero una dannosa 
infl uenza sulla scelta dei loro magistrati, e nuocerebbero alla loro retta e regolare amministrazione; 
e sarebbe quasi impossibile che in questo sistema le elezioni municipali non fossero interamente 
politiche, non uscissero da esse uomini devoti in tutto alle opinioni dominanti» (the nomination of 
G. Mecca
187
elective assembly, 98 over the electoral constituencies, 99 the active electorate and the 
conditions of  eligibility . 100  Cavour insisted upon political representation in that it 
was a fundamental institution of the new constitutional construction:
 «costituire un’assemblea, che rappresenti quanto più esattamente e sinceramente sia possi-
bile, gli interessi veri, le opinioni ed i sentimenti della nazione: e che però sia composta di 
cittadini atti al diffi cile incarico e nello stesso tempo dotati di suffi ciente scienza e moralità 
per cooperare utilmente alla confezione delle leggi e al governo del paese» 101 
 We may deduce from the words of the subalpine statesman, the idea that repre-
sentative assemblies are the only ones that are able to give a voice to and represent 
the nation. We can also note that the public debates regarding electoral  law and 
representation permitted fi lling the refl ections on the ‘nation’ with practical conno-
tations which, even if they were not lacking in Italian political thought, till 1848, 
remained still to an anthropological meaning, indeterminate and, anyway, devoid of 
an effective corroboration on an institutional level. 102 While, for a clearer formula-
tion of ‘nation’ as homogeneous entity able to place itself as sovereign subject on 
the international scene we have to wait for the well-known inaugural lecture by 
Pasquale Stanislao  Mancini . 103 
 As  Allegretti noted, during the liberal  period the monarchical  principle and the 
representative principle lived side by side. 104 First of all, this is possible because, 
unanimously, the monarchical  principle was not understood as having an absolutist 
meaning, as in the French  Charte of  1814 which enclosed supreme authority in the 
the deputies by municipal Councils, contrary to the general interests of the State, would be no less 
dangerous to the true interests of the municipalities. The parties and the political passions would 
exercise a harmful infl uence on the choice of their magistrates and would damage their straight and 
regular administration; and it would be almost impossible that, in this system, the municipal elec-
tions were not entirely political, and that, from these, men not completely devoted to the dominant 
opinions came). 
98  ID=”ITerm585” l Risorgimento N° 46, 19th February 1848. 
99  ID=”ITerm586” l Risorgimento N° 48, 22nd February 1848. 
100  ID=”ITerm588” l Risorgimento N° 49, 23rd February 1848. 
101  This quotation is taken from  ID=”ITerm590” l Risorgimento N° 46, 19th February 1848: «constituting an 
 ID=”ITerm591”assembly , which represents, as exactly and sincerely as possible, the true interests, the opinions 
and feelings of the nation: and one which, however, is made up of citizens fi t for the diffi cult 
charge and, at the same time, equipped with suffi cient knowledge and morality to usefully cooper-
ate in law-making and in ruling the country». 
102  Romanelli, Raffaele.  1999 . Nazione e costituzione nell’opinione liberale italiana prima del’48. 
 Passato e presente 46: 157–171. Concerning the nation during the Risorgimento ideology I refer 
to Banti, Alberto Mario. 2002.  La nazione del Risorgimento. Parentela, santità e onore alle origini 
dell’Italia unita . Einaudi: Torino. Floriana, Colao. 2001. L’idea di nazione nei giuristi italiani tra 
Otto e Novecento.  Quaderni fi orentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno 30: 255–360. 
103  ID=”ITerm594”Mancini, Pasquale Stanislao .  1851 .  Della nazionalità come fondamento del diritto delle genti. 
Prelezione al corso di diritto internazionale e marittimo pronunciata nella Regia università di 
Torino dal Prof. Stanislao Mancini . Torino: Tip. Botta. 
104  ID=”ITerm598”Allegretti ,  ID=”ITerm599”Umberto .  2012 . Forme costituzionali della storia unitaria: monarchia e repubblica. 
 Rivista telematica dell’associazione dei costituzionalisti italiani 2 ( http://www.rivistaaic.it/forme-
costituzionali-della-storia-unitaria-monarchia-e-repubblica.html ). 
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person of the  King , but in the more modern meaning of a  monarchy which through 
the granting of the constitution constrained itself fully and irrevocably to it. On the 
other hand, representation was considered a genetic element of the new legal order 
which was qualifi ed as ‘representative monarchical  government ’ in virtue of the 
formula contained in article 2 of the  Statute . Via this principle of living together, it 
established that the basis of sovereignty lived in the Crown as well as in the politi-
cally represented  Nation . 105 
4  From Words to Practice. Initial Steps 
of the ‘Representative  Government ’ 
 In Italy, a parliamentary  government – if by this we mean the institutional mecha-
nism which binds the Government to the elected  Chamber via the confi dence and 
the principle that the  Parliament (in that it is representative of the nation) is capable, 
by way of its own majority, of orientating  government policies – had diffi culty in 
affi rming itself. The question of the form of  government occupied jurists ever since 
the promulgation of the constitutional text. 106 At the same time, dealing with the 
form of  government , especially in its practical development, meant observing the 
way in which sovereignty was shared out and organised. 
105  Cf. Boncompagni,  ID=”ITerm607”Carlo .  1880 .  Lo Statuto italiano annotato dal Professor Carlo Bon-
Compagni. Torino, Stamperia dell’Unione Tipografi ca editrice, 11: «Il Governo defi nito dallo 
Statuto non è soltanto monarchico, esso è pure rappresentativo. Cioè si hanno delle istituzioni per 
cui la Nazione è rappresentata ed essa esprime liberamente i suoi giudizi su tutti gli atti del 
Governo. Dunque questa libertà di esprimere l’opinione nazionale è sinceramente mantenuta, essa 
acquista una tale infl uenza che i reggimenti dello Stato non possono sottrarvisi. In tutti gli Stati, 
qualunque siansi i loro reggimenti, l’andamento della cosa pubblica è determinato dalle opinioni 
comunemente ammesse». 
106  Besides the literature till here mentioned, for a synthesis and a review of the debate on the forms 
of  ID=”ITerm614”government during the Statuto  ID=”ITerm615”Albertino : Bonfi glio, Salvatore.  1990 . Il dibattito sulle forme di 
governo nel periodo statutario . Il politico. Rivista italiana di scienze giuridiche 153: 93–115. 
Lucatelli, Luigi.  1996 . Sulla forma del governo monarchico costituzionale previsto dallo Statuto 
 ID=”ITerm616”albertino .  Diritto e società 4: 583–599. Merlini, Stefano. 2000.  ID=”ITerm617” l Parlamento e la forma di gov-
erno parlamentare nel periodo statutario. In  L’istituzione parlamentare nel XIX secolo. Una pros-
pettiva comparata, eds. Anna Gianna Manca and Wilhelm Brauneder. Bologna: Il Mulino, 79–94. 
Barbera, Augusto.  2001 . Fra governo parlamentare e governo assembleare. Dallo Statuto albertino 
alla Costituzione repubblicana.  Quaderni costituzionali 31, 9–37. Antonetti, Nicola.  2003 .  La 
forma di governo in Italia. Dibattiti politici e giuridici tra Otto e Novecento. Bologna: il Mulino. 
More generally on forms of  ID=”ITerm618”government and its classifi cations:  ID=”ITerm619”Colombo, Paolo .  2003 .  Governo. 
Bologna: il Mulino, 2003; Tommasi, Claudio.  1990 . Parlamentarismo e governo di gabinetto nella 
scienza politica e giuridica del secondo Ottocento: Inghilterra, Germania e Italia.  Società e storia 
49: 583–652; Bobbio, Norberto.  1976 .  La teoria delle forme di governo nella storia del pensiero 
politico. Torino: Giappichelli; Elia, Leopoldo.  1970 . Governo (forme di). In  Enciclopedia del 
Diritto . Milano: Giuffrè, XIX, 634–675. 
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 As we have already said, the formula used by the  Statute to describe the new 
constitutional regime is representative  government . 107 This lexical expression is a 
fl uid category which allows us to bring together in one formula both the ideas of 
who, in the statuary timeframe, tends to envisage the form of  government of the 
pure constitutional  monarchy where the  Monarch maintains executive control and 
the ideas of who exalts parliamentary  infl uences . 108 For that which regards the exer-
cise of  sovereignty in the representative  government , one of the fi rst commentators 
of the  Albertine Statute noted:
 «il sistema monarchico rappresentativo è fondato all’incontro sul principio che il monarca 
abbia a dividere colla  nazione una parte della sovranità. Ma, come nella repubblica, la 
 nazione non potrebbe occuparsi direttamente di affari politici. Vengono per ciò da essa 
nominati nei modi prescritti da apposite leggi individui che godono della fi ducia della mag-
gioranza e che si assicurano il mandato di rappresentare quella parte di  sovranità o di com-
partecipazione al potere pubblico che per il maggior bene dello Stato è conferito dallo 
Statuto fondamentale alla  nazione , e per essa ai suoi rappresentanti». 109 
107  The  ID=”ITerm623”preamble to the Proclamation affi rmed: «abbiamo risoluto e determinato di adottare le 
seguenti basi di uno Statuto fondamentale per istabilire nei nostri stati un compiuto sistema di 
governo  ID=”ITerm624” appresentativo » (we have resolved and determined to adopt the following bases of a 
fundamental  ID=”ITerm625”Statute to establish a complete system of representative  ID=”ITerm626”government in our states). 
Article 2 of the  ID=”ITerm627”Albertine Statute stated: «lo Stato è retto da un Governo Monarchico 
Rappresentativo. Il Trono è ereditario secondo la legge salica» (the State is borne by a Representative 
Monarchial Government The throne is hereditary in keeping with Salic law). On the origins of its 
formulation, Paolo Colombo, noted that ‘representative  ID=”ITerm628”government ’ is no invention of 
 ID=”ITerm629”Piedmontese constituents rather, it can be found both in the  ID=”ITerm630”Neapolitan Constitution of 11th 
February 1848 which uses the expression «temperata monarchia ereditaria costituzionalmente 
sotto forme rappresentative» (a tempered constitutionally hereditary  ID=”ITerm631” onarchy in representative 
forms), as well as in the constitutional project elaborated by  ID=”ITerm632”France in 1815 following the defeat 
at Waterloo. Cf. Paolo,  ID=”ITerm633”Colombo . 2001. La ben calcolata inazione: Corona, Parlamento e ministri 
nella forma di governo statutaria. In  ID=”ITerm634” l Parlamento . Annali 17 , ed. Luciano Violante, cit., 69. 
Specifi cally for the French case, the norm is contained in the Projet d’acte costitutionnel, presented 
by the Commission to the French  ID=”ITerm635”Parliament on 29th of June 1815. The project never came into 
force. Regarding ‘representative  ID=”ITerm636”government ’, see: Mannori, Luca. 2011. I nomi del “governo  ID=”ITerm637” ap
presentativo ” nella dottrina costituzionale italiana dal settecento al fascismo. In  Un secolo per la 
costituzione , cit., 129–176. 
108  Luigi Lacchè noted this, with special regard to the French experience. Cf.  ID=”ITerm642”Lacchè, Luigi .  2009 . 
La razionalizzazione ottocentesca: il problema dell’affermazione del modello parlamentare 
nell’età delle Chartes. In  La Costituzione francese. La Constitution française. Atti del convegno 
biennale dell’Associazione di diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo, Bari, Università degli Studi, 
22–23 maggio 2008 , ed. Marina Calamo Specchia. Torino: Giappichelli, 125–147. On the distinc-
tion between parliamentary principle and representative  ID=”ITerm643”government , see:  ID=”ITerm644”Lacchè , Luigi.  2004 . 
Governo rappresentativo e principio parlamentare: le  Chartes francesi del  ID=”ITerm645”1814 e  ID=”ITerm646”1830 .  Giornale 
di storia costituzionale 8: 99–120. 
109  ID=”ITerm656”Peverelli, Pietro .  1849 .  Commenti intorno allo Statuto del regno . Torino: Tipografi a Castellato, 
13–14: «the monarchical representative system is founded on the agreement on the principle that 
the monarch has to share a part of his sovereignty with the nation. But, as in the republic, the nation 
could not directly take care of political affairs. For this reason, individuals – who enjoy the trust of 
the majority and who gain the mandate to represent that part of sovereignty or to share the public 
power which for the greater good of the State is conferred to the nation by the fundamental  ID=”ITerm657”Statute , 
and for it to its representatives – are nominated by the nation through ways prescribed by suitable 
laws». 
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 For Castiglioni, instead,
 «il potere  costituente legittimo sta dunque nel popolo, ossia, per una necessità morale che 
abbiamo dimostrata, nell’intelligente e capace maggioranza di esso. Il consenso dei più vale 
a rendere obbligatoria la costituzione, non già perché si supponga il tacito consenso anche 
del numero minore, ma perché, senza dare alla volontà preponderante una forza giuridica 
ed obbligatoria, la società non potrebbe sussistere. E quanto più la volontà della maggio-
ranza sarà libera e largamente espressa, quanto più si avvicinerà, per progredita educazione 
nazionale, al suffragio universale, tanto più acquisterà forza morale la costituzione in nome 
di essa stabilita ed accettata». 110 
 The author specifi ed that
 «non sempre il potere  costituente è esercitato dal popolo. Avviene nei pacifi ci rivolgimenti 
e riordinamenti delle società costituite da secoli, che il potere, quale trovasi investito tra-
dizionalmente della facoltà di far le leggi riconosca spontaneo i naturali diritti, su cui la 
società vuol essere basata, e si offra egli stesso, o volonterosamente, o aderendo al mani-
festo desiderio delle popolazioni, a sancire i principii del diritto naturale in una nuova 
costituzione, facendo parte del potere al popolo, e così riconoscendone la  sovranità di 
diritto. Allora il popolo consente, ed accetta l’opera di questo potere costituente indiretto, 
che si riconosce rappresentante tacitamente delegato della sovranità  nazionale , e ad essa fa 
ritorno». 111 
 The widest reconstruction upon the form of  government will remain that one of 
Cesare  Balbo , published posthumously in 1857, written between 1850 and 1851, 
entitled  La monarchia rappresentativa. 112 The well-known author, after having 
110  ID=”ITerm659”Castiglioni, Pietro .  1859 .  Della monarchia parlamentare e diritti e doveri del cittadino secondo 
lo Statuto e le leggi piemontesi. Trattato popolare contenente lo Statuto, le ultime leggi organiche 
e politiche e altri documenti . Milano: Tipografi a Guglielmi. I, 51: «the legitimate constituent 
 ID=”ITerm660”power lies, therefore, in the people: or rather, because of a moral need we have demonstrated, in 
the intelligent and capable majority of it. The consensus of the many is enough to make the consti-
tution obligatory, not because we suppose the tacit consent also of the lesser number, but because 
without giving juridical and obligatory force to the preponderant wish, society would not be able 
to subsist. And the freer and more widely expressed the will of the majority will be, the closer to 
universal suffrage it will draw because of enhanced national education, the more moral force the 
constitution, in its name established and accepted, will acquire». 
111  Ibidem , 53: «not always is the constituent  ID=”ITerm664”power exercised by the people. It comes about in the 
pacifi c upheavals and rearrangements of societies constituted for centuries, that the power, which 
traditionally fi nds itself invested with the faculty of making laws, spontaneously recognises natural 
rights, on which society wants to be founded, and offers, either voluntarily, or agreeing to the 
manifest wish of the people, to sanction the principles of natural law in a new constitution, making 
the people part of the power and in such a way recognising its legal sovereignty. Then the people 
consent and accept the workings of this indirect constituent power, which recognises itself as a 
tacitly delegated representative of national sovereignty, and which goes back to it». 
112  The fi gure of Cesare  ID=”ITerm667”Balbo is surely one of the most important of Savoy  ID=”ITerm668”Piedmont . Born in 
 ID=”ITerm669” urin in 1789 and there he died in 1853. He was the fi rst Cabinet president in the constitutional era 
(16th March 1848 to 27th July 1848). Previously, he had distinguished himself for having pub-
lished  Le speranze d’Italia (1844), unanimously considered as one of the most important works 
concerning the political thought of the Risorgimento by all. He also collaborated with  ID=”ITerm670” l 
Risorgimento newspaper.  ID=”ITerm671”King  ID=”ITerm672”Vittorio Emanuele II gave him the charge of forming a new 
 ID=”ITerm673”government in 1852, though the experiment did not have a happy ending because of the lack of 
support from  ID=”ITerm674”Cavour and  ID=”ITerm675” ’Azeglio . On this famous author, see: Passerin D’Entrèves, Ettore. 
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established that the only possible forms of  government were the republics and the 
representative monarchies, dedicated a detailed analysis as to the theories of sover-
eignty with the aim of identifying the «generating principle», the essence of the 
representative  monarchy and the «instruments» via which the constituted powers 
divide sovereign power. 113 For  Balbo , indeed, « sovereignty is the supreme problem 
of bearing the State in accordance with the laws and of changing these laws accord-
ing to need» and the question was to pinpoint, through the analysis of the main theo-
ries in force, the place where sovereign power resided in the representative 
 government . 114  Balbo concluded that
 «la rappresentanza nazionale non risiede né può risiedere in nessuno dei tre poteri detti ma 
in tutti e tre; che nessuno di questi solo, ma tutti e tre si debbano chiamare parlamento; e 
che in questo Parlamento solo può e debba risedere la potenza del fare e disfare le leggi e 
di mutare la costituzione dello Stato» 115 
 For  Balbo , the only possible theory on the topic of sovereignty was that of par-
liamentary  omnipotence . From here, it should have been deduced that the constitu-
ent  power was a «really dangerous theory» which would destroy the omnipotence 
of  Parliament , rather, the idea of an  assembly or a constituent  power would be 
opposed to the abovementioned principle. 116 Briefl y,  sovereignty resided in the 
State. 117 
 These attempts of adapting the differing theories of  sovereignty to the Italian 
case, including specifi c variations with regard to foreign experiences, can also be 
seen in Domenico  Carutti who noticed how the idea of popular  sovereignty was not 
wrong providing that it was purifi ed of excesses and of false meanings which were 
attributed to it. Popular  sovereignty meant
 «signoria della pubblica opinione operante per mezzo degli uomini più capaci, a ciò depu-
tati dal popolo». 118 
1940.  La giovinezza di Cesare  ID=”ITerm676”Balbo . Firenze: Le Monnier. Ceretti, Mauro. 2004. Per una rivisi-
tazione critica di Cesare  ID=”ITerm677”Balbo : Costituzione, amministrazione e opinione pubblica nel discorso di 
un aristocratico liberale del Risorgimento.  Rassegna storica del Risorgimento 94: 483–522. 
113  ID=”ITerm680”Balbo , Cesare.  1857 .  Della Monarchia rappresentativa in Italia. Saggi politici di Cesare  ID=”ITerm681”Balbo . 
Firenze: Le Monnier, 176. On this work, see  ID=”ITerm682”Ghisalberti, Carlo . 1995. La monarchia rappresenta-
tiva nel pensiero di Cesare  ID=”ITerm683”Balbo . Rassegna storica del Risorgimento, 291–306. 
114  Ibidem , 186: «la  ID=”ITerm687”sovranità è il problema supremo di reggere lo Stato secondo le leggi, e di mutar 
le leggi secondo la necessità». 
115  Ibidem , 209. «national representation neither resides nor can it reside in any of the three powers 
mentioned, rather, in all three together; that none of these alone, but all three must be called 
 ID=”ITerm689”Parliament ; and that in this Parliament only can and must that power of making and un-making 
laws and changing the constitution of the State reside». 
116  Ibidem , 194 and 209. 
117  Ibidem , 185 
118  ID=”ITerm702”Carutti, Domenico .  1852 .  Dei principi del governo libero. Torino: Tipografi a Ferrero e Franco, 
147: «dominion of public opinion operating by means of the most capable men, appointed to this 
by the people». 
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 Representative  government is the sole form of perfect political  government since 
«people and  government are closely united in virtue of a tacit or explicit pact 
between he who assumes command and he who confers it or recognises it». 119 
Representative  government is the  government of the best wherein public opinion 
fi nds a form of organisation:
 «la sovranità  s i ripartisce fra popolo e governo, ed è in ambidue inviolabile» 120 
 The theoretical refl ections that till now, we have recalled, fi rst and foremost, 
highlight that during the years of insertion of the representative  government a thor-
ough public law science develops. 121 The doctrine refl ections concentrated both on 
the exegesis of the individual normative measures, but also on more refi ned doctri-
nal constructions. These theorisations were not always unequivocal, neither did 
they effectively explain the origin of legitimate power. Finally, doctrinal thoughts 
upon the form of representative  government did not fi nd an adequate parallel on the 
level of institutional praxis which was still confused and in the process of being 
perfected. 
 The formation of the fi rst constitutional  government was no easy thing. Federico 
 Sclopis recounted that the  King entrusted him with the task of conferring with 
Ministers Cesare  Alfi eri , Ottavio Thaon di  Revel and Des  Ambrois , in order to form 
a  government . After the Ministers refused to take on the  government offi ce, the look 
turned to the fi gures that mostly stood out in the public law science among whom 
were: Cesare  Balbo , Camillo  Cavour and Riccardo  Sineo . The choice fell upon 
Cesare  Balbo , seeing that the two from Genoa, Lorenzo  Pareto and Vincenzo  Ricci , 
showed themselves to be intransigent on certain positions. 122 The fi rst Cabinet was 
made up of Cesare  Balbo (Prime Minister), Lorenzo  Pareto (Minister of the Interior), 
Vincenzo  Ricci (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Luigi Des  Ambrois (Minister of 
Public Works), Ottavio Thaon di  Revel (Minister of Finance), Antonio  Franzini 
(Minister of War), Carlo  Boncompagni (Minister for Education), and the same 
Federico  Sclopis (Minister for Justice). 
 The  subalpine Parliament was convened for the fi rst time on 8th May 1848, in 
 Palazzo Madama which was destined to be the seat of the Senate, following the 
parliamentary elections of 27th April in 204 single-member constituencies. The fi rst 
parliamentary sitting opened with a speech by the Crown, pronounced on 8th May 
119  Ibidem: «popolo e governo sono uniti intimamente in virtù di un patto o tacito o esplicito fra chi 
assume il comando e chi lo conferisce o riconosce». 
120  Ibidem, 153: « ID=”ITerm709”sovereignty is divided between people and  ID=”ITerm710”government , and is inviolable in 
both». 
121  On the public law science of these times, see the summaries of  ID=”ITerm712”Ghisalberti, Carlo . 1972. 
L.A. Melegrani e i costituzionalisti dell’Unità. In  Stato e costituzione , ed. Carlo  ID=”ITerm713”Ghisalberti , cit., 
119–248 and Moscati, Laura.  2003 . Sulla dottrina costituzionalista piemontese tra la Restaurazione 
e l’Unità. In  Amicitiae pignus. Studi in ricordo di Adriano Cavanna , eds. Antonio Padoa Schioppa, 
Maria Gigliola Di Renzo Villata, Gian Paolo Massetto. Milano: Giuffrè, II, 1591–1608. 
122  News reports of the events is contained in  ID=”ITerm729”Sclopis, Federico .  1849 . Della introduzione del 
Governo rappresentativo in Piemonte. In  Dalle riforme allo Statuto di  ID=”ITerm730”Carlo Alberto . Documenti 
editi ed inediti , ed. Adolfo Colombo, cit., 190–195. 
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by the Prince of Carignano,  Eugenio Emanuele of Savoy representing  King Charles 
 Albert who was engaged in battle. Having put his name forward to cover the offi ce 
of the member of parliament Camillo  Cavour , in the appeal to the voters of Vercelli 
on 12th April 1848, showed his trust in the constitutional  monarchy ; the only one to 
be able to guarantee a rational development and improvements at a moral and eco-
nomic level. Besides, the illustrious politician declared that
 «lo  Statuto sarà il nostro simbolo politico; ma lo  Statuto considerato non solo come la con-
sacrazione di molti, grandi e fecondi principi di libertà, ma altresì come il mezzo più effi -
cace ed acconcio per introdurre nell’ordine economico e politico tutte le riforme, tutti i 
miglioramenti richiesti da provate esperienze o da incontestabili ragioni scientifi che, e tutti 
quelli ancora che il futuro rivelerà allo spirito indagatore dei popoli moderni». 123 
 The  Statute was, once more, placed as foundation and legitimisation of the new 
political  regime and constituted the basis for future progress, both as regards politi-
cal and socio-economic levels. Nevertheless, in the initial years of implementation 
of the constitutional charter, the representative  government had some diffi culties in 
developing and even less could the  Parliament consider itself the pivoting point of 
the system.  Piedmont addressed its energies to the war effort and the same attention 
of the press was catalysed by events of foreign politics with ample reports from the 
battle fi elds. Till the fi rst Premiership of Camillo  Cavour and the union with the 
opposition, the true motor of the institutional system will remain the Crown. 124 The 
most proper category to qualify this fi rst phase of the political regime is, rather, that 
of ‘Government of the  King ’, to emphasise the link and the trust that the Cabinet 
should receive from the sovereign. 
 Given that the nature of the often extra-parliamentary crises and the uncertainty 
in identifying a true majority, the Crown was repeatedly in the condition of having 
to consider who was better able to guide the Cabinet and make itself accountable to 
 Parliament . From this «the principle that the  King ’s right and duty, in the changes 
of Ministry, far from being passive and automatic, is an active task» affi rmed 
itself. 125 Therefore, the Crown found itself in the condition of carrying out political 
123  Lettera di Camillo  ID=”ITerm748”Cavour agli elettori di Vercelli, 12 Aprile 1848. In Lucchini, Luigi.  1889 .  La 
politica italiana dal 1848 al 1897. Programmi di governo . Roma: Tipografi a Camera dei Deputati. 
I, 3–4: «the  ID=”ITerm749”Statute will be our political symbol; but the  ID=”ITerm750”Statute considered not only as the conse-
cration of many, great and fertile principles of freedom, also as the most effective and suitable 
means to introduce, into economic and political order, all the reforms, all the improvements 
required by lived experiences or by incontestable scientifi c reasons, as well as all those the future 
will reveal to the investigative spirit of modern peoples». 
124 According to Carlo  ID=”ITerm757”Ghisalberti  ID=”ITerm758”Cavour ’s rise to  ID=”ITerm759”government marked a turning point in the con-
stitutional history of Italy. Since the  ID=”ITerm760”government crisis of his predecessor,  ID=”ITerm761” ’Azeglio , was caused 
by extra-parliamentary reasons, the choice of the  ID=”ITerm762”King to entrust the presidency of the  ID=”ITerm763”government 
to the head of the political majority of the elective  ID=”ITerm764”Chamber determined, indeed, a change in insti-
tutional praxis ( Storia costituzionale cit., 68 ff.). Even  ID=”ITerm765”Allegretti underlined that the parliamentary 
system had affi rmed itself after a certain while, that is from 1852 with  ID=”ITerm766”Cavour and the union with 
the left wing of politics, and not in a stable way with about-turns that infl uenced the strengthening 
of parliamentarianism ( Profi lo di storia costituzionale italiana cit., 435–453). 
125  Palma, Luigi.  1885 . La prerogativa regia nei cambiamenti di ministero in Italia dal 1848 al 
marzo 1884. In  Questioni costituzionali. Volume complementare del corso di Diritto Costituzionale. 
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evaluations: it verifi ed majorities and established if and when it turned to the coun-
try. Particularly the Savoy Court maintained its own range of action which went 
beyond the simple role of the ceremonial handbook and of administration of the 
royal estates. There was no lack of politicians, functionaries and soldiers who 
revolved around the  King , stood up for the monarchical institution and carried on – 
independently or on behalf of the sovereign – a precise and ambiguous political 
activity which was parallel to and often in complete contrast to that of the 
 Government . 126 
 The fi rst four legislatures were characterised by political instability with a suc-
cession of  government changes. 127 During the speech by the Crown for the second 
legislature, inaugurated on 1st February 1849, Charles  Albert affi rmed
 «Il Governo costituzionale si aggira sopra due cardini: il Re ed il Popolo. Dal primo nasce 
l’unità e la forza, dal secondo la libertà e il progresso della  Nazione ». 128 
 An alliance between  King and people was therefore restated for the improve-
ment of national conditions. 
 The image of the nation, born of the alliance between Sovereign and people, was 
also reiterated on the occasion of the discussion of the law on the forced loan. 
During parliamentary debate, Senator  Albini , in defence of the full powers con-
ceded to the  Government , announced the rule that
 «il parlamento pertanto congiuntamente al  Re rappresenta la  nazione ; riunisce in sé la 
sovranità  nazionale ; può fare tutto quanto farebbe la  nazione stessa se potesse esercitare da 
sé». 129 
Firenze: Giuseppe Pellas editore, 121: «il principio che il diritto e il dovere del Re, nei cangiamenti 
di Ministero, lungi di essere passivo ed automatico, è un uffi cio attivo». 
126  Gentile, Pierangelo.  2011 . L’ombra del Re.  ID=”ITerm772”Vittorio Emanuele II e le politiche di Corte. Torino: 
Carocci and  ID=”ITerm773”Colombo, Paolo .  1999 .  Il re d’Italia. Prerogative costituzionali e potere politico della 
Corona (1848–1922) , cit. 
127  During the fi rst legislature (8th May 1848-30th December 1848) there were the governments of 
 ID=”ITerm775”Balbo ,  ID=”ITerm776”Casati , Alfi eri di  ID=”ITerm777”Sostegno , Perrone Di  ID=”ITerm778”Sammartino ,  ID=”ITerm779”Gioberti . During the second legisla-
ture (from 1st February 1849 to 30th March 1849) the governments of  ID=”ITerm780”Gioberti ,  ID=”ITerm781”Chiodo , De 
 ID=”ITerm782”Launay followed one after the other. In the third legislature (from 30th July to 20th November 
1849) the Cabinet was led by Massimo  ID=”ITerm783” ’Azeglio Tapanelli. For a history of the  ID=”ITerm784”Parliament from 
outside which has, as its departure point, the single legislature and the main political events we can 
consult those works that have already been quoted in footnote 2. 
128  Discorso pronunciato da Re  ID=”ITerm787”Carlo Alberto per l’apertura della Seconda legislatura del 
Parlamento, 1° febbraio 1849. In Lucchini, Luigi.  1889 .  La politica italiana dal 1848 al 1897. 
Programmi di governo , cit., 36–37: «the constitutional  ID=”ITerm788”Government revolves on two hinges: the 
 ID=”ITerm789”King and the People. From the former, unity and force, come and from the latter springs freedom 
and progress of the Nation». 
129  Cf.  Atti del Parlamento  ID=”ITerm797”Subalpino  – Discussioni della Camera dei Deputati, I Legislatura – 
Sessione 1848 (08/05/1848 – 30/12/1848 ). Torino: Tipografi a Eredi Botta, 1856, I, Tornata del 30 
Ottobre 1848: «parliament, therefore, in conjunction with the  ID=”ITerm798”King represents the nation; reunites 
national  ID=”ITerm799”sovereignty within itself; it may do whatever the nation itself would do if it could exercise 
it by itself». 
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 In this fi rst period, the parliamentary institution being welcomed with initial 
grand enthusiasm, however, had diffi culties cutting out spaces for itself with regard 
to the prerogatives of the Crown. Voices which underlined its limits and fl aws were 
not lacking, rather, criticism of parliamentarianism runs incessantly since the prom-
ulgation of the  Statute and was a constant of Italian constitutional history. 130 
 Rosmini , regarding parliamentarianism, expresses the following judgement:
 «La politica astratta e perciò vaga ed indeterminata della Rivoluzione  francese , la quale 
esercitò ed esercita tuttavia una specie di tirannide sulle menti, espresse un concetto con-
fuso del  Parlamento nazionale. Lo si concepisce come il più solenne de’ poteri, anzi il solo 
potere nazionale, senza farne alcuna analisi, senza accertarne gli uffi ci e così conoscere il 
vero e il preciso scopo. Si sa solamente in generale ch’egli è istituto per concorrere a for-
mare le leggi. Ma quello che non si sa, e piuttosto quello che non si considera, si è, che le 
leggi da farsi sono di due maniere, altre che dichiarano ciò che è giusto ed ingiusto, altre 
che promuovono, tendono ad accrescere la pubblica prosperità. Anche queste seconde deb-
bono essere giuste, ma il loro scopo non è la pura giustizia… Per le leggi d’utilità, il 
 Parlamento è indispensabile e però questo è il vero e il proprio suo scopo. Quindi egli deve 
unire in sé gli elementi di tutta l’utilità, nessun interesse deve rimanere escluso. Non già che 
i deputati siano là per rappresentare gli interessi particolari, ma poiché l’interesse pubblico 
non risulta che dalla somma di tutti gli interessi privati, perciò l’interesse pubblico non può 
essere rappresentato a pieno se tutti gli interessi privati, grandi e piccoli non vi sono ad un 
tempo rappresentati». 131 
 In the words of  Rosmini , the diffi culty in transforming the  Parliament into a 
national institution, in the sense of an organ able to mirror the interests of the entire 
community. The essay  La Costituzione secondo la giustizia sociale wanted to be an 
alternative to the statute models which have affi rmed themselves during the 
 Risorgimento and, more generally, it must be noticed that in the thought of Antonio 
 Rosmini , the revolutionary and Napoleonic charters were, anyway, to be refused for 
130  For greater detail, see Perticone, Giacomo. 1961. Parlamentarismo e antiparlamentarismo nel 
Post-risorgimento. In  Nuove questioni di storia del Risorgimento e dell’Unità d’Italia II. Milano: 
Morzati, 621–670. 
131  ID=”ITerm805”Rosmini , Antonio. 1848.  La costituzione secondo la giustizia sociale con un’appendice 
sull’Unità d’Italia dell’abate Antonio  ID=”ITerm806”Rosmini -Serbati roveretano . Napoli: Stab. Tip. e Calc. di 
C. Battelli e comp., 43: «Abstract politics and therefore vague and indeterminate of the French 
 ID=”ITerm807”Revolution , which exercised and nevertheless exercises a sort of tyranny on minds, expressed a 
confused concept of national  ID=”ITerm808”Parliament . It conceives it as the most solemn of powers, rather, as 
the sole national power, without making any analysis of it, without ascertaining its offi ces and thus 
knowing its true and precise aim. It is only generally known that it is instituted to cooperate in 
formulating the laws. But that which is not known, and rather that which is not considered, is that 
the laws to be made are of two kinds, some laws that declare what which is right and that which is 
not right, other laws that promote, tend to increase public wealth. Also the latter must be just, but 
their goal is not pure justice … For the usefulness laws, Parliament is indispensable and however 
this is its true and proper aim. Therefore it must, within itself, unite the elements of all the useful-
ness, no interest should be excluded. It is not that deputies are there in order to represent particular 
interests, but since public interest results from the sum of all private interests, therefore public 
interest cannot be fully represented if all the private interests, both big and small, are not at the 
same time represented». 
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their inspiration principles and the enlightenment ideals on which they were 
based. 132 
 The  Costituzione secondo la giustizia sociale was written by  Rosmini in 1848, at 
the same time as the drafting of the  Albertine Statute . The writer from Rovereto, 
however, had the chance of returning to the constitutional topics with a series of 
interventions entitled  La Costituzione del Regno dell’Alta Italia which appeared in 
 Il Risorgimento . The occasion of the writings was provided by the annexation of the 
Lombardy-Veneto  Kingdom . The author specifi ed that «a Constitution is the great-
est work we can do: the most important of work: that which must bring order to all 
the nation, which providing it with the organism, it also gives it unity, life, exis-
tence. A Constitution is promulgated because it is perpetual, because a nation should 
never die». 133  Rosmini was also cautious on sovereign power in the hands of society, 
he was wary of empty constitutional formulas that could be easily bypassed and he 
cautioned against the various forms of  government that could turn into despotisms. 
Such were the forms of  government which had no solid basis of representation of 
interests. Leaving aside the concerns of  Rosmini on parliamentarism, most Italian 
authors recognised the link between public opinion and representative  government 
took shape. 134 
4.1  Massimo  D’Azeglio and the Defence of the Representative 
 Government 
 In 1849 the national scene changed decisively. The events of the war with  Austria 
had various consequences on an institutional level, so much so, that the same con-
stitutional regime was at risk. Massimo  D’Azeglio  Tapanelli (1789–1866) assumed 
the leadership of the Cabinet in one of the most dramatic moments of the period 
132  Gray, Carlo. 1952. Introduzione. In  ID=”ITerm813”Rosmini , Antonio.  Progetti di Costituzione . Milano: Fratelli 
Bocca editori and Ghisalbeti, Carlo. 1985.  ID=”ITerm814”Rosmini e il costituzionalismo risorgimentale.  Clio. 
Rivista trimestrale di studi storici 3: 427. 
133  ID=”ITerm819”Rosmini , Antonio.  1848 . La Costituzione del Regno dell’Alta Italia II .  ID=”ITerm820” l Risorgimento , 3rd July, 
N° 159: «è l’opera più grande che si possa fare: l’opera la più importante: quella che deve dare 
ordine a tutta la nazione, che dandole l’organismo, le dà altresì l’unità, la vita, l’esistenza. Una 
Costituzione si decreta perché sia perpetua, chè una nazione non dovrebbe morir giammai». 
134  Cf.  ID=”ITerm826”Lacchè, Luigi .  2015 . L’opinione pubblica nazionale e l’appello al popolo: fi gure e campi di 
tensione. In  Burocracia, poder político y justicia, Libro-homenaje de amigos del profesor José 
María García Marín , eds. Manuel Torres Aguilar and Miguel Pino Abad. Madrid: Dykinson, 462–
464. «Il governo con il pubblico è la strada per arrivare al governo con la costituzione. Non sor-
prende che gli “incunaboli” del costituzionalismo italiano siano incentrati in grandissima misura 
sul nesso libertà di stampa, opinione pubblica, governo costituzionale/monarchia rappresentativa» 
and «L’obiettivo degli scrittori moderati degli anni’40 e’50 è dunque quello di “costituzionaliz-
zare” l’opinione pubblica nel governo  ID=”ITerm827” appresentativo (e in maniera non certo univoca nella forma 
del governo parlamentare). L’opinione pubblica è il vapore, è il fl uido, la condizione per l’esistenza 
e il funzionamento di un sistema rappresentativo». 
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when the  Albertine Statute was in force. 135 In the famous  Proposta d’un programma 
per l’opinione nazionale italiana (1847), the illustrious protagonist had already 
expressed the idea that the consent of public opinion is a necessary material force. 136 
In other words, the idea that public opinion and consent expressed themselves in the 
representative  government became manifest. According to the author, the people 
would suffer if the  Statute , born out of the ideas of nationality, was going to be 
abandoned and moreover if the aristocracy’s infl uence was going to be restored. Nor 
would they like the despotism of  King and of demagogy to be renewed. 137 
 In the  government programme,  D’Azeglio could better explicate his own politi-
cal creed and the trust placed in the Constitutional regime. In a letter to Giovan 
Battista Giorgini, Massimo  D’Azeglio affi rmed:
 «Comunque sia son deciso a salvar lo Statuto spinte o sponte, e perciò salvare il Piemonte 
che è il solo paese rimasto in piedi in Italia. Se ci riuscirò, credo che non sarò stato inutile 
 super terram ». 138 
135  ID=”ITerm834” ’Azeglio was the head of Cabinet 7st May 1849 to 21st May 1852 and then for the second time 
till 4th November 1852, continuing to hold the offi ce during the fourth legislature which was 
ended by the fi rst  ID=”ITerm835”government of Count Camillo Benso di  ID=”ITerm836”Cavour . On this protagonist see: Macchi. 
Mauro. 1850.  La vita politica di Massimo  ID=”ITerm837” ’Azeglio . Osservazioni istorico-critiche . Torino: 
Magnaghi; Ghisalberti, Alberto Maria. 1960.  Massimo  ID=”ITerm838” ’Azeglio : moderato realizzatore . Roma: 
edizione dell’ateneo; Maturi, Walter. 1962. Azeglio, Massimo Taparelli d’. In  Dizionario Biografi co 
degli italiani 21; Brignoli, Marziano. 1988.  Massimo d’Azeglio. Una biografi a politica. Milano: 
Mursia. 
136  Cf.  ID=”ITerm839” ’Azeglio , Massimo. 1847.  Proposta d’un programma per l’opinione pubblica nazionale . 
Firenze: Le Monnier. «L’adottar il principio di cercare miglioramenti pratici e ragionevoli, con-
dotti dalla forza morale; dalla, ragione cioè, appoggiata al giudicio dell’opinione per mezzo della 
più intera pubblicità: l’adottare, in una parola, le idee d’un progresso moderato, e perciò possibile; 
che non porti offesa agli interessi de’ Principi, e favorisca invece il pieno e libero esercizio della 
loro potestà» (p. 14). «Nell’età presente, il progresso del senso morale, l’istruzione, la pubblicità, 
e la frequenza delle comunicazioni, rendono impossibile ormai 1’occultare l’ingiustizia e la sle-
altà: le quali esposte una volta agli sguardi dell’universale, cadono sotto 1’anatema dell’opinione 
pubblica, e strascinano nella loro rovina chi se n’era reso colpevole. Questa rovina non è sempre 
attuale e di fatto, ma è compiuta in principio e virtualmente, quando l’ha sentenziata il consenso 
universale» (p. 29). C.f. Meriggi, Marco. 2011. Opinione pubblica. In  Atlante culturale del 
Risorgimento. Lessico del linguaggio politico dal Settecento all’Unità , cit., 160 and Pichetto, 
Maria Teresa. 2007. La «congiura al chiarogiorno» di Massimo d’Azeglio. In  Potere e circolazione 
delle idee. Stampa, accademie e censura nel Risorgimento italiano , ed. Domenico M. Bruni, 
Milano: Franco Angeli, 91–108. 
137  Massimo  ID=”ITerm843” ’Azeglio ai suoi elettori. In  ID=”ITerm844” ’Azeglio . Massimo.  1931 –1938.  Scritti e discorsi 
politici, ed. M. De Rubris. Firenze: La Nuova Italia. II, 162–163: «Cardine d’ogni Stato è la forza; 
tanto la materiale che la morale. Il Governo di parte ci ha fatto perdere ambedue. Scopo del nuovo 
Governo dev’essere il riacquistarle, tanto negli ordini interni, come nelle relazioni coll’ estero. 
Credo s’otterrà nell’interno col dare al Governo la sola, la vera base su cui possa fondarsi, l’ opin-
ione dell’ universale, del popolo vero. Questo non patirebbe che si tornasse addietro dallo Statuto, 
né dalle idee di nazionalità, e soprattutto che si restaurasse l’ infl uenza aristocratica. Non vorrebbe 
neppure che venisse rinnovato il despotismo della demagogia; il despotismo di piazza». 
138  Letter to Giovan Battista  ID=”ITerm848”Giorgini ,  ID=”ITerm849” urin 1st July 1849. In  ID=”ITerm850” ’Azeglio , Massimo.  2002 . 
 Epistolario , ed. Georges Virlogeux. Torino: Centro studi piemontesi. V, 115: «However, I am 
determined to save the  ID=”ITerm851”Statute by hook or by crook, and therefore to save  ID=”ITerm852”Piedmont which is the 
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 Also in a letter addressed to his wife Luisa Blondel, the Prime Minister showed 
his awareness of danger:
 «Del resto è naturale che  l’Austria farà di tutto per buttarmi giù. Capisce che non è  Valerio 
che le fa male. Per me personalmente casco in piedi. Ma capisco che il paese cadrebbe in 
mano di chi rimetterebbe presto il buon tempo antico, e perciò sto a questo maledetto timore 
e mi sono messo in testa (seccato per seccato), di rimetterci la pelle o salvar quel poco che 
s’è guadagnato con tante tribolazioni». 139 
 In the attempt to defend the representative  government ,  D’Azeglio looked for the 
approval of the foreign monarchies as well. Particularly,  D’Azeglio had the approval 
of the British Government who encouraged the Italian Prime Minister to keep going 
along the constitutional path. 140 
 On 6th August 1849 the peace treaty with  Austria was stipulated, this was quite 
unfavourable to  Piedmont . The agreement was strongly criticised in  Parliament . On 
20th November, the Prime Minister, Massimo  D’Azeglio , dissolved the Houses of 
parliament and  Vittorio Emanuele II turned to the nation with the Moncalieri proc-
lamation in which the most interesting piece was:
 «I primi atti della Camera furono ostili alla Corona (…) Io fi rmava un trattato  coll’Austria , 
onorevole e non rovinoso (…) I miei Ministri ne chiedevano l’assenso alla Camera, che, 
apponendovi una condizione, rendeva tale assenso inaccettabile, poiché distruggeva la 
reciproca indipendenza dei tre Poteri e violava così lo Statuto del Regno. Ho promesso di 
salvare la nazione dalla tirannia dei partiti, qualunque sia il nome, lo scopo, il grado degli 
uomini che li compongono. Questa promessa, questo giuramento li adempio disciogliendo 
una Camera divenuta impossibile, li adempio convocandone un’altra immediatamente». 141 
only country still standing in Italy. If I succeed, I believe that I will not have been useless on 
Earth». 
139  Letter to Luisa D’Azeglio Blondel,  ID=”ITerm855” urin 24th July 1849. In  ID=”ITerm856” ’Azeglio , Massimo.  2002 . 
Epistolario, cit., V, 164: «After all, it is natural that  ID=”ITerm857”Austria will do everything to bring me down. 
Austria understands that it is not Valerio that hurts it. As for myself, I would land on my feet. 
However, I understand that the country would fall into the hands of those who will soon restore the 
good old times, and therefore I stick to this damned worry and have decided (nothing be left to 
lose) either to lose my life or to save that little bit that we have earned with so many 
tribulations». 
140  Dépêche du Marquis Ricci au Chev. Maxime  ID=”ITerm861” ’Azeglio (Londres 1st Jun 1850). In Bianchi, 
Nicomede.  1884 .  La politica di Massimo  ID=”ITerm862” ’Azeglio  dal 1848 al 1859 . Torino: Roux e Favale, 
97–98: «Arrivé à Londres le mardi 21 mai, j’ai eu le lendemain l’honneur d’être présenté à Lord 
Palmerston par le Marquis d’Azeglio. Sa Seigneurie nous reçut avec une politesse exquise et 
écouta avec beaucoup de bienveillance les demandes que j’avais été changé de lui adresser de la 
part du Gouvernement du Roi. Puis il nous répondit qu’il voyait avec une grande satisfaction le 
Piémont marcher d’un pas assuré dans la voie du Gouvernement constitutionnel (…) le 
Gouvernement Sarde pouvait être convaincu des bonnes dispositions du Cabinet Anglais en sa 
faveur et de toutes ses sympathies pour la consolidation du régime constitutionnel en Piémont». 
141  ID=”ITerm869” ’Azeglio . Massimo.  1931 –1938.  Scritti e discorsi politici , ed. M. De Rubris, cit., II, 195–196: 
«The fi rst acts of the Chamber were hostile to the Crown (…) I signed a treaty with  ID=”ITerm870”Austria , hon-
ourable and not ruinous (…) My Ministers asked the House to agree with it, the House, placing a 
condition on it, made such consent unacceptable, since it destroyed the reciprocal independence of 
the three Powers and so, violated the  ID=”ITerm871”Statute of the Kingdom. I promised to save the nation from 
party-political tyranny, whatever its name, its aim, the calibre of the men who make it up. This 
promise, this oath I fulfi l dissolving a Chamber that has become impossible, I fulfi l them conven-
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 With the Moncalieri proclamation and the return to the polls, Massimo D’Azeglio 
saved the representative  government guaranteeing it would be a long and a prosper-
ous one. 
5  Towards National Unifi cation 
 The end of the  D’Azeglio Cabinet was extra-parliamentary and its end was essen-
tially caused by the opposition to laws on marriage coming from certain clerical 
circles and from the sovereign,  Vittorio Emanuele II . A new phase of the representa-
tive  government was signalled by the fi gure of Camillo  Cavour who strongly 
believed in the parliamentary  form . 142 The statesman will, uninterruptedly, hold the 
offi ce of cabinet chief from 1852 till his death on 6th June 1861. 143 Being in charge 
of the Cabinet,  Cavour tried to contain the infl uences of the royal court, removing 
some men who were faithful to the Crown from the institutions. It was a matter of 
changes in the crucial offi ces and roles which were not sudden or radical, but fol-
lowed the path taken by his predecessor. 144 
 Following the Second War of  Independence , the  Kingdom of Sardinia acquired 
Lombardy and, through the procedure of annexation and  plebiscite ,  Tuscany ,  Parma , 
 Modena and  Emilia Romagna . The unifi cation process ended on the 4th November 
1860 with the annexation plebiscites in the Marche and  Umbria . 145 The  plebiscites 
assumed a character of  a posteriori legitimisation and were instrumental in that they 
had the aim of confi rming monarchical choices which were sustained by the liber-
als. It resorted to universal suffrage in order to give the utmost importance to the 
consensus, but it returned in a restricted suffrage (based on census) when it came to 
elect members of the national parliament. 146 It was before a  dual level of  legitima-
tion : the consent of the people was the instrument to justify the unifi cation process, 
however for the liberal  movement , the people could not be the source of  legitimation 
ing another immediately». On the proclamation, see Ghisalberti, Alberto M. 1952. Il proclama di 
Moncalieri.  Rassegna storica del Risorgimento : 566–588. 
142  Mack Smith, Denis. 1957.  ID=”ITerm878”Cavour and  ID=”ITerm879”Parliament .  Cambridge Historical Journal 13/1: 37–57. 
143  Passerin D’Entrèves, Ettore. 1962. L’ascesa di   ID=”ITerm880”Cavour nel parlamento subalpino (1850–1851). 
 Vita e pensiero 36: 160–170. Regarding a bibliography on  ID=”ITerm881”Cavour we can see at least: Romeo, 
Rosario. 1969–1984.  ID=”ITerm882”Cavour  e il suo tempo . Roma-Bari: Laterza. 3 voll. Passerin D’Entrèves, 
Ettore. 1956.  L’ultima battaglia politica di  ID=”ITerm883”Cavour . I problemi dell’unifi cazione italiana . Torino: 
ILTE; Hearder, Harry. 2000.  ID=”ITerm884”Cavour . Un europeo piemontese. Roma-Bari: Laterza. Viarengo, 
Adriano. 2010 .  ID=”ITerm885”Cavour , Roma: Salerno editrice. 
144  Gentile, Pierangelo. 2001.  L’ombra del Re.  ID=”ITerm887”Vittorio Emanuele II  e le politiche di corte , cit., 
114 ff. 
145  Genta, Enrico.  2012 .  Dalla Restaurazione al Risorgimento. Diritto, Diplomazia, personaggi . 
Torino: Giappichelli, 147–219. 
146  Mongiano, Elisa.  2003 . Il “voto della Nazione”. I plebisciti nella formazione del Regno d’Italia 
(1848–1860). Torino: Giappichelli editore. 
The Omnipotence of Parliament in the Legitimisation Process of ‘Representative…
200
of the ruling class in  Parliament . 147 As Alberto  Caracciolo perceived, during the 
process of national unifi cation there was still the will of having the Parliament as 
foundation of the national edifi ce. 148 The role of the organ legitimising the new State 
entity was reserved to  Parliament . Once more  Cavour ’s ideas weighed on this. In a 
letter to the Countess of Circourt, Count  Cavour affi rmed that the parliamentary 
way is the longest but the safest way. 149 Parliament remained a place of expression 
of national public opinion. Against those who highlighted the risk of the parliamen-
tary way, the statesman could say with conviction:
 «Io non me ne spavento, la lotta è una necessità del governo costituzionale; dove non v’è 
lotta, non v’è vita, non vi è progresso: quando ogni discussione avesse a cessare, io potrei 
lasciare la politica e ritirarmi in campagna a piantar cavoli». 150 
 To choose the parliamentary  road meant primarily to want the parliament as a 
place of discussion, control, censorship and consensus. According to  Cavour , only 
with the concurrence of parliament could Italy retain the sympathy of the European 
governments and public opinion, and could guarantee freedom in the process of 
national unifi cation:
 «Il miglior modo di dimostrare quanto il paese sia alieno dal dividere le teorie del  Mazzini 
si è di lasciare al Parlamento liberissima facoltà di censura e di controllo. Al voto  favorevole, 
che sarà sancito dalla grande maggioranza dei deputati, darà al Ministero un’autorità morale 
di gran lunga superiore ad ogni dittatura». […]. 
 Ora non vi ha altro modo di raggiungere questo scopo, che di attingere dal con-
corso del Parlamento la sola forza morale capace di vincere le sette, e di conservare 
le simpatie dell’Europa liberale». 151 
147  On this aspect see, diffusely,  ID=”ITerm900”Lacchè, Luigi .  2015 . L’opinione pubblica nazionale e l’appello al 
popolo: fi gure e campi di tensione. In  Burocracia, poder político y justicia, Libro-homenaje de 
amigos del profesor José María García Marín , cit., 467: «L’uso del suffragio universale maschile, 
rivelava … il principale campo di tensione interno a quel  doppio movimento o doppio livello di 
legittimazione . L’opinione pubblica nazionale era il vapore del processo di unifi cazione, ma il 
ricorso al suffragio universale non poteva essere fonte, per i liberali, di legittimazione della classe 
dirigente italiana». 
148  ID=”ITerm902”Caracciolo, Alberto .  1960 .  ID=”ITerm903” l Parlamento  nella formazione del Regno d’Italia , cit., 41. 
149  Letter to Countess of Circourt,  ID=”ITerm907” urin 29 Dicember 1860. In  ID=”ITerm908”Cavour  e l’Inghilterra. Carteggio 
con V.E.  ID=”ITerm909” ’Azeglio . Bologna: Zanichelli, 284–285. 
150  The words of  ID=”ITerm910”Cavour are shown in Bianchi, Nicomede.  1863 .  Il Conte Camillo di  ID=”ITerm911”Cavour . 
Documenti editi ed inediti . Torino: Unione tipografi ca-editrice, 120: «I will not fear, the fi ght is a 
necessity of constitutional  ID=”ITerm912”government ; where there is no struggle, there is no life, there is no 
progress: when discussion ceases, I could leave politics and retire to the countryside to plant 
cabbages». 
151  Ibidem , 121: «The best way to show how much the Country is alien in sharing theories of 
 ID=”ITerm916”Mazzini is to leave  ID=”ITerm917”Parliament the absolute freedom of censorship and control. A favourable vote 
will be enshrined by a Parliament majority, it will give the Cabinet a moral authority far superior 
to any dictatorship. […] The only way to achieve this is to draw from the help of Parliament which 




 Finally, making  Parliament the cornerstone of the constitutional order was tanta-
mount to preventing Italy from falling into the hands of monarchical or democratic 
despotism. However, the longevity of the  Statute contributed, if nothing else, to 
legitimate the representative  government . If in the initial phase many underlined the 
anachronism, the incompleteness, the inadequacy of the text and the lack of demo-
cratic nature of the constitutional Charter, in the following period these characters 
became a strong point which guaranteed its survival over time.
 «Il nostro Statuto al confronto delle mutate leggi fondamentali di tutto il continente europeo 
è uno dei più antichi monumenti del diritto pubblico interno degli Stati: così che dopo il 
breve giro di quattro anni può considerarsi sanzionato dal tempo». 152 
 The abovementioned affi rmations were fi rst of all spurred by the observation of 
the French experience characterised by political-constitutional instability. Indeed, 
Italian public law science noted that in  France , after the republican experience of 
1848, a new constitutional charter with a presidential imprint (14th January 1852) 
had been promulgated and added itself to the already numerous constitutional texts 
and drafts. The  Albertine Statute was considered well-grounded even if compared 
with the Italian constitutionalism of 1848–1849 which proved to be ephemeral. 
Moreover, the same democratic movement could only recognise that the Savoy 
 Monarchy was one of the most long-lived in Europe and could by now boast a 
sound tradition. Within the left wing of  Parliament , voices that hypothesised putting 
the republican idea to one side for a while in order to follow the path of national 
unifi cation under the coat of arms of the Savoy dynasty which was the only one of 
Italian origin in the Peninsula were not lacking. 
 On the eve of national unifi cation, on the pages of the newspaper the  La Nazione , 
it was still affi rmed with a certain pride that:
 «intanto noi abbiamo a vantaggio della nostra tesi un atto innegabile: ed è che la  costituzione 
albertina ha fatto buona prova di sè durante dodici anni; che è per essa e per la religiosa 
osservanza che ne ebbero un re (il quale perciò fu gratifi cato da’ popoli italiani 
dell’appellativo galantuomo) e i vari parlamenti che si succedettero, che noi siamo giunti al 
punto in cui ora ci troviamo; che quello Statuto fu per noi l’arca santa della libertà; che 
contro quello Statuto non sorse mai dubbio ne’ popoli nostri». 153 
 For the liberal moderate  party , tradition and the capacity of survival of the repre-
sentative  government under the protection of the  Monarchy were points of strength, 
a sure thing which should not be left. The unifi cation process of 1859–1861 sharp-
ened, however, old disputes which developed the day after the granting of the 
152  Ricostruzioni in  ID=”ITerm921” l Parlamento , 3 gennaio 1853, n. 2: «Our  ID=”ITerm922”Statute compared to the fundamental 
changing laws throughout the European continent is one of the oldest monuments of internal pub-
lic law of States: so that after the brief 4-year period it can be considered sanctioned by time». 
153  ID=”ITerm928”La Nazione  17 aprile 1861, N° 107: «anyway we have an undeniable act to the advantage of our 
thesis: and it is that the Albertine constitution proved to be good for 12 years; that it is thanks to it 
and to the religious observance of it which was kept by a king (who therefore was rewarded by the 
Italian people with the title of gentleman) and by the various parliaments which followed one 
another that we reached the point where we now stand; that that  ID=”ITerm929”Statute was the holy ark of free-
dom; that a doubt never was raised against that  ID=”ITerm930”Statute among our people». 
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 Statute , again bringing the questions concerning the constituent  power and the 
necessity to convene a national assembly to the fore. For example, in the pages of 
democratic newspapers it could be read that
 «il presente parlamento accolto in Torino, non solo dall’impero dei  plebisciti , non solo dagli 
antecedenti democratici creatori del nuovo ordine di cose, ma dalla natura stessa delle 
 questioni sull’ordinamento interno, che pur fa d’uopo risolvere, è fatalmente condotto a 
dichiarare la sua incompetenza, e dar luogo all’assemblea eletta a voto universale con 
 autorità fondatrice di  Statuto . Le questioni dell’ordinamento interno si collegano ai principi 
costituzionali del Regno, e i principi costituzionali non si possono riformare, se non per 
esplicita delegazione di sovranità  nazionale ». 154 
 These pages summarise some of the themes of the democratic unitary movement 
which had its own impulse from the programmes elaborated among the exiles in 
centres situated outside the Peninsula. To this idea concerning popular legitimisa-
tion,  Mazzini who forever had expressed the necessity of a constituent assembly 
contributed much:
 «Chi può rilevare il pensiero nazionale? La  Nazione . Come può rilevarlo? Per mezzo de’ 
suoi rappresentanti. Come può la nazione costituire i propri rappresentanti? Delegandoli 
coll’elezione. Quale deve essere l’elezione? Quella del suffragio universale, uniforme, 
libero. Il popolo si raccoglie nelle assemblee primarie e vota: il popolo tutto quanto, dacchè 
altrimenti l’elezione non rileva il pensiero nazionale, ma una frazione di quel pensiero. E i 
delegati della  nazione costituiscono un congresso nazionale, una  Costituente . Essa stende il 
Patto Nazionale: lo sottomette all’approvazione del popolo: poi si riconfonde in seno al 
paese». 155 
154  L’autorità parlamentare e le questioni d’ordinamento.  La Nuova Europa 20 aprile 1861 , N° 7: 
«the current parliament – which is sitting in  ID=”ITerm939” urin not only because of the command of the 
 ID=”ITerm940”plebiscites , not only because of the preceding democratic creators of the new order of things, but 
because of the same nature of the questions on the internal legal order which must though be 
solved – is fatally led to declare its incompetence, and give way to the assembly elected by univer-
sal suffrage with the authority of issuing the  ID=”ITerm941”Statute . The questions of the internal legal order are 
connected with constitutional principles can only be reformed by the explicit mandate of national 
sovereignty» (see  ID=”ITerm942”Caracciolo, Alberto .  1960 .  ID=”ITerm943” l Parlamento  nella formazione del Regno d’Italia , 
cit., 277). 
155  «Who can bring out the national thought? The Nation. How can it bring it out? By way of its 
representatives. How can the nation constitute its own representatives? Delegating them by way of 
election. Which election must there be? That one with universal, uniform, free suffrage. People 
gather in primary assemblies and vote: all the people, because otherwise the election does not 
bring out the national thought, but a fraction of that thought. And the representatives of the nation 
constitute a national congress, a constituent  ID=”ITerm948”assembly . The latter draws the National Pact: submits 
it to the people for approval: then it blends again with the country». Cf.  ID=”ITerm949”Mazzini ,  ID=”ITerm950”Giuseppe .  1909 . 
Necessità d’una costituente. In  Scritti editi ed inediti di Giuseppe  ID=”ITerm951”Mazzini . Imola: Paolo Galeati, 
VI, 51–52. The article appeared for the fi rst time in  La Jeune Suisse N. 21, 9th September 1835. It 
was translated into Italian by the same author. On Giuseppe  ID=”ITerm952”Mazzini and democratic movement: 
Della Peruta, Franco. 1958.  I democratici e la rivoluzione italiana. Dibattiti ideali e contrasti 
politici all’indomani del 1848. Milano: Feltrinello; Mastellone, Salvo. 1960.  ID=”ITerm953”Mazzini  e la Giovane 
Italia (1831–1834). Pisa: Domus Mazziniana; Della Peruta, Franco (ed). 1974.  Scrittori politici 
dell’Ottocento. G.  ID=”ITerm954”Mazzini  e i democratici . Milano-Napoli: Ricciardi;  ID=”ITerm955”Scirocco, Alfonso . 1978. Le 
correnti dissidenti del mazzinianesimo dal 1853 al 1859. In  Correnti ideali e politiche della sinis-
tra italiana dal 1849 al 1861. Atti del 21° Convegno storico toscano: (Castelvecchio Pascoli, 
26–29 maggio 1975). Firenze: Leo S. Olschki; Lovett, Clara Maria. 1982.  The Democratic 
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 According to  Mazzini , the Constituent  assembly was a political tool of legitimi-
sation, the sole act able to transform the nation into a legal entity. Any other way 
was, instead, usurpation. In compliance with this, he said that every nationality 
requires a common principle and
 «spetta alla costituzione nazionale il defi nire questo principio, e regolarne le norme; come 
è uffi cio d’un governo nazionale il promuovere e dirigere le manifestazioni, associando 
sempre più i cittadini nell’intento comune». 156 
 In the end, the Italian  Kingdom was born under the weight of ambiguities. 
Legitimisation went through  plebiscites and the parliament which gathered the rep-
resentatives of the new nation. 
6  Conclusion 
 On 18th February 1861, the fi rst  Parliament of Italy sat at  Turin and thus the eighth 
legislature was opened. The  Statute was extended to the  Kingdom of Italy , which 
was proclaimed on 17th March and. 157 On 23rd March, the fi rst  government was 
constituted which was headed by  Cavour (4th Government). 158  Vittorio Emanuele II 
was proclaimed king «by the grace of God, by the will of the nation». 159 At the end 
of the unifi cation process, Pasquale  Castagna , in his commentary to the Italian 
 Statute was able to affi rm that
 « legittimo è ogni potere liberamente accettato. Legittimo il Sabaudo e il Napoleoide; chè il 
volere parlato con il  plebiscito è forma ottima di volontà popolare». 160 
Movement in Italy 1830– ID=”ITerm956”1876 . Cambridge-London: Harvard University Press; Montale, Bianca. 
1996. La crisi dei democratici. In  Verso l’Unità. 1849–1861. Atti del LVII Congresso di Storia del 
Risorgimento Italiano (Bari, 26–29 ottobre 1994) . Roma: Istituto per la storia del Risorgimento 
Italiano. 
156  ID=”ITerm959”Mazzini ,  ID=”ITerm960”Giuseppe .  1909 . Nationalité. Quelques idées sur une Constitution nationale. In  Scritti 
editi ed inediti di Giuseppe  ID=”ITerm961”Mazzini , cit., VI, 149: «it is up to the national constitution to defi ne this 
principle, and regulate its norms; as it is duty of a national  ID=”ITerm962”government to promote and direct the 
manifestations, associating the citizens more and more to the common intent». 
157  Furlani, Silvio. 1988. Le elezioni del 27 gennaio 1861 e l’inizio della VIII legislature: la prima 
del Regno Unito. In  ID=”ITerm969” l Parlamento  italiano 1861–1988. Vol. 1: 1861–1865. L’unifi cazione italiana. 
Da  ID=”ITerm970”Cavour  a La Marmora , cit., 135–154 
158  The Cabinet was made up of Ministers: Camillo Benso  ID=”ITerm973”Cavour (Minister for Foreign Affairs 
and Minister of the Marine), Giuseppe  ID=”ITerm974”Natoli (Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Trade), 
Ubaldino Peruzzi (Ministry of Public Works), Marco  ID=”ITerm975”Minghetti (Ministry of the Interior), 
Francesco De  ID=”ITerm976”Santis (Ministry for Public Education), Manfredo  ID=”ITerm977”Fanti (Ministry of War), Giovanni 
Battista  ID=”ITerm978”Cassinis (Ministry of Justice), Francesco Saverio  ID=”ITerm979”Vegezzi , and then, Pietro Bastogi 
(Ministry of Finance), Vincenzo  ID=”ITerm980”Niutta (Minister without Portfolio). 
159  «per grazia di Dio, per volontà della nazione». For the debate in parliament and relevant docu-
mentation on the title to give to  ID=”ITerm982”Vittorio Emanuele II , see  ID=”ITerm983”Caracciolo, Alberto .  1960 .  ID=”ITerm984” l Parlamento , 
cit., 42–50. 
160  ID=”ITerm989”Castagna, Pasquale .  1865 .  Commentario statuto italiano . Firenze: Barbera, 31: «legitimate is 
every freely accepted power. Legitimate is the  ID=”ITerm990”government of the House of Savoy and that of 
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 While, the representative monarchical  government is that where the people 
retaining sovereignty for themselves, delegate its exercise to many powers or politi-
cal bodies, which must be maintained in harmony by a hereditary head who is the 
 king . 161 The debate on legitimisation of power and on the nature and exercise of 
sovereign power was deeply embedded in public discourse on representative  gov-
ernment , which was entrusted to journalists, intellectuals, politicians and jurists. 
Nevertheless, these debates have to be placed within the process of unifi cation and 
connected with debates surrounding construction of national identity. All this com-
plicates the framework of our analysis further, the  Risorgimento movement being 
divided into various, different contrasting streams (democrats, republicans,  liberals , 
conservatives) worrying to underline every lacking of the other. 162 The absolute 
power of the sovereign had been circumscribed by the gracious concession of the 
Constitution which, as has been seen, was generic on the origin of legitimate power, 
and was lacking every defi nition of  sovereignty as well. On the other hand, the 
expression ‘representative  government ’ is a formula which assumes different mean-
ings according to the socio-political moment wherein it is considered. Only con-
stant application and public debate will attribute ever more weight to  Parliament . 
Also, the relationship between  Monarch and Parliament is not stable, but is in con-
tinuous movement. The parliamentary  system establishes itself only in the second 
phase and will never be complete. In the fi rst phase of the  Albertine Statute we must 
speak, rather, of a « King ’s Government». The theory of the «omnipotence of 
 Parliament » is a corrective between the monarchical  principle and the excesses of 
popular  sovereignty . Moreover, the metaphor of the pact between sovereign and 
people contributed to  legitimising the new constitutional regime. There will not be 
ideal models to determine the organisation and the exercise of the sovereign  power . 
The lesson of  Cavour as regards the centrality of parliament was clearly evident, but 
the legacy of the  Risorgimento is unclear, in that it contains both disdain of the par-
liamentary system and its appreciation. 163 
Napoleon; since the will spoken by the  ID=”ITerm991”plebiscite is an excellent form of popular will». 
161  Ibidem , 42: «governo monarchico rappresentativo è quello in cui il popolo ritenendo a sé la 
sovranità, ne delega l’esercizio a più poteri o corpi politici, i quali debbono essere mantenuti in 
armonia da un capo ereditario, che è il re». 
162  On the period of time we are considering, there is a plethora of literature available. Personally, 
on the Italian  ID=”ITerm997”Risorgimento movement , I availed myself of the summary by Woof, Stuart J. 1981. 
 Il Risorgimento italiano . Torino: Einaudi.  ID=”ITerm998”Scirocco, Alfonso . 1990.  L’Italia del Risorgimento . 
Bologna: Il Mulino. Derek, Edward Dawson and Biagini Eugenio F. 2002.  The Risorgimento and 
the Unifi cation of Italy . Harlow-London: Pearson Education Limited. Banti, Alberto Mario. 2006 . 
La nazione del Risorgimento. Parentela, santità e onore alle origini dell’Italia unita , cit. Banti, 
Alberto Mario and Ginsborg, Paul (eds.). 2007.  Il Risorgimento. Annale 22 Storia d’Italia . Torino: 
Einaudi. 
163  In these terms speaks Banti, Alberto Mario.  2004 .  Il Risorgimento italiano . Roma-Bari: Laterza, 130. 
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 Finally, sovereignty is not concentrated only in one place and the constituent 
 power lies in the nation represented in  Parliament . 164 According to Augusto 
 Pierantoni 
 «il potere  costituente adunque è fatto per lo svolgimento delle libertà, e non per la loro 
riduzione. Noi sinora lo abbiamo esaminato senza confonderlo con la sovranità  nazionale 
… Il portare opinione, come fanno moltissimi pubblicisti, che il potere  costituente sia la 
stessa società sovrana operante, condurrebbe a questa conseguenza, che nessuno potrebbe 
avere il diritto di reclamare contro gli errori e le violazioni che la società avesse commessi 
nella sua violazione. Invece egli è vero che il potere  costituente deve emanare direttamente 
dalla  nazione , ma non può dirsi che sia la  nazione stessa, la quale resta sempre inviolabile 
innanzi di lui con la facoltà di non riconoscerne l’azione, se eccessiva, e con l’autorità di 
poterlo richiamare al mancato uffi cio». 165 
 Pierantoni admitted the rational distinction between the legislative and constitu-
ent  power , but the constituent power survived inside the legislative power and the 
theory of the omnipotence of parliament consented in authorizing the legislator to 
amend, modify and correct the provisions contained in the articles. We need to wait 
for the national school of public law to reach a thorough layout and defi nition of 
concepts like ‘Government’ and ‘Sovereignty’. The description of the parliamen-
tary  government by Vittorio Emanuele  Orlando will be emblematic. He, after hav-
ing exposed his juridical theory of the Cabinet Government, that is a theory distilled 
of all political, historical and philosophical contamination, was able affi rm that 
popular  sovereignty is rendered concrete within the  government . In this sense, the 
Government, meant in the wider sense of ‘State’, is considered as an element which 
integrates the idea of  sovereignty ». 166 
 Certainly, the patrimony of ideas, debates and concepts worked out during the 
subalpine period will not go lost with national unifi cation. Savoy  Monarchy will be 
one of the political protagonists of the new phase and will act as favourable condi-
tion for the development of the new regime on a parliamentary basis. Nevertheless, 
in a constitutional legal order in continual evolution, the Monarchy will not, and 
cannot, be the only legal tool to interpret the feelings of public opinion. It is for sure 
that from  Cavour onwards, the conviction that the  Parliament was the interpreter of 
164  Specifi cally, see:  ID=”ITerm1015”Lacchè, Luigi .  2015 . L’opinione pubblica nazionale e l’appello al popolo: 
fi gure e campi di tensione, cit., 469–470. 
165  ID=”ITerm1023”Pierantoni, Augusto .  1873 .  Trattato di Diritto costituzionale . Napoli: Giuseppe Marghieri edi-
tore, 231: «the constituent  ID=”ITerm1024”power is therefore made for carrying on the liberties, and not for their 
reduction. Till now, we examined it without mixing it up with National  ID=”ITerm1025”sovereignty … Holding the 
opinion, as many public law scientists do, that the constituent  ID=”ITerm1026”power is the same operating sover-
eign society, will lead to this consequence that nobody could have the right to complain about 
mistakes and violations that society committed violating it. On the contrary, it is true that the 
constituent  ID=”ITerm1027”power must emanate directly from the nation, but it cannot be said that it is the  ID=”ITerm1028”nation 
itself, which remains forever inviolable before it with the faculty of not recognising its action, if 
excessive, and with the authority of being able to recall it to its failed duty». 
166  «la sovranità popolare si concreta nel governo». Cf.  ID=”ITerm1036”Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele . 1940. Studi 
giuridici sul governo parlamentare. In  Diritto pubblico generale. Scritti vari (1881–1940) coordi-
nati in sistema . Milano: Giuffrè. Previously published in the periodical  Archivio Giuridico, 
XXXVI, 1886. 
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public opinion and that it is not possible to govern without its consent, was dis-
tinctly manifested. In this context and on these conditions, we recognise that 
Parliament is «the only and whole and perpetual representation of national 
 sovereignty », 167 «the authority of the Parliament is absolute, unlimited, undefi ned; 
it does not recognise any other boundary to its power but physical and moral laws 
of nature», 168 «in Parliament it is sovereignty, in Parliament it is the nation, in 
Parliament it is the very Constitution of the country». 169 The questions about the 
“constituent  power ” and the “Constituent  Assembly ” are absorbed in the debate on 
the powers and limits of legislative power. The Parliament was charged with the 
constituent function and was considered “perpetual Constituent”. The history of the 
rationalisation of the system is however another one, often far away from the expec-
tations of the intellectuals, having to face the effective reality of the country. 
7  Summary (Italian) 
 Il presente contributo vuole indagare la legittimazione del governo  rappresentativo 
nel Piemonte subalpino. Il saggio propone alcune rifl essioni che mettono insieme il 
dato normativo con la prassi costituzionale, il dibattito pubblico e le trattazioni 
giuridiche. Lo scopo è mostrare alcune rappresentazioni che la collettività ha della 
Costituzione. 
 Con l’avvento dei regimi rappresentativi si affermava l’idea che il sistema costi-
tuzionale funzionava quanto più c’era sintonia tra le istituzioni e l’opinione pub-
blica. Il tema del consenso e della legittimazione era questione fondamentale. 
 Dopo la rivoluzione francese, la Monarchia affrontava il diffi cile passaggio da 
una forma di legittimazione dinastica a una nuova di tipo nazional-rappresentativa, 
ponendo in essere strategie orientate a ripensare i tradizionali fondamenti della 
sovranità. Spazi, rituali e simboli della politica tradizionale dovevano confrontarsi 
con l’affermazione delle assemblee rappresentative. Dall’altro lato, i Parlamenti 
dovevano relazionarsi con il potere regio e dovevano ritagliarsi degli spazi propri di 
autonomia, trovare formule in grado di legittimarsi come realtà rappresentative 
d’interessi comuni. 
 In Italia un lessico politico-costituzionale si forma assai tardi. Uno studio sulle 
fonti di legittimazione e sulla sovranità deve tener conto della fl uidità del linguag-
gio politico, nonché della diffi cile e lenta formulazione di concetti giuridici. Il 
dibattito sulla legittimazione del potere e sulla natura ed esercizio della sovranità si 
intrecciava col discorso pubblico sul governo  rappresentativo . 
167  Broglio, Emilio.  1865 .  Delle forme parlamentari . Brescia: Sentinella Bresciana, 33: «la rap-
presentanza unica e intera e perpetua della sovranità nazionale». 
168  Ibidem , 103: «l’autorità del Parlamento è assoluta, illimitata, indefi nita; non riconosce altro 
confi ne al suo potere che le leggi fi siche e morali di natura» 
169  Ibidem , 98: «nel Parlamento è la sovranità, nel Parlamento è la nazione, nel Parlamento è la 
stessa Costituzione del paese» 
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 Lo Statuto  Albertino sterilizzava la sovranità popolare e il potere costituente, 
evitandone ogni riferimento. La sovranità regia era la sola fonte della legittimità 
politica e l’auctoritas risiedeva nella persona del monarca. A circoscrivere il potere 
assoluto del sovrano era stata la concessione graziosa della Costituzione. Il prin-
cipio monarchico non fu, però, inteso in senso assolutistico, come nella Charte fran-
cese del 1814, che racchiudeva l’autorità suprema nella persona del Re, ma nel 
signifi cato più moderno di una monarchia che attraverso la concessione della costi-
tuzione si vincolava in modo pieno ed irrevocabile ad essa. 
 Al di là della laconicità dello Statuto, nel periodo successivo alla concessione 
dello Statuto  Albertino si creavano alchimie lessicali proprie della tradizione costi-
tuzionale italiana. Nella prima parte dello scritto si analizzano i signifi cati delle 
espressioni “sovranità” e “governo  rappresentativo ” attraverso dizionari, il cate-
chismo politico di Michelangelo  Castelli e  Briano e i giornali. In particolare i gior-
nali furono il principale luogo ove si sviluppava una moderna opinione pubblica 
critica ed attenta. Dalle colonne dei quotidiani non veniva mai meno il tentativo di 
popolarizzare il nuovo regime politico. 
 Lo Statuto, per la sua natura di Charte octroyée, era debole sotto il profi lo della 
legittimazione. I primi osservatori della costituzione notavano immediatamente la 
mancanza di democraticità che si esprimeva attraverso il potere costituente e la 
sovranità. In questo contesto, numerosi furono i tentativi per colmare questo vuoto. 
Tra le varie idee che prendevano piede vi era quella che vedeva nello Statuto un 
patto o un accordo tra Sovrano e popolo. Inoltre, da subito circolava la teoria 
dell’onnipotenza  parlamentare . Questa teoria era usata per allontanare lo spettro del 
potere costituente ed era utilizzata come correttivo tra il principio monarchico e gli 
eccessi della sovranità popolare. 
 Preso atto che la Statuto è un atto politico del Re, i liberali concentrarono la pro-
pria attenzione sulla rappresentanza rendendosi conto che sotto questo profi lo si 
giocava una delle partite più importanti. In Piemonte, il parlamento non era certo 
rappresentativo della sovranità popolare, essendo costituito dal Senato di nomina 
regia e una camera eletta su base censitaria. L’articolo 41 dello Statuto  Albertino 
recitava: «I deputati rappresentano la Nazione in generale, e non le sole provincie in 
cui furono eletti. Nessun mandato rappresentativo imperativo può darsi dagli 
Elettori». Sebbene su base censitaria, nell’immaginario collettivo la presenza elet-
tiva qualifi cava l’intero ordinamento rendendolo fi nalmente “nazionale”. La rap-
presentanza era considerata un elemento genetico del nuovo ordinamento, qualifi cato 
come ‘governo monarchico-rappresentativo’. Attraverso la convivenza tra principio 
monarchico e principio rappresentativo si stabiliva che la base della sovranità risie-
deva oltre che nella Corona nella Nazione politicamente rappresentata. 
 Nei primi anni del governo  rappresentativo si sviluppava un’accurata pubblicis-
tica sulla forma di governo e l’esercizio della sovranità. Queste teorizzazioni non 
sempre erano univoche né spiegavano effettivamente l’origine del potere legittimo. 
In ultimo, le rifl essioni dottrinali sulla forma di governo  rappresentativo non trova-
vano un’adeguata corrispondenza sul piano della prassi istituzionale che era ancora 
confusa e in fase di perfezionamento. 
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 In una prima fase l’istituzione parlamentare, accolta con un grande entusiasmo 
iniziale, aveva delle diffi coltà a ritagliarsi spazi propri rispetto alle prerogative della 
Corona. Solo l’applicazione costante e il dibattito pubblico attribuirono sempre più 
peso al Parlamento. Inoltre, i rapporti tra Monarca e Parlamento non furono stabili, 
ma in continuo movimento. 
 Una nuova fase del governo  rappresentativo fu segnata dalla fi gura di Camillo 
 Cavour che credeva fortemente nella forma parlamentare. In questa seconda fase la 
longevità dello Statuto contribuiva a legittimare il governo  rappresentativo . Se nella 
fase iniziale si sottolineava da più parti l’anacronismo, la lacunosità, l’inadeguatezza 
del testo e l’assenza di democraticità del testo costituzionale, in un secondo periodo 
questi caratteri diventarono punti di forza che ne avevano garantirono la soprav-
vivenza nel tempo. L’Unifi cazione nazionale si concretizzava sotto il peso delle 
ambiguità. La legittimazione passava attraverso i plebisciti e il nuovo parlamento 
che raccoglieva i rappresentati della nuova nazione. Di certo il patrimonio d’idee, i 
dibattiti e i concetti elaborati durante il periodo subalpino non andranno persi con 
l’unifi cazione nazionale. 
 La Monarchia Sabauda era uno dei protagonisti politici della nuova fase e costi-
tuiva condizione favorevole per lo sviluppo del nuovo regime su base parlamentare. 
Tuttavia, in un ordinamento costituzionale in continua evoluzione, la Monarchia 
non poteva essere l’unico strumento legale per interpretare i sentimenti dell’opinione 
pubblica. Certo è che da  Cavour in poi si manifestava distintamente la convinzione 
che il Parlamento fosse interprete dell’opinione pubblica e non si poteva governare 
senza il consenso di questa. Tuttavia, non mancarono voci che individuavano limiti 
del parlamentarismo, anzi la critica correva ininterrottamente dalla promulgazione 
dello Statuto e fu una costante della storia costituzionale italiana 
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 Abstract  The following study is a result of the fi rst phase of the ReConFort research 
on the constitutional debate of late eighteenth century in Poland (the so- called First 
Republic, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth). Several categories of sources, 
including not only juridical but also political writers’ and politicians’ private corre-
spondence, were analysed. An analysis of the issue of sovereignty and an interpreta-
tion of this concept in journalistic writings and legal acts of that time lead to the 
conclusion that sovereignty was defi ned as an external independence and, in par-
ticular, as the ‘inner freedom’. On the grounds of journalistic writings and the Great 
Sejm’s (the 4-Year Sejm) legal acts the class of nobility remained the sovereign. The 
articles of the Constitution of the 3rd of May 1791 changed the role of the nobility 
(possessors), which became henceforth ‘the free nation’ in a political sense. Its main 
task was to represent the whole society composed of the nobility, bourgeoisie and 
peasantry. The adoption of the law on the free royal cities (1791) also provided an 
opportunity for a more liberal interpretation of the constitution itself. Another mat-
ter was a discussion on the position of the monarch related to the problem of his 
resignation from ‘free royal elections’, which was the most controversial regulation. 
The conservatives clearly interpreted these plans of the patriotic fraction as a ‘coup 
d‘etat’, an attack against the existing freedom and the fi rst step to the introduction 
of an absolute model of rules. 
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1  Introductory Remarks 
 The ReConFort is an attempt to open a new and very particular perspective. The 
research conducted under the project essentially focused on the problem of sover-
eignty. Case studies brought manifold dilemmas. An instance of late eighteenth- 
century Poland, the oldest analysed one, could not be embedded in a context of the 
modern idea of sovereignty. A researcher, in order not to succumb to such temptations 
which may create artifi cial structures, is obliged to stick to the precise historical con-
text. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the concept of sovereignty had taken on 
double meanings within the abovementioned period: ‘the external  independence and 
internal freedom’, as announced in the  preamble to the 3rd of May  Constitution . 1 
 The fi rst aspect can be associated with the American concept of “ independence ”. 
The term of “independencja” was implemented at that time into the Polish dictionary 
by the revolutionaries who took part in the  American War of  Independence (e.g. 
Tadeusz  Kościuszko ). 2 This point seems to be less interesting with regard to the com-
prehensive analysis. On the other hand, it is still signifi cant due to the disastrous situ-
ation of Poland surrounded by imperial powers and the direct threat associated with 
it and manifested in the 1st partition of the Polish  territory by the  Kingdom of Prussia , 
the  Russian and Austrian  Empires . This action was fi nalized by the treaties signed in 
St. Petersburg on the 5th of August (the 25th of July), 1772 and subsequently 
approved by the decision of the Polish Parliament (Sejm) forced thereto in 1773. 3 
The interest of the neighbouring powers was to retain the weakness, anarchy, desta-
bilized laws and ineffective executive authorities. The participants of reform  move-
1  Text of the Constitution (Polish: Ustawa Rządowa):Volumina Legum, Wydawnictwo Komisyi 
Prawniczej Akademii Umiejętności w Krakowie, t. IX, Kraków 1889, p. 220–225; in German edi-
tion: Willoweit Dietmar, Seif Ulrike. 2003.  Europäische Verfassungsgeschichte . Rechtshistorische 
Texte. München: Verlag C.H.Beck, p. 281–291, in English: a.o. Kasparek Joseph – Obst, 1980. 
The constitutions of Poland and of the United States. Kinship and genealogy, Miami, Florida: The 
American Institute of Polish Culture, p. 303–312. 
2  F. Pepłowski for Władysław Konopczyński indicates Stanisław Konarski as the one who fi rst 
coined this phrase in Latin version. Comp. Pepłowski Franciszek. 1961.  Słownictwo i frazeologia 
polskiej publicystyki okresu oświecenia i romantyzmu, Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 
p. 44. 
3  The direct cause of action of the partitioners was to be a threat allegedly caused by the “spirit of 
partiality, supporting the anarchy in Poland”, which “makes them fear a complete decomposition 
of the state, which could damage the interests of the neighbours, adhering to the Republic, under-
mining good relations between them and igniting a general war. Thus, Austria, Prussia and Russia, 
having pretences to Poland with regard to the laws as old as true, decided to pursue them, to restore 
the order within Poland and to ensure this country a political status more in line with the interests 
of its neighbours”. (“duchem stronniczym, podtrzymującym anarchię w Polsce”, który „każe 
obawiać się zupełnego rozkładu państwa, co mogłoby zaszkodzić interesom sąsiadów tej rzecz-
pospolitej, naruszyć dobre stosunki istniejące między nimi i wzniecić ogólną wojnę. Więc Austria, 
Prusy i Rosja, mając zresztą względem polski pretensję o prawa równie dawne jak słuszne, 
postanowiły wystąpić z nimi, przywrócić porządek wewnątrz Polski i nadać temu państwu stan 
polityczny więcej zgodny z interesami jego sąsiadów.”). Cit. after Zielińska Zofi a. 1986.  Ostatnie 
lata Pierwszej Rzeczypospolitej , Warszawa: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, p. 18; texts of treaties 
between Russia and Prussia, Russia and Austria, Prussia an Russia among others in: Recueil des 
traités, conventions et actes diplomatiques concernant la Pologne 1762–1862, par le Comte 
d’Angeberg, Paris MDCCCLXII, p. 97–106. 
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ments of the second half of the eighteenth century, political writers and  lawyers 
particularly emphasized this aspect and treated it as a reason for internal reforms. 
 The idea of sovereignty in Poland of that time, through the prism of the State’s 
structures, was connected with the concept of freedom, which eventually was theo-
retically transferred from the level of human beings as its subjects into the structure 
of the State. This freedom was understood as the good “ more valuable than the life 
and personal happiness ” (again the  preamble to the 3rd of May  Constitution ) and it 
became an argument instrumentally used by debaters throughout the reform period 
between 1788 and 1792. Thus, sovereignty was also a “thousand-year old” freedom – 
the value that used to preponderate during discussions. 4 In practise, however, the 
subject of this freedom, its “guardians” 5 remained solely a political nation, i.e. the 
noblemen. The catalogue of rights and freedoms dedicated even to the petty  nobility , 
based on the Cardinal Laws adopted in  1791 , the 3rd of May  Constitution and consti-
tutional bills, 6 was relatively comprehensive. Incidentally, it should be noted that 
 nobility made up an infl uential and signifi cant group – up to 8 %, or according to 
other controversial estimates even as much as 10 % of Poland’s population. 7 
 The debates that took place out of the Polish Parliament, brought forth voices 
opting for an alliance of the  nobility and the  bourgeoisie . A tentative expression of 
these trends was the adoption of the Law on free royal  cities in 1791. It was not a 
very signifi cant step, yet allowed to read the articles of the Constitution in a more 
liberal perspective. At the same time, the regulations adopted in the analysed period 
led to the loss of political rights by the poorest group of petty  nobility ,thus establish-
ing a kind of  sui generis property qualifi cation. 
 Finally, the concept of sovereignty appeared in another context, less emphasised 
in the following parts of the analysis, however still deserving to be highlighted. 
Zygmunt Izdebski, a Polish publisher of Jean  Bodin ’s ‘Six books on the Republic’ 
found that “  a pattern of another sovereignty derives from the tradition of Polish 
political thought, although it used to be violated by a native anarchy and a foreign 
tyranny. This is a model of the sovereignty of  law .” 8 
4  Comp.  Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Anna . 2004. O starożytnej wolności Polaków. Historia wolności 
polskiej w dyskusjach politycznych i historycznych wieku XVIII.  Teki Historyczne – Cahiers 
d’Histoire – Historical Papers , Londyn: Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne w Wielkiej Brytanii, 
XXIII: 34–53, also Grześkowiak Krwawicz, Anna. 2006a. Staropolska koncepcja wolności i jej 
ewolucja w myśli politycznej XVIII w.  Kwartalnik Historyczny , t. CXIII (1): 57–83. The author 
concluded previous studies in monographic work: Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Anna. 2006b.  Regina 
libertas. Wolność w polskiej myśli politycznej XVIII wieku , Gdańsk: słowo/obraz terytoria, 
passim. 
5  Krzywoszyński Przemysław. 2007. Suwerenność w myśli szlachty polskiej. In:  Nad 
społeczeństwem staropolskim . T. 1 Kultura- instytucje – gospodarka w XVI – XVIII stuleciu, 
Łopatecki Karol, Walczak Wojciech (ed.). Białystok: Ośrodek badań Europy Środkowo-
Wschodniej Zakład Historii nowożytnej Instytut Historii Uniwersytet w Białymstoku, p. 16. 
6  Dziadzio Andrzej. 2006. O konstytucji 3 maja 1791 roku na tle koncepcji ustrojowych Oświecenia . 
Państwo i społeczeństwo, Rok VI, Nr 4: p. 16 and f. 
7  Comp. however, considerations Rostworowski Emmanuel. 1987. Ilu było w Rzeczypospolitej 
obywateli szlachty.  Kwartalnik Historyczny , 94 (3): 3–58. 
8  “Wzór innej suwerenności leży w tradycji polskiej myśli politycznej, choć często bywał gwałcony 
przez rodzimą anarchię i przez obcą tyranię. Jest to wzór suwerenności prawa”. Idebski Zbigniew. 
1958.  Bodinus a Polska myśl polityczna . In: Jan Bodin, Andegaweńczyk,  Sześć ksiąg o 
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 Let us provide some introductory remarks. The mentioned foreign intervention 
caused a change of the political course within the progressive wing of petty  nobility . 
These noblemen were aware of the deep institutional reforms and that was why they 
split up with the  magnates , their so-called ‘elder brothers’. They were thus far 
regarded as the enlightened leadership power that could be trusted. 9 This phenom-
enon took the form of a substantive action in the late years of the reign of Stanisław 
August  Poniatowski . He was a king, who from the role of a cockscomb- cosmopolite, 
Empress  Catherine ’s lover and a Russian ally, turned into the last great reformer of 
the  First Polish Republic . This process was initiated quite timidly in the 1770s with 
the administrative and educational reforms in order to explode with the legislation 
passed by the Great  Parliament at the end of the 1780s (1788–1792). At the time of 
the parliamentary debates’ inauguration, three political parties could be indicated: 
primo the Conservatives, secundo the party that supported the king, tertio the liberal 
 party also called the patriotic party, initially distrustful of Stanisław  August but soon 
in a political alliance with the king. Eventually, two political wings emerged: a 
reactionary and a progressive one, which had been discussing sovereignty from 
several perspectives. The reformatory efforts were crowned with the enactment of 
the 3rd of May  Constitution and constitution-related acts of law that signifi cantly 
rebuilt the existing institutional and political regime and – to a much lesser extent – 
the social system. Its reform was planned to be carried out in the following months. 
Unfortunately, external circumstances, in particular, the armed intervention of 
 Russia , as well as internal causes, e.g. the resistance of the conservative petty  nobil-
ity in fact led to the actual collapse of the Constitution only a year later after its 
enactment. The Constitution lost its force, which is why the constitutional practice 
does not exist. And perhaps for that very reason it became a myth cherished for 
decades of foreign ruling (1795–1918), a myth of an unfulfi lled dream, the dream of 
liberated Poland. 
2  Planes of Discussion 
 There are several planes to which reference should be made while analysing the 
issue of sovereignty in the fi nal period of the First  Republic . A more detailed discus-
sion can refer to the concept of sovereignty itself, the construction of a sovereign as 
a subject authorized to undertake political actions, in particular, legislative ones, 
and in this respect, to create laws, including those located highest in the hierarchy 
of sources of law, cardinal  laws , as according to  Wielhorski each nation has “ an 
Rzeczypospolitej , ed. Zbigniew Izdebski, Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 
Bodinus…, p. LXX. 
9  Maciejewski, Janusz. 1977. Pojęcie narodu w myśli republikanów 1767–1775. In : Idee i koncep-
cje narodu w polskiej myśli politycznej czasów porozbiorowyc h, Goćkowski Janusz, Walicki 
Andrzej (ed.), Warszawa: Państwowe Wydaw. Naukowe, p. 22, 33. 
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elemental law of its government ”. 10 Franciszek Salezy  Jezierski further specifi es 
this issue: “ The freedom of the nation relies on the government constitution, not on 
the choice of the person to reign, the power of the King described in reasonable 
laws, the human rights reserved in their completeness, the legislative authority in 
the hands of the estates composing the nation, the executive power entrusted with 
magistrates elected by the estates makes up true freedom .” 11 
 In practice, such a source of decision, a sovereign power could in Poland be 
found only in the consent of the  Parliament , “ the uniformity of the three estates, and 
within them the complete power and authority of the inseparable Republic .” 12 
 The construction of the notion related to the nation and an attempt to defi ne it 
will be indispensable. Again, it is worth referring to the words of  Wielhorski who 
fairly consistently applies this concept although he himself did not attempt to create 
a defi nition: “ excluding any other authority, particularly, appointed to watch over 
the order established in the country, the legislative power and the highest  indepen-
dence  are vested only in the Nation itself which is decent and right ”. 13 It is necessary 
to refer to the actual discrepancies between the capacious notion of nation used in 
the literature and the right to represent its interests reserved only to one estate. It 
was the concept of the nation now substantially liberated from ethnic connotations 
(thus e.g. the wording  gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus ), however, still the  Sarmatian 
myth made up a part of the political concept of the nation, justifying a particular 
social and political role of lesser  nobility by its descent from the ancient tribe of 
 Sarmatians . 14  Catholicism became another component of the state identity, which 
brought with it a political result of an exclusion from decision-making of  Protestant 
burghers and  Orthodox Christian people as the Russian lesser  nobles became 
10  “pierwiastkowa swego rządu ustawa”. Wielhorski Michał, O przywróceniu dawnego rządu 
według pierwiastkowych Rzeczypospolitej ustaw (About the restoration of elemental laws of the 
former government of the Republic), n.p. 1775, p. 1. The work of Michal Wielhorski still enjoys 
the great interest of researchers as they consider him to be a writer who tried to introduce the ideals 
of the new republican gentry with already enlightened language. 
11  “Wolność narodu zasadza się na konstytucyi rządu, nie na wyborze Osoby do panowania, władza 
Króla rozsądnymi opisana prawami, prawa człowieka zawarowane w swej zupełności, władza pra-
wodawcza złożona w ręku stanów naród składających, władza wykonawcza powierzona magistra-
tom przez stany wybranym, składem jest prawdziwej wolności”. NN [Jezierski Franciszek Salezy], 
O Bez-Królewiach w Polszcze y Wybieraniu Królów, w Warszawie 1791, p. 8. 
12  Three estates defi ned as noble deputies in Chamber of Deputies, senators and the King: 
“jednostajność trzech stanów, a w niej zupełna moc i władza nierozdzielnej Rzeczy Pospolitej”. 
Leszczyński Stanisław, Głos wolny wolność ubezpieczający, ed. A. Rembowski, Warszawa 2003; 
comp. Ekes, Janusz. 2001. Trójpodział władzy i zgoda wszystkich. Naczelne zasady “ustroju 
mieszanego” w staropolskiej refl eksji politycznej, Siedlce: Instytut Historii Akademii Podlaskiej, 
p. 74–81 (80). 
13  wyłączając wszelkie inne władze, do czuwania szczególnie nad porządkiem Kraju ustanowione, 
samemu tylko Narodowi Moc Prawodawcza y naywyższa Udzielność są przyzwoite y właściwe”. 
Wielhorski Michał, O przywróceniu…, p. 44–45. 
14  Comp. the refl ections of Maciejewski, Janusz. 1977. Pojęcie…, p. 31–32. 
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 converts to  Catholicism . 15 On rare occasions the term “citizens” was used directly in 
respect of the powers of the sovereign. An instance of its application was recorded 
in the speech of the priest canon  Hajewski in 1790. 16 
 Finally, it is necessary to refer to the monarch as the subject of the discussion 
being analysed. The second half of the eighteenth century brought about a certain 
turn in the discussion lasting almost for centuries, regarding the position of the king 
in the specifi c lesser  nobility of the Republic, a turn in the long-standing dispute 
 inter maiestatem ac libertatem . The echoes of the  discussion on sovereignty were to 
take the form of a very real debate on the model of power i.e. the choice between an 
elective  monarchy and hereditary  monarchy , perhaps the biggest controversy in the 
literature of that time. It should also be immediately noted that in the Polish debate 
there was never any room for the thesis that only the monarch was the  sovereign . 
The assumption that the monarch may be merely the fi rst among equals, the ruler of 
free people and possibly a separate parliamentary state, a factor in the deliberations, 
was absolutely approved of. Nonetheless, in practice, his infl uence was mainly 
associated with his personal features and his political alliance with the deputies. 
 Wielhorski , already quoted above, refused the king even the role of one of the three 
states, which was rather commonly assumed by other authors. The position of the 
king at the threshold of the reform was so weak that, paradoxically, one of the main 
postulates of the reformers was the strengthening of the monarch’s power by imple-
mentation of succession to the  throne . 
3  Characteristics of Sources 
 All the issues mentioned are present both in the parliamentary debate and publicist 
papers created parallel to the legislative process, in the form of free prints, pam-
phlets and on the pages of main periodicals. To a lesser extent, according to the 
fi ndings of the author, the sovereignty debate was refl ected in the correspondence of 
the main protagonists (with the exception of the letters of Ignacy  Potocki ); however, 
this problem requires more in-depth queries. 
15  Comp. Walicki, Andrzej. 2000.  Idea narodu w polskiej myśli oświeceniowej , Warszawa: Polska 
Akademia Nauk. Instytut Filozofi i i Socjologii, p. 22–23.However, the characteristic that the num-
ber of deputies of the heretical heterodox nobility participation surpassed even the share of nobility 
heterodox in total number of gentry. Bardach, Juliusz. 1983. Sejm dawnej Rzeczypospolitej jako 
najwyższy organ reprezentacyjny.  Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne , XXXV (1): p. 141–142. 
16  Mowa Dowodząca: że przepisy nauk od Prześwietney Komissyi Edukacyi Narodowey dla Szkół 
Publicznych podane są nie tylko użyteczne Kraiowi ale też potrzebne w szczególności Obywatelom 
przez Ja. X. Daniela Haiewskiego Kanonika Kijowskiego Nauczyciela Wymowy w Szkołach 
Akademickich Warszawskich przy rozpoczęciu rocznych nauk dnia 29 września 1790 Roku 
miana, Biblioteka PAN Kraków, Rps. 177, k. 26: “…w wolnych narodach republikantskich, gdzie 
bowiem sprawy dobra publicznego są dziełem obywatelów…” (“in free republican nations, where 
issues for the public good are the work of citizens …”). 
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 A preliminary analysis of parliamentary diaries and journals leads already to the 
conclusion that the parliamentary  debate in the late eighties and early nineties of the 
eighteenth century, had a specifi c character – it was an erudite debate, conducted in 
a baroque rhetoric, full of references to characters and events of the ancient times, 
classical authors, diplomatic and accommodating, while at the same time, little 
effective. It is necessary to note that its participants are not professional  lawyers but 
representatives of lesser  nobility of varied levels of education; however, their rhe-
torical skills were always high in price. Speakers were supposed to speak freely, 
without notes, and provide accurate punchlines to the words expressed by previous 
speakers. The practice shows, however, that such legislative work stretched beyond 
measure and fairly easily strayed from the starting point. In the parliamentary dis-
cussions, almost theatrical, dramatic techniques were used, with a particular exam-
ple of this visible on the 3rd of May, 1791, the date of Constitution enactment. 
 Up to now only fragments of  The Parliament Diary 17 and  The Parliament Minutes 
( Records of Operation ) 18 have been analysed. The publications do not document the 
entire period of duration of the Great  Parliament . A substantial part of parliamentary 
sessions was recorded only in the form of handwritten minutes (Records of 
Operations) stored in the Central Archives of Historical Records in  Warsaw 
(Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, further cit. as AGAD), whereto were attached 
e.g. printed speeches of adversaries, which makes the query somewhat diffi cult. 19 
This category of sources should also include collections of royal speeches, manu-
script versions drawn up by royal secretaries and prints from the Printing House of 
His Royal Majesty. 20 Diffi culties in the categorisation are concerned with the quasi- 
offi cial sources, such as proclamations to the army, especially in the era of  competi-
tion between the Targowica  Confederation (proclamations issued by the Marshal of 
the Confederation Szczęsny  Potocki ) and the weakening patriotic centre. It might be 
added that even formally adopted legal acts were often characterized by journalistic 
language with instances of attempts to explain the legislature’s intention instead of 
being limited solely to the texts of regulations. 21 
17  Printed: Dyaryusz seymu ordynaryinego pod związkiem Konfederacyi Generalney Oboyga 
Narodow w Warszawie rozpoczętego roku… 1788/[wyd. Jan Paweł Łuszczewski] Diariusz 
Sejmowy – 1788–1789 Drukarnia Nadworna, Warszawa w Warszawie: w drukarni Nadwornej 
J.K.Mci i… Kommissyi Eduk[acyi] Narodowej [po 3 XI 1788]–1790, Dyaryusz seymu ordynaryj-
nego pod związkiem Konfederacyi Generalney Oboyga Narodow w podwoynym posłow składzie 
zgromadzonego w Warszawie od dnia 16 grudnia 1791 [właść. 1790]/[wyd. Antoni Siarczyński], 
w drukarni… Michała Grölla… [1791]. 
18  Dziennik Czynności Seymu Głównego Ordynaryinego Warszawskiego pod związkiem 
Konfederacji Oboyga Narodów agitującego się, partly printed, partly in the form of handwritten 
protocols. 
19  Comp. AGAD, Archiwum Sejmu Czteroletniego. 
20 AGAD, Archiwum Królestwa Polskiego, sygn. 207 Mowy Jego Kr Mci w ciągu Sejmów 1761–
1793, further as: AGAD, AKP, sygn. 207. 
21  Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Anna. 2000a.  O formę rządu czy o rząd dusz? Publicystyka polityczna 
Sejmu Czteroletniego, Łódź: Instytut Badań Literackich Polskiej Akademii Nauk, p. 7. 
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 Another source of expression, available not only to parliamentary members but, 
among others, to the whole lesser noble community, were free publicist papers and 
pamphlets. The period of the late eighties and early nineties brought an unmatched 
explosion of free  prints and pamphlets. The correspondent of Ignacy (?)  Potocki 
expressed himself as follows: “ so great is the Rush of writing various things ” and 
asked for protection on the admission of his anonymous letter to one of the leading 
 newspapers . 22 Anna Grześkowiak- Krwawicz , in recent years the most important 
interpreter of the eighteenth-century journalism, clearly refl ects this common trend: 
“ every writer, grasping a pen, even if in the opinion of their opponents eligible to 
stay with the Brothers Hospitallers, felt he was a citizen fulfi lling his patriotic duty, 
benefi ting from his citizen rights. And as such, they demanded respect for them-
selves and their views from the other participants of the debate ”. 23 Moreover, the 
possibility of publishing was perceived not only in terms of civil rights but also as 
such a duty. As an anonymous author wrote, “ as a free citizen (…) you do not have 
anything shameful over the latency of your thoughts about the Republic to please 
someone or to not daunt someone ”. 24 That was a real forum for the exchange of 
thoughts and ideas, the most vivid and meeting with an instant response. As men-
tioned, epistolary forms were also applied, for instance, as anonymous letters “of a 
friend” to “friends”, commenting on the diplomatic and political events. 25 Such let-
ters, refl ections and comments were published as free prints or on separate pages of 
magazines. The main protagonists of political discussion often disclosed their cor-
respondence in the form of prints, using it as a useful propaganda tool. The abun-
dantly published correspondence of Szczęsny  Potocki creates an immediate 
impression of having been addressed to a collective rather than an individual 
recipient. 26 
 There were numerous cases of responses to the “Letters” and “Comments”. 
There were many debating  pairs : for instance a discussion between Seweryn 
 Rzewuski and Stanisław Szczęsny  Potocki and Ignacy  Potocki , between  Rzewuski 
and the Bishop  Krasiński , between Tomasz  Dłuski and  Potocki , rejoinders by 
22  “tak wielka Gorączka pisania rozmaitych rzeczy panuie”. Letter to Ignacy (?) Potocki of 25 May 
1791, AGAD, APP, sygn. 279b: Listy do I. (Ignacego Potockiego, Stanisława i Aleksandra 
Potockiego… oraz do innych osób, 1791, t. VI, k. [chart]104-105. 
23  “każdy chwytający za pióro, nawet jeśli w opinii swych przeciwników kwalifi kował się do 
pobytu u Bonifratrów, czuł się spełniającym swój obowiązek patriotą, korzystającym ze swego 
prawa obywatelem. I jako taki domagał się szacunku dla siebie i swoich poglądów od innych 
uczestników debaty”. Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Anna. 2000a.  O formę…, p. 19.Comp. also broadly 
p. 39–68. 
24  “w wolnym obywatelu (…) nie masz nic haniebniejszego nad utajenie swoich myśli o 
Rzeczypospolitej dla przypodobania się komuś, albo dla niezrażenia kogoś”. NN, Myśli patrioty-
czno-polityczne do stanow Rzeczypospolitey Polskiey, na seym 1788. roku zgromadzonych, przez 
obywatela o wolność i samowładztwo Rzeczypospolitey swoiey gorliwego, spisane, n.p., 1788, 
p. 4. 
25  Cf. As an example: Refl exye nad Listem Króla Pruskiego od Przyjaciela Przyjacielom przesłane, 
AGAD, AKP, sygn.. 352, k. 388. 
26  Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Anna. 2000a.  O formę …, p. 54. 
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 Czacki and  Wolski to the paper “On the Third of May 1791 Constitution to  Zaleski 
and  Matuszewic Esq. Lithuanian parliamentary members” (“O Konstytucji 
Trzeciego Maja 1791 do JWW Zaleskiego trockiego i Matuszewica brzeskiego, lite-
wskich posłów”), 27 and fi nally between Antoni  Trębicki and Dyzma Bończa 
 Tomaszewski . 28 A more radical letter would frequently elicit an avalanche of 
responses. A serious reply to the popular work by Stanisław  Staszic “Notes on the 
life of Jan  Zamoyski ” is a selection of eight letters published as a collective book in 
1790. 29 
 Among the  journals , on the other hand, in the fi rst place it is necessary to men-
tion the “Gazeta Narodowa Y Obca” (“National and Foreign Newspaper”) and 
“Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny Przypadków, Ustaw, Osób, Miejsc i Pism wiek 
nasz szczególnie interesujących” (“Historical and Political Cases, Laws, People, 
Places, and Diary Writings of particular interest to our age”). “Gazeta Narodowa Y 
Obca” contained reports of parliamentary sessions, the texts of key legislative acts 
and political news from abroad, infrequent rare journalistic articles published usu-
ally in the form of letters to the editor. The “Historical-Political Diary” certainly 
played the most signifi cant role, due to its editor breaking the purely informative 
convention of the press at that time, an ex-Jesuit priest, propagator of reforms, Piotr 
 Świtkowski . In particular the articles published since 1788 refl ected the political 
views of the editor. Moreover, there were papers published in French, the “Gazette 
de Varsovie” and the “Journal Hebdomadaire de la Diète”. “Gazeta  Warszawska ” 
(“The  Warsaw Newspaper”) published since 1774, limited itself to the role of a pas-
sive informer reporting in particular foreign events and serving as a rather poor 
stimulant for the discussion. 30 
 As can be seen  prima facie, the public  media discourse includes voices which are 
much more interesting, more radical towards the centrist position, both on behalf of 
progressive and conservative parties. The parliamentary  debate had a rather conser-
vative, courteous nature, however, suddenly in early May 1791, it abruptly changed 
its character, becoming radically reformatory. In those days, opponents to the 
 Constitution would often avoid speaking in the Parliament just due to the explicitly 
27  Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Anna. 1992. Za czy przeciw ustawie rządowej? Historia pewnej 
polemiki.  Wiek Oświecenia, 8: Wokół Rewolucji Francuskiej i Sejmu Czteroletniego : 169–184. 
28  Comp. broadly Żbikowski Piotr. 1992. Potępienie i obrona ustawy rządowej z 3 maja 1791 roku. 
Wokół sporu Antoniego Trębickiego z Dyzmą Bończą Tomaszewskim, In:  Ku reformie państwa i 
odrodzeniu moralnemu człowieka. Zbiór rozpraw i artykułów poświęconych dwusetnej rocznicy 
ustanowienia Konstytucji 3 Maja 1791 roku , Żbikowski Piotr (ed.), p. 97–118. Rzeszów: 
Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej. 
29  Comp. also Szczepaniec Józef. 1991. Sejm Wielki wobec zagadnień cenzury i wolności słowa, 
In:  Antynomie Oświecenia. Tom specjalny w 200 rocznicę Konstytucji 3 maja, Acta Universitatis 
Wratislaviensis, Prace Literackie XXXI, Matuszewska Przemysława, Zakrzewski Bogdan (ed.). 
Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego,p. 155–184, particularly p. 164–168. 
30  Comp. broadly Łojek Jerzy, 1988. Prasa dawnej Rzeczypospolitej. In:  Dzieje prasy polskiej . 
Łojek Jerzy, Myśliński Jerzy, Władyka Wiesław (ed.), 18–22. Warszawa: Interpress, Homola-
Dzikowska Irena. 1960. Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny Piotra Świtkowskiego 1782–1792, 
Kraków: Rozprawy i Studia – Uniwersytet Jagielloński. 
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expressed unity of parliamentarians, declaring themselves as those who voice the 
will of the  nation , and the nation was to be represented directly by “arbitrators” 
present at the gallery as guests, eager to utter loud words of praise or condemnation. 
The constitution was  adopted in this very climate. Forcible voices against the 
 Constitution , coming from parliamentary circles, later were to take the nature of 
separate journalist writings, however they would not actually exist in the parliamen-
tary debate itself as it one was to refl ect  sui generis political correctness, praising 
the constitution. Incidentally, a few prominent opponents of the Constitution, under 
the pressure of the public opinion changed their position and published pamphlets 
expressing their support for the new Constitution and the regulation of the succes-
sion to the  throne (Adam  Rzewuski , Wojciech  Turski , Tomasz  Dłuski ). 31 
 Ewa Borkowska-Bagieńska did not hesitate to put forward the thesis that the 
writing and practical activities of outstanding individuals – the inspirers of change – 
had a signifi cant, and perhaps even the greatest infl uence on the transformation of 
the legal awareness of the lesser  nobility of the Stanisław Poniatowski period. 32 
4  Some Aspects of the Discourse on Sovereignty 
in the Poland of Enlightenment 
4.1  Sovereignty as a Theoretical Problem 
4.1.1  Introduction 
 The concept of sovereignty rarely appears in the debate in this very wording. 
Adequate clues used in the analysis also refer to the concept of “ free will ”, and 
“ national  will ”. The terms of “ independence ” and “ self-governing ” can be consid-
ered synonymous with the concept of sovereignty, similarly to the “ majesty ” used 
in the earlier period of time. (“ The majesty is thus the highness and dignity of the 
Republic ” 33 ). Sovereignty is identifi ed with the highest authority. Already at the 
31  Comp. at least Lis Rafał, 2012. Między Konstytucją 3 maja a Targowicą. Poglądy polskich 
republikantów w latach 1791–1793,  Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne , LXIV (2): 161–191 or the 
discourse around Tomasz Dłuski writing: JW. JP. Tomasza Dłuskiego podkomorzego Generalnego 
Usprawiedliwienie się przed Publicznością z Manifestu przeciwko Ustawie dnia 3 Maia Ru 
teraźnieyszego. 
32  Borkowska-Bagieńska Ewa. 2009. O świadomości prawnej szlachty w czasach stanisławowskich 
i potrzebie jej badania.  Studia z dziejów państwa i prawa polskiego , XII, Kraków-Lublin-Łódź: 
p. 158. 
33  “Majestat tedy jest wielmożność a dostojność rzeczypospolitej”. Andrzej Frycz-Modrzewski, 
cited after: Wachlowski, Zbigniew. 1927. Pojęcie suwerenności w literaturze politycznej polskiej 
XV i XVI wieku. In:  Pamiętnik trzydziestolecia pracy naukowej prof. dr. Przemysława 
Dąbkowskiego wydany staraniem Kółka Historyczno-Prawnego Słuchaczów Uniwersytetu Jana 
Kazimierza 1897–1927, . Lwów: skł. gł. Księgarnia Gubrynowicza i Syna, p. 240. 
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beginning of the sixteenth century, Stanisław  Zaborowski invoked the Latin terms 
“ principatus ”, and “ superioritas ” as the power in the hands of the nation. 34 
 The second of the early theories (16th c.), expressed primarily in the papers by 
Stanisław  Orzechowski and Andrzej Frycz  Modrzewski and repeatedly invoked in 
subsequent periods, was the theory of sovereignty of the  law , of course not entirely 
original, but stressing the element of subordination to the law, not necessarily to the 
entities which enacted it. 35 This phenomenon appeared in Polish literature at the 
beginning of the sixteenth century along with the interpretation of the so called 
Nihil Novi  Constitution (1505, 1538) and the 1530 Constitution on the election of 
 King . This theory, contrasted to the traditional sovereignty of the  monarch , served 
the movement for the restriction of royal rights. 36 The freedom in the free country 
of Poland was the freedom “ under the law ” (“ there is no freedom without law ”, as 
Michał Karpowicz 37 claimed in the spirit of  Locke ), which was to bind not only the 
citizens, but primarily the king. This interdependence was already emphasized in 
the sixteenth century: “ The Republic is to be governed not according to the king’s 
will but pursuant to the written law ”. 38 The principle of sovereignty of the  law , so 
characteristic of the Polish tradition, in the legislation of the 4-Years- Sejm (as car-
dinal  laws ) took form of a modern at that time rule of law, which in thought of many 
European countries will not appear until the constitutionalism of “the Spring of 
Nations” (the executive power operates on the basis of law and to exercise the 
law). 39 
 The noble political writing since the sixteenth century considered the Republic 
itself as an entity of sovereign power, however over time the nature of this political 
community changed (the political body). From the sixteenth century until the May 
 Constitution this community was created exclusively by  nobles (deputies and sena-
tors) and the King, which was the construction of three states acting as Seym (“ stany 
sejmujące ”). The sovereignty of the Republic was therefore in some measure 
divided between the  nobles and the King. The King although chosen through free 
 elections , was formally the King of the grace of God, and theoretically the enforce-
ment of a new law that bound the two sovereigns, the  nobles and the king, depended 
on his own will. Hence the popular identifi cation of the sovereign Republic with 
34  Wachlowski, Zbigniew. 1927. Pojęcie …, p. 235–236. 
35  Ibidem, p. 237. 
36  Relevant literature cites at least Makiłła Dariusz. 2010. Idea jedności a koncepcja rozdziału 
władz w teorii i praktyce ustrojowej Rzeczypospolitej na przełomie XVI – XVII w. In:  W kręgu 
nowożytnej i najnowszej historii ustroju Polski. Księga dedykowana Profesorowi Marianowi 
Kallasowi . Godek Sławomir, Makiłła Dariusz, Wilczek-Karczewska Magdalena (ed.), 1–20. 
Warszawa: InterLeones Halina Dyczkowska. 
37  “nie masz wolności bez prawa”. Karpowicz Michał, Kazanie o miłości ojczyzny, Wilno, n.d. 
[1781], no pagination; cited after Grześkowiak-Krwawicz Anna, 2006a. Staropolska koncepcja…, 
p. 71. 
38 Andrzej Frycz-Modrzewski, cite Wachlowski, Zbigniew. 1927. Pojęcie…, p. 241. 
39  Dziadzio, Andrzej. 2010. Polnische Version des Rechtsstaates vom Ende des 18 Jahrhunderts 
(System des Verfassungsrechts 1791). In:  Parliaments: the law, the practice and the representa-
tions. From the Middle Ages to the Present Day . Lisbon 2010, p. 117 and ff. 
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sovereignty of the  law . This situation changed with the moment of the adoption of 
the Constitution of the 3rd of  May . The King ceased to be the third Seym-estate, it 
became only an organ of the executive power, no longer having such a share in the 
legislation as before. He remained the King of God’s grace and the will of the  peo-
ple , ceased to be a sovereign ruler. Now, formally, the whole nation constituting the 
Republic as a political community of all states, was entitled to the attribute of 
sovereignty. 
 As mentioned above, the issue of external security was emphasized in the second 
half of the seventeenth century to a greater extent as compared with western defi ni-
tions. The justifi cations for the genesis of the social  contract also went exactly in 
this direction. 40 A special connection with the fear that the freedom could be con-
verted into a “ yoke of  serfdom ” in the  absolutist states also occurs here. 41 
 In the seventeenth century, the understanding of the internal  sovereignty became 
permanently bound with the Parliament of the  Republic (“ the Republic is founded 
on the Parliament ”), which was expressed both by theory and by political practice. 42 
There was a common conviction that the parliamentary states were the  sovereign – 
simply saying – the parliamentary chambers were the carriers of the supreme 
authority. “ This is the realisation of the essence of our freedom. We may enact All 
Political and Civil Rights, following our will and thus the fortunes of the whole 
Fatherland, in particular, of each natural person, his assets and life are in our 
power. We pour this power onto the deputies. Together with the  Senate , they enact 
the Laws in the Parliament ”. 43 Members of the Chamber of  Deputies were elected 
by the terrestrial district assemblies ( Dietines ), offi cially unanimously, although in 
the absence of a general agreement the majority choice was accepted. The sources 
of the Polish representation theory lie naturally in the canon law. 44 The key role of 
systemic parliament also refl ects the fact that many of the eighteenth-century reform 
programmes came out from the repair and improvement of the functioning of par-
liaments. The composition of the  Senate , the aristocratic chamber, will be reduced 
by the future constitution to approx. 130 members: provincial governors, castellans 
(lesser castellans were frequently also members elected to the lower chamber), 
diocesan bishops and ministers. The system of the 3rd of May enacting the law on 
40  Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Anna. 2000b. O recepcji umowy społecznej w Polsce w czasach 
stanisławowskich,  Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne . LII (1–2): 115–116. 
41  Grześkowiak-Krwawicz Anna, 2006a. Staropolska koncepcja…, p. 67. 
42  Borkowska-Bagieńska Ewa. 1992. Nowożytna myśl polityczna w Polsce 1740–1780,  Studia z 
Dziejów Polskiej Myśli Politycznej, Vol. IV. Od reformy państwa szlacheckiego do myśli o nowocz-
esnym państwie , Toruń: p. 34–35.Comp. also Bardach Juliusz. 1983. Sejm…, p. 134–147. 
43  “Tu jest całey wolności naszey użycie. Wszystkie Polityczne i Cywilne Prawa możemy podług 
naszey woli stanowić, a tak całey Oyczyzny losy, każdego w szczególności Obywatela majątek i 
życie, są w mocy naszey. Tę moc zlewamy na posłów, Posłowie z Senatem stanowią Prawa na 
Seymie”. NN, Zbiór pism do których były powodem uwagi nad życiem Jana Zamoyskiego. Ósme 
Pismo. Myśl względem poprawy formy rządu, b.m.w., Roku 1790, p. 31. 
44  Grzybowski Konstanty. 1959.  Teoria reprezentacji w Polsce epoki Odrodzenia , Warszawa: 
Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, p. 22. 
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the Parliament 45 would also affect the decline in the role of this body, limiting the 
powers of the monarch connected with legislative power – the successor Stanisław 
 August would have to appoint lay senators just amongst twice the number of candi-
dates proposed by regional assemblies. 
 It is also required to invoke another theoretical problem – the local assemblies 
( Dietines ) vested a specifi c role by the existing legal system. Between the mid- 
seventeenth and mid-eighteenth century their importance in the political practice 
grew, when, due to interruption of central parliaments, Dietines took over many of 
the executive tasks of the Parliament, even the enlisting of troops. Thus, there was 
a kind of “ sovereignty  decentralization ”. 46 By expressing instructions for parlia-
mentary members,  Dietines formed real boundaries for their parliamentary activity. 
Members of Parliament feared exceeding assumptions and breaking the sworn 
instructions – a kind of a “ general  will ” tool; feared going beyond these boundaries, 
being aware of their obligation to report and justify themselves at the so-called 
 reporting  Dietines where they had “to account before the nation” for the actions of 
the Parliament. These were the local assemblies ( Dietines ) that  Rousseau under-
stood as a link between the inalienability of  sovereignty with the representative 
system, as the lesser  nobles did not renounce their sovereignty in favour of their 
representatives, providing them with a sort of a  mandat  impératif . 47 Finally, the 
local assemblies ( Dietines ) as the fi nal nexus were to accept the Constitution of the 
3rd of  May along with the comprehensive reform, which they did with the majority 
of 82 % in February 1792, proving the invalidity of the stereotype of an exclusively 
conservative nature of local lesser  nobles ’ assemblies. 48 This may have been the 
reason for the mentioned Wojciech  Turski 49 to change his attitude towards the 
 Constitution so radically. The derivative of this important function of  Dietines (and 
understanding the role of Members only as “ the lips of the provincial confreres ” 50 ) 
is the thesis sporadically put forward in the literature in relation to the sovereign role 
45 Art. IV, Seymy (Prawo o Sejmach), Actum in Curia Regia Varsaviensi Die Vigesima Octava 
Mensis Maij, Anno Domini Millesimo Septingentessimo Nonagesimo Primo, Zbiór Ustaw 
Seymowych w Warszawie; also published: Volumina Legum, Wydawnictwo Komisyi Prawniczej 
Akademii Umiejętności w Krakowie, t. (Vol.) IX, Kraków 1889, p. 250–266. 
46  Bardach Juliusz. 2002.  Historia ustroju i prawa polskiego , Warszawa: Państwowe Wydaw. 
Naukowe, p. 248. 
47  In fact in contrast to the position of the court which appealed in letters to councils to equip depu-
ties in plena potestas, the free mandate guarantees freedom of decision in the Parliament. Naturally, 
closely linking local councils with the preferred allowance, limitata potesta. Bardach Juliusz. 
1983. Sejm…, p. 146. Comp. also:Michalski Jerzy. 1983. Z problematyki republikańskiego nurtu 
w polskiej reformatorskiej myśli politycznej w XVIII w.  Kwartalnik Historyczny , 90: 331–332; 
Uruszczak Wacław. 2010. Poselstwo sejmowe w dawnej Polsce. In:  Drogi i bezdroża nauk history-
czno-prawnych , Małecki Marian (ed.), 52–56. Bielsko-Biała: Wyższa Szkoła Administracji. 
48  Szczygielski Wojciech, 1994.  Referendum trzeciomajowe. Sejmiki lutowe 1792 roku , Łódź: 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, passim. 
49  Lis Rafał, 2012. Między Konstytucją…, p. 173. 
50  Bardach, Juliusz. 1983. Sejm…, p. 146. 
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of the  provinces or a quasi-federal system of the Republic (for instance by Stanisław 
Płaza). 51 
 Generally, a strictly theoretical discussion over the issue of sovereignty is not too 
extensive; Anna Grześkowiak- Krwawicz stresses that this may have arisen from the 
practical orientation; “ Polish authors were less interested in philosophical consider-
ations on the origins of human societies and more on the conclusions stemming 
from them. Hence, they stressed hardest the fact that power was entrusted with the 
monarch – somehow positioning the nation over the monarch – and showing the 
sovereignty of the  nation  itself ”. The latter was not a consequence of the reception 
of foreign theories, but of “ Polish practice, in which the sovereignty of the  nation 
 (lesser  nobility ) was the reality ”. 52 Hence, the right of the nation to resist the mon-
arch in the event of a breach of his obligations was never questioned. The choice of 
the  monarch ensued through “ viritim ” election, direct selection, and additionally, 
admittedly theoretically, there existed the possibility of convening equestrian par-
liament to protect the rights, which could bring together the mass of the nobility. 53 
Mutual agreement was in Poland not a theoretical construction, but a purely living 
practice, since a visible contract was concluded with each elected ruler as  pacta 
 conventa . 54 Therefore, to the Frenchman’s accusation: “ vos non habetis regem ”, the 
Pole might have answered: “ sed vox rex habet ”. 55 At the same time, the  sui generis 
paradox is that the Poles needed an elective  king , because this phenomenon raised 
their own prestige, “ they needed a king just to elect him ”, what emphasized the 
sovereignty of the  nation . 56 
51  Lityński Adam. 1985. O reformach sejmikowania 1764–1793.  Czasopismo-Prawno-Historyczne , 
XXXVII (2): p. 260–262. 
52  “autorów polskich mniej interesowały fi lozofi czne rozważania nad początkami społeczeństw 
ludzkich, a bardziej wnioski z nich wypływające. Stąd najsilniej podkreślali oni fakt powierzenia 
władzy monarsze – stawiający niejako społeczeństwo ponad monarchą i ukazujący suwerenność 
tegoż społeczeństwa (…) [będącej skutkiem]„praktyki polskiej, w której zwierzchnictwo narodu 
(sc. szlacheckiego) było rzeczywistością”. Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Anna. 1987. Polska myśl poli-
tyczna lat 1772–1792 o systemie władzy monarchii absolutnej.  Kwartalnik Historyczny , z. 3: 
p. 45. Similarly, in other work: Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Anna. 2010. Polskie poglądy na monar-
chie europejskie. In:  Rozkwit i upadek I Rzeczypospolitej , Butterwick Richard (ed.), Warszawa: 
Bellona, p. 151: “ Poles treated political topics in a very pragmatic way ”, hence they were less 
interested in the Republican model, which – they believed – they knew from experience, drawing 
the attention of monarchical governments. Comp. also Lis Rafał, 2012. Między Konstytucją…, 
p. 173–174. 
53  Olszewski Henryk. 1985. Sejm konny. Rzecz o funkcjonowaniu ideologii demokracji szlacheck-
iej w dawnej Polsce.  Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne , XXXVII (2): 225–242. 
54  Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Anna. 1987. Polska myśl…, p. 46. Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Anna. 
2000b. O recepcji…, p. 109–125. 
55  Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Anna. 1987. Polska myśl…, p. 57. 
56  Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Anna. 2003. Czy król jest potrzebny w republice? Polscy pisarze poli-
tyczni wieku XVIII o miejscu i roli monarchy w Rzeczypospolitej. Zarys problematyki. In:  Dwór 
a kraj między centrum a peryferiami władzy. Materiały konferencji naukowej zorganizowanej 
przez Zamek Królewski na Wawelu Instytut Historii Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Instytut Historii 
Akademii Pedagogicznej w Krakowie w dniach 2–5 kwietnia 2001 , Skowron Ryszard (ed.), 
Kraków: Zamek Królewski na Wawelu. Państwowe Zbiory Sztuki, p. 475. 
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4.1.2  ‘Sovereignty’ in Media and Free Prints Debate 
 One of the most distinguished voices in the public debate belonged undoubtedly to 
Hugo  Kołłątaj , the “Polish Robespierre.” He did not use the notion of sovereignty in 
his writings, but formulated his recommendations for the creation of a system with 
Parliament as “ the highest authority ”, authorized not only to enact the law, but also 
to the executive power, the Seym debating in “ a parliamentary way ”. Undermining 
the existence of a free government in a country where some people remain in feudal 
captivity,  Kołłątaj differentiated “ human freedom ” from “ governmental freedom ”, 
political one, 57 the latter he awarded to  nobles and burghers, what will be discussed 
more extensively in the following parts. 
 Later  discussions , from the time following the adoption of the Constitution of 
 May , would be in relation to the issues of freedom, full of paradoxes. On the one 
hand, the protagonists would raise that the Constitution allowed freedom to be 
maintained (an important aspect is this direct reference of reformers to external 
threats, which was an important factor in the process of the adoption of the 
Constitution; it is worth reminding that reading foreign news dispatches on the 3rd 
of May, 1791 helped to build the atmosphere of terror and a sense of a need for 
reform). Its antagonists would stress that it was a “monarchical” constitution which 
had taken the freedom away from the Nation. 58 Sovereignty in the debate thus far 
would be identifi ed with freedom. 
4.1.3  ‘Sovereignty’ in Parliamentary Debate 
 Similarly, the term of “sovereignty” is not used in the parliamentary debate. 
Occasionally, it refers directly to the supreme authority (“ Two Nations  Majesty  pre-
served itself the supreme authority in the Parliaments ” 59 ). The terms of “self- 
governance” (e.g. “ The laws of the Polish Republic self-governance ”) 60 or 
“ independence ” or else “highest independence” can be recognized as equivalent 
notions. 
 There are, in turn, many references to the element, which the author considers to 
be complementary to the sovereignty, i.e. freedom. Such formulations had been 
present in the discussion since the fi rst sessions of the  Parliament , as for instance in 
the acceptance by members of the confederation formula. This prevented 
57  Grześkowiak Krwawicz, Anna. 2006a. Staropolska koncepcja…, p. 80. 
58  Copies of the letters of Stanisław Szczęsny Potocki , AGAD, AKP, pudło (box) 90. 
59  “Maiestat Oboyga Narodów zachowawszy sobie najwyższą władzę w Seymach”. Głos Jaśnie 
Wielmożnego Imci Pana Raczynskiego Marszałka Nadwornego Koronnego i Generała Wielko-
Polskiego, Roku 1788, Dnia 24 Października Na Sessyi Seymowey miany, Zbiór mow i pism 
niektórych w czasie Seymu Stanów Skonfederowanych Roku 1788, Tom I, w Wilnie w Drukarni 
J.k. Mci przy Akademii, p. 285. 
60  Głos Jego Kr. Mości na Sessyi Seymowey dnia 20. Lipca 1789. Miany, AGAD, AKP, sygn. 207, 
k. [chart] 813 (443). 
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 renouncement of the Parliament by single members and resulted in the procedure of 
adopting resolutions by a majority. Although this was a kind of a denial of the 
already existing ‘ freedom ’ of the deputies, the members were aware of the serious-
ness of the moment and agreed to this restriction, seeing it as an act of expression of 
the Republic’s self-governance and of a mutual trust between the king and the 
nation. The court chamberlain of the king, Marcin  Slaski , said: “ With freedom and 
liberty born, let’s be independent, to any prejudice not being bound to hand the 
spirit of Patriotism listening only to inspiration, so we direct our actions to that 
what is always appropriate for the Common good ”. 61 Troop enlargement enacted in 
autumn 1788 is also to serve as a protection of the “ free constitution ” and the ‘ free 
Government ”. 62 Military power cannot be used “ for the suppression of Liberty. This 
is indeed Freedom, which has elements of the Republican Government in Our 
Nation, and has always been the goal of common solicitude ”. 63 
 Then for the Throne it is glorious “ to govern the free people, even as it would 
blemish wanting to be despotic. Prevail Your Royal Majesty over the hearts of citi-
zens arbitrarily, leaving the mind of each free from any infl uence and of any foreign 
subordination” , as a Livonian member  Kublicki appealed to the monarch. 64 Member 
 Czetwertyński outlined, that equality introduced “ in the Republican state ” under the 
reign of King Stanisław  August “ established the crucial freedom in that Republican 
State ”, the King is the one who “ effectively opened freedom for the Nation ”. 65 
61  “Z wolności i do wolności zrodzeni bądźmy niepodległemi, do żadney z uprzedzeniem nie 
wiążąc się strony, ducha tylko Patryotyzmu słuchaiąc natchnienie, tak nasze kieruymy czyny, aby 
zawsze stosowne dobra Powszechnego były”. Mowa Jaśnie Wielmożnego Imi Pan Ślaskiego 
Podkomorzego Nadwornego J. K. Mci, Posła z Województwa Krakowskiego na Sessyi przed 
Stanami Skonfederowanemi Rzeczypospolitey, Dnia 16 Października Miana, Zbiór mow i pism 
niektórych w czasie Seymu Stanów Skonfederowanych Roku 1788, Tom I, w Wilnie w Drukarni 
J.k. Mci przy Akademii, p. 68–69. 
62  Głos Jaśnie Wielmożnego Ignacego Potockiego M.N. W.X.L. na Sessyi Seymowey dnia 24. 
Października 1788-Roku o Rządzie nad Woyskiem, Zbiór mow i pism niektórych w czasie Seymu 
Stanów Skonfederowanych Roku 1788, Tom I, w Wilnie w Drukarni J.k. Mci przy Akademii, 
p. 152. 
63  “na potłumienie Wolności. Ta to iest zaiste Wolność, która od pierwiastków Rządu 
Republikantskiego w Narodzie Naszym, była zawsze celem troskliwości powszechney”. Głos 
Jaśnie Wielmożnego Imci Pana Raczynskiego Marszałka Nadwornego Koronnego i Generała 
Wielko-Polskiego, Roku 1788, Dnia 24 Października Na Sessyi Seymowey miany, Zbiór mow i 
pism niektórych w czasie Seymu Stanów Skonfederowanych Roku 1788, Tom I, w Wilnie w 
Drukarni J.k. Mci przy Akademii, p. 283. 
64  “rządzić wolnym ludem, równie iak byłoby skazą chcieć być samowładnym. Panuy W.K. Mość 
nad sercami Obywatelów samowładnie, umysł każdego zostaw wolnym, i od wpływu iakiegokol-
wiek, i od obcey podległości”. Przymówienie się Za Proiektem Kommissyi Woyskowey Jaśnie 
Wielmożnego Kublickiego Posła Infl antskiego, Zbiór mow i pism niektórych w czasie Seymu 
Stanów Skonfederowanych Roku 1788, Tom I, w Wilnie w Drukarni J.k. Mci przy Akademii, 
p. 206. 
65  równość wprowadzona “w Stan Republikancki” za panowania Stanisława Augusta “ustanowiła 
dopiero w tymże Stanie Republikanckim istotną wolność”, król jest tym, który “skuteczną 
Narodowi otworzył wolność”. Głos JO Xcia imci Antoniego Czetwertyńskiego Chorążego i Posła 
Bracławskiego, Na Sessyi Seymowey Dnia 24. Października 1788. Roku miany, Zbiór mow i pism 
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 Finally, freedom as a purpose for the enactment of the  Constitution was indicated 
in the anniversary royal speech held in 1792: “ the real and only objective to estab-
lish the new form of Government was nothing else, but (if possible for humans) for 
all Polish Nationals to share equally in the freedom and the security of their 
property .” 66 Members expressed their conviction that the Polish system of govern-
ment guaranteed this freedom, which is now threatened, whereas thus far, after all, 
it seemed that “ it’s enough to be a Pole to be free ”. 67 
4.1.4  ‘Sovereignty’ in Legal Acts 
 “The Rules for improvement of the form of government” ( Zasady do poprawy formy 
 rządu ) of December 1789 indicated key constitutional principles,  “the authorities 
and the laws of the Republic ”. The essential duty of the state included “ the right and 
power of making acts, not being subject to any other, only this, which itself repre-
sents the Republic .” “ The rights and authorities that they have is appropriate ” 
entrusted by the Republic to the Parliament and to  Dietines – regional assemblies; 
“ The will of the Republic as to the legislative and parliamentary power by a matter 
of unanimity or a different majority shall demonstrate ”; absolute unanimity was 
required in matters concerned with the cardinal  laws . The Republic entrusted the 
execution of power to the King and the highest guard. Offi cials were responsible for 
their duties to the Republic. “ The Republic in a free and republican composition is 
empowered ” 68 to execute its authorisations. 
 The inviolable cardinal rights ( Prawa kardynalne niewzruszone ,  1791 ) of the 8th 
of January, 1791 declared the Republic of Poland “ free and independent of anyone ”. 
The Republic creates a single indivisible body exercising its tasks specifi ed in art. 
VI “ in a state of  nobility ” through it. Any foreign intervention “ opposing  indepen-
dence  of the Republic and its derogatory self-inertia ” was considered invalid. 
niektórych w czasie Seymu Stanów Skonfederowanych Roku 1788, Tom I, w Wilnie w Drukarni 
J.k. Mci przy Akademii, p. 301, p. 303. 
66  “prawdziwy i jedyny cel utworzenia tey nowey Formy Rządu nie był inny, tylko (ile po ludzku 
być może) wszyscy Narodu Polskiego Współ-Ziomkowie równie byli uczestnikami udziału 
wolności i ubezpieczenia własności swoich”. Mowa Jego Królewskiey Mci Dnia 3go Maia Roku 
1792 w Kościele Świętego Krzyża miana, AGAD, AKP, sygn. 207, k. [chart] 1337 (683). 
67  “dość bydź Polakiem, by bydź wolnym”. Przymówienie się Jaśnie Wielmożnego Stanisława 
Mieroszewskiego Posła Krakowskiego na Sessyi Seymowey Dnia 21. Lutego Roku 1791 Sessya 
38 dnia 21 Lutego 1791 Roku, AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 19, k. [chart] 652od. 
68  “prawo i władzę czynienia ustaw, niepodlegania żadnym innym, ieno tym, które sama 
Rzeczpospolita stanowi”. “Prawa i władze sobie właściwe” powierzyła Rzeczpospolita sejmom i 
sejmikom; “wola Rzeczypospolitey, co do prawodactwa, władzy seymuiącey poruczona, podług 
gatunku materii iednomyślnością, lub różną większością okazywać się będzie”; jednomyślność 
bezwzględnie wymagana była przy materiach z zakresu praw kardynalnych. Wykonanie praw 
powierzyła Rzeczpospolita królowi i najwyższej straży. Urzędnicy za swe obowiązki odpowiadali 
przed Rzecząpospolitą. Uprawnienia swe “Reczpospolita w składzie wolnym i republikanckim 
czynić mocna iest”. Zasady do poprawy formy rządu , Volumina Legum, Wydawnictwo Komisyi 
Prawniczej Akademii Umiejętności w Krakowie, t. IX, Kraków 1889, p. 157–159. 
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Finally, nothing “ in the Republican state for law and authority reckoned not to be, 
that would not fl ow from the expressed will of the Republic on the parliaments: no 
formal authority orders nobody to carry out orders to coerce it will be, do they not 
order right: it will not be able to allow itself and anyone what the law prohibits ”. 69 
Therefore there exists a visible link between sovereignty and state  independence . 
Thus the “Cardinal Rights” also constitute another post fi gurative wording of the 
idea of “ the will of the Republic ”. 
 Based on the text of the Government Act of the 3rd of  May , the issues of the 
sovereignty of the  State and of the  nation can be distinguished. Nothing surprising 
can be found in the understanding of sovereignty of the  State ; however, attention 
shall be drawn to the fact that those provisions were adopted in a specifi c intention 
to manifest the  independence from foreign powers – read: the  Russian Empire – 
hence the emphasis in the preamble to the Constitution that the nation wants to free 
itself “ from foreign oppression ” to recover “ its political existence, internal and 
external  independence  of the nation .” The sovereignty of the Republic was the 
result of sovereignty of the  nation , the entity which was entitled to the highest 
authority in the State. The  Constitution did not contain direct references to the State, 
however the “countries of the  Commonwealth ” are referred to in articles III and IV. 
 In turn, the principle of sovereignty of the  nation was proclaimed in art. V which 
read: “ All authority in a human society takes its origin in the will of the  nation ” 
(“ Wszelka władza społeczności ludzkiej początek swój bierze z woli narodu ”). The 
 Preamble to the Constitution defi ned sovereignty as “ the external  independence  and 
internal freedom .” 
 Although the inspiration, coming from the relevant article II of the French 
 Declaration of Rights of Man and  Citizen of 1789 is clearly visible in the regula-
tions, Polish solutions are far from any radicalism. After all, the  Constitution main-
tained the division into social states, the monopoly of the lesser  nobles in the fi eld 
of political rights, not undermined to a greater extent by the appointment of pleni-
potentiaries of towns and cities to the Parliament with an advisory vote. This con-
fi rmed and put into life the principles already present in the fundamental cardinal 
laws of January 1791. 
69  “w państwach Rzeczypospolitey za prawo i władzę poczytane bydź nie ma, coby nie wypływało 
z wyraźney woli Rzeczypospolitey na seymach: żadna urzędowa władza nikomu rozkazywać i do 
wykonania rozkazów zniewalać nie będzie mogła, czego nie rozkazuią prawa: nie będzie mogła 
pozwalać sobie i nikomu tego, czego zakazuią prawa”. Prawa kardynalne niewzruszone , Volumina 
Legum, t. IX, p. 203–204. 
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4.2  The Nation 
4.2.1  Introduction 
 As already mentioned, in the political practice, the expression of beloved liberty is 
the right to decide freely on one’s matters through the best representatives of the 
nation, as lesser  nobility perceived themselves; the right to articulate the needs of 
the whole community through the lips of  nobles . 
 At that time it was the quest for freedom, originating from lesser  nobles , that was 
to shape the system of balance between the state of lesser  nobility (not the state of 
aristocracy; it should be emphasized that the Polish  nobility did not carry separate 
princely titles, those could only come from foreign monarchs and it was believed 
that “ the nobleman on his farm is equal to the governor ”, although, of course, politi-
cal practice turned masses of impoverished gentry into ideal clients of  magnates ) 
and the king, who gradually gave away his prerogatives by granting privileges to 
the estate of lesser  nobility . In the seventeenth and mid-eighteenth centuries, the 
state of equilibrium was in practice utterly destroyed, leading to such pathological 
situations as notorious breaking off of the Parliament by corrupt members without 
any decisions being taken, buying royal election results by foreign courts, which 
resulted in the weakness of the monarch and an empty treasury, corruption of those 
holding high public functions, for instance the case of prince Adam  Poniński , a 
gambler maintained by Moscow. This system in the conservative papers is referred 
to as  republican, 70 the republic with an elected  monarch – often just a fi gurehead. 
Modern scholars write in agreement about the system of government at a later stage 
of development of the First  Republic as a “ monarchia  mixta ”. 
 It is a paradox that the authors of the Polish Enlightenment already well familiar 
with  Montesquieu and  Rousseau papers easily employed the concept of  the nation , 
while their majority accepted that the actual exercising of the rights of the sovereign 
was in the hands of one social class, which made up approximately 8 % of the popu-
lation. Some political activists of the 60s and 70s, and then of the period of the Great 
 Parliament , already represent another generation, educated in a different manner 
(the role of Piarist schools), conscious of cameralistic and  mercantilist processes, 
taking place in Europe, as well as, the transformation of law, especially of criminal 
law. 71 However, the struggle for the change of the convictions on a specifi c role of 
the  nobility , deeply established in the literature – in the free prints and sources 
related to the functioning of the Parliament – was to be extremely diffi cult. This 
referred not only to the social issues, but rather to the overall way of thinking of an 
average lesser nobleman, rather reactive and slow, which is refl ected, for instance, 
70  This concept was subject to evolution. While Janusz Maciejewski in his studies (e.g. Maciejewski, 
Janusz. 1977. Pojęcie…, p. 21–41) uses them to determine the so-called Bar Confederation nobili-
ty group, contesting the baronial established order, so much so that in the day of the Great 
Parliament, and therefore approx. 20 years later, republicans are customary supporters for retain-
ing elections and supporters of traditional, conservative political solutions. 
71  Borkowska-Bagieńska Ewa. 1992. Nowożytna myśl…, p. 40. 
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in the debate over the draft of “the Collection of Laws”. 72 At the same time, very 
special demands of the reforms, different than those in  France or German countries 
were not directed against  absolutism or the “omnipotence of the State which gave 
them [the reformatory thoughts] an individualistic coloration”, but exactly against 
the  Sarmatian individualism, hence their deep social or even pro-“etatism” 
character. 
 Even though the selected authors are aware of the need to reform the nation 
towards “ turning the people into citizens”, as for instance Adam  Rzewuski , 73 they 
accept the necessity to carry out a slow, not revolutionary reform. The legislation 
takes time, “ it cannot proceed to effecting these great intentions yet [the abolition of 
social classes].” 74 
 Around 1790, voices to improve the legal status of  townspeople gained in force. 
An alliance was formed between the most radical deputies, such as Ignacy  Potocki , 75 
and the representation of townspeople. It was not limited to writing papers and 
drawing up manifestos. One of the more marked events that should be noticed was 
the so-called “ Black procession ” under the leadership of Jan  Dekert , the Mayor of 
the City of  Warsaw that passed along the streets of the Capital City to the Royal 
Palace, where the King was handed a petition of the bourgeois state. These actions 
coincided with the submission of one of the most liberal reform drafts to be dis-
cussed later. 
 While the voices for equal bourgeois empowerment were relatively numerous in 
this phase of the social and political debate, there were no extensive references to 
raising the status of  peasants to the rank of “citizenship”. This does not mean that 
the peasants’ state did not appear in  journalism , but these were mainly appeals for a 
more humanitarian way to demand the fulfi lment of  peasants’ obligations towards 
the owners of villages, the settlement of mutual obligations in contracts. Piotr 
 Świtkowski painted very visual pictures in “The Diary …”. 76 Chancellor Andrzej 
 Zamoyski , a Lithuanian Vice-Chancellor Joachim  Chreptowicz and the nephew of 
King, Stanisław Poniatowski belonged to a small group of reformers. 
72  Ibidem, p. 41–42. 
73  [A.W. Rzewuski] Adama Wawrzeńca Rzewuskiego Kasztelana Witebskiego o formie rządu 
republikańskiego myśli, w Warszawie 1790. w szczególności: Rozdział III. O edukacji, p. 25–61. 
An edition of the work of Rzewuski with an introduction by W. Bernacki and footnotes by 
M. Sanek were recently published, Kraków 2008. 
74  “jeszcze do dokonania tych wielkich zamiarów [likwidacji klas] przystąpić nie może”. 
[A.W. Rzewuski], Adama Wawrzeńca…, p. 168.Comp. alsoWalicki, Andrzej. 2000. Idea narodu…, 
p. 36–37. 
75  However he was a Potocki supporter for preserving the essential role of the nobility , while pro-
moting the  bourgeoisie . “ Equality is not taken at this point for chimeric and even according to the 
natural order unlike the equality of fortunes and riches, but only for the equality that every person 
who lives in the community gives equal right to free and safe use of the property to a person, prop-
erty and his income” . Zabawy Przyjemne i Pożyteczne, 1771, t. V, p. 415, t. VI, p. 227. Comp. 
Janeczek Zdzisław. 2007. Idea wolności w mowach i pismach Ignacego Potockiego. In:  Spory o 
państwo w dobie nowożytnej: między racją stanu a partykularyzmem , Anusik Zbigniew (ed.), 
Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, p. 201–214, in particular p. 206–207. 
76  Homola-Dzikowska Irena. 1960.  Pamiętnik …p. 54–62, p. 69–92. 
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 The most radical demands appealed to do away with the  serfdom ; however, com-
mentators underline that even those had a very restricted character, pushing for no 
more than the liberation of  peasants , without granting them any land property, 
which might have been exclusively the right of  townspeople . 77 In his well-known 
brochure even Jan Baudoin de  Courtenay suggested the attendance of “ eloquent, 
reasonable and those familiar with the needs of their state ” peasants’ representa-
tives in the Parliament. However, he foresaw a long way for them, before they 
would save enough money to purchase some “settlement”. 78 
 The  nobility will have a more democratic attitude toward their own social group. 
Attempts to restrict the rights of the non–property nobility will cause fi erce  debates . 
It is also worth mentioning that understanding the nobility as a sovereign was con-
nected with the specifi city of the Polish political system, i.e. the activity of the 
regional councils (the  Dietines ) consisting in the preparation of instructions for 
members for the meetings of the next parliament. It was an element of direct democ-
racy invoked even by Rousseau. In practice, perhaps, it less refl ected the spirit of 
local decision-making, as during that part of the parliamentary meeting when the 
instructions were laid out, it was usually already attended by a small part of the local 
gentry. Nonetheless, breaking the instructions could be a serious accusation; as we 
shall see, the issue will appear in the procedure for the adoption of the Constitution 
of the 3rd of  May . 
4.2.2  ‘The Nation’ in the Media and Printed Materials 
 The concept of  the nation is extremely popular in the analysed debate. However, 
very rarely did the publicists dare to defi ne the concept, here it is necessary to recall 
the liberal defi nition of Franciszek  Jezierski , “ the nation is the gathering of people 
having one language, customs and manners contained in one general legislation for 
all citizens. The people and the government of the nation are separate things though 
it seems that a nation cannot be without a country for it is without its habitat, and 
again that the country cannot be without a government ”. 79 Similarly, to Father 
 Hajewski the nation is “ a collection of people within certain limits of settled land, a 
compound of will, power and riches for the common needs and the help of the 
united ”, but the author adds the estate elements “ in various divisions of the estate 
77  Borucka-Arctowa Maria. 1957.  Prawo natury jako ideologia antyfeudalna , Warszawa: 
Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, p. 198–200. 
78  Ciąg dalszy uwag ogólnych nad stanem rolniczym i miejskim. Uwaga II, n.p., n.d., quot. after: 
Woliński Janusz, Michalski Jerzy, Rostworowski Emanuel (ed.). 1955.  Materiały do Sejmu 
Czteroletniego , Wrocław, Vol. I, p. 128, 133. 
79  “naród jest zgromadzenie ludzi mających jeden język, zwyczaje i obyczaje zawarte jednym i 
ogólnym prawodactwem dla wszystkich obywatelów. Naród a rząd narodu są osobne rzeczy lubo 
zdaje się, że naród nie może być bez kraju, to jest bez swojego siedliska, i znowu że kraj nie może 
być bez rządu”. F.J. Jezierski,  Wybór pism , Warszawa 1952, p. 217. 
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under the law and under the care of the highest sovereignty remaining ”. 80 Therefore, 
it suggests an enigmatic sovereign to which nation is subject; in an earlier, already 
cited passage of speech he acknowledged, however, that taking care of public affairs 
is “the citizens’” matter. 
 For a vast majority of writers the decision-making force rests in the will of the 
 people . Often the concept of the nation occurs in a phraseological connection with 
the adjective “free”. 81 It is only nation that can decide and choose between a system 
of “ self-empowered government ” and “ a free government ”. 82 The issue of the power 
of the whole nation with regard to such crucial decisions will be present in the litera-
ture critical of the Constitution of the 3rd of  May , seizing onto the allegations that 
in the parliamentary debate, described broadly below, there appeared already on the 
3rd of May: Members of the Great  Parliament could only be interpreters of the deci-
sions that were made at regional assemblies ( Dietines ) and had no right to break 
parliamentary instructions regarding maintenance of elections to the throne. It is 
nation gathered at regional  councils that is the sovereign; these regional councils 
“ are  interpreters  of the will of the people and the opinion coming under parliamen-
tary decision ”. 83 Members, even in a majority of “several dozen”, according to the 
opponents of the Constitution did not have the right to free the king from the oath 
of  pacta  conventa . 84 This element, an abuse of members’ power, opposing of the 
Sejm to the nation (as well as a group of  Warsaw “madmen” to the worthy of trust 
nobleman who settled in the provinces), appear relatively frequently in a discussion 
related to the Constitution. Also, supporters of the constitution did not question the 
meaning of the instructions, “ but through a different interpretation merely tried to 
prove that the members did not act against them ”. 85 The nation is all the  nobility . 
80  [naród jest] “zbiorem ludzi w pewnych granicach ziemi osiadłych, związkiem woli, sił i dostat-
ków dla wspólnych potrzeb i pomocy zjednoczonych (…) w różnych podziałach Stanów pod 
prawem i opieką naywyższey udzielney Zwierzchności zostaiących”. Mowa Dowodząca: że prz-
episy nauk od Prześwietney Komissyi Edukacyi Narodowey dla Szkół Publicznych podane są nie 
tylko użyteczne Kraiowi ale też potrzebne w szczególności Obywatelom przez Ja. X. Daniela 
Haiewskiego Kanonika Kijowskiego Nauczyciela Wymowy w Szkołach Akademickich 
Warszawskich przy rozpoczęciu rocznych nauk dnia 29 września 1790 Roku miana, Bibliotek 
PAN Kraków, Rps. 177, k. 27. 
81  Kołłątaj, Rzewuski, Konarski. Comp. Pepłowski Franciszek. 1961.  Słownictwo …, p. 108. 
82  M. Wielhorski, O przywróceniu dawnego rządu według pierwiastkowych Rzeczypospolitej 
ustaw, n.p., 1775, p. XIII – XVII. 
83  “są tłumaczami woli narodu i zdania przychodzącego pod decyzją sejmową”. JW. JP. Tomasza 
Dłuskiego podkomorzego Generalnego województwa lubelskiego i z tegoż Województwa Posła 
Sejmu Walnego Warszawskiego Usprawiedliwienie się przed Publicznością z Manifestu przeci-
wko Ustawie dnia 3 Maia Ru teraźnieyszego 1791 nastąpioney w grodzie warszawskim zaniesio-
nego, no pag. A copy has been used from the University Library in Torun., sygn. Pol. 8.III.854, Nr. 
22. 
84  Dyzmy Bończy Tomaszewskiego komissarza cywilno-wojskowego wojew. Bracławskiego nad 
Konstytucją i rewolucją dnia 3 Maja uwagi, n.p., n.d., p. 11. 
85  Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Anna. 2012. Czy rewolucja może być legalna? 3 maja w oczach 
współczesnych, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo DiGA. p. 71. Comp. also p. 68–74. 
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 And at the same time solely and exclusively the  nobility . As it turns out, also in 
an open public  disccusion the concept of the nation will be reduced to the nobility 
only. Just a few authors postulate a wider look at the nation. Piotr  Świtkowski , the 
publisher of the “ Diary ” belongs to this group. He defi ned the nation as “ the whole 
universality of the Polish nation, consisting of all the states ,” and imposing the task 
on the legislature of “ giving privileges not just to one state but to the whole nation ”. 86 
At the beginning of the Great  Parliament session,  Świtkowski wrote with much 
hope: “ Now another stage has opened. The nation becomes suddenly independent 
and grounds its self-government forever ”. 87 The “Diary” eagerly rendered its col-
umns available for publications, supporting the reform of the  townspeople ’s legal 
status. 88 
 Stanisław  Staszic , of bourgeois origin, expressed his opinion in the matter under 
consideration clearly in his “Warnings for Poland” …where he concluded: “ If the 
 nobility  state in the existing circumstance cannot easily and quickly agree to the 
abolition of the feudal government, and to the establishment of a true Republic, 
covering the whole nation, and based on the universal law, at this time, the quickest, 
the easiest and in the present circumstances the surest manner to preserve the 
nation: is to establish the omnipotence (..) The nation with the feudal or else lesser 
 nobles ’ government cannot maintain their power ”. 89 An anonymous author of 
“Thoughts on improvement of the form of Government”, said these words: “  the 
free government is of this importance that no one person, but the nation is the heir 
to the country. The nation is nearly everywhere divided into three states: peasants, 
burghers and lesser  nobles . This nation either in all three states, or in two of them 
or else in one state places the superior national power ” 90 ; however, in Poland “ the 
knights’ estate with its offi ces (the  Senate  and the King) holds the national 
government .” 91 
86  jako “całą powszechność narodu polskiego, składającą się ze wszystkich stanów”, i nakładając 
na prawodawcę zadanie “upomyślnienia nie jednego tylko stanu, ale całego narodu”. Pamiętnik 
Historyczno-Polityczny, 1789, II, p. 955, p. 856. 
87  “Teraz insza otworzyła się scena. Naród zostaje nagle niepodległym i gruntuje samowładztwo 
swoje na wieki”. Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny, 1788, II, p. 1050. 
88  Homola-Dzikowska Irena. 1960.  Pamiętnik …p. 198–204. 
89  “Jeżeli stan szlachecki w nadarzonej okoliczności nie potrafi  się łatwo i prędko zgodzić na znie-
sienie rządu feudalnego, a na ustanowienie prawdziwey Rzeczypospolitey, cały Naród 
obeymującey, i na powszechnym prawie zasadzonej, na ten czas sposób najprędszy, nayłatwieysz 
a w teraźnieyszych okolicznościach dla zachowania Narodu naypewnieyszy: Ustanowić 
jednowładztwo (..) Naród z rządem feudalnym czyli z szlacheckim dzisiay żadnym sposobem 
utrzymać się nie może”. Staszic Stanisław, Przestrogi dla Polski z teraźnieyszych związkow z praw 
natury wypadające przez Pisarza “Uwag nad życiem Jana Zamoyskiego, Dnia 4 Stycznia 1790, p. 
I – II. 
90  “rząd wolny ma te istotę, że nie iedna osoba, ale Naród cały iest kraiu Dziedzicem. Ten prawie 
powszechnie na trzy stany dzieli się: Wieyski, Mieyski i Szlachecki. Ten Naród albo we wszyst-
kich trzech stanach, albo w dwóch, albo w iednym z tych stanie, zwierzchnią Narodową władzę 
umieszcza”. NN, Zbiór pism… Ósme pismo…, p. 9. 
91  Ibidem, p. 18. 
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 The political assumptions of Hugo  Kołłątaj expressed in the “Letters of an 
Anonymous Writer” have a particular nature. They expressed a project to transfer 
 townspeople into a co-governing state, represented in the Townsmen’s Chamber, 
and setting up a joint lesser  nobles and  bourgeoisie sovereign. Kołłątaj, a supporter 
of a far-reaching social revolution, appealed: “ Poles! I challenge you to fi nally 
become a nation and a truly free one! ” 92 
 The translator of the bitter satirical “Catechism” inquires: “ Who holds the legis-
lative and executive power in the Republic?” And he obtains the following answer: 
“ the King, the  Senate  and the knights, three states but one lesser nobleman. (…)It is 
a secret never to be conceived by reason that the Republic, having only one noble 
state for its government, did three states thereof, in such a wonderful way, and 
moreover, from one person of the king it has also created a complete state ”. 93 
Another question is: “ After all, this can be seen that all the Polish Government 
 Majesty  is only the Republic of lesser Nobles ?” And the answer: “ It is obvious that 
in the Polish Nation, he who is not a Gentleman, may not even be human. P. 
[Question]  Can the natural and property laws be altered by the Constitution of the 
Polish Government? O. [Answer]  Where it comes to the dignity of the Nobility 
Estate in Poland, all such simple and insignifi cant laws as natural and property 
laws must give way .” 94 In further part of the Catechism, the author tries to prove that 
particular honours of the Noble State are freedom and equality: “ As lesser  nobles  in 
Poland are humans, some of them are rich, some poor, some are learned and some 
incompetent, some wise and others foolish. Well, they have the fundamental privi-
lege of their Constitution that despite these distinctions of Providence, they are all 
equal, and as soon as a Pole is a lesser noble no feature of poor, or silly can be used 
thereto, as he has the holy equality of rights, which raises him over everything what 
Providence partly offers to humans ”; the  Dietines are a particular expression of this 
equality. 95 
92  “Polacy! Ośmielcie się, aby raz być narodem a narodem prawdziwie wolnym!”. Kołłątaj Hugo, 
Do prześwietnej Deputacji, In:  Listy Anonima i Prawo polityczne narodu polskiego . Eds. 
Leśnodorski Bogusław, Wereszycka Helena, Vol. 1. Warszawa 1954. 
93  Król, Senat i Rycerstwo, trzy stany a jeden Szlachcic. (…) To tajemnica nigdy nie poięta 
rozumem, że Rzeczpospolita nie maiąc tylko ieden Stan Szlachecki do swojego Rządu, przecież z 
tego stanu zrobiła trzy stany, tak cudownym sposobem, iako i to, że z iednei Króla poiedynczey 
osoby, ma także ieden stan zupełny”. Katechizm o tajemnicach rządu polskiego, jaki był około 
Roku 1735 napisany przez JP. Sterne w ięzyku Angielskim, potym przełożony po Francuzku, a 
teraz nakoniec po Polsku, w Samborze, w Drukarni Jego Cesarsko-Królewsko Apostolskiej Mości, 
Roku 1790, dnia 10 Stycznia, p. 3–4. 
94  Wszakże z tego daie się widzieć, że cały Maiestat Rządu Polskiego iest tylko Rzecząpospolitą 
Szlachecką?”, i odpowiedź: “To iest iawna pewność, że w Narodzie Polskim kto nie iest 
Szlachcicem, nie może być nawet człowiekiem. Pytanie: Jakże, czyliż Prawa natury i własności 
mogą się odmieniać przez Konstytucją Rządu Polskiego? Odpowiedź: Gdzie idzie o powagę Stanu 
Szlacheckiego w Polszcze, tam wszystkie takie proste i drobne prawa, iako Prawa natury i 
własności ustępować muszą”Ibidem, p. 5. 
95  “Szlachta w Polszce ponieważ są ludźmi, są iedni bogaci i ubodzy, uczeni i nieumieiętni, rozumni 
i głupi. Otóż maią naygłównieyszy przywiley swoyei Konstytucyi, że mimo te rozróżnienia 
Opatrzności, są sobie wszyscy równi, i jak prędko w Polsczcze iest kto szlachcic, iuż do niego nie 
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 The  peasant -farmer in Poland is not a human, he “ has only qualities of soul and 
body, but his person is not a human, he is the Nobleman’s own thing, who being an 
omnipotent Lord can sell or buy him, use him to his advantage .” 96 A town  resident 
is “ a being between the human or else the lesser noble and the non-human or else a 
peasant ”, “ substantia incompleta ”. He lives like a gentleman, “ the latter bows 
thereto, when in need to borrow money ,” but he does not have “ all the powers which 
adorn human nature” because the law does not allow it: the law forbids him to be 
an abbot or bishop of a diocese, or an army offi cer, he may not cultivate the land, “ in 
short, a townsman born in the Republic belongs to no state nor is he a citizen. ” 97 
 The author of another Catechism is kinder and treats his educational mission 
more seriously, thus sketching the political ideal, “ So, do the people constitute the 
law?”Yes. In the Nation whose people are free, they enact the law, to which they 
subdue voluntarily and without coercion,“ by which it differs from the people sub-
ordinated to an autocrat. Freedom means the ways which” the man grabs to become 
happy without harming anybody else . “Freedom has a natural dimension, it is the 
state of nature, citizenship, as well as a political dimension:”  the status of the nation, 
which enacts the law itself on its own either by a common vote by the people them-
selves or by agreeing thereto by their representatives who express their will ”. 98 The 
author defi nes the duties of citizens, including the political activity, “ the obligation 
to work and hire oneself to the interest of the home country ”. However, the com-
munity is made up of three classes; lesser  nobles ,  burghers , and  farmers ; the fi rst 
state “ was granted by the superior sovereignty this title to reward the merits in the 
service for the community, to reward talents and virtues ”. Townspeople are very 
needed and useful for the industry and work, whereas farmers “ defend the States, 
feed and clothe all the other inhabitants (…) are the source of all the good and hap-
piness of the nation and contribute to the power of each country .” Both the lower 
classes are more useful for the nation, hence the need to foster them, “ encourage 
them without having them in contempt, sweeten their hardships, declare great 
respect and gratitude, consider them friends and brothers ”, a nobleman, who 
despised them, would deserve a reprimand. “ Such a conduct would mean his  scarcity 
należy ani ubóstwo, ani głupstwo, ale święta równość Prawa, wynosi go nad to wszystko, co 
Opatrzność po części rozdaie ludziom”. Ibidem, p. 14–15. 
96  “ma tylko przymioty duszy i ciała, ale zaś osoba iego nie iest człowiekiem, ale rzeczą własną 
Szlachcica, który będąc Panem iedynowładnym chłopa, może go przedawać i kupować, obracać na 
swój pożytek”. Ibidem, p. 5–6. 
97  pośrzedniczącym iestestwem między człowiekiem Szlachcicem, a nie człowiekiem chłopem”, 
“substantia incompleta”. Żyje jak szlachcic, szlachcic “kłania mu się, potrzebując pieniędzy 
pożyczyć”, lecz nie ma “wszystkich władz ozdabiających naturę człowieka”, ponieważ prawo mu 
przeszkadza: prawo zakazuje mu być opatem zakonnym i biskupem diecezji, ofi cerem, nie może 
uprawiać roli, “słowem urodzenie Mieszczanina w Rzeczypospolitey nie ma ani stanu, ani iest w 
rzędzie obywatelstwa”. Ibidem, p. 6–7. 
98  “stan Narodu tego, który sam sobie prawa przepisuie, iuż to przez okrzyknienie powszechne 
samego ludu, iuż to przez zgodzenie się na to iego reprezentantów, którzy wyrażają iego wolę”. 
Katechizm Narodowy w Warszawie, 1791, W Drukarni uprzywileiow. Michała Grolla, Księgarza 
Nadwormego J.K. Mci., p. 5–6. 
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of enlightenment, his shortage of morality and politics (…), but unfortunately there 
still remains a great amount of unpunished superstition ”. 99 
 Supporters of far-reaching social reforms criticized the half-hearted parliamen-
tary solutions, such as the ennoblement programme of  townspeople proposed in 
autumn 1790. On the pages of an anonymous controversial brochure, which was 
attributed to Franciszek Salezy  Jezierski , it was alleged that in this way the  nobility 
wants to deprive the  bourgeois class of its fi nest individuals and drag them insidi-
ously to its side. 100 
 As mentioned, the demands associated with the estate of  peasants had a very 
limited character. They were an expression of the  physiocratic doctrine, whose 
assumptions were contrasted with the uncertain legal position of the peasantry in 
Poland. An exception was Józef Pawlikowski, whose emancipatory writing “On 
Polish subjects” had a nearly revolutionary character. 101 Appeals addressed to the 
King and the Parliament took the form of a call to the king to prove to be the father 
of “all” and make everybody without exception happy under his dominion. 102 The 
arguments originated rather from the ecclesiastical doctrine or the ancient history, 
however “ The light in Europe slowly expanding to Poland, had a diffi culty in fi nding 
its access to the dispersed Polish lesser  nobility , whereas all its way to the Peasants 
Estate was obstructed. ” 103 The opponents of radical action took the voice, “ unen-
lightened people do not know what freedom means, and which decent freedom is 
vested in each state .” 104 Many voices commonly realized a danger in the French 
example: “ the hacks want to vest human equality and the sentence on freedom in the 
town, intoxicated by the French circumstances. This prejudice is false or rather the 
French plague moved into the heads of Polish writers; towns! do not believe this ”. 105 
99  Obie niższe klasy są pożyteczniejsze dla Narodu, stąd wynika potrzeba sprzyjania im, 
“zachęcania ich, niegardzenia nimi, słodzenia trudów, oświadczania im największego uszanowania 
i wdzięczności, uważania ich iak przyjaciół i braci”, szlachcic, który by nimi gardził, wart by 
nagany. “Ten postępek ukazałby w nim niedostatek oświecenia, niedostatek moralności i polityki 
(…), lecz nieszczęściem wielka moc jeszcze pozostaie przesądów bez upodlenia”. Ibidem, p. 9–13. 
100  NN [F.S. Jezierski], Głos na prędce do stanu miejskiego, Warszawa 1790. Comp.  Grześkowiak-
Krwawicz, Anna . 2000a.  O formę rządu …, p. 177–179. 
101  NN [Pawlikowski, Józef], O poddanych polskich, Roku 1788. Comp. also Rostworowski, 
Emanuel. 1963. Myśli polityczne Józefa Pawlikowskiego In: Legendy i fakty XVIII w. 
Rostworowski Emanuel (ed.). Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, p. 196–264. 
102  NN, Głos poddaństwa do Stanów Sejmujących, n.p., n.d. 
103  “Światło w Europie powoli rozszerzające się z trudnością do Polski znalazło wstęp do rozpro-
szonej szlachty, a wcale zatamowaną miało drogę do stanu wiejskiego”. NN, Uwagi o chłopach, w 
Warszawie, w Drukarni uprzywilejowanej Michała Grölla, Księgarza Nadwornego J.K.Mci, in 
edition of Woliński Janusz, Michalski Jerzy, Rostworowski Emanuel. 1955. Materiały do Dziejów 
Sejmu Czteroletniego, Vol. 1, Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wydawnictwo 
Polskiej Akademii Nauk, p. 104. 
104  “nie zna lud nieoświecony, co to wolność znaczy, jak każdemu stanowi w towarzystwie inna 
wolność przyzwoita”. Ibidem, p. 106. 
105  “chcą w miasta wrazić pismaki równość człowieka i zdanie o wolności, trafunkiem francuskim 
upojeni. Fałszywe to jest uprzedzenie, a bardziej zaraza francuska przeniesła się do głów polskich 
pisarzów; nie wierzcież temu, miasta”. Jezierski Jacek, Wszyscy błądzą. Rozmowa Pana z 
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In the “Historical and Political  Diary ” (Pamiętnik Historyczno-Polityczny), this dif-
fi cult issue is raised relatively less frequently and in a rather balanced way. 106 The 
peasant issue very easily became an instrument of demagogic republican conserva-
tive narrative which would notoriously accuse the King and the reformist camp of 
plans for the peasantry emancipation or their incitement. 107 
 Characteristically, after the adoption of the constitution and in the course of 
struggle for its retention, even at a time when the fate of the constitution was 
doomed, in view of the allegations of Stanisław Szczęsny Potocki, Marshal 
 Małachowski defends the King against the charges of incitement of the peasantry 
and the middle class, “ the thoughts of the King have always recognized the priority 
and superiority of the Nobility over the Burghers and Peasants; His Majesty makes 
no secret of this, however, that he wishes and thinks the thing needed is to improve 
the Urban State and agriculture more than the situation remained of the Parliament 
of 1786 ”. 108 
4.2.3  ‘The Nation’ in the Parliamentary Debate 
 There is no doubt that the parliamentary  plenum is the main forum in which the 
exclusive authority of the nobility, the Knights state and the Senators state to take 
up legislative actions is emphasized, which, at the same time, is just a kind of mys-
tifi cation, as this assumption was practically never challenged. In the fi rst half of the 
eighteenth century, such opinions as the demands by Antoni  Potocki “ to create a 
state of  townspeople  equal to the lesser  nobles ” 109 were sporadic at the Parliament. 
Andrzej  Zamoyski , the author of the draft of the Codifi cation of Court Laws, spoke 
more emphatically in his famous speech at the 1764 Convocation. However, even 
though the journalism of the era of the Great  Parliament opened to a larger extent to 
promoting a broader understanding of the nation, the parliamentary debate had 
much more conservative overtones. 
Rolnikiem. Obaj z błędu wychodzą, W Warszawie u P. Dufour, konsyliarza nadwor. drukarza 
J.K.Mości i Rzplitej, dyrektora drukarni Korpusu Kadetów, 1790, in edition of Woliński Janusz, 
Michalski Jerzy, Rostworowski Emanuel. 1955. Materiały do Dziejów Sejmu Czteroletniego, Vol. 
1, Wrocław” Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, p. 297. 
106  Homola-Dzikowska Irena. 1960.  Pamiętnik…, p. 205–208. Comp. in particular: Myśli względem 
dopełnienia wolności i pomyślności narodowej przez Sejm niniejszy konstytucyjny,  Pamiętnik 
Historyczno-Polityczny , 1791 I, p. 371–374. 
107  Michalski Jerzy. 1952. Propaganda konserwatywna w walce z reformą w początkach panowania 
Stanisława Augusta,  Przegląd Historyczny , 43 (3–4), p. 560–561. 
108  “myśli Krolewskie były zawsze uznające pierwszość i wyższość Szlachty nad Mieszczan i 
Chłopów; z tym się jednak Król JMść nie tai, że życzy i myśli rzeczą potrzebną ulepszyć Stan 
Mieyski i rolniczy nad sytuacyą która iest zostawiona po Seymie 1786”. Copy of letter of 
JW. Małachowski to JW. Szczęsny Potocki Mar. G.Konf. Kor., de 5 Xbris 1792, AGAD, AKP, 
Pudło (box) 90, k. 692. 
109  Bieniarzówna Janina. 1952. Projekty reform magnackich w połowie XVIII w.,  Przegląd 
Historyczny , 42: 317. 
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 The  nobles , as representatives of the Nation were elected to make the laws, 
including the specifi c ones, which was announced by the appointment of the 
Government Deputation with the task to draw up the “Bill for the New Form of 
Government”. Shortly before fi nalizing the work, the  townspeople representation 
started to act by submitting memoranda that even in their softened version were 
considered by the king to be too far-fetched. At the session on the 15th of December 
1789, castellan Jacek  Jezierski appeared with an unusually sharp criticism of city 
delegates, whose activities he compared to a revolt against the fi xed arrangement of 
social relations. 110 Jan  Dekert and other authors of the manifesto found it reasonable 
to keep the softened version and courageously stand up to the hetman “ party of 
zealots ”. Krystyna Zienkowska argues that the King himself was opposed to the 
introduction of the townspeople issue on the agenda of the Parliament (nor did he 
like the introduction to the Memorial of city delegates referring in his opinion to 
French revolutionary literature), while Ignacy  Potocki acted in a completely differ-
ent way, introducing a revolutionary passage into the fi rst edition of the “Rules…”: 
“ of the important duties of the nation to secure and bring up the freedom, property 
and equality of every citizen, derive the following rights and authority appropriate 
to the nation ”. 111 Finally, the disputed fragment was prematurely “denounced” by 
deputy  Suchodolski , who also alleged that the draft was not an agreed upon work of 
the entire deputation but, as a matter of fact, of one man. Under the infl uence of 
 Suchodolski ’s speech, the term “nation” was deleted from all parts of the bill and 
replaced by the terms of “ State of Lesser Nobility ” , “ Republic ”, whereas “ every citi-
zen ” was turned into “ every resident ”. Thus, the task of the Republic was to guaran-
tee the freedom and equality to the state of lesser  nobles . 112 Similarly, “the Draft to 
the Form of Government” turned out to be too republican. It spoke about sover-
eignty of the  nation but did not refer the nation directly to the  nobility , rather using 
it as an open notion, not quite defi ned. The  Potockis’ republicanism became widely 
too suspected and a similar situation took place as in the case of the “Rules …” – 
during the discussion on the cardinal  laws in September 1790, the word nation was 
deleted and replaced with the term “Republic” and the conservative deputies further 
demanded to supplement it to state: “ The Republic made up by lesser  nobles ”. 113 
110  Mowa JW. Jacka Jezierskiego na sejmie dnia 15 grudnia 1789 roku powiedziana, n.p. 
[Warszawa], n.d. In response appeared: Bezstronne uwagi nad mową JW. Jezierskiego… mianą na 
sejmie dnia 15 grudnia 1789 przeciwko mieszczanom J. Baudouina de Courtenay, Warszawa, 
Drukarnia M. Grölla, 1790. Jezierski then tried to accuse the author before the Court Marshal, and 
then called in parliament for legal action. Comp. Szczepaniec Józef. 1991. Sejm Wielki…, 
p. 168–170. 
111  Z istotnych powinności, które ma naród, zabezpieczenia i wychowania wolności, własności i 
równości każdego obywatela wypływają następujące prawa i władza narodowi właściwa”. Printed 
amended proposal: AGAD, Archiwum Sejmu Czteroletniego, sygn. 13, k. 66. Comp. Zienkowska 
Krystyna. 1976.  Sławetni i urodzeni. Ruch polityczny mieszczaństwa w dobie Sejmu Czteroletniego , 
Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, p. 103–106. 
112  Zienkowska Krystyna. 1976.  Sławetni …, p. 111. 
113  “Rzeczpospolita z stanu szlacheckiego złożona”. AGAD, ASCZ, sygn. 9, k. 159. Cf. also 
Zienkowska Krystyna. 1976 . Sławetni …, p. 117–119. 
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The King remained neutral, not taking a voice at this session. Moreover, it was a 
deliberate policy of preparation for the consecutive phases of the discussion on the 
cardinal laws that were to apply to the royal prerogatives. Potocki lost this battle as 
well. 114 
 At the same time, the representative dimension of the deputies’ parliamentary 
function in the context of the  mandate entrusted with them by the local  Dietines was 
generally regarded by them as very serious, as confi rmed by discussions on the 
prorogation (extension) of the Parliamentary  session (e.g. the discussion in 
September 1790, whether to “ask the nation” through the universal manifestos for 
the permission to extend the session) and the deputies’ doubts about the legality of 
the regulations of Parliament carried out contrary to the Parliamentary instructions. 
The  King pointed out in his voice of the 24th September, 1790: “ Nobody respects 
the Rights of the Nation more, nor is anybody more convinced than I that the legisla-
tive power is not for life, thus it should return to its source i.e. the nation electing its 
Representatives ”. 115 
 On almost every occasion, the deputies were ready for a corresponding  argument 
regarding the position of lesser  nobility – an example can be the session No CCL of 
20 April 1790, 116 when, in connection with the planned census and vetting of farms, 
in fact, problems having nothing in common with politics, a discussion arose, 
whether “Christians” should be further divided into three classes, separate for the 
lesser nobility,  townspeople and  peasants ; or whether lesser  nobles should be 
included at all, as they are not recruited to the army nor do they pay a poll tax. 
Characteristically, a deputy of Pińsk,  Butrymowicz added that “ this obligation is not 
provided by any law as in itself that would be contrary to the Republican Spirit ”. 
Member  Niemcewicz notes in response that every man belongs to the people and 
one should not be afraid to place lesser nobility in an appropriate column, as “ woe 
be to the government that funds itself on inhumanity and terror. Let each citizen, 
infl uencing the government be just, let justice be equal to every state – then every-
one will be attached to their own country, loving their natal land ” and then he asks 
to return to substantive issues. 117 
 All voices of the parliamentary debate are full of indications that these  disputes 
were led by the “nation”. In the parliamentary states the King pointed to the fact that 
114  Janeczek Zdzisław. 2007. Idea wolności w mowach i pismach Ignacego Potockiego. In:  Spory o 
państwo w dobie nowożytnej: między racją stanu a partykularyzmem , Anusik Zbigniew (ed.), 
Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, p. 201–214. 
115  “nikt nie poważa więcey Prawa Narodu y nie iest bardziey przeświadczony nade mnie, że Moc 
Prawodawcza nie dożywotnia, koleynie wracać się powinna do źrzódła swego, to iest do 
obierającego swych Reprezentantów Narodu”. Głos J Kr. Mci Na Sessyi Seymowey dnia 24 
Września 1790 Ru miany, AGAD, AKP, sygn. 207, k. 1047 (540). 
116  Dziennik Czynności Seymu Głównego Ordynaryinego Warszawskiego, pod związkiem 
Konfederacyi Oboyga Narodów agituiącego się 1790, Sessya CCL, Dnia 20 Kwietnia we Wtorek. 
117  “biada takim rządom, które się funduią na nieludzkości i postrachu. Niech każdy Obywatel w 
Rząd wpływający będzie sprawiedliwym, niech równy każdemu stanowi wymiar sprawiedliwości 
oddawany będzie, w ten czas każdego przywiązanego do swego Kraiu swoią kochającego 
Oyczyznę zobaczemy”. Ibidem. 
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he was “ within the National Jurisdiction ”, the “ Enlightened Nation .” 118 The laws 
written by the Parliament are the laws of the Nation, 119 the will of the  Nation “ shed 
into our mouths and our laws ” 120 ; and perhaps even more, what the constitutional 
Deputation does, “ will fl ow from the will of the  Commonwealth ”. 121 
 Finally, the next stage of debate is an issue that appeared during the deliberations 
in early 1791, along with the adoption of the work on the law on regional assemblies 
( Dietines ). Here, besides the theme of the rights of military offi cers in active service 
to parliamentary mandates, particularly vivid emotions were induced by the matter 
of deprivation of the rights of the non-property  nobility failing to pay the due 
amount of tax. The repeated argument “in favour of” this solution consisted in the 
susceptibility of poor nobility to any pathologies associated with the occurrence of 
clientelism. The invoked counterarguments, on the other hand, focused on the injus-
tice – the once obtained ennoblement for the “knight opus”, for the blood shed for 
the country, whilst when contemporary economic relations and usury led to the 
impoverishment of this layer, it is proposed to withdraw the rights of the non- 
property nobility. 122 The division of nobility so strongly emphasising its unity was 
feared as was the strengthening of the position of the aristocracy. “  Not the rich, but 
the virtuous are the honour of the Country ”, said Józef  Olizar . 123 Also, the voices in 
that  debate concerned with military rights recalled the roots of the nobility, the risks 
of isolating the military corps, as in a Republican Government the army could not 
be considered ministerial. 124 On the other hand, it is necessary to note the voices in 
support of the withdrawal of rights of non-possessionists. Members saw this as the 
only way to free themselves from the magnates and clientelism. “ There are three 
things which are the scariest for the Republic: the King having too much of a van-
tage, a powerful neighbour and an overbearing citizen. The law protects us from the 
fi rst; the army covers the second, but the third would have remained, if parliamen-
tary freedom was allowed for the non-possessionists ” as member Boreyko 
118  Głos Jego Kr. Mości na Sessyi Seymowey dnia 20. Lipca 1789. miany, AGAD, AKP, sygn. 207, 
k. 813 (443). 
119  Prince Czartoryski in the debate on how to perform tasks by deputations from the Chamber asks: 
“Kto ieźli można tak myśleć, że to, coby postanowiły Osoby od Seymu, y z pośrzód niego obrane, 
nie byłoby Prawodactwem Seymowym, że go cały Seym nie stanowi, toby równie powiedzieć 
można, że Prawa, które Seym pisze, nie są Prawami Narodu, bo ich sam cały Naród nie pisze”. 
Sessya 36, 17 Lutego 1791 r, AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 19, k. 571. 
120  [Wola Narodu] “przelana do ust i prawa naszego”Głos Jaśnie Wielmożnego Marcina Leżeńskiego 
posła Bracławskiego Względem Proiektu dokączenia Opisów Seymikowych Dnia 18. Lutego 
Roku 1791. W Izbie Seymowey miany, Sessya 37 dnia 19 Lutego 1791 R., AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 
19, k. 634. 
121  “to będzie wypływało z woli Rzplitej”. Such reasoning Suchodolski , Castellan of Radom 
assigns to antagonists.Sessya 37 dnia 19 Lutego 1791 R., AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 19, k. 629od. 
 122  Comp. Voice of JW. Suchodolski , Sesja 33 Dnia 11 Lutego 1791 R., AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 19, k. 481, 
and other voices in this session, especially Józef Kalasanty Olizar, Volyn member, k. 491- 492od. 
123  “Nie bogaci, lecz cnotliwi stanowią honor Kraju”. Ibidem, voice of Olizar, k. 491od. 
124  Sessya 34 z 14 lutego 1791, Sessya 35 dnia 15 lutego 1791 R., AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 19, k. 
530 – 579od. 
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 perorated . 125 Adam Lityński rightly points out the specifi c paradox of the Polish 
political scene – saving democracy by limiting political rights. 126 
 At the same time this deadlock in parliamentary work made the members aware 
of how ineffi cient the parliamentary procedure was to allow the deliberations over 
individual provisions of the law on regional assemblies to be delayed for several 
days, which was to be counteracted by the project proposed by member of  Krakow 
 Sołtyk , which entrusted legislative binding transactions to the constitutional deputa-
tion elected by the Parliament. 127 Members wished, however, to deliberate on the 
regulation of assemblies, i.e. those that they were directly related to, in pleno. 
 The issue of towns appeared in the second half of 1789. An analysis of royal 
speeches allows to fi nd references to the generosity of  Warsaw and special royal 
favours to  Krakow . In his speech of the 15th of December, 1789, the King expressed 
himself in the following way: “ it is not only my opinion that the grandeur of the 
Knights State deserves being granted freedoms and liberties, but it is also in its 
[Knights Estate’s]  interest. ” 128 This confi rms the previous notes that the reform 
measures were to be limited to an “ improvement”, “raising ” of the status, extending 
the rights of  townspeople , but absolutely not to contribute to their equality. The 
words of the king recorded in the spring of 1791 are of a bit more progressive char-
acter, i.e. already in the course of works on the  Law on towns where the king stressed 
his obligations towards the towns and cities, the duty to defend “ the rights and 
privileges of people of any condition .” 129 In another comprehensive speech of the 
14th of April, 1791, he cited the example of the Danish  nobility that, reserving all 
the rights for themselves and denying them to other estates, “ went towards the full-
est government of  absolutism .” 130 According to the King, the extension of the rights 
was to change the attitude of the townspeople, who would be interested in defend-
ing their freedom “together” with the  nobility [in case of an external emergency]. 
He was of the opinion that it was insuffi cient for  townspeople to be entitled to send 
125  “Trzy są rzeczy dla Rzeczypospolitey naystrasznieysze: Król nadto przewagi maiący, sąsiad 
potężny i przemagaiący obywatel. Od pierwszego zabezpiecza nas prawo; od drugiego zasłania 
wojsko, ale zostałby się trzeci, gdyby wolność sejmikowania, nieposesjonatom dozwolona była”. 
Voices from 28 January 1791., cited in Gazeta Narodowa i Obca, Nr X z 2 lutego 1791, p. 1. 
126  Lityński Adam. 1999. Sejmik jako instytucja demokracji szlacheckiej 1764–1793. Tradycje – 
mity-nowości –utopie. In: Parlamentaryzm i prawodawstwo przez wieki: prace dedykowane prof. 
Stanisławowi Płazie w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin,  Malec, Jerzy , Uruszczak Wacław (ed.), 
Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, p. 76, p. 75–86. 
127  Comp. for example Głos Jaśnie Wielmożnego Imci Pana Piusa Kicińskiego, Posła Ziemi 
Liwskiey, Na Sessyi Seymowey Dnia 17 lutego 1791 R., AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 19, k. 583 – 584v. 
and the other voices. 
128  “nie tylko iest zdaniem moim, że przystoi wspaniałości Stanu Rycerskiego nadawać im wolności 
y swobody, ale że to iest y Interessem jego”. Głos JKMci na Sessyi Seymowey dnia 15. Grudnia 
1789. miany, AGAD, AKP, sygn. 207, k. 897 (460). 
129  Głos Jgo Kr. Mości na Sessyi Seymowey dnia 6. Kwietnia miany [1791], AGAD, AKP, sygn. 
207, k. 1193 (612). 
130  Głos J. K. Mci na Sessyi Seymowey dnia 14. Kwietnia 1791 miany, AGAD, AKP, sygn. 207, k. 
1198. 
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a deputation, without the right to vote, “ without freedom of speech, until asked ,” 131 
which eventually would be included in the provisions of the future Constitution. 
The fi nal reform would cover slightly more than 30 % of the townspeople living in 
free royal  cities . Undoubtedly, the very process of selection of deputies to depart-
mental assemblies, construction of desiderations, listening to the reports from the 
selection of the plenipotentiary all may be seen as a form of political mobilization 
of the middle class. 132 However, the implementation of the demands of the bour-
geois movement should be assessed as extremely restrained. 
 The peasantry-related topic is rarely present in the parliamentary discussion. A 
similar tone to that used by free media was applied by Adam Wawrzeniec Rzewuski, 
who  thus  spoke in the debate over the starosties: “ I say freedom requires too pure a 
light, too noble a soul, to honor with it our not-enlightened farmers ”. 133 
 In the May discussions, doubts regarding the  legitimacy of the Great  Parliament 
to adopt the  constitution returned. It was emphasized that, since the legislature was 
with the people, it could only be realized by local assemblies ( Dietines ), with the 
Members of Parliament being mere interpreters of the will. “ The will of the  Nation 
 does not come from the will of the members, but from the entire composition of citi-
zens having the right of choice of the Representatives of Law who in the name of 
their tenure at the members' choosing, give the power to do express their will in the 
legislation. ” 134 A member from Oszmiana, Chomiński, thus lamented by proposing 
implementation of a despotic government: “ The Parliament has already become the 
Master of your will, and You the Nation, giving power to the representatives having 
it so far, have already lost it ” by introducing  succession “ despite the majority num-
ber of Instructors in favour of the Election ”. 135 These voices, already recorded in a 
heated discussion on the 3rd of May will soon echo in numerous writings critical of 
the constitution. Anna Grześkowiak- Krwawicz indicates that it was one of the most 
131  Ibidem, k. 1201 (616). 
132  Bałtruszajtys Grażyna. 1996. “Zgromadzenia ludu miejskiego” według projektów i ustaw 
Sejmu Czteroletniego. In:  Parlament, prawo, ludzie. Studia ofi arowane Profesorowi Juliuszowi 
Bardachowi w sześćdziesięciolecie pracy twórczej , Iwanicka Katarzyna, Skowronek Maria, 
Stembrowicz Kazimierz (ed.), Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, p. 47–54. 
133  “wolność mówię zbyt czystego wymaga światła, zbyt szlachetney duszy, aby się nią nie 
oświeceni rolnicy nasi zaszczycać już mogli”. Adama Wawrzeńca Rzewuskiego kasztelana witeb-
skiego Głos w Stanach Rzeczypospolitey Zgromadzonych dnia 31 Października 1791, AGAD SD 
III 1. 
134  “Wola Narodu nie pochodzi od woli Posłuiących, ale od całego składu Obywatelów do wyboru 
Reprezentantów Prawa maiących, którzy w Imieniu swym na Poselskie urzędowanie wybierając, 
moc czynienia w przepisach woli swey daią.” Głos JP Posła Wileńskiego Korsaka, for: NN 
[Siarczyński], Dzień Trzeci Maja Roku 1791, w Warszawie, Nakładem Drukarni M. Grolla, Księg. 
JKM, p. 94. 
135  “już Seym stał się Panem Twojey woli, a Ty Narodzie, nadawczą moc Reprezentantom maiąc 
dotychczas, iuż ją straciłeś”, [wprowadzając sukcesję] “mimo większość liczby Instrukcyow za 
Elekcją” JP Chomiński , poseł Oszmiański, for: NN [Siarczyński], Dzień Trzeci Maja…, p. 147. 
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serious allegations against the constitution, accusations of breaching one of the fun-
damental political principles. 136 
4.2.4  ‘The Nation’ in Constitutional Acts 
 As indicated above, the term “nation” did not appear in earlier constitutional acts. 
In the “Rules for improvement of the form of government” of December 1789 
inspired by  Kołłątaj and prepared by Ignacy  Potocki , the concept of the nation was 
deleted and replaced by the concepts of “ lesser  nobility  estate ”, and the “ Republic ”, 
“ who entrusted the proper authorities and rights ”. A key duty of the state in the fi nal 
version of the act was to ensure freedom to the nobles, preservation of their equality, 
retrenchment of ownership of each inhabitant and extension of governmental pro-
tection to “ all in general ”. 137 
 Eventually, a similar step was made in September 1790 when the cardinal  laws 
were approved and fi nally published in January 1791. Also here there is absence of 
a broader reference or modern understanding of the term “nation”. What is meant is 
the establishment of laws by the  nobility “ for the nation ”, “ and those [laws] that 
people only owe obedience to ”. It is solely the nobility that remain the political 
nation – “ free speech at regional assemblies ” for every nobleman “ is most solemnly 
protected ”. “ Free speech ”, expressed in speech or in writing, shall however be enti-
tled to “ every citizen ”. 138 
 Finally, the  Constitution , adopted on the 3rd of May, contained many paradoxes 
as far as the issue of “nation” is concerned. As the enacting entity, the monarch was 
indicated together with the Parliament by these words: “ Stanisław  August , by the 
grace of God and the will of the  Nation , Polish King, Grand Duke of Lithuania, 
Russia, Prussia, Mazovia, Zemajtija, Kyiv, Volyn, Podole, Podlasie, Livonia, 
Smolensk, Siverskyi and Chernihovsk together with the confederated states in a dual 
number, representing the Polish nation .” It is clear that, in fact, without the consent 
of the states, the King could not introduce any constitutional regulation, as it was 
only the lesser  nobility that had the legislative power. Subsequently, the Constitution 
used the words “ the fate of us all ”. The concept of “the nation” appeared wider in 
two regulations – in the  Rousseau -like art. V: “ All the authority in a human society 
takes its origin in the will of the  nation . So to keep the whole States, civil liberties 
and social order equally important forever, three authorities shall constitute the 
government of the Polish nation, and always will by force of this law, that is: the 
legislative authority in the assembled estates, the supreme executive authority of the 
King and the Guard, and the judicial authority in jurisdictions to that end instituted 
or to be instituted ,” and art. XI, the National Armed Force: “ The nation owes to 
itself its own defence against an attack and preservation of its integrity. Therefore, 
136  Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Anna. 2012. Czy rewolucja może być legalna? 3 maja w oczach 
współczesnych, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo DiGA, p. 68–70. 
137  Zasady do poprawy formy rządu , Volumina Legum, t. IX, p. 157–159. 
138  Prawa kardynalne niewzruszone , Volumina Legum, t. IX, p. 203–204. 
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all citizens are defenders of national integrity and liberties. The Army is nothing 
else, but only a defensive and decent force extracted from the overall strength of the 
nation. The nation owes its army a reward and esteem for the exclusive devotion to 
its defence. The army owes the nation protection of borders and maintenance of 
common peace, in short, it is to be its strongest shield ”. 139 Interpreters of both regu-
lations come to an agreeable conclusion that the word  nation referred to in art. V 
had a limited scope, and practically related only to the  nobility authorized by a 
number of laws to participate in the executive, legislative and judicial powers, 
whereas art. XI already imposed such an obligation on all citizens, however, of 
course, the Constitution did not construct the notion of a “ citizen of the Republic. ” 
It was merely a foretaste of the bourgeois revolution but in practice the duty to 
defend was to refer both to the estate of lesser  nobility and  peasants , which was later 
proved by the military action against  Russia , both in the war for the defence of the 
Constitution in 1792, as well as in the Tadeusz  Kościuszko Insurrection in 1794. 
 In summary, in Poland the principle of sovereignty was  formulated in such a way 
that all the authority originates with the will of the  people , strictly to emphasize that 
the function of representation of the people in enacting the law was only fulfi lled by 
a “free nation”, that is such that by virtue of tradition and the past should “ prevail in 
public life .” It can be assumed that the 3rd of May constitution uses the terms “ free 
nation ” not in the context of national  sovereignty but rather to refer to its political 
representation. This concept also appears in the about-constitutional laws, to pre-
cisely defi ne the  nobility as a state playing the role of a representative of the nation. 
 The said nation was still divided into classes, which was refl ected in the very 
structure of the  Constitution . Its extensive art. II entitled “Gentry-landlords” left no 
illusions – profound changes in social issues were missing in the Government Act. 
Nor did art. III, dedicated to the  townspeople , realize the demands expressed by the 
publicist writings. On the other hand, special attention is deserved to the fact that in 
parallel to a slight improvement of the situation of the townspeople, it ended up in 
withdrawing the rights of the non-possessionist  nobility . A consistent interpretation 
is that these measures are likely to open the way to changes in the system of consti-
tutional monarchy based on the  bourgeoisie . Also, Article III, dedicated to the 
townspeople did not realize the demands expressed by the literature. At the same 
time, however, it should be noted that, in accordance with article VI of the constitu-
tion, “ the deputies elected by the  Dietines  will be recognized in the legislation and 
139 Art. V: “wszelka władza społeczności ludzkiej początek swój bierze z woli narodu. Aby więc 
całość państw, wolność obywatelską i porządek społeczności w równej wadze na zawsze zostawały, 
trzy władze rząd narodu polskiego składać powinny i z woli prawa niniejszego na zawsze składać 
będą, to jest: władza prawodawcza w Stanach zgromadzonych, władza najwyższa wykonawcza w 
królu i Straży, i władza sądownicza w jurysdykcjach, na ten koniec ustanowionych, lub ustanowić 
się mających” and Art. XI: Siła zbrojna narodowa: “Naród winien jest sobie samemu obronę od 
napaści i dla przestrzegania całości swojej. Wszyscy przeto obywatele są obrońcami całości i 
swobód narodowych. Wojsko nic innego nie jest, tylko wyciągniętą siłą obronną i porządną z 
ogólnej siły narodu. Naród winien wojsku swemu nadgrodę i poważanie za to, iż się poświęca 
jedynie dla jego obrony. Wojsko winno narodowi strzeżenie granic i spokojności powszechnej, 
słowem winno być jego najsilniejszą tarczą”. 
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the general nation’s needs according to this Constitution as the representative of the 
whole nation in whom the common trust will be vested ”. 140 The article mentioned 
the entire nation, not only the nobility. Deputies were supposed to represent the 
needs of the entire nation, also the  peasants and  burghers who, although did not 
elect these Members of Parliament, place in them their hope for the realization of 
their interests, since deputies were persons of social (public) trust. 
 The Constitution in fact lifted the instructions although the law passed a month 
earlier on  Dietines 141 – after rejecting the different proposals twice – purposely pre-
served the binding nature of instructions. The king was also subjected to the will of 
the  people , in accordance with the broadly discussed (see further below) article VII 
of the highest executive authority entrusted with the king only after ensuring “ the 
free nation power of establishment of its laws ” and “ the power to guard over all 
executive authorities and elect offi cials to magistracies ”. 142 
 The article of the constitution devoted to the  bourgeoisie only declared that the 
law of the royal towns be part of the constitution, “ as the law of the free Polish 
nobility ensuring new, genuine and effective  force  for the security of their liberties 
and the integrity of common Fatherland. ” (“ jako prawo wolnej szlachcie polskiej, 
dla bezpieczeństwa ich swobód i całości wspólnej Ojczyzny nową, prawdziwą i 
skuteczną dające siłę ”). Even the consecutive article devoted to the  peasantry was 
much broader, although in fact it represents only  physiocratic praise of the rural 
state and its responsibilities. The real signifi cance could only be seen in the commit-
ment to draw up detailed contracts with the peasants and the announcement of free-
dom for the immigrant population. 143 There came a political revolution, neither 
social nor economic one. 
4.3  The Monarch as a Sovereign 
4.3.1  Introduction 
 As noted already in the introduction, no thesis of the exclusive sovereignty of the 
 monarch was ever raised in Poland, because this would have never been approved. 
Such an understanding of the role of the monarch was established naturally through 
140  “posłowie na sejmikach obrani w prawodawstwie i ogólnych narodu potrzebach podług 
niniejszej konstytucji uważani być mają jako reprezentanci całego narodu, będąc składem ufności 
powszechnej”. Volumina Legum, t. IX, p. 222. 
141  Seymiki (Prawo o Seymikach), Actum in Curia Regia Varsaviensi Die Vigesima Octava Mensis 
Maij, Anno Domini Millesimo Septingentessimo Nonagesimo Primo, Zbiór Ustaw Seymowych w 
Warszawie; also: Volumina Legum, Wydawnictwo Komisyi Prawniczej Akademii Umiejętności w 
Krakowie, t. IX, Kraków 1889, p. 289–241. 
142  Zagwarantowanie “wolnemu narodowi władzy praw jego stanowienia” i “mocy baczności nad 
wszelką wykonawczą władzą, oraz wybierania urzędników do magistratur”. 
143  Leśnodorski Bogusław. 1951.  Dzieło Sejmu Czteroletniego (1788–1792). Studium historyczno-
prawne , Wrocław: Wydaw. Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich, p. 226–230. 
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the elective  experience . Moreover, it is easy to notice the ultimate exclusion of the 
monarch from the scope of discussion on the shape of law-giving powers. And yet, 
 Kołłątaj precisely concluded: “ never did the nation honestly think that the republi-
can government depended on reducing the king’s prerogatives, but on permanent 
actions of the people representing the will of the  nation  and exercising it ”. 144 In this 
sense, a proof of maturity of the nation was a parliamentary resolution of September 
1790 which restored the monarch’s right to grant offi ces, withdrawn in 1775. 145 
Until that time, however, an almost phobic attitude towards monarchs had domi-
nated, as they were constantly accused of  absolutist tendencies. Also Stanisław 
August  Poniatowski would frequently be an object of such a propaganda in the 
earlier period of his reign. 146 At the same time, it was reluctantly admitted that the 
King was a stabilizing element of the political system. 147 Nonetheless, it was agreed 
that the King was the embodiment of  majesty , the carrier of solemnity and dignity, 
a representative in external relations. 148 
 Hence, the question of the monarch’s position was, by far, the most vividly dis-
cussed problem of sovereignty and aroused the strongest emotions, in particular – 
the way of his appointment, that is, the decision whether to continue the  election , or 
rather introduce the hereditary  throne . The talk on this issue would burst almost 
suddenly, often on the occasion of subsidiary questions. In terms of parliamentary 
 discussions , one can clearly distinguish several major stages: discussion on the 
“Rules for improvement of the form of  government ” in December 1789, followed 
by the ongoing debates in autumn 1790 on a draft of the cardinal laws and then on 
the proclamation to the Nation. Ultimately, the case was settled surprisingly, and 
contrary to numerous  Dietines instructions, by enacting the May  Constitution intro-
ducing the election by a  dynasty and appointing the Saxon Elector Frederick 
 Augustus to the throne after the death of King Stanisław August  Poniatowski . 
4.3.2  The Monarch in the Debate of Public Media 
 As indicated earlier, the monarch was no longer perceived as a legislative authority 
acting on his own. Michał  Wielhorski in the already cited dissertation on freedom 
took a radical position: the King does not even have the role of an estate, he is not 
even one of the pillars of “ independence ” – as supported by the fact that even during 
the  interregnum the State will be able to  function . 149 The Kings became exclusively 
144  “nigdy zaś rzetelnie nie pomyślał naród, iż rząd republikantski nie zależy na odjęciu prerogatyw 
królowi, lecz na nieprzestannym działaniu osób reprezentujących naród i wolę jego 
wykonywających”. [Kołłataj Hugo],1954.  Listy Anonima i Prawo polityczne narodu polskiego . 
Eds. Leśnodorski Bogusław, Wereszycka Helena, Warszawa, Vol. 1.p. 265. 
145 Volumina Legum, t. IX, p. 183. 
146  Michalski Jerzy. 1952. Propaganda…, p. 536–562. 
147  Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Anna. 2003. Czy król…, p. 472–473. 
148  Ibidem, p. 474–475. 
149  Michał Wielhorski,,op.cit., p. 44–45. 
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the “fi rst offi cials of the Republic”. 150 The author of the anonymous “Thoughts on 
improving the Forms of Government” emphasized the subordination of the King to 
the law, concluding that “ all power, all law-giving rights that earlier served the only 
authority of Polish Kings, today is the attribute of the Knights’ state. The King holds 
the priority everywhere, he presides everywhere, but he decides nowhere .” 151 
 The main stage of discussions in the free media on the role of the monarch was 
the dispute between the protagonists and antagonists of king’s  succession . 152 One of 
the most famous protagonists was an activist of the Republican camp – a hetman, 
Seweryn  Rzewuski . Amazingly, in his key pamphlet, 153 he did not use classic argu-
ments of traditional, historical postulates against hereditary  monarchy , but rather 
referred to current world events. It is the irony of fate that this conservative 
 Sarmatian , a signifi cant politician, a rich  magnate opposing any social reforms, with 
sympathy invoked the revolutionary events in  France and the United  States assum-
ing that the system devoid of a King was better than the hereditary  monarchy . It 
shall be noted, however, that the voices in favour of abolition of the monarchy in the 
system of government were very rare. 154 
 In the  debate about the  succession , the issue of freedom was also strongly empha-
sized. It was widely believed that the  election “ granted us a lot of freedom ”, 155 
although the opponents cited historical arguments also in favour of the fact that at 
the times of hereditary kings, the Polish State was free, and the election contributed 
to as much freedom as anarchy. 156 The essential argument against the election, the 
“ pupil of freedom ”, was the problem of anarchy during the  interregnum . 
 Finally, the topic of the debate should be concluded with a strong accent.  How 
does the King of Poland hold the throne? – as inquired by the author of the afore-
mentioned Catechism. “ A King chosen in a free  election  is conceived in the womb 
of the Republic, behind the veil of  nobility ’s freedom, owing to a powerful neigh-
bouring State (…) The King is himself a complete estate, although in nature, he is 
only a single individual.” “What is his importance in governing the Nation? During 
his election, the King means everything, after he takes the Throne, he does not mean 
much.” “How is it that he means a lot during his election?” “The Nation, unwilling 
150  Ibidem, p. 226. 
151  “wszelka władza, całe prawodawstwo, które przedtym iednowładnym Królom Polskim służyło, 
dziś iest w Rycerskim Stanie. Król wszędzie trzyma pierwszeństwo, wszędzie prezyduie, lecz nie 
decyduie nigdzie”. NN, Myśli… Myśl Ósma. Myśl względem…, p. 28. 
152  These issues have repeatedly been analyzed in Polish literature. It is necessary to recall the work 
of Zielińska Zofi a. 1991.  “O sukcesyi tronu w Polszcze” 1787–1790 . Warszawa: Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe PWN, recently also some signifi cant voices of the debate recalled the aforementioned 
Rafał Lis. 
153  Seweryna Rzewuskiego hetmana polnego koronnego o sukcessyi tronu w Polszcze rzecz krótka, 
n.p., n.d. 
 [Drezno 1789]. Walicki, Andrzej. 2000.  Idea narodu …, p. 33–34. The title of brochure also 
served Z. Zielińska for the title of the aforesaid paper. 
154  Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Anna. 2003. Czy król…, p. 483. 
155  Myśl z okazji “Uwag nad życiem Jana Zamoyskiego, n.p.. [Warszawa], 1788, p. 43. 
156  Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, Anna. 2004. O starożytnej wolności…, p. 43–45, 50–52. 
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to do anything for the public good, decides to take over all domestic needs from the 
King in Pacta  Conventa ; so at that time the King means as much as should be the 
task of the entire Nation.” After coming to power, he does not mean much, “because 
the aristocracy, using the  nobility  differentiation, do not allow him to do anything. 
The rule over the military, the municipal courts, supervision of the Treasury, even 
the safety of the  Majesty , all is transferred into the hands of Ministers, all that is left 
to the king’s offi ce is “convening Parliament, appointing offi cers, signing the 
fairs .” 157 
4.3.3  The Monarch in the Parliamentary Debate 
 As mentioned before, Stanisław August  Poniatowski played a prominent role during 
parliamentary discussions. His parliamentary speeches were characterized by 
acceptance of the customary rules of debate – which was supposed to be polite and 
erudite, however, the content had evolved: from his cautious statements from 1788 
to 1789 to progressive ideas expressed in 1791. 
 As a rule, the King would use the parliamentary forum to emphasize his position 
of subordination to the Nation (“ those obligations which, among others, the Nation 
placed upon me when they elected me to reign over them ”, 158 “ I recognise it is an 
honour to wear this Crown, which by your will was placed upon my head ”, 159 “ my 
Offi ce ”, 160 “ appointed for the Throne by the Nation ” 161 ), and his absolute reluctance 
to interfere with the powers and free discretion of the states, declared at least for-
mally, which was supposed to be illustrated by the repeatedly quoted King’s expres-
sion: “ The King with the Nation, the Nation with the King” . A subsequent passage 
157  “Król wolną wybrany Elekcyą, poczyna się w żywocie Rzeczypospolitey, pod zasłoną wolności 
szlacheckiey, za sprawą iakiego Sąsiedzkiego Mocarstwa (…) Król iest stanem zupełnym, choć 
iest w naturze tylko poiedynczą osobą”. W zarządzeniu Narodu Król co znaczy? Król przy swoiey 
Elekcyi znaczy wszystko, po obięciu Panowania nie wiele”. “jakże to wiele znaczy przy swoiei 
Elekcyi?” “Naród niechcąc nic czynić dla dobra publicznego, wszystkie potrzeby krajowe wyz-
bacza zastąpić Królowi w Paktach Konwentach; więc Król w ten czas to znaczy, co powinno być 
dziełem całego Narodu”. Po objęciu władzy znaczy niewiele, “bo możnowładztwo Panów, 
używając rozróżnienia Szlachty, nie dopuszcza mu nic czynić. Rząd woyska, Sądy Miast, dozór 
Skarbu, beśpieczeństwo nawet Majestatu, wszystko przeniesione iest w ręce Ministrów, władzy 
królewskiej pozostało “zwoływanie Seymu, rozdawanie Urzędów, podpisywanie Jarmarków”. 
Katechizm o tajemnicach…, p. 11–12. 
158  “te obowiązki, które przy innych włożył na mnie Naród, gdy mi nad sobą Królować kazał”. 
Mowa Jego Królewskiej Mości na Sessyi Seymowey dnia 9. Stycznia 1789. Roku miana, AGAD, 
AKP, sygn. 207, k. 807 (415). 
159  “znam chlubę nosić tę Koronę, którą Wola Wasza na Skronie moie włożyła”. Mowa Jego Kr. 
Mości na Sessyi Seymowey dnia 26. Marca 1789 Rku miana, AGAD, AKP, sygn. 207, k. 829 
(426). 
160  Głos Jgo Kr. Mci na Sessyi Seymowey dnia 1go kwietnia 1791 Roku. Miany, AGAD, AKP, 
sygn. 207, k. 1187 (609). 
161  “wezwany do Tronu wolą Narodu”. Głos JKr. Mci na Sessyi Seymowey dnia 22 września 1791 
r. miany, AGAD, AKP, sygn. 207, k. 1267 (649). 
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is also of great importance: “ I noticed long ago the advantage that a King reigning 
over a free Nation has over those Kings who govern in  absolutist  States, because the 
King of a free Nation, together with the representatives of free co-citizens, has the 
daily opportunity to strengthen his determination and have his mind enlightened 
through the comments made by those who, by engaging in parliamentary discus-
sions with the King, exercise the sovereignty and enact the legislation for the Nation, 
while an absolutist Parliament has to determine everything on its own ”, “ I am nour-
ished by the light of my fellow deputies of the Parliament ”, says the King. 162 
Similarly, after the  constitution had been adopted, he continued to emphasize: 
“ When the duties of ruling were placed upon me in the Pacta  Conventa , I decided to 
understand always that the King of Poland shall never act without the Parliament, 
only shall he act, according to the will of the Parliament, which represents the 
Nation and its will ”, and this was a particular feature of the doubled, constitutional 
Parliament. 163 
 As noted, it was very easy for the  Parliament to become a place to discuss the 
duties of the King and the manner of his appointment. The parliamentary sessions 
of September 1790 were a typical phase of this  discourse . In the discussion over an 
unfi nished article concerned with the  nobility , who “ were free to create offi ces and 
appoint offi cers to hold them ”, a Volhynian member of the Parliament,  Świętosławski , 
demanded that an amendment be made to say that the nobility are “ free to appoint 
Kings ”. The Lithuanian Marshal pointed out in his response that, in his opinion, 
such an amendment did not protect the interests of members as it was probably the 
members’ intention to exclude the rule of a dynasty, and this option assumed either 
the election of a family or the election of a King. As regards  Świętosławski ’s sug-
gestion, it was requested that a proclamation be sent to the Nation; in response, 
member  Przyłuski , the castellan of Brzeziny opposed, arguing that a nation who 
recognized the need for conscription and military taxes, “ would not hesitate to 
inform their representatives through instructions if it found the succession to the 
 Throne  to be its common good ”. Member  Niemcewicz promptly upheld his pro-
succession position arguing that since the law and the Polish people’s virtues pro-
hibit it, a succession  king would not seize “ the Treasury, the Army and the Tribunals ”. 
The example of England was supposed to prove that although the throne there was 
hereditary but the rulers did not seek omnipotence, “ the freedom in  France  increases 
but nobody in France suggests the dynasty be disposed of ”(sic!).  Niemcewicz pro-
162  “dawno zważałem awantaż Króla panującego w wolnym Narodzie nad temi Królami, którzy 
rządy absolutne sprawuią, ponieważ Król wolnego Narodu wspólnie z Reprezentantami wolnych 
Współ-Obywatelów ma codzienną sposobność zasilania determinacyi swoiei, y oświecania swych 
myśli przez podawane uwagi od tych, którzy seimuiąc wspólnie z Królem, samowładność y pra-
wodawstwo Narodu sprawuią, a absolutny sejm sam na siebie brać musi wszelkie determinacye”, 
“zasilam się światłem współseymuiących”. Głos Jego Kr. Mości na Sessyi Seymowey dnia 10. 
Maia 1791. Roku miany, AGAD, AKP, sygn. 207, k. 1219 (625). 
163  “gdy Mi przepisywane były Królowania powinności w Paktach Konwentach, tak one poiąłem, 
y w tym nieodzownym zostaię rozumieniu, że Król polski, nic czynić bez Seymu nie powinien, 
tylko z wolą Seymu, Naród y Wolą Yego reprezentującego”. Głos JKr. Mci na Sessyi Seymowey 
dnia 22 września 1791 r. miany, AGAD, AKP, sygn. 207, k. 1267 (649). 
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posed to issue a proclamation, describing the calamities that result from an  inter-
regnum . Lastly, member  Suchodolski took the fl oor, presenting Hungary, Czech, 
Denmark and Sweden as examples of misery brought about by hereditary thrones. 
Finally,  Suchodolski emphasized that since the objectives of the adopted  Rules 
 (Zasady) referred “ to an improvement of the form of government ,” that meant that 
they were about improvement, not about creating a new system. To conclude, while 
the king was still alive, one should not think about his successor. 164 His supporters 
included member  Rzyszczewski , who claimed that the proclamation would suggest 
the Saxon dynasty to the Polish throne, whereas the  Elector had no son, only a 
daughter, which would cause further problems. He also explicitly said that “ during 
 interregnums , the lesser  nobility  has always sought to increase their freedoms and 
expand the boundaries of their privileges, but when  Succession  is introduced, this 
will be unthinkable and these privileges will be more and more suppressed .” (“ w 
czasie bezkrólewiów zawsze przyczyniała sonie wolności Szlachta, i tego Przywileju 
rozszerzała granice, a gdy stanie Sukcessya już o rozszerzeniu onych myśleć nie 
będzie wolno, kiedy coraz to bardziey ścieśniane będą ”). In response, a member 
from Podolia,  Morski , presented some predictable arguments, and the bishop from 
Livonia,  Kossakowski , concluded that “ the Nation’s liberty rests upon the free elec-
tion of the  king ” (“ wolność Narodu zasadza się na wolney Tronu Elekcyi ”), that this 
freedom should not be overthrown during the confederated Parliament, and the dis-
cussion on the superiority of election over succession should be left to historians. 
He also called upon the 1607 law, folio 1596, which states: “ He, who dares to sug-
gest succession to the  throne  shall be tried in court pro hoste Patria & perduelli .” 
(“ ten pro hoste Patria & perduelli będzie sądzony, ktoby się odważył proponować 
Sukcessyą Tronu ”). 165 
 In the debate on the day when the  Constitution was adopted, the monarch could 
not explicitly say that the bill was written under his guidance, and that he had a 
direct infl uence on its fi nal shape consulted with the Potockis’ reforming wing 
through the secretary Scipione  Piattoli . 166 The King emphasized, having been some-
what distanced from it: “ the draft has been born out of this what was shown to me, 
and what is in accord with the will of many parliamentarians ”. 167 This distance is 
164  Dziennik Czynności Seymu Głównego Ordynaryinego Warszawskiego, pod związkiem 
Konfederacyi Oboyga Narodów agituiącego się 1790, Sessya CCCXIII, Dnia 16. Września, we 
Czwartek. 
165  Dziennik Czynności Seymu Głównego Ordynaryinego Warszawskiego, pod związkiem 
Konfederacyi Oboyga Narodów agituiącego się 1790, Sessya CCCXIV, Dnia 17. Września, w 
Piątek. 
166  This is unfortunately not the place to discuss the process of creating the fi nal text of the 
Constitution and mutual chases between the King and Ignacy Potocki. Comp. Dihm Jan. 1930: 
Przygotowanie Konstytucji 3-go Maja ważnym etapem w urzeczywistnieniu idei niepodległości, 
Pamiętnik V Powszechnego Zjazdu Historyków Polskich w Warszawie 28 listopada do 4 grudnia 
1930 r. T. I Referaty, Tyszkowski Kazimierz (ed.), Lwów: nakładem Polskiego Towarzystwa 
Historycznego, p. 386–398. 
167  “urodził się z tego projekt, który Mi był pokazany, a który iuż iest zgodny z Wolą wielu 
Seymuiących”. Głos JKr. Mości na Sessyi Seymowey Dnia 3go Maja 1791. Roku miany z okazji 
proiektowaney nowey Formy Rządu, AGAD, APK, sygn. 207, k. 1209 (620). 
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further expressed, just in case, in the following words which undoubtedly referred 
to the succession: “ in the same bill, I found such things, or else one point, which I 
am myself reluctant to touch and rather should not following the Will of the  Nation , 
therefore, I declare that I had doubts in this one point ”. 168 After the bill had been 
read, Stanisław August  Poniatowski requested to be released from the relevant pro-
hibition in  pacta  conventa . The  pacta were read and the discussion continued. In its 
course, the reform camp members spoke out, arguing for the  succession and trying 
to palliate the expressed theatrically, yet justifi ed worries of the king. The speeches 
were, in fact, directed not to Poniatowski but to the hetman’s conservative camp. 169 
The representative of the latter, member  Chomiński from Oszmiana, argued that 
such a large group of antagonists of the  Constitution means that the nation does not 
free the king from the oath at  pacta  conventa . 170 This issue, as mentioned, was fur-
ther developed in political journalism on the 3rd of May. 
 Let us also not forget about another political scene, where an equally emotional 
 discussion on the election was under way. During the meetings of  Dietines of 
November 1790, where, at the request of the King, expressed in the manifesto of the 
Parliament Marshals, the election proposals related to the  Elector of Saxony as an 
heir to the throne in the  Vivente rege procedure with the king still living were 
decided. 55 regional Dietines accepted the nomination suggested, while 36 of them 
were in favour of maintaining the elective  monarchy , and only nine – allowed for 
hereditary  monarchy . 171 
 Later voices in the debate generally accept changes made in the constitution. 
Characteristic is the voice of Tadeusz Kościałkowski, member of Wiłkomierz, raised 
in September 1791: “ King, it was a futile word, and not a thing important and holy, 
several Kings shared the executive authority among themselves, and the Nobility 
was not more free and raised against the Ruler, not that it hated him, but since that 
was a need of the mightier  nobility , the mightier argued with the Throne until they 
achieved what they demanded .” 172 
168  “w tym samym proiekcie znalazłem rzeczy takie, czyli punkt ieden, którego Ja Sam przez się 
tykać się niechcę, y nie powinienem chyba za Wolą Narodu, dlatego oświadczam, iż w tym iednym 
punkcie zastanowiłem się.” Ibidem, k. [chart] 1210. 
169  NN [Siarczyński], Dzień Trzeci Maja…, as example voice of deputy Zakrzewski, p. 74. 
170  Ibidem, p. 147–148. 
171  Łukowski Jerzy. 2010. Szlachta i monarchia: refl eksje nad zmaganiami inter majestatem ac 
libertatem. In:  Rozkwit i upadek I Rzeczypospolitej , Butterwick Richard (ed.), Warszawa: Bellona, 
p. 167. 
172  “Król, było to czcze słowo, a nie rzecz ważna i święta, kilkunastu Królików dzieliło władzę Jego 
wykonawczą po między siebie, Szlachta z tym wszystkim nie była wolnieyszą, powstawała na 
swego prawego Rządzcę, nie iżby go nienawidziała, lecz, że tak było potrzeba możnieyszym, a 
możnieysi póty się z Tronem kłócili, póki tego, czego żądali, nieosiągnęli.”. Głos Jaśnie 
Wielmożnego Imci Pana Tadeusza z Zyndramów Kościałkowskiego, starosty czotyrskiego, posła 
Wiłkomirskiego, Orderu Ś. Stanisława Kawalera, Na Sessyi Seymowey dnia 20 Miesiąca Września, 
1791. Roku Miany, AGAD, ASCz, sygn. 22, k. [chart] 55v. 
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4.3.4  The Monarch in the Constitutional Acts 
 “Rules for improvement of the form of  government ” ( Zasady do poprawy formy 
rządu ) from December 1789 almost ignored the issues of the legal status of the 
King. Defi ning, above all, the powers of the  nobility , the stipulated principles dic-
tated the election of the  King of the Roman Catholic  religion . The Rules entrusted 
to him “ the highest, uniform and general supervision ”(„ naywyższy, iednostayny i 
ogólny dozór ”), and exercising of rights. The King and his guard was to serve as 
“ the primary government protection ” (art. 6to). 173 
 Also “ Inviolable cardinal  laws ” from September 1790, fi nally published in 
January 1791 dictated that the King was  Catholic by birth “or vocation”. The King 
“freely  chosen ” remains the prerogative of the “Republic” in a state of  nobility . The 
King was also required to preserve the rule “ neminem captivabimus nisi iure 
victum ”. 174 No compromise was reached on the manner of succession to the  throne 
(the original version of the rights provided for the election of the Dynasty); due to 
parliamentary  disputes and the inability to reach a compromise, it was decided to 
move this dilemma to be taken care of at the level of local assemblies. They were 
also to decide whether to present to the Elector of Saxony, Frederick  Augustus 
Wettin, the proposal to take over the Polish throne after the death of King Stanisław 
 August . 175 
 Wider regulations were brought about as late as with the Government Act 
(Ustawa Rządowa). The King was devoted only to Article VII of the Constitution of 
the 3rd of  May (“ The King, the executive power ”). He was entrusted – however “ in 
the council ,” i.e. the Guardian of Rights – the highest executive authority, which 
should limit itself to “ the observation of the laws and carrying them out ” and should 
be active wherever the law permits and even requires enforcement. “ The executive 
power will not be able to enact or interpret laws ” (“ Władza wykonawcza nie będzie 
mogła praw stanowić ani tłumaczyć ”), impose taxes, raise public debts, alter the 
budget, enact war, peace and other treaties, but merely lead temporary 
negotiations. 
 The throne was henceforth to be  elective in dynasties. This decision was dictated 
by “ the experienced disasters of  interregnum ”, thus protecting the fate of each of the 
residents, shutting down the infl uence of foreign powers and their ambitions to the 
throne, calling the “ unanimous cultivation of national liberty .” The issue of inheri-
tance of the throne, as mentioned, was settled in favour of the Elector of  Saxony , 
followed by his daughter and son-in law; signifi cantly, the diplomatic activity in 
order to consult the person concerned was carried out very inconsistently. 
 The person of the King was to be “ holy and safe from everything .” “ Doing noth-
ing by himself, cannot respond to the nation in relation to any matter” . The King 
“ shall not be an autocrat, but the father and head of the nation, and as such he is 
173  Zasady do poprawy formy rządu , Volumina Legum, t. IX, p. 157–159. 
174  Prawa kardynalne niewzruszone , Volumina Legum, t. IX, p. 202–203. 
175  Zielińska Zofi a. 1991.  “O sukcesyi …”, p. 137–221. 
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recognized and declared by the law and this constitution ”. 176 Legal acts and judg-
ments should be issued in the name of the King, he was entitled to the right of par-
don, to supremacy over the army, appointment of ministers, offi cials, senators and 
bishops. 177 Ministers, Guard members participated in such powers of the King as 
convening of the Parliament, exercising of the prerogative of pardon and the right 
of legislative initiative, but the opinion of the King fi nally prevailed. Hence, it was 
being spoken of a creation of “ something like the King’s institution within the 
Guard ”, whereas Bogusław Leśnodorski even considered a possible analogy with 
the presidential system of the  United States of America . 178 Royal acts required min-
isterial countersigning and if any minister refused and the King insisted on a deci-
sion, the Parliament was expected to be an instance of conciliation. 
5  Summary 
 The Stanisław Poniatowski era of reform was to constitute merely the beginning of 
a revolution, announcing a deeper planned social and economic transformation. It 
was a “ gentle revolution ” held without a profound deconstruction of the status quo. 
Even its opponents were aware that the projects were not overly progressive, though 
this was not an obstacle for them to invoke the bloody example of France as a pre-
caution to the public. Stanisław Szczęsny  Potocki realistically and prophetically 
evaluated the plans of the King already post factum, in 1792, “ and as for the French 
[way, reform] , I have no doubt that the King is not interested in disseminating it, but 
there is a middle way which they want to keep it seems, however in this middle way 
neither security, nor an end can be found ”. 179 The King naturally distanced himself 
from the events of the French  Revolution . The correspondence of the monarch with 
176  “Nic sam przez siebie nie czyniący, za nic w odpowiedzi narodowi być nie może. Nie 
samowładcą, ale ojcem i głową narodu być powinien i tym go prawo i konstytucja niniejsza być 
uznaje i deklaruje”. Volumina Legum, t. IX, p. 222–223. 
177  Council composed of: primate, the Minister of Police, the Seals, War, Treasury and Foreign 
Affairs. The right to participate in meetings without voting rights also have adult heirs to the throne 
and the Marshal of parliament. 
178  Leśnodorski Bogusław. 1951.  Dzieło Sejmu Czteroletniego (1788–1792). Studium historyczno-
prawne , Wrocław: Wydaw. Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich, p. 309, 319 (certain analogy 
saw a researcher indicated e.g. in the institution’s message to the nation rendering in parliament). 
Similarity, however, it belies the fact that the introduction of countersignature and lack of proper 
royal prerogatives (except for acts of supreme command during the war). There are studies show-
ing that changes in the form of work within the Guards came almost at the last moment – in the 
draft submitted to the King by Piattoli on April 29, after the comment of Stanisław Kostka Potocki 
was ultimately ruled that the Guard did not vote, and that the king takes the decision. However, 
they were effective only after the countersignature.Comp. Rostworowski Emanuel. 1966 . Ostatni 
król, Geneza i upadek Konstytucji 3 Maja , Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna, p. 214–216, 224–225, 
228–230. 
179  “co zaś do francuszczyzny, nie wątpię, że króla nie iest interesem rozszerzać Ich naukę, lecz iest 
śrzednia droga, którey się chcą trzymać iak się zdaie, lecz w tey śrzedniey drodze ani 
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Feliks Oraczewski, an envoy in Paris, perpetuated a negative image of the revolution 
in the King’s perspective. 180 
 It can be assumed that, contrary to numerous antagonists, it would not have come 
to a strong consolidation of royal power at the expense of the noble parliamentary 
representation. It is diffi cult to imagine that in a country with entrenched “republi-
can” tradition the pursuit of monarchical absolutism could be accepted. This 
occurred on the Polish soil only with partitioners, neighbouring powers. The idea of 
a “middle way” – reformatory rather than revolutionary, also remained on the 
municipal agenda. 
 An important element of the “ republican monarchy ” was the key position of the 
Parliament. In none of the feudal countries did the Parliament “ play such a polymor-
phous role as in Poland, nor was it as strongly associated with the history of the 
nation and the state or had such a great impact on the history. It [the Parliament] 
 called itself the guardian of the rights of the Republic and its nobility. Its authority 
was derived from the nature of freedom and the sovereignty of their representatives, 
which allowed it to think of itself as being synonymous with the Republic and with 
freedom itself ”. 181 
 The analysed sources show that modern Western political doctrines were well- 
known to protagonists of the era of the Great  Parliament . At the same time, how-
ever, they were subject to a specifi c reinterpretation, and to some extent also served 
as a tool of petrifi cation of the existing system. As Bogusław Leśnodorski rightly 
pointed out, “ natural law”, “sovereignty of the nation”, “separation of powers” – 
all these terms had a specifi c meaning for us (…). After all, they are not concepts 
and related phenomena that can be considered “beyond time” and beyond a given 
place. These are historical categories, with an undoubtedly variable content” 182 . 
 At the same time a certain myth-making role of the political thought of the First 
Republic should be noted. During the partitions “ noble traditions gradually became 
general national traditions and the old Sarmatians were found synonymous with 
Poles. The traditional Polish idea of the “noble nation ” , and thus the idea of defend-
ing the noble freedom transformed into the principle of defence of national 
 independence ”. 183 Joachim  Lelewel would announce soon that the principle of the 
noble nation’s sovereignty was an embryonic form of the principle of the people’s 
 sovereignty . At the same time, however, according to the later theses of numerous 
bezpieczeństwa, ani końca nie znajdzie”. Copy of letter: JW. Marszałek Konfederacyi Generalney 
Koronney do JW. Pana Marszałka W.K. de 12 Xbris 1792, AGAD, AKP, pudło (box) 90, k. 694. 
180  Kocój Henryk. 1988. Misja Feliksa Oraczewskiego w Paryżu podczas Sejmu Wielkiego w 
świetle jego korespondencji ze Stanisławem Augustem Poniatowskim i Joachimem 
Chreptiowiczem. In: W dwusetną rocznicę wolnego Sejmu: ludzie – państwo – prawo czasów 
Sejmu Czteroletniego, Lityński Adam (ed.), Katowice: Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Śląskiego w 
Katowicach, p. 15–40. 
181  Olszewski Henryk. 1983. Funkcjonowanie sejmu w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej.  Czasopismo 
Prawno-Historyczne , T. XXXV (1), p. 162. 
182  Leśnodorski Bogusław. 1951.  Dzieło… , p. 411. 
183  Olszewski Henryk. 2001. Doktryna złotej wolności i spory o jej spuściznę.  Państwo i Prawo , 60 
(2), p. 6. 
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political scientists, the freedom of the nobles contributed to the “misery” of liberal-
ism in the nineteenth-century Poland – in Andrzej Walicki’s opinion it was even an 
anti-individualistic phenomenon, with the doctrine and practice of such freedom 
constituting “ more of a participation in the collective sovereignty than protection of 
individual rights ”. 184 
 Finally, it is worth giving the fl oor to the author of the Catechism who underlined 
the fact that in Poland misfortunes rarely came from the nature – no earthquakes nor 
famine are known and the plagues are rare. Poland has its own misfortunes, “ sepa-
rate from other nations ” – these are the  Interregnum , Confederations, elections, the 
corruption in the elections, amnesties, and “ by these arrangements of its Government, 
the Republic shall be so tortured and weakened”, that it is enough to stand for  “all 
the effects of a disastrous war .” 185 These were extremely prophetic words as soon 
afterwards Poland lost its sovereignty for over 100 years and the Constitution of the 
3rd of May, as well as further plans of the Great  Parliament ’s deputies remained 
only a paper reform. One can only consider whether it could follow the same path 
as Britain, moving into the modern era of the rule of law without episodes of abso-
lutist regime. 
6  Summary (Polish) 
 W poszukiwaniu wątków suwerenności w debacie epoki Sejmu Wielkiego (1788–
1792) poddano analizie kilka wybranych kategorii źródeł, które wyselekcjonowane 
zostały w założeniach poświęconego problemowi formowania się nowoczesnych 
konstytucji projektu badawczego ReConFort, którego ustaleń pierwszą odsłonę 
stanowi niniejsze studium. W zakresie obowiązujących źródeł prawa w przypadku 
polskim skupiono się na regulacjach Zasad do Formy Rządu, Prawach kardynal-
nych opublikowanych w styczniu 1791, Ustawie Rządowej oraz składających się 
obok niej na system Trzeciego Maja prawach o miastach (z kwietnia 1791) i o 
sejmikach (z marca 1791). Prześledzono także w ograniczonym jednak zakresie 
debatę parlamentarną, utrwaloną na łamach diariuszy sejmowych i dziennika 
czynności sejmu, jak również w postaci opublikowanych “mów”, “przymówień”, 
“głosów”. Spośród źródeł o mniej czy wcale niejurydycznym charakterze badani-
ami objęto szeroko rozumiane media, przy czym polski przypadek oczywiście 
cechuje mniejsza obecność w dyskursie publicznym czasopism politycznych (w 
istocie rzeczy na to miano zasłużyć w pełni mógłby tylko Pamiętnik Polityczny y 
Historyczny Piotra Świtkowskiego), przy niebywale obfi tej obecności wolnych 
druków, pamfl etów, tworzących nieraz intelektualną dyskusję w przestrzeni public-
znej (przeróżne odpowiedzi, przymówienia kierowane do konkretnych prac). 
184  Ibidem, p. 9. 
185  nieszczęścia “oddzielne od innych Narodów”, są nimi Bezkrólewia, Konfederacje, Elekcje, 
poparcie elekcji, amnestie, “temi układami swojego Rządu tak się zmorduie i osłabi Rzeczpospolita”, 
że jej to wystarczy za “wszystkie skutki szkodliwej woyny”. Katechizm o tajemnicach…, p. 22–23. 
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Ograniczoną kwerendą objęto także źródła archiwalne w zakresie notatek i prywat-
nej korespondencji głównych protagonistów politycznych procesów (jak dotychc-
zas Ignacego Potockiego, Kołłątaja, wybrane zespoły zachowanych akt dotyczących 
Stanisława Augusta). Otrzymane dotychczas wyniki trudno uznać za 
satysfakcjonujące i bez wątpienia ta kategoria źródeł wymaga bardziej pogłębionej 
analizy. 
 Kategoryzacja źródeł znalazła swe odzwierciedlenie w strukturze niniejszego 
opracowania. Zdecydowano się na wyróżnienie kilku płaszczyzn analizy. Po 
uwagach wstępnych zaprezentowano ustalenia w zakresie ogólnie pojmowanej teo-
rii suwerenności w badanej dyskusji. Na uwagę zwraca fakt utożsamiania 
suwerenności z niezależnością wobec sąsiednich potęg oraz bezpieczeństwem 
wewnętrznym, co naturalnie jest pokłosiem działania państwa w nadzwyczajnych 
warunkach – w czasach po I rozbiorze Polskie, w okresie próby uwolnienia spod 
protektoratu Rosji w przejściowej, korzystnej sytuacji geopolitycznej. Podkreślono 
tu także długą polską tradycję “suwerenności prawa”. 
 Kolejna obszerna część pracy poświęcona została pojęciu narodu i jego interpre-
tacji w debacie. Piśmiennictwo temu poświęcone wyraźnie pozostaje pod wpływem 
innowacyjnych idei z zachodu i nie kwestionuje faktu, że “naród” jest suwerenem. 
Wykonywanie suwerennej władzy powierzono posłom skupionym w sejmie (tego 
przymiotu nie przypisywano wprost członkom senatu pochodzącym z mianowania, 
oczywiście zmiana nastąpiłaby, gdyby weszły w życie demokratyzujące nieco tę 
kwestię procedury wyboru senatorów, dokonywanego przez następców Stanisława 
Augusta spośród dwóch kandydatów). Nie można zapominać, że poważnie rozu-
miano węzeł między posłem a lokalną społecznością – poseł związany był formal-
nie instrukcjami, składał relacje z ustaleń sejmowych na sejmikach i to one 
ostatecznie zamknęły proces uchwalania konstytucji – sejmiki zebrane jesienią 
1792 r. jako wyraz “woli narodu” w ogromnej przewadze dokonały zaprzysiężeń 
lub laudacji konstytucji. Niekwestionowalne pozostaje zarazem ograniczenie 
narodu politycznego wyłącznie do szlachty, choć na uwadze trzeba też mieć fakt jej 
znaczącego procentowego udziału w ogóle społeczeństwa (ok. 8 %), co dawało 
prawa wyborcze rzeszy wyborców liczniejszej niż niejedna z dziewiętnastowiecznych 
konstytucji opartych na kryterium majątkowym. Debata publiczna nad poszerze-
niem prawa reprezentacji obejmującym warstwę mieszczańską przyniosła ogranic-
zone rezultaty. Posłowie znacznie ostrożniej niż publicyści podchodzili do kwestii, 
dopatrując się w działaniach ruchu mieszczańskiego i wydarzeniach “czarnej pro-
cesji” swoistego szantażu, grożenia rewolucją społeczną i “Francuszczyzną”. 
Uchwalone ostatecznie prawo o miastach obowiązywało tylko w wolnych miastach 
królewskich, tj. nieco ponad 30 %, i upoważniało zaledwie do wyboru i kierowania 
do parlamentu plenipotentów z głosem doradczym w sprawach miejskich. Kwestia 
chłopska pojawiała się z rzadka w piśmiennictwie publicystycznym – jeszcze rza-
dziej w obradach sejmu. 
 Opracowanie zamyka część poświęcona monarsze. Choć polski porządek polity-
czny nie uprawnia do stawiania tezy o suwerennej władzy króla, mimo formuły 
uchwalenia konstytucji z woli królewskiej, to jednak nader istotne jest uzupełnienie 
obrazu o zagadnienie budzące ogromne emocje polityczne. Mowa o dyskusji nad 
A. Tarnowska
261
następstwem tronu, w której obóz postępowy podważył kluczową zasadę wolności 
szlacheckiej, tj. elekcję króla. Przywołując w szczególności takie argumenty, jak 
anarchia bezkrólewi, próby obsadzenia zagranicznych książąt w drodze prze-
kupstwa szlachty, protagoniści doprowadzili do utrwalenia kwestii w obszarze pub-
licystyki. Są to problemy znakomicie już w literaturze przedmiotu opracowane, stąd 
celem autorki jest jedynie podkreślenie obecności tych zagadnień w szerzej poj-
mowanej dyskusji nad suwerennością. W debacie parlamentarnej nie odważono się 
w zasadzie na podniesienie tej kontrowersyjnej kwestii, samo zaś przyjęcie w 
Ustawie Rządowej regulacji elekcji dynastii, czyli w istocie sukcesji tronu, stanowiło 
w oczach “republikantów” jej grzech śmiertelny. 
 Przedłożone opracowanie stanowi wynik wstępnej części badań prowadzonych 
w ramach projektu ReConFort. Dalsza analiza koncentrować się będzie zagadnien-
iach zasady prymatu konstytucji oraz odpowiedzialności ministerialnej i urzędniczej 
jako przedmiotów dyskusji w przestrzeni publicznej. 
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 English translation by Max Bärnreuther and Ulrike Müßig based on the German 
translation of Dr. Inge Bily 1 
 Our Free Royal Cities 2 in the States of the Rzeczpospolita 3 
of April 18, 1791 
 Article I 
 On the Cities 
  1.  All Royal Cities in the states of the Rzeczpospolita are acknowledged as free 
[cities] 4 by us. 
  2.  We acknowledge the inhabitants of these cities as free men. Furthermore, we 
acknowledge their land property in the cities in which they live, their houses, 
villages and  territoria 5 which currently legally belong to these cities. All this is 
acknowledged by us as hereditary property of the inhabitants of these cities. 
1  I cordially thank Prof. Dr. Danuta Janicka (Toruń/Thorn) and Prof. Dr. Zygfryd Rymaszwski 
(Łódź) for the critical perusal of the translation and the deliberation concerning the question of the 
Polish and German historical legal terminology. 
2 Annotation of the translator: in a legal sense, these free royal cities are not comparable 
to the German “Freie Städte“ or “Königsstädte“. Rather, the free royal cities are cities within 
the state. From now on, they had new rights by means of which they were able to – amongst other 
things – free themselves of the feudal corset. What was understood by “free“ is explained in Article 
I, 2. 
3  Foundation of this translation is the edition of J. Kawecki, “ Miasta nasze królewskie wolne w 
Rzeczypospolitej “, in: “ Konstytucja 3 maja 1791 “ PWN, Warszawa 2014, p. 125–136. 
4 Annotations of the translator are put into parentheses []. 
5  In the sense of  land property ,  land belongings . 
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Currently ongoing and not yet terminated [legal] matters are not concerned 
hereby. 
  3.  Those cities that have lost location privileges are issued  diplomata renovationis 6 
as the undoubtable proof of the [earlier] ownership of these privileges together 
with the transferal of the land that these cities currently own. 
  4.  Those Royal Cities in which the Assemblies [Polish  sejmiki ziemskie ] take 
place are issued respective location privileges by the King even if these cities 
have not yet owned the like. 
  5.  If a thorough city develops on royal land and territory out of a convenient 
 settlement, then we, the King, issue a  diploma erectionis 7 to this new city 
together with the dedication of the land and territory. 
  6.  The landlords also were allowed to found cities with free people on their ground 
and territory and to free farmers as well as to transform their hereditary cities 
into local cities. The like settlements were not to be deemed free cities but for 
the case that the landlord had transferred hereditary land to them during the 
location. Then we, the King, will grant these cities the  diploma confi rmationis 8 
and ordain to have the location of the landlord registered if we are being asked 
to do so. 
  7.  As the law is one for all cities, the citizens of any city as of now enjoy the same 
privileges. 
  8.  All state citizens, be they of noble or citizen decent, who wish to do commerce 
with pounds, lengths etc. and who already own or are about to acquire land in 
the city are obliged to acknowledge the town law and to subject themselves 
irrespective of what offi ce, job or art they are undertaking. And the other noble-
men are allowed to acknowledge the town law. 
  9.  The assumption of the town law will take place as follows: everybody who 
accepts the town law, 9 who personally or represented by an empowered indi-
vidual [Polish  plenipotent ] appears before the magistrate and who delivers the 
following: “I, NN, pledge allegiance to the greatest King and the Rzeczpospolita. 
I commit myself to the rights and law of the Sejm as the highest duty to be 
obeyed. I subject myself to the nobility of the city N in which I belong to the 
citizen class. And I will fulfi l my duties. I commit myself as my descendants” 
shall, as the declaring party – after such a declaration – be entered into the town 
register. 
 10.  The cities shall offer the admission to the class of citizens and the registration 
in the town book to all sober foreigners, craftsmen, all free men and Christians, 
that are not subject to any person by virtue of the law and they shall do so with-
out asking for any consideration. 
 11.  All noblemen as well as the members of the citizen class that have later been 
admitted to the nobility as well as their descendants shall from now on no lon-
6  Documents that renew the privilege. 
7  Founding document. 
8  Diploma of confi rmation. 
9 Annotation of the translator: in the originial, only referred to as  miejskie ‘city-’. 
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ger be exposed to any disadvantage resulting from the admission to the citizen 
class, the participation in it, the holding of offi ce, the exercise of any kind of 
trade and craftsmenship in relation to their noble class and the rights and privi-
leges associated herewith. 
 12.  The election of an own magistrate, more precisely, of a mayor, by bailiffs as 
well as all offi cials by the citizens of the town is a symbol of liberty and this 
liberty will remain vested in the cities. The cities may furthermore ordain 
decrees and survey their enforcement. The Police Commission 10 is to be 
informed in the form of a report. 
 13.  All inhabitants of the cities that are registered in the town book and that own 
hereditary land may vote and be elected by a majority of the votes cast which 
applies to all town offi ces that there are. However, nobody may combine the 
executory offi ce 11 and the noble offi ce with the offi ce and the function of the 
town representative [Polish  plenipotent miejski ]. 12 The latter would lead to the 
invalidity of both functions. Moreover, nobody may have a military rank in the 
active service while being a town offi cial. 
 Article II 
 On the Rights of the Town Citizens 
  1.  The fundamental right  neminem captivabimus – nisi iure victum 13 applies to 
everybody who lives in the cities. Only thievish bankrupts as well as those who 
have not left a suffi cient bail amount at court and those having been seized 
when committing the offence are excepted herefrom. 
  2.  The towns in which appellate courts have been set up elect a representative 
[Polish  plenipotent ] before the Ordinary Sejm [Polish  sejm ordynaryjny ] with a 
majority of the votes of the citizens who own land in the city, who fulfi l the 
criteria enabling them to hold offi ce, who are  crimine non notatos, 14 who have 
not yet been involved in a trial and who have already held offi ce. The cities are 
at liberty to elect such a representative [Polish  plenipotent ]. These representa-
tives [Polish  plenipotenti ] have to act in the respective city in which the 
10 Annotation of the translator: Police Commission = formerly the Polish Ministry for Interior 
Affairs. 
11 Annotation of the translator: the offi ce of execution = an offi ce that focuses on the compulsory 
execution in the fi eld of aristocratic jurisdiction. 
12 Annotation of the translator: Polish  plenipotent miejski was a representative of a city for the 
Parliament ( Sejm ). His title ( plenipotent ) referred to his incomplete position in comparison to the 
noble representative. In the Sejm, there were 204 noble representatives and 24 representatives of 
the cities [Polish  plenipotenti ]. We will use the English term of empowered representatives for the 
Polish  plenipotent . 
13  We will keep nobody imprisoned who has not been legally condemned. 
14  Respectable. 
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 Sejm- Marshal will hand over the confi rmation of the election at the day of the 
opening of the Sejm. The representatives [Polish  plenipotenti ] of the cities for 
the Police and Finance Commission as well as the assessor college are elected 
at the assemblies of the provinces. Furthermore, it is provided who shall belong 
to which commission and which assessorium. Everybody can have a seat in the 
named commissions and assessoria, however, not more than two representa-
tives from each province in the fi nancial and police commission and not more 
than three in the assessorium. These commissioners and assessors shall have 
 vocem activam 15 in the commissions and the assessors’ court [actually asses-
soria (plural) 16 ] in the matters that concern the cities and the commerce and 
 vocem consultativam 17 in all other matters. If one or all of these empowered 
representatives [Polish  plenipotenti ] of the cities that derive the right to elect 
from empowered representatives are confi rmed in their offi ce again, then they 
may hold offi ce for two further years. For these commissioners and assessors, 
we will fi x a salary when setting up the table of expenditure but only for the 
fi xed number of those empowered representatives [Polish  plenipotenti ] that 
have the right to participate in the commissions and the assessorium [Polish 
 plenipotenti ]. 
  3.  In order to ensure that the safeguarding of the government and the necessary 
justice accrued to all cities and their claims, we allow our cities to bring forth 
 desideria 18 of the cities in the Sejm by means of the assessors or citizen com-
missioners in the assessors‘court [actually assessoria (plural) 19 ] as well as by 
means of the representatives in the fi nance and police commissions. And these 
[assessors and commissioners] are to address – if this is necessary and to their 
liking – the Sejm-Marshall and ask for an audience which may not be denied. 
And they shall express themselves in a manner as it is usual for the delegates 
from the commissions when giving a speech. 
  4.  After two years of public service in the offi ces of the named commissions or the 
assessors‘ court [actually assessoria (plural) 20 ] the representatives that are 
elected by the cities are to be made noblemen at the Sejm without having to pay 
the  nobilitatis- fee provided they are not yet noblemen. 
  5.  From now on, every citizen will be allowed to acquire to own and to pass on by 
hereditary law all noble goods as well as other goods to their descendants as the 
legitimate heir and to own goods by means of inheritance or  iure potioritatis. 21 
They are to refer to these goods before the Regional Court even if they are 
citizens. 
15 An active and decisive voice. 
16  In the Polish text, the plural is found at this place, despite the fact that there is only  one Royal 
Assessorial Court. 
17 A consultative vote. 
18  Postulates, claims. 
19  Compare annotation 15. 
20  Compare annotation 15. 
21  Pre-emptive right. 
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  6.  Every citizen who acquires an entire village or city in accordance to hereditary 
law and who pays 200 Złoty of the tenth  Groschen as taxes will be made a 
nobleman at the  Sejm provided he has asked for the same in a written form that 
has been given to the Sejm-Marshall and forwarded to the estates. 
  7.  Furthermore, 30 people at the  Sejm coming from the citizens that had heredi-
tary land in the cities were to be made noblemen. The following merits were to 
be especially acknowledged: accomplishments in the military, the participation 
in civil-military commissions, new foundations in the fi eld of craftsmanship as 
well as the commerce with regional agricultural products. This was to take 
place on the basis of the recommendations of the land messengers as well as the 
cities. 
  8.  In the entire armed forces (except the national cavalry), in each corps, regiment 
and pulk there is from now on free citizen access to the offi cer ranks. And if 
somebody has reached the rank of a fi eld or banner captain in the infantry or of 
a cavalry captain in a group, he and his descendants will be made noblemen 
with all privileges associated herewith. And we, the King, will issue the  diplo-
mata nobilitatis 22 and free from the stamp tax if the respective certifi cate is 
presented. 
  9.  The members of the citizen class are from now onwards allowed to participate 
in the work of the chambers and palaces of all governmental commissions, in 
the tribunal offi ces and other smaller courts. They are further allowed to act as 
defense lawyers as well as to undertake other kinds of services and to ascend in 
the respective chamber in accordance with their merits and gifts. And if some-
body has reached the level of the board of the chamber in the governmental 
dicasteries, 23 he shall be made a nobleman at the fi rst Sejm to follow and we, 
the King, will issue a  diploma nobilitatis 24 without the obligation of having to 
pay a fee. 
 10.  In the class of the clergy, members of the citizen class may acquire the position 
of the prelate and the capitular at the abbey churches or the position of the 
capitular at the cathedral – provided they fulfi l the further requirement of hav-
ing a doctoral title in the latter case – furthermore all  benefi cia saecularia et 
regularia 25 with the exception of the foundations explicitly reserved for the 
nobility. 
 11.  In the civil-military ordering commission of the voivodeships, the countries and 
counties may elect – from the cities that are found in the territory of the com-
mission – three commissioners into each commission. They may either be of 
noble birth or of citizen origin provided they possess hereditary land in their 
city. 
22  Certifi cate of ennoblement. 
23 Annotation of the translator: dicasteries in the sense of public authorities. 
24  Certifi cate of ennoblement. 
25  Benefi ces secular and religious. 
Appendix
270
 12.  If our cities 26 Gdańsk [Danzig (German)] and Toruń [Thorn (German)] have 
requests for the estates, then they will hand them in to the Marshal’s baton via 
the secretary or will directly deliver it via a delegate by virtue of the right to do 
so if they so please. 
 13.  The punishment for those that falsely inform about their possession is the fol-
lowing: who hands down a hereditary piece of land violating a respective 
reverse will lose it forever. And the court will attribute the property of such an 
object encumbered with such a reverse to the person who is capable of proving 
the reverse. If the person possessing the hereditary piece of land by virtue of a 
reverse is able to prove the encumbrance, he will be attributed the land forever. 
The Regional Court will decide on the like matters  praecisa appellatione. 27 
 14.  All earlier rights and statutes that contradict the current law on the cities are 
hereby removed. And the current provisions on the cities are hereby fi xed as 
constitutional rights. 
 Article III 
 On the Justice for the Citizens 
  1.  The cities are left to their own town jurisdiction within their territory. The cities 
with boards are also left to their own town jurisdiction and excepted from all 
other jurisdictions, namely the following: tribunal, country, voivodeship, sta-
rosta and castle courts. Excepted herefrom are the ongoing cases of the com-
missions that have already been allocated to the tribunals. The court of the 
Court Marshal that was only competent for the residence city and by virtue of 
26 Annotation of the translator: the geographic names (esp. town names) in the Polish text are par-
tially also names for the geographic objects beyond the territory of the contemporary Poland and 
are mostly left unaltered as of the Polish text. 
 In the translation, the geographic names of places or rivers in the contemporary Poland are put 
into parentheses [] as far as there are  exonyms and parentheses () are used to indicate the country 
whose langugage has been used, e.g.  Gdańsk [ Danzig (German)],  Kraków [ Krakau (German)], 
 Toruń [ Thorn (German)],  Warszawa [ Warschau (German)],  Warta [ Warthe (German)].  Exonyms 
are names that are used out of the territory in which the respective geographical object is located, 
e.g.  Krakau (German) for Polish  Kraków or  Warthe (German) for Polish  Warta . There are not 
German exonyms for all Polish geographic names. 
 As to geographic names for places that are located out of the territory of contemporary Poland, 
apart from the Polish form that is extracted from the Polish template, the respective  endonym will 
be put into parentheses [] and the addition of the respective linguistic reference as (Lithuanian), 
(Ukrainian) and (Belarussian) will be put into round parentheses (). An  endonym is the offi cial 
geographic name that is being used in the territory where the respective geographic object is nowa-
days located, e.g.  Vilnius (Lithuanian), compare Polish  Wilno or  Kyjiv (Ukrainian), compare Polish 
 Kijów or  Minsk (Belarussian), compare Polish  Mińsk . 
 This approach respects the current indigenous spelling of the names and allows for a localisa-
tion of the places on up-to-date maps. The principle proves especially valuable in regions in which 
the state-political affi liation changed in the course of history or where territory was renamed. 
27  With the abolition of the appellation. 
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the King is hereby deprived the competence for all other excessive 
jurisdiction. 
  2.  Wordly and clerical juridica 28 are hereby abolished. Small towns that have been 
set up on the property that has originally been attributed to the cities are dis-
solved in respect of their jurisdiction and police competence as they are now 
still in possession. Yes, we sign the juridica of the jurisdiction of the citizen 
magistrates. And we ban all actions as the income of any kind for the owners of 
this property. 
  3.  However, where the cities have hereditary (country) villages, they can address 
the competent jurisdiction in the villages concerned with the respective 
matters. 
  4.  All citizens who are the owners of land in the city or who conduct commerce or 
a craft are subjected to the citizen jurisdiction and are all obliged to pay the 
same taxes without the possibility of an exemption. 
  5.  In every city, the elected magistrate has the judicial power in disputed matters. 
In these magistrates, the litigations are decided in a  in prima instantia 29 matter. 
Legal matters that do not exceed the value of 300 Złoty and offences with a 
prison sentence of up to three days are to be decided by the magistrates without 
a certifi cation themselves. In greater legal matters, however, the appeal to 
higher appellate courts shall be allowed. 
  6.  For these Appellate Courts, we hereby defi ne the following cities and in the 
province of Małopolska [Kleinpolen (German)] the cities of Kraków [Krakau 
(German)], Lublin, Łuck [Luc’k (Ukrainian)], Żytomierz [Žytomyr 
(Ukrainian)], Winnica [Vinnyc’ja (Ukrainian)], Kamieniec Podolski 
[Kam’janec’-Podil’s’kyj (Ukrainian)], Drohiczyn [Drahičyn (Belarussian)], in 
the province of Wielkopolska [Großpolen (German)] the cities of Poznań 
[Posen (German)], Kalisz [Kalisch (German)], Gniezno [Gnesen (German)], 
Łęczyca [Lenczyca (German)], Warszawa [Warschau (German)], Sieradz 
[Schieratz (German)], Płock [Plock (German)], in the province of Lithuania the 
cities of Wilno [Vilnius (Lithuanian)], Grodno [Hrodna (Belarussian)], Kowno 
[Kaunas (Lithuanian), Kauen (German)], Nowogródek [Navahrudak 
(Belarussian)], Mińsk [Minsk (Belarussian)], Brześć Litewski [Brest-Litowsk 
(German)], Pińsk [Pinsk (Belarussian)]. The cities in the voivodeship Kraków 
[Krakau (German)] that are located in the county of Sandomierz [Sandomir 
(German)], Wiślica and Chęciny will belong to the appellate court that is 
located in Kraków [Krakau (German)]. The cities that are located in the 
voivodeship of Lublin as well as those of the country of Stężyca as well as those 
located in the counties of Radom, Opoczno and in the country of Chełm [Cholm 
28 Annotation of the translator: Polish  jurydyka , Pl.  jurydyki = settlement with a town like character 
that has been set up on the ground of or next to a royal city.  Jurydyki were usual in the  Rzeczpospolita 
of the sixteenth to eighteenth century. Such a settlement was noble or clerical property. There was 
no mandatory membership of a guild and there were no limitations for merchants. This is why the 
 jurydyki correspond to the interest of the magnates. 
29  In the fi rst instance. 
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(Ukrainian)] will belong to the appellate court of Lublin. To the appellate court 
of Łuck [Luc’k (Ukrainian)] will belong the cities that are located in the 
voivodeships of Wolhynien [Volyns’ka zemlja (Ukrainian)] and Bełz [Belz 
(Ukrainian)]. To the appellate court of Żytomierz [Žytomyr (Ukrainian)] will 
belong the cities located in the voivodeship of Kijów [Kyjiv (Ukrainian)]. To 
the appellate court located in Kamieniec Podolski [Kam”janec’-Podil’s’kyj 
(Ukrainian)] will belong the cities that are located in the voivodeship of 
Podolien [Podillja (Ukrainian)]. To the appellate court in Winnica [Vinnyc’ja 
(Ukrainian)] will belong the cities of the voivodeship of Bracław [Braclav 
(Ukrainian)]. To the appellate court located in Drohiczyn [Drahičyn 
(Belarussian)] shall belong the cities of the voivodeship of Podlachien. To the 
appellate court of Poznań [Posen (German)] will belong the cities of the 
voivodeship of Poznań [Posen (German)] and of the country of Wschowa 
[Frauenstadt (German)]. To the appellate court located in Kalisz [Kalisch 
(German)] will belong the cities of the voivodeship of Kalisz [Kalisch (German)] 
and of the county of Konin, as well as the cities of the county of Pyzdry [Peisern 
(German)] on this side of the Warta [Warthe (German)] are to be long to Kalisz 
[Kalisch (German)]. To the appellate court of Gniezno [Gnesen (German)] 
shall belong the cities of the voivodeship of Gniezno [Gnesen (German)], of the 
county of Kcynia [Exin (German)] as well as of the county of Pyzdry [Peisern 
(German)] the part which is located on the Gnesian [Gniezno: Gnesen 
(German)] side of the Warta [Warthe (German)]. To the appellate court of 
Sieradz shall belong the cities of the voivodeship of Sieradz and of the country 
of Wieluń. To the appellate court of Warszawa [Warschau (German)] shall 
belong the cities of the earldom of Masowia and of the voivodeship of Rawa. To 
the appellate court of Łęczyca shall belong the cities of the voivodeships of 
Łęczyca, Breść Kujawski [Brest (German)] and Inowrocław [Inowraclaw 
(German)]. To the appellate court of Płock [Plock (German)] shall belong the 
cities of the voivodeship of Płock [Plock (German)], of the country of Zawskrzyn 
and of the country of Dobrzyń. To the appellate courts of the cities in the 
Grandduchy of Lithuania shall belong: to the appellate court of Wilno [Vilnius 
(Lithuanian)] the cities of the voivodeship of Wilno [Vilnius (Lithuanian)], of 
the counties of Ašmjany (Belarussian), Lida (Belarussian) [Lityn (Ukrainian)], 
Wiłkomierz [Vilkmergé (Lithuania, today: Ukmergé (Lithuanian)], Brasław 
[Braslaŭ (Belarussian)], of the voivodeship of the county of Troki [Trakai 
(Lithuanian)]. To the appellate court of Grodno [Hrodna (Belarussian)] shall 
belong the cities of the county of Grodno [Hrodna (Belarussian)], Wołkowysk 
[Vaŭkavysk (Belarussian)] and Merecz [Merkinė (Lithuanian)]. To the appel-
late court of the city of Kowno [Kaunas (Lithuanian), Kauen (German)] shall 
belong the cities of the earldom of Żmudzkie [Żemaitija (Lithuanian), 
Samogitien (German)], of the counties of Kowno [Kaunas (Lithuanian), Kauen 
(German)], Preny [Prienai (Lithuanian)] and Upita [Upytė (Lithuanian)]. To the 
appellate court of the city of Nowogródek [Navahrudak (Belarussian)] shall 
belong the cities of the voivodeship of Nowogródek [Navahrudak (Belarussian)] 
and of the county of Słonim [Slonim (Belarussian)] and of the county of Słuč 
[River Sluč (Belarussian, Ukrainian)]. To the appellate court of Brześć Litewski 
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[Brest Litowsk (German)] shall belong the cities of the voivodeship of Brześć 
Litewski [Brest Litowsk (German)] and of the county of Kobryń [Kobryn 
(Belarussian)]. To the appellate court of the city of Pińsk [Pinsk (Belarussian)] 
shall belong the cities of the counties of Pińsk [Pinsk (Belarussian)], Pińsk 
zarzeczny [Pinsk-behind river area], Mozyrz [Mazyr (Belarussian)] and 
Rzeczyca [Rėčyca (Belarussian)]. To the appellate court of the city of Mińsk 
[Minsk (Belarussian)] shall be the cities of the voivodeships of Mińsk [Minsk 
(Belarussian)], Połock [Polock (Belarussian)], Witebsk [Vicebsk (Belarussian)] 
and of the county of Orsza [Orša (Belarussian)]. 
  7.  In these appellate cities, every two years, fi ve people are elected to the appelate 
courts from the nobility and the non-nobility, i.e. those citizens owning land 
property, as well as persons of the magistrats from these as well as other cities 
of this department 30 that have been specifi cally fi xed for these appellate courts. 
And these elected people are to form the Appellate Court. The condition is that 
those elected to the Appellate Court who are active in the magistrate or the lay-
men court – as long as they exercise the offi ce in the appellation – may not sit 
in the courts  primae instantiae 31 of the magistrates by whom they were elected 
and that they may also not adjudicate on these magistrates. 
  8.  These courts will adjudicate on the appeals lodged by the magistrate of a value 
of 3000 Złoty or a penalty of up to three weeks. These decisions are fi nal with-
out the possibility of further appeals. In all legal matters that exceed the value of 
3000 Złoty and a prison sentence of three weeks, the appeal of the magistrates 
 primae instantiae 32 to the appellate courts of the cities is no longer allowed but 
the appeal to the assessorial courts and to the relation court, both in the Kingdom 
of Poland 33 as well as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania according to the law. 
  9.  Criminal law matters may be decided by the magistrates but they may directly 
send them to the appellate courts who may also adjudicate on criminal matters. 
However, the attention had to be drawn to the fact that the criminal who has 
been condemned to a temporary prison sentence has to abide to its enforce-
ment. If, however, there is a condemnation to life imprisonment or to death, the 
appellate court will send the accusation elaborations as well as the verdict to the 
assessorial court. At the assessorial and relation courts, we leave the legal mat-
ters on the abuse of power to the town offi ces as well as on the income from 
citizen property and all other matters that are arranged for by the laws of the 
Rzeczpospolita. 
 10.  We hereby order that the cities, according to our order, are subjected to police 
commission 34 in matters of the interior order and the general town income. 
30 Annotation of the translator: Polish  wydział = department, it has been the second level of the citi-
zen self-administration since 1791. The Rzeczpospolita was divided into 24 departments, the fron-
tiers of the voivodeships not coinciding with the frontiers of the departments. 
31  First instance. 
32  First instance. 
33 Annotation of the translator: Kingdom of Poland: in Polish referred to as the Crown. 
34 Annotation of the translator: the Police Commission was set up in 1791 as an organ of supervi-
sion over the cities. 
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